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This article examines the evolution of UK military doctrine on counterintelligence (CI), one of the more consistently troubled aspects of military doctrine in general and intelligence doctrine in particular. We argue that current UK and NATO CI doctrine are in thrall to a deeply problematic defining concept in TESSOC (Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Organised Crime) that conflates an intractably diverse assortment of security threats under CI. Furthermore, TESSOC is the latest embodiment of a slow, century-long oscillation between two different basic concepts of CI. The first focuses purely on human threat vectors (referred to here as Human Threat CI or HTCI) while the latter entails a more comprehensive, all-source range of adversary technical and open as well as human source intelligence activities (designated Multidisciplinary CI or MDCI in US doctrine). That oscillation is driven largely by the balance between conventional and asymmetrical operations in defence priorities and recent campaign experience. TESSOC is a legacy of the recent, pre-Russo-Ukraine War emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Consequently, UK and allied military counterintelligence doctrine are entering the second quarter of the 21st Century fundamentally ill-equipped to cope with strategic peers and their use of full-spectrum and hybrid strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain has long provided military assistance to help develop and support the local armed forces of its dominions, colonies and other parts of its Empire. This was not done out of benevolence but as part of Britain's efforts to encourage its partners to be responsible for their own security. This article describes an unusual case of such assistance, which was provided to help establish Abu Dhabi's air force in the 1967–1971 period. The Abu Dhabi ruler's decision to only engage contract officers, rather than seconded officers, had a profound effect on the shape of the military assistance provided by Britain. Unlike most training, advising, assisting and mentoring missions, Britain provided no training nor mentoring, and only limited advice. Its greatest contribution was assistance with the recruitment for Abu Dhabi of both soon-to-retire and already retired British officers. These findings have relevance for current British doctrine on military assistance, notably in relation to the more effective use of contract officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article empirically examines how British 21st Army Group produced a functional doctrine by late 1944. How much weight to give Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery in the outcome remains unclear despite significant scholarly literature. This article shows his openness to the "bubbling up" of operational methods from subordinate commanders. He closely managed this process, actively promulgated its output, and determined when he had gleaned sufficient feedback from it. His doctrinal contribu- tion to the British Army's inal push against the Germans developed into British doctrine for many decades, and many Commonwealth countries followed the British lead. This article examines its roots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the characteristics of the doctrinal provisions of the military doctrines of Great Britain and France on nuclear missile weapons. The significance of nuclear missile programs in the foreign and domestic policy of Great Britain and France has been determined. It has been established that the doctrinal foundations of Great Britain are based on the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence. The main content of its provisions is the UK’s desire to preserve a minimal and at the same time effective possibility of nuclear deterrence as a “last resort”. The prevention of threats to the national security of both the state itself and the NATO states is carried out by preventing the most dangerous threats to national and international security. France’s nuclear missile doctrine was formed under the conditions of an autonomous and independent from NATO program, therefore doctrinal provisions at the present stage demonstrate the priority of French national security, at the same time nuclear missile policy is in solidarity with the policy of deterring and preventing NATO military threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British strategic foreign policy was in disarray between 1932 and 1934, when Japan was the major concern for British strategic planners. Japan's challenge to British interests affected British policy generally, and particularly Anglo-American relations. British departments had differing views: the Treasury preferred improved Anglo-Japanese relations, the Admiralty wanted a fleet sufficiently large to deal with both Japan and Europe, and the Foreign Office rejected the Treasury's position as naïve, preferring to work with the United States to check Japan as much as possible. The cut and thrust among the various departments underlined the matter's complexity and the difficulty of deciding British policy at this juncture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Army of the Second World War does not retain a positive reputation in the field of operational and tactical battle doctrine, particularly so in armoured warfare. Many historians argue that in Normandy in the summer of 1944, British armoured forces had still failed to grasp many essential elements of modern combat. This article demonstrates that in reality the British Army's loose approach to developing and imposing doctrine, despite inherent shortcomings, actually facilitated a flexible attitude that allowed the armoured forces in Normandy to adapt and modify their battle doctrines in the heat of battle quickly and effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses British military man Basil Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach doctrine on which was based the official British defense policy. Business of war that was not position and attrition but analysis and paralysis; Revolutionary potential of the `landship' or the tank.

