Search

Discusses treatment of the United States in Chinese textbooks. Focuses on a world history text and a political economics text for high school seniors. Reports that the Chinese texts present the United States as an imperialistic bastion of capitalism. Suggests that a more balanced presentation is necessary to prepare students for the global era. (DK)

Analyzes revisions in Chinese historiographical treatment of world history since 1949, stressing the dominance of Marxist/Maoist ideology, political isolation, and Chinese nationalism. Shows evidence of these influences in high school textbooks. Examines the Cultural Revolution's impact on historiography. Sees current liberalization producing a less insulated, more factual view of world history. (CH)

A content analysis of selected German translations of six Chinese primary school textbooks, used from 1963 to 1982, assessed the socializing functions of qualification, integration, and identification. Categories involved include professional, moral, cultural, family, school, associations, China as a unified nation, China's achievements, and socialism as an ideal goal. (TJH)

Discusses dependency theory in comparative education studies. Examines U.S. educational transfer to China during the Republican period as it functioned through the public health delivery model of the Dingxian Experiment. Notes that resistance to dependency in this case could serve as a model for avoiding the technological misfitting of programs. (KO)

Last June the author, a teacher of political theory at Tsinghua University, was asked by a Canadian television crew to get hold of some students for a special on modern China. During the discussion, the author observed that his Chinese students express a thoughtful and informed nationalism, and a distrust of Western-style democracy. Some of the students become "nationalistic" in the sense of being committed to learning more about Chinese culture and philosophy: They really confront the need to think about their roots only when they clash with another culture. That is not to say that students entirely reject Western influence; many still hope to go abroad and learn about the West. Today Chinese students commonly believe that any stable and legitimate political arrangement needs to be founded, at least partly, on political ideals from their own tradition.

How does China signal foreign policy intentions to domestic and international audiences during territorial conflicts? While China can signal its resolve by provoking nationalism at home, doing so may risk appearing threatening to neighbouring countries in the region. We argue that China resolves the dilemma by sending different types of messages to domestic and international audiences. Focusing on China’s maritime conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, we examine China’s narratives regarding the maritime disputes through the analysis of state-run media. Our findings from text mining and topic analyses of more than 31,000 state media reports from 2002 to 2021 suggest that China signals to the international audience on international cooperation emphasising diplomatic and peaceful resolutions while relatively less so in domestic media. The analyses have implications for how China signals foreign policy intentions amidst rising nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the evolution and hybrid nature of Chinese classical dance (gudianwu), exploring its development since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and its role in promoting national identity. It argues that the integration of elements from Soviet ballet and traditional Chinese theatre has created a unique dance form that challenges essentialist notions of Chineseness, presenting gudianwu as a product of postcolonial modernity.

This article focuses on China's policy response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Pelosi's action triggered a surge of popular nationalist sentiments in China, but the response of the Chinese government was far less tough than what many popular nationalists had expected. The article argues that the Chinese government's policy choice in response to Pelosi's visit to Taiwan did not depend on the demands of popular nationalists, but rather was based on a cost-benefit analysis according to its perceptions. The influence of popular nationalism on the government's foreign policy choices has been exaggerated owing to an overestimation of the government's reliance on nationalism for its regime legitimacy, and an underestimation of the government's control over public opinion and nationalist activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the complex process of symbolic boundary-making of 'Hongkonger' cultural identities through the lens of the controversial 2015 film Ten Years, which is a celebrated omnibus production comprised of five short segments that picture a dystopic end to Hong Kong's cherished way of life in the year 2025. The article is premised on an interdisciplinary approach engaging with cultural studies and film studies. On one hand, it explores how Ten Years functioned as a boundary object, a vast terrain within which cultural identities of what it means to be a Hongkonger are constructed, banished, imagined, and performed under the rubric of bodily performatives. On the other hand, it offers blurring encounters into unfamiliar and precarious territories where the formation and formulation of Hongkonger identities and sense of belonging are negotiated, evacuated, and inhabited. In the end, the key tropes in Ten Years suggest that boundary work in post-Umbrella Hong Kong affectively negotiates with state-level nationalism advocated by the central government in Beijing through