Search

Where cross‐border sanctuaries enable rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border fortification. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational militants' resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. Extending resource‐centric theories of conflict, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in this strategy. Externally supplied rebels can afford conventional attacks and civilian victimization. When border fortifications interdict their foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and cooperative relations with civilians. Hence, counterinsurgent border fortification trades off reduced rebel capabilities for greater competition over local hearts and minds. I test this theory using declassified microdata on border fortification and violence in Iraq. Results highlight the central link between border control and cross‐border militancy, and show how governments can contest the transnational dimensions of civil wars, such as external rebel sponsorship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractMilitant groups delegate operations to contingent, short-term, and freelance agents. Informal and ad-hoc employment patterns have wide-reaching consequences, yet the literature lacks a systematic vocabulary and framework to analyze these practices. Using primary and secondary sources, I introduce a descriptive typology of informal employment patterns in militant groups. This contributes to scholarship and practice by establishing a basis for a systematic comparison of variation in militant employment models, particularly highlighting how these practices can have far-reaching implications for conflict and post-conflict settings. Case studies of informal militant hiring practices in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria support the typology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterinsurgencies mostly fail, as the 2021 allied withdrawal from Afghanistan illustrates. Still, confronting insurgencies remains a central component in ongoing counterterror efforts around the world. The crux of counterinsurgency (COIN) centers on winning the 'hearts and minds' of noncombatants in order to cut militants off from a needed source of material and psychological support. In practice, however, COIN has failed to leverage a pacified civilian population into a military victory and has instead led to protracted engagements with unclear and contradictory goals. I argue that this policy failure can be explained by rehabilitating the doctrine's colonial heritage to its contemporary deployment. I do so by tracing the doctrinal origins of COIN to American-led pacification programs in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Using time as a conceptual anchor, I draw on postcolonialism and social theory to unearth how embedded imperialist notions of Self/Other in the doctrine help explain this ongoing failure. A temporal lens augments an analysis of COIN in three respects. First, it illustrates the longevity of counterinsurgency as a geopolitical practice of pacifying 'disruptive Others'. Second, it reveals a paradox in a doctrine that intimates an end state marked by the absence of those disruptive Others but is designed to constantly seek out disruption. Finally, it lays bare differing motivations for the imperial Self to endure the encounter with the Other in the first place. I conclude by reflecting on the potentially harmful consequences both at home and abroad should the underlying assumptions of COIN remain unexamined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using project-level data on US payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in Sunni and mixed sectarian areas; for the types of insurgent attacks, most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does wartime debate in democracies during counterinsurgency campaigns embolden insurgent adversaries? Despite the historical frequency of this claim, there is little direct evidence assessing this 'emboldenment' hypothesis. This paper develops a novel test of this argument during the US counterinsurgency campaign following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. We find that following spikes in US domestic debate over the Iraq war, there is no evidence that insurgent attacks on military or civilian targets increased in regions of Iraq with greater access to US news compared to regions with less access. Overall, these results offer no support for the emboldenment claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athar alrafedain is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines the nature and significance of the economic aspect, which was the most significant spark for the start of many revolutions and upheavals that people saw, particularly in recent history. Consequently, the study clarifies the logical impacts of the economic factors in a local rebellion that Iraq experienced in the 1930s in a southern city that is tiny in size but has significant effects on the country overall political and social situations. The revolutionary movement is strong and well-known since it upended the state at the time. This revolutionary movement also benefited from popular, clan, and ideological backing as seen by its reliance on the endorsement of the local religious establishment in Najaf. The study was based on two axes: the first looked at the state of the economy and how it affected the involvement of Iraqi tribes in the political unrest of the 1930s; the second focused on the effects of the state of the economy and the clans' use of violent conflict with the government. The research used