In the literature on the emergence of the principles of war in British military thought there has been a failure to examine the reaction of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to the appearance of the first list of principles in the army’s 1920 Field Service Regulations. By considering correspondence, articles, books, field manuals, and staff college lecture scripts, this article demonstrates that there was a debate on the principles of war between the world wars which involved all three armed services. The acceptance of the principles into the doctrine of each of the services represented a fundamental shift away from Jomini and the final acceptance of Clausewitzian approaches to the theory of war. The debate also contributed significantly to the emergence of a ‘common language’ between the services, thus laying the basis for a tri-service ‘strategic culture’ which was attuned to the challenges of joint operations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article exploits the previously unused private papers of the General Headquarters doctrine writers to examine the process by which the British Expeditionary Force’s combat doctrine was produced and the influences upon it. It also reveals SS.198, a hitherto unknown manual from the autumn of 1917, which illustrates Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s influence upon doctrine writing at the time of the controversial Third Ypres offensive. It concludes that the doctrinal process raises serious questions about the notion of a consistent ‘learning curve’ within the BEF. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In recent years two theories have emerged in academia with regards to ‘small wars’: A ‘German way of war’ and a ‘British way of war’. The first one believes in a specific German military culture until 1945 accepting mass violence against civilians to quell any form of civil unrest. The second theory stresses a moderate British approach during the twentieth century; in defeating insurgencies the British Army had applied ‘minimum force’. This article challenges both views by looking into two largely forgotten counter-insurgency campaigns by the end of the First World War: The Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 and the British in Mesopotamia in 1920. It will be argued that one cannot speak in general terms about a ruthless German and a moderate British approach during this period – in fact it was quite the contrary in some ways. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his classic book Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896), the military theorist Charles E. Callwell divided small wars into three broad classes: wars of conquest were fought to expand empires; pacification campaigns were internal, and often followed campaigns of conquest; campaigns to wipe out an insult, avenge a wrong, or overthrow a dangerous enemy, often developed into wars of conquest. While all three categories involved major political considerations, Callwell's text is often criticised for its lack of discussion of politics. However, Callwell recognised that, if the ultimate objective of a campaign was successfully to assimilate a people into the British Empire, then ‘military intimidation’ was ill adapted to that end. This article will argue that a strategy of ‘butcher and bolt’ was indeed considered by many commentators, including Callwell, to be the best way to win ‘hearts and minds’. This stemmed from a belief in the all-importance of ‘moral effect’, a recurring theme in small wars literature. However, to view the British approach to colonial small wars as pure and simple brutality, in a ‘dark age’ before a more enlightened period of ‘minimum force’, is an oversimplification. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

No aspect of British counter-insurgency has been more problematic and controversial than the doctrine of minimum force. This common law principle provided ambiguous guidance for soldiers and police quelling unrest within a global empire and has become the subject of intense scholarly debate in the post-imperial era. The argument divides academics into two broad camps. One group sees minimum force as a vital element of a largely successful, uniquely British approach to counter-insurgency. The other claims that the legal principle never really restrained British security forces and considers the British approach to counter-insurgency neither unique nor particularly successful. This debate appeared in an exchange of views between John Newsinger and the current author in a 1990 volume of Small Wars and Insurgencies and more recently in a similar but lengthier argument between Rod Thornton and Huw Bennett in the same journal between 2007 and 2010. Such disagreements are of course endemic to academic discourse. This one, however, seems to be about more than history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the British Ministry of Defence prided itself that it was the Western world's leader in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Drawing on the lessons it had learnt during Britain's wars of decolonisation, it believed that it had discovered ways of waging wars among the people that enabled it to use force effectively but with discrimination, distinguishing between the ‘guilty’ few and the ‘innocent’ many. This article will survey these assertions in the light of historical evidence drawn from 10 of those campaigns: Palestine, Malaya, the Suez Canal Zone, Kenya, British Guiana, Cyprus, Oman, Nyasaland, Borneo, and Aden. It will suggest that the real foundation of British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice was not the quest to win ‘hearts and minds’. It was the application of wholesale coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Alexander Alderson was responsible for the publication of the new British Army doctrine on counter-insurgency in 2009. Three years after its publication, Alderson looks back at how the doctrine was formulated, dissecting its historical and contemporary influences, conceptual framework and practical application. His insider's reflection on the elaboration of UK doctrine illuminates the ongoing nature of the process, and highlights the need for constant attention and innovation to meet the challenges faced by the British Army. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much attention on the Strategic Defence and Security Review focused on the issues of deterrence and inter-service rivalry. But a number of other important choices, not obviously apparent in the document, might instead suggest the direction in which British defence policy has evolved. The outcome may be affordable, but is it at the cost of shortterm coherence? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the evolution of the army from an unarmored infantry into a mechanized and mobile force capable of deployment within and outside of the territory of Great Britain. The author notes that the post-war army is influenced by financial constraint as funds are used for civil reconstruction, and the role of military administrator who is highly accessible to the troops. The air force and the navy are seen as key components to win any war of battle in the field.

