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The likelihood of confusion standard defines the scope of trademark infringement. Likelihood of confusion examines whether there is a substantial risk that consumers will be confused as to the source, identity, sponsorship, or origin of the defendants' goods or services. This Article presents a contemporary empirical analysis of the various factors and how they interact. Conventional wisdom teaches us that courts should comprehensively traverse each factor and that likelihood of confusion cases generally require jury determination. However, the data reveals that neither is true. Instead, courts provide early off-ramps to litigants by "economizing," and analyzing only a handful of factors or by "folding" factors within each other. The findings also reveal (1) which forums are pro-defendant and which are pro-plaintiff; (2) the impact of rivalry and fair use on outcomes; and (3) an apparent Ninth Circuit dominance. What constitutes "confusion" remains highly subjective and difficult to evaluate. Proxies like intent, survey evidence, mark strength, and consumer sophistication fail to incorporate real-world purchasing conditions or are better considered within omnibus factors. In contrast, actual confusion, mark similarity, and competitive proximity provide judges with a potent trio of factors to guide the infringement inquiry. Together with safe harbors for descriptive and expressive uses, these rules of thumb enable courts to resolve trademark disputes more coherently, consistently, and expeditiously. This Article concludes with a blueprint of how these rules of thumb complement artificial intelligence systems and how those systems can use empirical studies as training data to inform future likelihood of confusion analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on background information on the U.S. trademark law, traditional infringement, and upcycling which is materially different from traditional infringement. It mentions pervasive infringement framework, including traditional infringement exceptions and policy arguments that distinguish upcycling from traditional infringement. It also mentions necessity of distinguishing between traditional infringement and upcycling.

The article examines the laws aimed to prohibit trademark bullying in the U.S. Topics discussed include elements of federal and Missouri trademark infringement laws; provision of Lanham Act aimed to protects trademarks used in interstate commerce; and purpose of cease and desist letters for trademark infringement claims.

The article look at the need of creating a federal law to remove the disparity of leverage trademark holders in the U.S. small businesses as of April 2015. Topics discussed include the overactive trademark policing in the country; methods that companies use against trademark bullying; and domestic trademark laws and the trademark law from the foreign jurisdiction.

The article discusses the court case Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank wherein Hana Financial made allegations on Hana Bank in the District Court for the Central District of California regarding the violation of its registered federal trademark. The District Court granted judgment to Hana Financial on infringement claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the issue and passed judgment in favor of Hana Bank.

The article focuses on the need to determine the willfulness' proper place when awarding damages disgorged from the trademark infringer's profits. Topics discussed include trademark protection and legislative actions taken to preserve the protection, U.S. Congress's silence on willful infringement under the common law and damage-based policies of compensation. It mentions the decision of district court of Connecticut in Romag Fasteners Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. related to trademark confusion.

The author focuses on a decision held by the High Court of England and Wales that the use of the word "Pink" by lingerie retailer Victoria's Secret for its clothing sub-brand infringed the registered trade marks of the retail luxury clothing company Thomas Pink under the Trade Marks Act (TMA) 1994. Topics discussed include the challenge to the validity of the mark, partial revocation of the mark, and registered trade mark infringement under TMA. Also mentioned is the likelihood of confusion.

The authors focus on the court case Bimbo SA v. OHIM, Panrico SA which is related to composite trade marks (CTMs), and the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to the assessment of composite marks and the likelihood of confusion. They note that the Trade Marks (TM) Directive of the European Union (EU) law provides protection for national trade marks. Also mentioned are decisions held by the CJEU on court cases Sabel v. Puma and Medion v. Thomson.

The article explores the factors that contributed to the introduction of confusion into the legal discourse. The factors include the creation of the registration system itself, developments in the case law around the notion of deception, the breakdown of the rigidities in the law and the changes in how the system saw the individual. The rise of utilitarianism, the acceptance of the internal life of individuals and their possession of knowledge is discussed.