a range of sources to gather its historical data, foremost among them being the unpublished records, which are the documents of the Iraqi royal court, as well as academic theses, studies, and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By studying the rebellion of Ali bin Muhammad in southern Iraq, we concluded the following: Ignorance, poverty and injustice are the most dangerous things that nations face, as they are like a dormant volcano waiting for the right opportunity to erupt to destroy everything.The Zanj in southern Iraq suffered miserable conditions of poverty, poverty, enslavement and an inferior view of society, all of which encouraged Ali bin Muhammad to exploit them to achieve his goals in reaching the hierarchy of power. The rebellion of the Zanj leader did not involve a clear program that would guarantee him survival and continuity, as he believed in the principles of the Azeri Kharijites, and this sparked the indignation of the free against him and not dealing with him, as he went out of religion by claiming prophethood and violating the divine attributes, as well as following a policy of revenge, not reform. And the social revolution, not the calendar, so killing, captivity, burning, looting and looting was a feature of this rebellion. The Abbasid Caliphate suffered great losses as a result of this rebellion, which lasted for fifteen years (255- 270 A.H.), which destroyed agricultural lands, disrupted trade, ruined cities, killed thousands, and imprisoned free women, and weakened the state, which encouraged separatist movements to overthrow the Abbasid Caliphate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn's Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to the Iraq war, the Ansar al-Islam (AI) group formed in Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2001 has been the subject of intense debate and huge media coverage. In academic research, however, its history, evolution and affiliation have received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. Commonly depicted as an al-Qaida affiliated group or a sub-group controlled by al-Qaida's emerging organization in Iraq (AQI), the AI group should—this article argues—instead be understood as a strong independent-minded group with an ideology and operational pattern distinct from that of AQI. Although sharing many commonalities, the AI and AQI became de facto rivals, not allies. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the AI and its first successor group remained a distinct Salafi-jihadi insurgent group largely focused on fighting 'the near enemy', i.e., Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. It strongly resisted repeated calls for joining al-Qaida's new umbrella organization in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, and it paid no homage to AQI's or ISI's leaders. Also on the international level, the groups were fundamentally different. As opposed to al-Qaida's terrorist plotting abroad, the AI's international network were hierarchical structures, geared towards raising logistical and financial support as well as recruitment. The article highlights the need for greater attention to the complexities and nuances in patterns of contacts and cooperation between militant Islamist extremists. Informed by the growing scholarship on the multifaceted nature of contemporary jihadism, its numerous manifestations in local settings, and its strong internal rifts, this paper seeks to redress the early reductionist portrayal of the AI movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following Moltke's dictum that 'no battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy', military learning and adaptation has long been a staple of military studies. Over the past fifteen years, much of the literature has been focused on Western armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little attention has been paid thus far to adaptation by the Iraqi armed forces in their fight against ISIS. Whereas the Iraqi army was routed by the group in 2014, three years later it managed to take back almost all the territory lost to ISIS. How was that possible? This article discusses military adaptation by the Iraqi armed forces and their role in the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq. Combining an academic theoretical framework on military adaptation with a primary source-based investigation of the Iraqi fight against ISIS, we reconstruct how the Iraqi armed forces learned from their mistakes in 2014 and which role this process played in the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Bahith Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

At the height of the Syrian civil war, many observers argued that the Syrian state was collapsing, fragmenting, or dissolving. Yet, it never actually vanished. Revisiting the rising challenges to the Syrian state since 2011 – from internal collapse through external fragmentation to its looming dissolution by the 'Islamic State' – provides a rare opportunity to investigate the re-enactment of both statehood and international order in crisis. Indeed, what distinguishes the challenges posed to Syria, and Iraq, from others in the region and beyond is that their potential dissolution was regarded as a threat not merely to a – despised – dictatorial regime, or a particular state, but to the state-based international order itself. Regimes fall and states 'collapse' internally or are replaced by new states, but the international order is fundamentally questioned only where the territorially delineated state form is contested by an alternative. The article argues that the Syrian state