This paper examines British combined arms tactics in the last three months of 1918, via a case study of Third Army. It argues that, although some formations were capable of using sophisticated combined arms tactics well, others were not, and the application of such methods remained more diverse than some recent research has suggested. The diversity of approach was rooted not only in objective external factors, but also in the fact that pre-war regular officers continued to dominate the army of 1918. Their culture, rooted in the attitudes of the nineteenth century or even earlier, militated against the coherent dissemination and application of a single doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

With strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan far from certain, comforting beliefs about Britain's superiority at counterinsurgency have come under increasingly sceptical scrutiny. This article contributes to the debate with particular reference to the supposedly pivotal principle of minimum force. After discussing the recent literature on the subject, the article critiques the methodology employed by advocates of the traditionalist view on British COIN, arguing for a more rigorous historical approach based on primary sources. Following these historical matters, it is argued that conceptually, minimum force should be analysed dialectically in relation to practices of exemplary force, and above all, on the evidence of what happens in a conflict. Arguably the value ascribed to doctrine in strategic analysis has become unduly inflated, and we must look beyond it to understand war and political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author examines aspects of the review of military policy and national security ordered by the British government in 2010. At issue are the requirements of the British military from such a review. The author asserts that the wishes of the British armed forces are not clear or coherent. Noting the military desire for increased funding the author states that the size of Great Britain's budget deficit precludes growth in the military budget and will probably result in significant cuts.

In this article the author discusses aspects of the history British military policy and doctrine. The article was written in the wake of the 2010 release of British government mandated report that reviewed British military policy and the state of Great Britain's strategic forces. A number of topics are addressed including the changing nature of modern warfare, the diminished role played by Great Britain in global military exploits, and British reliance on her allies, particularly the United States.