establishing and reformulating notions of 'localism' and Hongkonger identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Chinese cyberspace, mass media and opinion leaders struggle over socio-political discourses. While the former propagates positive views on national policies, the latter often expresses dissenting opinions that challenge authoritarian rule. In the context of China–US competition, do citizens still perceive non-state sources as more credible? Taking the Belt and Road Initiative as the issue, this experimental study investigates how Chinese netizens process conflicting information from a government-owned news agency and two opinion leaders with varying levels of source credibility. Our findings reveal that high-credibility propagandistic news is effective, whereas low-credibility propaganda is not. Furthermore, an opinion leader perceived as independent surpasses government propaganda in influence, regardless of information credibility. However, when an opinion leader is perceived as backed by a rival nation, the former's influence is counterproductive unless their message credibility exceeds that of propaganda. This study sheds light on the prevalence of nationalistic sentiment in China, which has raised concerns about the manipulation of Chinese netizens by hostile forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how the nationalist, business-centric, elite-led and labour-subsuming logics of development in contemporary China are mirrored in contingent and locally-mediated ways in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China's present 'de-revolutionary' moment [Wang, 2006], non-elite populations are conceived as labour inputs to be used and moulded in the pursuit of national development through market means. This same developmental ethos, mediated by a plethora of Chinese and non-Chinese actors, underpins the authoritarian tendencies of BRI-branded projects across the world. While authoritarian practices in China have both Leninist and capitalist genealogies and drivers, I argue here that Global China's most tangible and remarkable impacts on international authoritarianism are found in the practices required to secure capital accumulation along the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's power grows, a widespread perception is that China is more willing to respond to nationalist demands and act assertively in international incidents. In reality, China has not supported and accommodated nationalism in all events but has cooled down nationalism in some cases. An important unanswered question is, why does the Chinese government demonstrate selectivity when responding to nationalism and take different foreign policies concerning nationalism in various incidents? This article provides a coherent and testable framework to answer this question and uses five cases to test the congruence and validity of the analytical framework. The core argument is that the primary concern of the Chinese government in dealing with nationalism is its legitimacy. When policymakers perceive severe threats to China's regime security and stability, they will open a 'safety valve' to embrace nationalism, allowing nationalism to unleash its anger under the government's monitor and escalating disputes to defend national interests and appease nationalism. When there are few threats to the regime, three factors will affect China's choice: the economic value of the diplomatic relationship, elements of China's core interests, and the viability of reaching an agreement that sets aside the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed a torrent of conspiracy theories across different social media platforms. Parallel to this conspiracy wave was a heightened sense of nationalism, which manifested through both in-group solidarity and perceived out-group threats. In this study, we examine how individuals' use of government social media to gather political information correlated with nation-related conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. Data were collected from 745 subjects in China and analyzed through path analyses, which allowed us to examine the direct association with political information consumption from government social media and the indirect association with nationalism on conspiracy beliefs. The results indicated that the use of government social media to gather political information was associated with greater beliefs in nation-variant COVID-19 conspiracies, both directly and through different mediations of nationalism. Our findings highlight the importance of examining government social media use and how nationalism can have differentiated mediation effects on beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current scholarship on Chinese public perceptions of international affairs tends to highlight the growing hawkishness and nationalistic tendencies in popular public opinion during the Xi Jinping era. Whereas these studies tend to deal with cases and contexts directly involving China, little is known about how the Chinese public responds to geopolitical crises in which China is not a direct participant. Our study attempts to address this gap by examining how Chinese social media commentators narrated and debated Russia's war in Ukraine—a major geopolitical event that has shaped China's interests but thus far has not directly implicated China in the conflict. Our analysis, drawing on online commentaries during the first six months of the Russia-Ukraine war, finds that the dominant narratives are still rooted in China-centric objectives and experiences. These nationalistic sentiments, however, diverge when it comes to advocating for China's positions on this war, ranging from direct