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How does violent military coercion work alongside liberal democratic values in contemporary iterations of imperialism? This article shows how the less‐than‐lethal paradigm occludes death and perpetuates extreme forms of both deadly and not‐deadly military coercion in Iraq. Key to the 2003 invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency in Iraq, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm extends across military doctrine and US popular discourse. Based on the idea that killing is an undesirable way to dominate, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm is not necessarily benevolent or less deadly; instead, it is a legal, discursive, and logistical maneuver to minimize the political power of death and dying on the global stage. Decentering death, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm rebrands violence by reframing war as a precondition for peace, minimizing killing and death, disseminating nonkilling forms of coercion, and assigning responsibility to others for violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any nation's combat doctrine describes how it will approach and behave in combat with the enemy, regardless of whether this behavior has been explicitly stated in the military strategy or is merely hypothetical at this point and will be handled in accordance with the yellow and red danger circle principle in the future. Regarding the Iraqi military strategy The Iraqi military combat doctrine was unable to meet the demands of the security situation after 2003 and up until the occupation of Mosul and the other cities in western Iraq in June 2014 for a number of reasons that were identified in the research, the most significant of which was that it was defensive based on the reaction to a specific and limited action in the beginning it's up, this research identified a number of factors that contributed to the Iraqi military combat doctrine's inability to meet the demands of the security environment, the most significant of which was that it was defensive in nature and initially based on a reaction to a single, limited action. As a result, the enemies were able to identify and predict the Iraqi response, which allowed the terrorists to maneuver and further their criminal objectives. As a result, the prior battle doctrine of the Iraqi armed forces did not clearly define the initiative and preemption against the enemy. With low morale and a high level of irritation and hostility, the military establishment was left with an unacceptable reality, few options, and a limited amount of time, particularly given the insurgents' advance on Baghdad. Following the development of the popular mobilization and the issue of the religious authority in Najaf Ashraf, for the fatwa jihad kifaeai, a number of government actions and decisions in favor of change were taken. And support a combat doctrine that can engage the enemy by changing the combat doctrine from defensive, going to be a reaction to a proactive offensive, and at that, victories came after victories, reaching the final elimination of ISIS and declaring victory against it at the end of 2017, the research delves into the impact and influence In those victories by evaluating the outcomes of the change in the Iraqi combat doctrine and the prospects for that now an option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In light of the Iraqi crisis's overall developments between 2015 and 2020, the Arab Crises Team– ACT at the Middle East Studies Center in Jordan decided to publish this report on the current crisis. The team has published an earlier report on the Iraqi crisis in September 2015. The new report aims to reach an exit strategy as a roadmap for Iraq to emerge from its ongoing crisis since the American occupation in 2003. The report considered the background of the crisis, its nature and description, and the local and external influential players. It provided the possible scenarios and the player's possible options as such. The Iraqi crisis is considered complex, whose details include international, regional, and local factors. The main crisis pillars are: 1. The sectarian dimension in the political system based on quotas with the significant imbalance in managing state resources efficiently and justly, 2. The security dimension that overlaps between militias, the military and security apparatuses, 3. The international and regional interference in Iraqi affairs, directly and through Iraqi forces. The report discussed the fundamental transformations that the Iraqi crisis witnessed during the years 2019-2020, most notably the outbreak of widespread and varied sectarian and regional popular protests in various parts of Iraq, especially in the primary ruling parties' cities' influence. The motives behind this development in the Iraqi crisis are referred to the weak role of the state in achieving social justice and controlling resources, the inability of successive governments to manage the state's essential services, the deepening of direct Iranian and US military and security intervention in Iraq under the pretext of fighting ISIS, in addition to the economic dimension, which is one of the most prominent manifestations of the crisis. The widespread popular protests erupted in Iraq in October 2019, even in light of the Corona epidemic challenges that the demonstrators face. Furthermore, among its most essential demands: building an alternative, non-sectarian political environment, amending the constitution and changing the structures of provincial councils, the independence of the military establishment and its monopoly alone of armed forces and arms, the provision of