As the battlespace has evolved, so has the need for effective and comprehensive military doctrine. Of the three services, the British Army has faced the broadest range of challenges to considered wisdom as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have unfolded. This has placed a premium on learning and adapting, in which the new Force Development and Training Command is an essential step. Nevertheless, more can be done to ensure the army is a learning organisation for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the British civil–military contract strained to breaking point? The contemporary portrayal of British civil–military relations is bleak, with academics, politicians, the media and military charities arguing that military–societal relations are in urgent need of repair. Through assessing the extent to which the reciprocal expectations of the armed forces and the British public are realized, this article will argue that the moral contract, although under stress, is not breaking. Underlying social trends and the use of doctrinal concepts such as the military covenant have, combined with recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, altered the expectations of both sides causing tensions within military–societal relations. Yet, while the armed forces do harbour unrealized expectations of the British public who are unwilling or unable to support the use of the military in recent conflicts, neither the public nor the military is so disillusioned with the performance of the other for the relationship to be described as breaking or broken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-examines the role of sacrificial ideology in motivating Germans and Britons to fight between 1914 and 1918. Contrary to current historiography, it contends that the ideology remained relevant in the war's mass slaughter and even exacerbated the violence. It begins by noting the ubiquity of sacrificial rhetoric and symbolism during peacetime and explains their importance in the mobilization of August 1914. It then explores how the ideology adapted to the circumstances of modern combat. The article shows that concepts of sacrifice not only remained resonant for most soldiers, but actually encouraged them to endure and seek vengeance to vindicate their dead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-examines the concept of the fiscal-military state in the context of the British armed forces during the Seven Years War (1756-63). This war, characteristic of British warfare during the eighteenth century, demonstrates that British victory depended on the state caring about the wellbeing of its troops, as well as being perceived to care. At the practical level, disease among troops led to manpower shortages and hence likely defeat, especially during sieges and colonial campaigns. During the 1762-3 Portuguese campaign, disease was regarded as a sign of ill-discipline, and jeopardized military and political alliances. At Havana in 1762, the fear, reports, and actual outbreaks of disease threatened American colonial support and recruitment for British campaigns. Throughout the controversial campaigns in the German states, disease was interpreted as a symptom of bad governance, and used in partisan criticisms concerning the conduct of the war. Military victory was not only about strategy, command, and technology, but nor was it solely a question of money. Manpower could not simply be bought, but needed to be nurtured in the long term through a demonstration that the British state cared about the welfare of its armies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two serving officers provide a revealing insight into doctrinal engagement amongst front-line officers, which casts serious doubts on the government's claim that British personnel understand the mission in Afghanistan. Their study, conducted amongst British officers with at least two combat operations under their belt, finds an alarming disconnect between political objectives and military doctrine. Harvey and Wilkinson offer a range of recommendations for reform, and issue a clarion call for the reinvigoration of doctrine at the heart of army culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasingly, a unitary view of war is becoming the 'gold standard' for which armed forces should prepare. Institutional flexibility is essential in identifying the character of each conflict, and the potential changes within it, thereby influencing doctrine, training and defence spending. The current UK defence structures concerned with the development, assimilation and application of ideas about war are stove-piped, however, and do not relate to this unitary view of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Britain's capabilities and resources in Helmand Province, and assesses the high-level strategy and civilian-military inter-relationships that provide the overarching framework of current operations. In doing so, Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon analyse the British counter-insurgency approach, arguing that the UK's troops have faced and overcome unique challenges in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's thoughts in response to the article "The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya," by Huw Bennett in issue 4 (2007). A discussion of the British military philosophy of minimum force is presented, noting concerns over the portrayal of several of the actors in the Kenyan Case in the article by Bennett. The Mau Mau uprising, differences between the King's African Rifles colonial military units and the British Army, and the work of British Army General George Erskine are also discussed.

The British military have embarked on a comprehensive process of transformation towards a network-enabled, effects-orientated, and expeditionary force posture. This has involved developing brand new military doctrine, organizational concepts, and technology. The US military are also transforming, and American military ideas about network-centric and effects-based warfare have influenced the British military. But the British have not simply aped their US ally. Rather, British military transformation has followed a different path. Hence, this article proposes a dynamic model of military innovation involving two international drivers: new operational challenges and military emulation; and three national shapers: resource constraints, domestic politics and military culture. This model is then applied to a detailed empirical analysis of the process and progress of British military transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents a commentary on the article of Colin McInnes discussing the doctrinal misstep in the British Army. He argues that McInnes is nonsensical as he only is concerned on the operational and strategic levels of the army. The author says that McInnes article failed to consider the alternative in using the doctrine. He discusses the questions penned by McInnes on the need to have a doctrine and how will the doctrine guides the army.

The article focuses on the review of the British Army's counter-insurgency doctrine. In early 2005, an attempt was made to start a review of the document, but it was not able to gain support as its terms lack supporting analysis. Doctrine is viewed in Great Britain as a something that contains an approach backed by rigorous analysis and according to a Director General, it must be readable even by an intelligent sixteen-year old. The review process is designed to take into consideration experiences relevant in the 21st century.

This article analyzes military and war theory, or lack thereof, as it relates to British armed forces. The author points out that the British army never had a formalized doctrine that acted as a guide for training and action. However, several historians, such as Liddell Hart, have probed trends in British military action that have been called the 'British way in warfare.' But this concept was never employed to explain organizational behavior.