support of Russia as part of China's battle against the West, to a cautionary position of learning from Russia's mistakes, to support for Ukraine as rooted in China's own experiences with foreign aggression. All these positions are distinct from the official stance of ambiguity in this conflict, highlighting the possibility of alternative, albeit still nationalistic, perspectives presenting themselves on social media despite strict censorship. This analysis contributes to our understanding of popular expressions on international affairs in the Xi era and, specifically, of the different manifestations of Chinese popular nationalism in contexts outside of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined how politics, along with familial and socioeconomic factors, influence the life satisfaction of marriage migrants in Taiwan. We conducted a social survey in Taiwan and offered a multidimensional and dynamic view on adaptation and life satisfaction among them. The results showed that in Taiwan, family relationships and socioeconomic class were significant factors of life satisfaction among mainland Chinese marriage migrants. A high level of social integration was positively related to life satisfaction, while the prejudice faced from neighbors, rather than from the media, was negatively related. Regarding political factors, political disagreement with their Taiwanese partners undermined life satisfaction among spouses from mainland China. However, those who possessed a dual identity (i.e., both Chinese and Taiwanese) and those who viewed mainland China and Taiwan as two separate entities tended to have high levels of life satisfaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Chinese football fans' reactions to the Japanese national team and their fans' behaviour during the World Cup 2022. Despite the historical and contemporary problems that make friendly relations with Japan difficult to achieve, football fans in China largely welcomed the good performance of the Japanese national team. This attitude may be described as 'thin cosmopolitanism' because Chinese fans' major frame of reference was still nationalistic. For them, the impressive performance of the Japanese national team means that Asians and the 'yellow race people' can also play good football. However, the Japanese fans, whose cleaning up of stadia received wide coverage during the World Cup, were criticized by the Chinese fans who interpreted the Japanese fans' action as reinforcing the existing global racial order. The findings of this paper help reveal the limits regarding football's role in contributing to a more cosmopolitan worldview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discipline of folklore studies was introduced to China in the early twentieth century while the country faced a grave national crisis resulting from intense foreign pressure and a rigid political system that was incapable of adapting to the challenges of the modern world. Nationalism contributed to the rising interest in folklore from the late 1910s to early 1920s, then became the dominant theme of folklore studies thereafter. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, folklore studies spread all over the country and developed vigorously within China. However, the eruption of the War of Resistance in 1937 interrupted this revitalization process and most folklore activities came to a standstill. In wartime China, leading scholars looked to the past in part as a reaction to Japanese imperialism, but also to strengthen cultural cohesion for the nation. In Japanese-occupied areas, some scholars persisted in independent folklore investigations and writing even though most upper tier Chinese universities and leading figures in the folklore movement gradually relocated to non-occupied territory. Scholars who remained in the occupation zone often had contact with foreign-backed institutions and were able to continue working during the war years. Their research activities served the purpose of rallying the nation and fed a growing popular demand for more and deeper investigations into China's folk traditions. This work examines the influence of nationalism on folk studies in Beiping and Shanghai, shining a light on folklorists' activities, folklore organizations, and primary publications during China's War of Resistance against Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is often considered as motivated by a desire to challenge the international status quo, a challenge the West is trying to mitigate. Social constructivists account for this challenge via a norm of nationalistic assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy; a norm constructed in the synergetic relationship between China's Communist Party and its nationalist movement. However, this work argues that Chinese foreign policy is motivated, in part, by nationalist pressure arising from an antagonistically symbiotic relationship between the Communist Party and China's nationalist movement. This understanding is significant as it indicates that western policies are paradoxically factoring in the emergence of a challenger China. © 2023 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Representing the nation in sports mega events has become a highly contested issue with the acceleration of the transnational movement of athletes. This research has examined Chinese people's attitudes to the naturalization of football players. The article discusses the findings in the context of the qualifying stages for the 2022 FIFA Men's World Cup by presenting and analysing data collected from semi-structured interviews and social media extracts. Two main issues were debated by Chinese people concerning the identity of naturalized