essential services in the country, and the conduct of new parliamentary elections to be fair under national non-sectarian election law. Despite several factors that weakened the strength of this popular movement, it was able to achieve several successes, most notably its continuation despite the difficulties, its distribution in the various regions of Iraq, and its success in dismissing the existing government and forming a new government (the government of Mr. Mustafa Al-Kazemi). The protests also succeeded in maintaining their peacefulness, despite all the security violence it faced. The report believes that there are internal and external parties that have a significant influence on this crisis. The report concluded that local forces' policies and trends had become a reflection of the nature of relations between regional and international powers and their interests in Iraq. This relation has weakened the independent national will and made these parties face a significant challenge in reaching any settlement for many issues. The report analyzed the positions, policies, and interests of these parties and concluded that their Iraqi affairs interventions have led to this crisis's additional internal and external complications. The report discussed the typical scenarios for the crisis. It identifies three possible scenarios: 1. The stalemate and the continuation of the crisis in its current state 2. The scenario of intensifying the crisis politically, socially, and in living conditions 3. The scenario of achieving national consensus and getting out of the state of this crisis 4. The team discussed the conditions for achieving each of these scenarios and highlighted their implications. The report set out several determinants to favor the more expected possible scenario. The report concluded that the crisis seems likely to alternate between the first scenario (stalemate and the continuation of the crisis in its current state) and the third scenario (national consensus and exit from the crisis). That might keep the possibilities of slipping into dangerous trends, if not reaching stability and unity among Iraqis on the road map to exit the crisis. The report proposed an exit strategy based on the need to address three fundamental causes that emanate problems in several directions: 1. The absence of sectarian balance between parties and sects 2. Iranian and American influence 3. The aggravating living problems of people including the lack of essential services The report provides Several recommendations in three main axes: the political, the social and economic axis, and the security and military axis. Among the most important of these recommendations is to hold an inclusive Iraqi national conference that unites the state and the Iraqi people without exclusion. The conference aims to stop the internal and external depletion of Iraq's role and its resources. The suggested conference would reinforce the Iraqi state's sovereignty over all its territories free of the foreign armed presence. The conference ought to agree on a specific roadmap to get Iraq out of this ongoing and renewed crisis. The road map includes developing the political system to be an open system without ethnic or sectarian quotas and unifying Iraqi citizenship's political weight, away from religion, sect, race, and others. Iraq would restore its Arab and Islamic unitary identity and relieves other sub-identities. The government has to dissolve armed militias and seize weapons in civilians' hands in an integrated system. The government would draw the re-positioning of Iraqi foreign, regional and international relations to guarantee Iraq the preservation of its sovereignty and independence and does not hinder its progress. The measurements have to satisfy the need to calm sectarian tensions and stop the sectarian prosecutions on false charges such as terrorism, eradication, cooperation with the former regime... etc. It is to control the general budget, reducing state expenditures from current and administrative expenditures, expanding investment in productive projects as the agricultural and industrial sectors. Moreover, to encourage investments in the primary service sectors and reorganizing the oil sector from production to export to ensure the restoration of national sovereignty over this sector. The government ought to combat administrative and financial corruption and reduce the government apparatus's masked unemployment burden. The report recommends, in particular, to rebuild the Iraqi security and military doctrine according to the intellectual, social, historical, and civilizational principles of Iraq. It is to cuff-hand from Iraqi interference in other countries, to control and stop any Iraqi party's cooperation with any parties threatening other countries' security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of The Iraqi University is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on how the international community can prevent the accumulation of large weapon stockpiles by unstable and irresponsible regimes. It reports on several examples of massive political upheavals that led to the widespread dispersal of government weapons stocks, including several disasters in Iraq, Somalia, and Albania. It suggests steps to prevent similar disasters, which includes securing and destroying surplus weapons caches and constructing an effective foreign aid programs to help dispose weapons. It mentions that the U. S. Government Accountability Office recommends the Defense Department to incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage security into all levels of planning of policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, and instructions.

