WILLFUL IGNORANCE.

This article focuses on the counterinsurgency warfare. Despite a long and well- documented history of insurgent warfare in the world, governments that have faced insurgencies or were once insurgents themselves tend to be quick at forgetting their roots. Scholars and soldiers alike have often used the phrase "the American way of war" to describe not just a predilection, but a virtual strategic obsession, which holds that wars are fought by gathering the maximum in manpower and materiel, hurling them into the maelstrom, and counting on swift, crushing victory. Thus far in Iraq, the U.S. effort, though riot entirely devoid of successes, has been hallmarked by over- whelmed and under-prepared troops effecting heavy-handed, large-scale roundups of civilians (in some cases errantly or overzealously harming them); or the destruction of large swaths of cities and towns. All counterinsurgency scholars agree the viability of any counterinsurgency endeavor, especially one undertaken by an occupying force, depends upon this capability.