athletes. One was the ethnicity of the naturalized footballers in relation to nationality, with some people questioning whether they belong to China and can represent China. The other issue concerned the players' skills and ability which influenced considerations of how much they could help China to qualify for the World Cup Finals. In relation to Chinese nationalism, national identity and Chinese sports, this study reveals, through the window provided by the presence of these naturalized footballers, how football, instrumentalism, nationalism and naturalization have been inextricably linked and have interacted with one another within the current context. The article analyses how pragmatic values have negotiated with ethno-cultural nationalism and impacted on the Chinese public's attitudes towards naturalized athletes, their image being presented in variable and dynamic ways by football fan netizens after each qualifying game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents new arguments on the role of trust in the government and nationalist sentiments in fostering policy-compliant behaviors. In July and September 2020, we launched two waves of a COVID-related survey in China with stratified quota sampling, and formed a longitudinal panel dataset of 822 responses. Based on the data, we examined how risk perceptions and nationalist sentiments jointly elicited trust in government agencies and, consequently, support for the state-sponsored immunization program. We argue that increasing concern about the risk to the state posed by the pandemic motivated Chinese citizens to rally around the government and comply with its vaccination drives. Nationalist sentiments simultaneously elevated risk perceptions, reinforcing their impact on trust in the government. Our findings contribute to the literature on crisis governance, offering new evidence on how trust in the government and nationalist sentiment may influence the dynamic interplay between risk perceptions and policy compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inaccessibility of ChatGPT to Chinese users has fueled public conspiracy theories surrounding the technology. We conducted a critical discourse analysis of 1,576 relevant Weibo posts to identify these conspiracy theories and the sociocultural and political factors at play. Our findings reveal four major themes, including a profound distrust of foreign high technology, nationalist fervor, disconcerting allegations of AI development, and sensational assertions of government manipulation of the fertility rate. More importantly, we observe that the escalation of nationalist sentiments in the online sphere exacerbates the spread of conspiracy theories, reflecting public concerns about the country's technological progress and global reputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Chinese party-state's production of visual racism towards Uyghurs as a discursive foundation for its ethnic policy, as globally reproduced and disseminated by non-state actors. The paper draws from theoretical literature on the relationship between visual politics and affect, stressing the need for visual literacy to reflect on how images emotionally affect audiences' identities and insecurities. It focuses this analysis on education texts in China's post-2012 'de-extremification' and 're-education' campaigns, specifically on how images tell stories about life-or-death security issues that define Chinese identity. Chinese education about Uyghurs tends to frame Uyghur identities as racialised, culturally external existential threats to be defeated by state violence or teaching them to be Chinese. However, Uyghurs' own visibility strategies in global advocacy counter the party-state's imagery by centring their lives and experiences. The article shows how these strategies can be used as resources for teaching about Chinese politics and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we discuss the Confucian tradition in today's multicultural China from two perspectives: that of the mandatory school curriculum, which represents 'official knowledge', and that of students from ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds who are located on the cultural margins in China. The analysis draws on curricular narratives of the Confucian tradition for six major school subjects and semi-structured interviews with a group of university students from non-Han ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds, whose lived experiences are rarely included in the national curriculum narrative. The analysis suggests that the interpretation of the Confucian tradition is a monopolising and dominant discourse that reinforces the cultural hierarchy between different cultural groups. However, the students appear to regard the Confucian tradition as only one culture and worldview in China, which can benefit from the critical reflexivity of other cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of the rising tension between Hong Kong and mainland China, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam blamed the city's education system for its inability to develop a sense of 'I am Chinese' national identity and vowed to step up 'national education' from preschool. This article explores how 188 young preschool teachers perceived their national identity and viewed the applicability of national education in Hong Kong preschools. Data were collected using both quantitative and qualitative measures. The findings showed that even though the participants strongly resisted their Chinese identity, they agreed that national education could be introduced in preschools if it would be rendered rational and apolitical. Nevertheless, they suspected that the