This article argues that the 1991 Persian Gulf War was not fought to acceptable moral and ethical standards by coalition forces. The most influential surprise of the war-the one that may dictate how future wars are fought--is the fact that air power proved far more successful over firmly entrenched occupying forces than commentators and original war plans had anticipated. Questions of moral responsibility are still being raised as Iraqi civilians continue to die, not only as a result of civil violence following the war, but also because of the allied bombing that devastated the civilian infrastructure during the war. Just-war theorists, as well as the U.S. Army Manual for Land Warfare, agree that attacks on sites that produce war materiel and sustain the war effort are bound to produce some civilian deaths. More than anyone might have expected, the U.S. strategy resembled the "total war" described by James Turner Johnson in "Can Modern War Be Just?"

“COIN,” the counter-terrorism doctrine the United States used during the Iraq War, was in criminological terms overly reliant on militarized “incapacitationist” strategies. Based a on competing “societal reactions” or community-level labeling theory, we argue that COIN failed to anticipate but predictably produced state-based “legal cynicism” in Arab Sunni communities—increasing rather than decreasing politically defiant terrorist crimes. We test our hypotheses with nationally representative surveys and data on terrorist attacks collected before, during, and immediately after the 2007 Surge in US troops. The Surge increased perceptions of unnecessary US-led violence against Arab Sunni non-combatants, provoking cynical beliefs in Arab Sunni communities, creating local contexts in which terrorist attacks increased, and foreshadowing later advances by the Islamic State. Our findings show that oversimplified, incapacitation-oriented control tactics—in domestic policing, in COIN, or in the traditional warfare strategies that are replacing COIN—are likely to contribute to rather than reduce cycles of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine - JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ - designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continuing the focus on military doctrine in this special issue, this essay explores institutional mechanisms that enable otherwise rigid bureaucracies to innovate. Rather than focus on organizational and strategic culture, the piece explores the role of pragmatic officers using incubators and advocacy networks to escape their iron cage. The piece traces the institutional origins of the US counterinsurgency doctrine between 2003 and 2006 to highlight the role of special study groups and cross-cutting bureaucratic coalitions in creating a space to deliberate over how to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 2004 was one of the worst and most widely talked-about cases of prisoner abuse by American forces during any war. This scandal had lasting implications for the War in Iraq and America's War on Terror as a whole. This essay examines what failures in military doctrine led to such egregious abuses and how those failures have or have not been remedied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the views of several foreign policy analysts and historians on the lessons that resulted from the U.S. War in Iraq from 2003-2011. Topics include the ineffectiveness of U.S. international nation-building efforts and the potential long-term damage they cause, the policy of U.S. President Barack Obama to pursue "light footprint" interventions using drone aircraft, local military forces, and alliances, and the risks posed by the strategy of nonintervention illustrated by conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Mali as of April 2013.

In recent years two theories have emerged in academia with regards to ‘small wars’: A ‘German way of war’ and a ‘British way of war’. The first one believes in a specific German military culture until 1945 accepting mass violence against civilians to quell any form of civil unrest. The second theory stresses a moderate British approach during the twentieth century; in defeating insurgencies the British Army had applied ‘minimum force’. This article challenges both views by looking into two largely forgotten counter-insurgency campaigns by the end of the First World War: The Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 and the British in Mesopotamia in 1920. It will be argued that one cannot speak in general terms about a ruthless German and a moderate British approach during this period – in fact it was quite the contrary in some ways. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Politicos (01215167) is the property of Universidad de Antioquia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1-7) along the Iraq-Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1-37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005-06. The empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest that, contrary to popular perceptions, the units successfully innovated in war - a process largely executed organically within the units themselves. Innovation is defined here as the development of new organizational capacities not initially present when the units deployed into the theater. The evidence presented in these cases suggests that the innovation process enabled these units to successfully transition from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations to organizations that developed an array of new organizational capacities for full-spectrum combat operations. The units in this study developed these new capacitites largely on their own initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the battlespace has evolved, so has the need for effective and comprehensive military doctrine. Of the three services, the British Army has faced the broadest range of challenges to considered wisdom as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have unfolded. This has placed a premium on learning and adapting, in which the new Force Development and Training Command is an essential step. Nevertheless, more can be done to ensure the army is a learning organisation for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SINCE the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military strategists, historians, soldiers, and policymakers have made counterinsurgency's principles and paradoxes second nature, and they now expect that counterinsurgency operations will be the likely wars of the future. Yet despite counterinsurgency's ubiquity in military and policy circles, legal scholars have almost completely ignored it. This Article evaluates the laws of war in light of modern counterinsurgency strategy. It shows that the laws of war are premised on a kill-capture strategic foundation that does not apply in counterinsurgency, which follows a win-the-population strategy. The result is that the laws of war are disconnected from military realities in multiple areas-from the use of non-lethal weapons to occupation law. This Article also argues that the war on terror legal debate has been somewhat myopic. The shift from a kill-capture to a win-the-population strategy not only expands the set of topics legal scholars interested in contemporary conflict must address, but also requires incorporating the strategic foundations of counterinsurgency when considering familiar topics in the war on terror legal debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To the extent that a grand strategy can be discerned in the first year of the Obama Administration, its defining features are not a break from the past but continuity. As the President himself has analogized since taking office, crafting grand strategy is like parallel parking. He has only been able to make changes to grand strategy around the margins since a number of existing commitments limit his freedom of action. This article first identifies the structural determinants of grand strategy, pointing to the international distribution of power, American bureaucracy, and public as the key sources of strategic constraint and opportunity. It then shows how shifts in these factors—comparatively less U.S. power, an overstretched military organized around counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an American public weary from an aggressive grand strategy—produced a shift in grand strategy that predated the 2008 election and that remains consistent with the current strategic setting. It is for these reasons that the 2008 “change” election has produced considerable continuity in American grand strategy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article introduces this special issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies by discussing the British model of counter-insurgency. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer associated the phrase 'hearts and minds' with Britain's apparently successful counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948-60). The phrase 'hearts and minds' is generally associated with a less coercive approach to counter-insurgency which emphasises the importance of using 'minimum force' in order to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people. This article argues that the phrase 'hearts and minds' does not accurately describe Britain's highly coercive campaign in Malaya. The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights. Britain's counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland did not deploy the same levels of coercion that were used in Malaya but, nevertheless, considerable levels of coercion were used which did not succeed in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local people. The various interpretations of 'hearts and minds' leads to confusion about what degree of consent should be expected from the people and the implication of this for the use of force. While the term 'hearts and minds' does not accurately represent Britain's experience of counter-insurgency in the retreat from Empire; in the post-Cold War period the British military has been generally more 'political' and less coercive in its approach to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq than the more conventional US approach to counter-insurgency. The British approach to counter-insurgency has influenced the recent development of US counter-insurgency doctrine but there are still considerable differences in the British and US approach to counter-insurgency which has led to severe tensions in the relationship between these allies. The 'hearts and minds' description of the British approach to counter-insurgency may be useful in public relations terms but it undermines the theory as a guide to operations because it can be interpreted in such divergent ways. The future may be to more carefully and practically specify in what contexts and circumstances the deployment of force is legitimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers commentaries on the use of political term surge by former U.S. President George W. Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address concerning the war in Iraq. It argues that the term surge used by the Bush administration evokes spatial and geographical connotations, suggesting power achievements through the number of U.S. troops deployed to Iraq. The author also provides an overview of the conditions of the war in Iraq, as well as U.S. military strategy and patriotism connected with support for the war.