survived not simply due to its legal sovereignty or foreign regime support, but also because states that backed the rebellion, fearing the vanishing of the Syrian nation-state in a transnational jihadist 'caliphate', came to prefer its persistence under Assad. The re-enactment of states and of the international order are thus ultimately linked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The novel tells the story of a group of children living in the same neighborhood and in the same school, sharing toys and family ties. As they are getting older, their intellectual and mental beliefs grow up. They suffer from injustice, abusiveness and marginalization of their rulers. They meet a teacher and they have an intimate relationship. He implants in them the love of the homeland and resistance to injustice. They join one of the resistance movements against the Ba'athist rule at that time The novel records different events in different places and different characters. The place is a group of alleys and neighborhoods of Amarah (i.e., a town in the southern Iraq) where the events of the novel take place. The movement of characters in different places leads to the transformation of some open spaces into a battlefield and become as if they are closed and lonely due to the change in the conditions of the characters from absurdity to commitment and their rebellion against the unjust authority and the revolution against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The novel tells the story of a group of children living in the same neighborhood and in the same school, sharing toys and family ties. As they are getting older, their intellectual and mental beliefs grow up. They suffer from injustice, abusiveness and marginalization of their rulers. They meet a teacher and they have an intimate relationship. He implants in them the love of the homeland and resistance to injustice. They join one of the resistance movements against the Ba'athist rule at that time The novel records different events in different places and different characters. The place is a group of alleys and neighborhoods of Amarah (i.e., a town in the southern Iraq) where the events of the novel take place. The movement of characters in different places leads to the transformation of some open spaces into a battlefield and become as if they are closed and lonely due to the change in the conditions of the characters from absurdity to commitment and their rebellion against the unjust authority and the revolution against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Bahith Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Little is known about how air strikes influence insurgent behavior toward civilians. This study provides evidence that air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by counterinsurgency forces were a contributing factor in its civilian victimization. I theorize that air strikes expanded the distribution of insurgent fatalities to include higher-echelon membership and, at the same time, imposed psychological impairments on its fighters. As a consequence, these changes relaxed restraints on civilian abuse at the organizational and individual levels. This theory is informed by interviews of ISIS defectors and translations of ISIS documents and tested through a statistical analysis of granular-level data on air strikes and one-sided violence during ISIS's insurgency. These findings contribute to our knowledge of insurgent behavior and provide important policy implications in the use of air strikes as a counterinsurgency (COIN) tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Thi Qar Arts Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi / Cumhuriyet Theology Journal is the property of Cumhuriyet Universitesi, Ilahiyat Fakultesi / Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2006 President George W. Bush and his advisers devised a strategy, known as the "surge," to combat the growing insurgency in Iraq. It is widely credited with reducing violence and stabilizing the country. Although surge troops were removed from Iraq, the narrative of the surge remains a rhetorical resource for defense hawks. This paper examines the uses of that narrative to (re)orient American security policy by analyzing the arguments of Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham from 2007–2015. Re-narrativizing the Iraq war with the surge foregrounded has two rhetorical effects: it reconstitutes the initial quagmire stage of the war as merely a test of American resolve and justifies confining war deliberation to the technical sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the effect of private military and security companies (PMSCs) on levels of civilian casualties in Iraqi governorates from 2004 to 2007. Within a principal-agent framework, we argue that the capacity to monitor and evaluate PMSC performance is conditioned by the availability of performance-related information. Crucially, PMSC corporate structure impacts the information available to the employer. Differences in PMSCs' corporate structure (e.g., whether a firm is publicly traded or closed ownership) influences the disclosure of different levels of information about a firm's performance. A closed ownership PMSC is opaque, obstructing access to information. Publicly traded PMSCs, by contrast, have legal obligations to release information on corporate performance, policies, and contracts. Closed ownership PMSCs are correlated with increases in the likelihood of civilian casualties while publicly traded PMSCs have no effect on civilian casualties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Following a period