administration's motive behind national education was political indoctrination. They also noted several pedagogical difficulties. Finally, the implications are discussed against the changing socio-political context, serving as lessons for local and international readers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As sport has become more globalized, there has been an increase in the number of athletes who have changed their nationality to maximize their chances to compete in international competitions. In order to maximize its chances at its home hosted Winter Olympic Games, the Chinese government authorized many foreign-born athletes to gain Chinese citizenship to compete for China. The purpose of the study was to explore how Chinese social media users perceived athlete naturalization of Chinese athletes during the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games. Through sentiment analysis and thematic analysis, results found that Chinese spectators generally had positive emotions toward these naturalized Olympians. Online discussions mainly focused on three topics: expressing their attitudes toward athlete naturalization, questioning the legitimacy of the strategy, and discussing athletes' heritage and cultural identities. This research hopes to broaden our understanding of the sport migrant issue in China, the perceptions of athletes who have naturalized, and the sentiments that Chinese consumers have of naturalized athletes at the Winter Olympic Games that were held in their country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This editorial introduces a themed section that focuses on the production of gender discourse and representations in the midst of tightening social and cultural control in China's entertainment industry and digital media landscape. In various ways, the two articles featured case studies that exemplify how the production of gender discourses and representations in this context emerges from the interplay of state control, the market, and the digital realm and unfolds against the rise of platform capitalism and techno-nationalism. Both articles center on the intricate and sometimes contradictory configurations of gender within China's state-market nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While national parochialism is commonplace, individual differences explain more variance in it than cross-national differences. Global consciousness (GC), a multi-dimensional concept that includes identification with all humanity, cosmopolitan orientation, and global orientation, transcends national parochialism. Across six societies (N = 11,163), most notably the USA and China, individuals high in GC were more generous allocating funds to the other in a dictator game, cooperated more in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, and differentiated less between the ingroup and outgroup on these actions. They gave more to the world and kept less for the self in a multi-level public goods dilemma. GC profiles showed 80% test–retest stability over 8 months. Implications of GC for cultural evolution in the face of trans-border problems are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasingly popular standpoint that the rise of Taiwanese identity has transformed Cross-Strait relations. The discourses of pro-unification are regarded as the antithesis of pro-independence. Seemingly, the shift from Han Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity has been a rupture in the recent development of Cross-Strait relations. This study sheds light on Wei Yung (Wei Yong, 1936–2004) and his concept of 'multi-system nations' to reassess this standpoint. Wei wanted to assist Taipei in recalibrating Cross-Strait relations in the late 20th century. He initiated the 'multi-system nations' concept to justify Taipei's adoption of dual recognition and parallel (international) participation. Wei used this concept to defend Taiwanese political scientists' collective representation in the International Political Science Association. However, the result was not as he had wished. Although Wei's concept of 'multi-system nations' is outdated and his wishful thinking about China's unification has become a path not taken for both Taipei and Beijing, this study shows that there is in fact common ground between the sympathisers of pro-independence and the advocates of unification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay traces the language of sacrifice used in a series of articles in the Protestant church magazine Tian Feng in the early 1950s to explore the ways in which sacrifice was demanded of Christians by church leaders, both to create an autonomous, indigenous church freed from imperialist association, and in service of the new nation. It explores the biblical tropes utilised to link sacrifice and nation, and the role of the Korean War in catalysing demand for physical martyrdom alongside ideological sacrifice. The essay suggests that the radical vehemence of the period masks continuities in theological expression with the earlier twentieth century and that much closer attention needs paying to the Chinese construct of 'nation' and its historic connotations in addressing the question of Chinese Christian nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid to late 1920s, the Chinese film industry experienced a severe setback. Driven by the Ming Xing Film Company and the 'Merchant Movement', the Shanghai Film Guild was established in September 1927. It was the first filmmaking industry guild in the history of China. It was relatively outgoing in safeguarding the interests of the industry. It played an important role in maintaining the image of the industry, forcing the film censorship authority