The article discusses the U.S. military's use of walls and aerial enforcement to maintain security in Iraq. The strategy is likened to Israel's usage of a system of walls in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The wall system is described as consisting of 12-foot-high concrete walls, military-controlled checkpoints, and technologically advanced biometric scanning devices. Aerial enforcement used by the U.S. and Israel includes unmanned drones and missile systems. The U.S. military describes its strategy as being based on sociology, noting that the Iraq War cannot be won militarily due to its political nature.

The article analyzes the presidency of George W. Bush. The author reports that in 2006, writers and scholars began to question Bush's ability as U.S. President, as well as debating his place on the list of American presidents. Called by some as the worst president in U.S. history, the author examines Bush's performance as a politician and examines the comparisons between Bush and various historical figures. Additional article topics include Bush's religious beliefs, his military policies, as well as foreign relations endeavors, including the Iraq War.

Examines the military policy employed by U.S. President George W. Bush against Iraq. Development of the U.S. policy on Iraq; Analysis of the Bush administration's success in achieving its Iraq-related goals; Assessment of the degree to which the U.S. pursued a multilateral track.

Discusses the claimed success of the U.S. and its difficulty in securing its political aims after the 2003 war in Iraq. Definition of the Network-Centric Warfare and the Shock and Awe concept; Overview of the programs of transforming the U.S. military services and major military systems; Application of technological developments in operations other than war environments; Highlights of the Operation Iraqi Freedom; Suggestions on changing the views of war in order to obtain success in pursuing U.S. policies.

Comments on the national security doctrine adopted by the U.S. following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that stresses military predominance, military preemption and political transformation. Pitfall of the Bush administration's foreign policy towards countries in the axis of evil; Difference between preemption and deterrence; Challenges posed by an anticipatory strategy to the U.S.; Implications of a democratic regime change in Iraq for the Middle East region.

The article analyzes the origins, course, and lesson of the Gulf Conflict from an Iraqi perspective, particularly through Iraq's absolute ruler, Saddam Hussein. It discusses Saddam's perception of national security and its manifestation in the invitation of Kuwait. Furthermore, it explores the reasons for Saddam's preferences for war over a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait. It analyzes that the Iraq's war strategy and the causes of its abysmal failure, as well as its final lessons from the entire ordeal.

The article discusses American military force deployment strategies as of September 2006. The U.S. military condition is discussed with regard to the lag between the emergence of new threats and deployment of correspondingly new arms and structures and forward deployed strategy versus surge strategy. Topics covered include access to the Gulf, regional requirements, surge versus stasis and relations with Iran and Iraq.