This article re-examines the British record of inter-service cooperation in the decade before the outbreak of World War I. A fresh perspective is offered through the ideas, writings and experiences of Sir George Aston, a Royal Marines officer and contemporary analyst of what would today be called joint warfare. The article observes that, despite Aston's best efforts, the Army and Navy did not advance beyond a degree of mutual sympathy for each others operational needs, and did not address the underlying problems of integrated planning and unified command. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent conflicts have seen the increased use of Information Operations (Info Ops) and furthered our understanding of their utility within the context of the overall campaign plan. This trend will continue due to their particular utility within an asymmetric context, providing a commander with an important force multiplier. Nevertheless the resourcing of Info Ops is still not sufficient to allow their full potential to be realised. Having reviewed the UK Info Ops doctrine, several areas of MOE were assessed by a combination of interviews and literary research with a view to assessing their future utility and informing the wider Info Ops debate. The article concludes that only by quantifying the effect of Info Ops within the overall campaign by the identification of robust Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) will a true assessment of their value become apparent and resourcing priorities change to reflect this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues the importance for British doctrine writers to critically reflect on what they write and on the role, character and evolution of military doctrine. State of the debate about the definition and character of doctrine; Dangers that might result from the unreflective use of history to inform doctrinal thinking.

Discusses the continuous process of development that the British military doctrine underwent during the 1920s. General staff's rejection of the manpower-intensive doctrine that had sustained the army in 1914; Preference for the doctrine that placed modernity and machinery at the very core of the army's thinking; Assimilation of the lessons of World War I into the army's written doctrine.

This article discusses the military situation in the Baltic States. In literature, the Baltic States are usually called "small" although their total area is not that unimportant at all. It is roughly as large as two thirds of Northern Germany or Great Britain, it comprises about one and a half times larger than the area of the BeNeLux states. The forests in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia, can be regarded as one of their great natural riches. Moreover, the Baltic States are not as poor in mineral resources as commonly measured.

This article examines the role of military doctrine in the post-Cold War period, focusing on the rationale behind the British Army's production of Wider Peacekeeping. This publication was nothing if not controversial. For why should an army, traditionally chary of doctrine for combat tasks in a `normal' security environment. rush into producing such a doctrine for operations that it, in any case, called `nothing new'? Indeed, many in the Army treated Wider Peacekeeping with contempt. The article investigates the reasons why the Army needed this doctrine and why its creation generated such ire. The vituperative nature of the debate within military circles underlines the controversial nature of Wider Peacekeeping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the planned establishment of a Joint Defense Center which will be responsible for the development of a defense doctrine and provide a joint framework for a more specific Single Service doctrine. Joint initiative from Britain's Strategic Defence Review; Center as a leading British contribution to the development of military policy for peace support; Relationship between doctrine and strategic development.

Seeks to examine the significant but neglected subject of the adoption of the military paradigm in British society. Focus on values inherent in the military paradigm; Why this subject is complicated in several ways; Additional aspects of data analysis.

This article sets out to establish the links between classical military doctrine as applied to general war and the empirical development of any doctrine with regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. The theme is developed by covering both the attrition theory and the maneuver theory of warfare in outline, and then by examining the essential tenets of maneuver warfare in detail and applying these tenets to the experience gained by the United Kingdom in countering insurgency. The scope and role of the newly fashionable "information warfare" in counterinsurgency operations is examined, followed by an assessment of the important task of integrating all the separate aspects of these operations into an overall plan of action for a counterinsurgency campaign. The author concludes that there is a clear and positive link between classical doctrine for the application of force in general war and doctrine that can be usefully applied in counterinsurgency operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the influence of British theory and practice on the development of German armor. Controversy of who in Germany deserves credit for the creation of the Panzer arm; Theories of tank warfare; British principle of mixing light and medium companies in the tank battalions.

The article focuses on the changes in the armed forces in Australia. According to the author, the Liberal-Country party governments recognized the changes occurred in the country's international position when it became clear that Great Britain would withdraw from East of Suez and that the U.S. would also withdraw from the defense of Southeast Asia. In 1972-1975, the changes in the armed forces were established, in which irreversible was acknowledged by the Liberal-Country party government. Moreover, the labor government quickened the country's adjustment to the changed circumstances by withdrawing the remaining land forces.