to revise its policies, and resisting those foreign films that insulted China. However, it did not form effective industry regulations to address industry autonomy. It did not change the vicious competition in the industry significantly, either. The establishment and operation of the guild was obviously affected by the wave of nationalism at the time, which caused it to perform more intensely in some situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sheds light on the intricate relationship between the revival of Hanfu, traditional couture from the Han Dynasty, and rising Chinese nationalism among Chinese youth living in the United Kingdom. Mobilizing the theoretical tool 'affective economies', we explore how particular feelings and values are assigned and attached to Hanfu, and thereby circulate among young Chinese migrants. We begin by examining the Hanfu movement to interrogate how Hanfu is reinvented based on a selective historicity of the past, serving as a specific cultural product for China's rejuvenation. We then move on to analyze a series of in-depth interviews conducted between December 2019 and July 2020. We probe the lived experiences of young Hanfu supporters, who are members of the UK Han Culture Association, and the cultural events organized by the Association, in order to scrutinize the ways Hanfu conjures up an imagined community suffused with nationalism. Drawing upon on the affective economies of Hanfu, we discern the following three key findings: First, we argue that there are both positive and negative affective attachments to Hanfu, such as homesickness, loneliness, alienation, happiness, pride and beauty, which impinge on migrant bodies, assigning values to Hanfu and the Hanfu-related cultural events. Second, we show through the analysis of the fieldwork materials the paradoxical desire for chuguo (going abroad) and huiguo (returning to the nation) in the hearts of the young migrants. Finally, we argue that Hanfu circulates as a 'mnemonic thing' that signifies a specific imaginary of Ancient China, where young migrant's aiguo (love of the nation) sentiments are then 'stuck' to this reinvented fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops the concept of 'patriotic consumer mobilization' to explain how China uses informal boycotts as economic coercion. Patriotic consumer mobilization employs citizens as the unit of action, facilitating manipulability, uncertainty, and plausible deniability. It manages public sentiment for domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals. Citizens are mobilized via propaganda that underscores national humiliation, frames boycotts as grassroots patriotism, and signals resolve to foreign countries. After outlining conditions for use and a case comparison with Taiwan, we draw on Chinese-language sources to examine Beijing's coercion of South Korea over a missile defense system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay offers a timely analysis of how the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian warfare is observed in China through a gendered prism. Accounting for an anti-West axis in China's current political climate, we articulate how misogyny and nationalism converge in Chinese social media users' discussions about the military crisis currently unfolding in East Europe. This is revealed by a vulgar interpretation of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship and the sexualisation of Ukrainian/Russian women, which are both widespread in the Chinese-language social media sphere. With the patriarchal specificities of the Party-State polity in mind, the discussion yields a feminist perspective to foreground China's nationalist politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how India – both as a modern nation-state and a symbolic geography – is digested by Chinese self-cultivators to negotiate their belonging in China's spiritual nationhood, defined as the landscape of belief that corresponds to the geo-body of the nation-state. It follows the practitioners of Oneness (Heyi), one of the most popular Indian new religious movements in China today, for whom such negotiations are riddled with tensions. While Oneness practitioners align themselves with political orthodoxy disseminated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), emphasizing China's special role as a spiritual leader for humanity, they engage in quasi-religious heterodox practices, risking being labeled an "evil cult" (xie jiao). These frictions occur at the junction of two contrasting notions of spiritual nationhood, one derived from lingxing (spirituality) and the other from jingshen, a secularized notion of spirit that situates the CCP as the sacred center of the polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study advances the understanding of consumer nationalism through an analysis of a Chinese boycott of South Korean goods. In early 2017, Chinese internet users expressed their strong aversion to the South Korean conglomerate Lotte and coordinated a folk boycott against it on the grounds that Lotte supported South Korea's deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system, which China considered a threat. We explored the increasing convergence of consumer activities in the form of consumer nationalism with commercial entities' marketing strategies and also with the state's interests with respect to security and promoting national pride. The internet and new technologies have facilitated grassroots nationalist activities in terms of the ready circulation of information and mobilization of collective actions. We investigated a digital discursive space in the communicative interactions among stakeholders through which digital