of low intensity conflict during 2009–2012, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (or Islamic State) in 2013 was associated with a resurgence of violence in Baghdad, Iraq's capital and largest city. We evaluated trends in injury-related deaths in Baghdad before and during the Islamic State insurgency. Methods: Iraqi National Injury Mortality Surveillance System prospectively collects information on fatal injuries from governorate coroner offices using standardized reporting forms. Trained coroner clerks collect information on victim demographics, intention of injury and mechanism of injury during medical examinations using reports from police and families. We analyzed data on all deaths reported by the Baghdad Forensic Institute from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2015. Results: There were 17,555 injury-related deaths with documented intent and mechanism (range 2385–3347 per year): 6241 from gunfire (36%), 1381 explosions (8%), 1348 non-gunfire assaults (8%), 3435 traffic accidents (20%), and 5150 other unintentional injuries (29%). Rates of gunfire (23.45 per 100,000) and explosion (5.90 per 100,000) deaths were significantly higher in 2014 than in all other years during the review period (p < 0.001 and p = 0.03, respectively). During the same period from 2010 to 2015, traffic accident deaths declined significantly from 13.29 to 6.35 (p = 0.002), with declines observed primarily among pedestrians. Trends in the rate of non-gunfire-assault and unintentional deaths, comparing 2010 and 2015, were not significant (p = 0.12 and p = 0.63, respectively). Unintentional deaths were mostly attributed to burns (46%) and electricity-related injuries (31%). The proportion of both females and children was highest in unintentional injury deaths. Conclusions: During the study period, deaths from both gunfire and explosions in Baghdad peaked in 2014, corresponding with emergence of the Islamic State. Trends suggest a potential impact of insurgency-related activity on other injuries as evidenced by a decrease in the death rate from traffic accidents. The decreased traffic-related death rate could be from decreased vehicle and pedestrian activity during times of violence. Monitoring trends in injury mortality during conflict allows Iraq to identify priority injury causes to inform public health interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalisation and modernisation were expected to transform the Middle East, by ending regional conflicts and spreading democracy, freedom, prosperity and peace. However, the oil reserves of the Gulf have been the main stake in Western policies that led to wars, not only to benefit the hegemon, but also the health of the world capitalist economy. Instead of democracy and prosperity, neoliberalism has fostered inequality, unemployment, poverty, mass migration and terrorism. Globalisation makes security interdependent; terrorism, gun crime and illegal migration are spill over effects of structural, political and economic insecurity. Iraq today shows how globalisation incites rebellion and radicalisation. The advancement of the neoliberal agenda by industrialised states through globalisation has failed to deliver the economic stability and growth it promised. Through a process of macro-securitisation, relationships, agendas and security dynamics have been consolidated. Globalisation coupled with a universalist narrative have constructed a neoliberal system of economic and ideological dominance, with clearly defined threats to it, regionally and globally. It is those security threats the War on Terror was designed to fight and eliminate, through the neoliberal, universalist narrative of a hegemonic social, political and economic culture. Thus was achieved the implementation of policies and procedures, ideas and cultures, that promote the structures and ideologies that will maintain hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the counterinsurgency warfare. Despite a long and well- documented history of insurgent warfare in the world, governments that have faced insurgencies or were once insurgents themselves tend to be quick at forgetting their roots. Scholars and soldiers alike have often used the phrase "the American way of war" to describe not just a predilection, but a virtual strategic obsession, which holds that wars are fought by gathering the maximum in manpower and materiel, hurling them into the maelstrom, and counting on swift, crushing victory. Thus far in Iraq, the U.S. effort, though riot entirely devoid of successes, has been hallmarked by over- whelmed and under-prepared troops effecting heavy-handed, large-scale roundups of civilians (in some cases errantly or overzealously harming them); or the destruction of large swaths of cities and towns. All counterinsurgency scholars agree the viability of any counterinsurgency endeavor, especially one undertaken by an occupying force, depends upon this capability.

This article challenges recent analyses on sectarianism and Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Iraq by examining the political and economic factors that have underpinned the rising levels of internecine violence that have become apparent since 2003. Rather than rooted in "ancient hatreds", these dynamics are, we argue, the outcome of a series of decisions and social transformations imposed on the Iraqi state in the immediate aftermath of the invasion - namely the format of the constitution, counter-insurgency policy, the establishment of a new media sector and the social effects of the Coalition's economic reorganisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]