media not only amplify the scale and intensity of the mundane and everyday practice of nationalism but also blur the boundaries among the participating actors. Our research documented the multilateral relationships among stakeholders – individual consumers/media users, commercial entities, and the state – in practicing nationalism and reproducing the nation through (non)consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study systematically examines, deconstructs, and maps the quotidian nationalist discourse among Chinese netizens and analyzes their 'liking' behavior on the social media platform, Zhihu, in order to investigate what and how they talk about nationalism. The analysis of the quotidian expression of nationalism marks a shift from the previous practice of relying on high-profile nationalist movements as evidence which may create an incomplete or inaccurate impression that much of Chinese nationalism is virulent and over-zealous. This study finds that Zhihu users are critical nationalists who are competitive but judicious. The existence of levelheaded nationalists in China's online space suggests the limits of strident nationalist contagion and nationalist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots 'patriotic' content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as 'high-level black' (gaoji hei) or 'low-level red' (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state's patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism increasingly dominates public debate in mainland China. This article examines the impact of this trend on Chinese policymaking by looking at the public consultation procedure for new regulations on foreigners' permanent residency in February 2020. Following an unexpectedly large online outcry of anti-immigrant sentiment in response to the draft regulations, government actors shelved the proposal, which constituted a long-delayed step towards a more comprehensive immigration framework. Drawing on textual analysis, expert interviews, and survey data, the article analyzes elite-public interactions before, during, and after the controversy, asking what factors contributed to this miscalculation of public sentiment, and what the P.R. debate can tell us about the role of public opinion in Chinese policymaking today. It argues that popular nationalists can play a bottom-up politicizing role on previously marginal policy issues such as immigration, surprising and constraining the state. Such politicisation further limits both public and elite policy debate, impairing state information gathering and exacerbating the tension between Chinese policy actors' desire to both control and understand public sentiment. In addition, the permanent residency debate demonstrates the relevance of public opinion to China's non-democratic immigration policymaking, which displays a trajectory of gradual politicisation similar to other early-stage immigrant-reception contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-feminism and misogyny online have intensified globally over the last decade, bringing substantive challenges to feminist identification and activism. This article explores the strategies for silencing and expelling feminists via the deployment of an anti-feminist discourse online, in response to feminism's increasing visibility in China. Data was collected via observation of 23 influential feminist accounts on Weibo. This was bolstered by data from 10 semi-structured interviews with feminist Weibo account contributors. By applying critical discourse analysis (CDA), four strategies used to demonise feminists and depoliticise feminism online in China are identified: feminists as deviant women, as betraying the nation, as connected to Islamists, and as "fake-feminists." The article highlights a kind of intertwined anti-feminism that draws power from distinct features—nationalism and Islamophobia. It argues that by interlocking Chinese historical and structural conditions as well as cultural context, anti-feminism diverts public attention away from systematic gender inequality, and onto antagonisms between feminists and anti-feminists, which further restricts the discussion of intersectional oppressions that affect women's lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction for the Special Issue establishes and substantiates China as a timely case study for the understanding of cultural diplomacy and nation branding. It traces the country's mobilization of creative expressions, including contemporary art, to recalibrate its international image in line with its expanding power, but also more often, to offset what it perceives as hostile representations and critique of its authoritarian rule. We first disentangle the overlapping objectives and strategies between cultural diplomacy and national branding, then how they are rendered through artistic expressions to both redeem and – sometimes unintentionally – undermine China's reputation. Finally, we mark the relationship between the assembled papers which explore a variety of cultural diplomacy and nation branding activities that have emerged out of different artistic traditions, geopolitical contexts and economic motivations. These papers pursue diverse themes, for instance, the misalignment of nationalist branding messages and actual cultural relations on the ground, or the shifting of China's external image as dictated by the evolving agenda of the Chinese Communist Party. The particularities of these approaches and discoveries, nevertheless, coalesce to underscore that knotted relationship between politics and aesthetics which China must manage and manipulate continually to sway global perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]