The article discusses whether a European Union (EU) legal test for trade mark confusion on the Internet differs from the tests that are applied to trade mark infringement in other spheres, focusing on the legal cases OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital and Interflora v. Marks & Spencer Flowers Direct which deal with initial interest confusion and the likelihood of association online. Community trade marks, Great Britain's Trade Marks Act 1994, and the trade origin of goods or services are examined.

The article focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) court case Leidseplein Beheer BV and de Vries v. Red Bull GmBH, which dealt with trademark infringement under the European Union (EU) Trade Marks Directive 89/104. Topics include trademark reputation and efforts to prevent trademark confusion.

The purpose of this piece is to draw attention to parallels between how European trade mark law treats certain issues pertaining to distinctiveness in the light of the Kit Kat reference and recent United States scholarship on confusion. It will be argued that, while the courts require a detailed consideration of consumer perception in establishing distinctiveness, this is not always the case when it comes to establishing confusion. However, a group of US scholars have called for a consideration of the real effect of junior use on consumers as part of the confusion test. I argue that this scholarship and European developments in the field of distinctiveness share a refreshing concern for the reality of consumer perception. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the use of consumer surveys to determine the extent of trademark confusion. Topics include the measurement of advertising on consumers, the use of surveys in trademark infringement litigation, and the International Trademark Association. Information is provided on false advertising laws in the U.S.

The article discusses U.S. trademark laws and a reported need to protect a brand's reputation as of January 2014, focusing on various defenses to trademark infringement such as fair use, parody, and noncommercial use. Trademark use is addressed in relation to unsponsored product placements in mass media. Trademark confusion and dilution claims are assessed, along with the U.S. Lanham Act and the distinctiveness of a trademark. The U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause is also examined.

The article focuses on the British court case BSkyB v. Microsoft, which dealt with actual evidence of trademark confusion. Topics include the passing off violation of trademark law, counterclaims for invalidity, and retaliation for trademark infringement. Information is provided on the primary law of registered trademark infringement.

The article focuses on trademark law interpretation by U.S. federal circuit courts in 2013. Topics include the difference between senior and junior users in cases of reverse trademark confusion, the federal courts' interpretation of trademark law in the U.S., and the authority of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).

This Article critically examines the core infringement standard for trademark law--the "likelihood of confusion" test--which imposes liability if an appreciable number of consumers are likely to be confused by the defendant's use of its mark. The test is a mess. It produces bad results, is doctrinally incoherent, and lacks a sensible normative foundation. It chills socially valuable uses and facilitates excessively broad expansions of trademark law, and it includes factors that make no sense as predictors of likely confusion. Most importantly, the test erroneously assumes that consumer confusion is enough to warrant liability without regard to the harmful consequences or the moral wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. This Article diagnoses these problems and proposes a set of promising reforms. It begins by presenting a systematic history of the test's origins. The likelihood of confusion test emerged in the early 1960s as a compromise between conflicting views about the proper scope of protection against noncompeting uses, a compromise that papered over the conflict without resolving the underlying normative disagreement. The result is a test without a secure normative foundation and one that remains plagued by the conflicts and disagreements that gave it birth. The test's history also suggests a promising avenue for reform. To improve the infringement standard, one must start at the normative level and work from a coherent theory of trademark law's goals. This Article distinguishes between moral and economic goals and fits infringement standards to the most plausible justifications for protecting marks. In those cases involving a moral wrong, such as intentional deception, moral principles should shape the test. In those cases where the economic goals of trademark law are paramount, the test should focus not only on the probability of confusion but also on the trademark-related harm that confusion generates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the problems faced by the European Union (EU) in the digital environment for the protection of trademark under the EU trademark law. Emphasis on the need of a more flexible and appropriate limitation infrastructure which will counterbalance the broad grant of protection is highlighted. Information on the traditional trademark protection against confusion under the article 5(1) of the Trademark Directive (TMD), and against dilution in article 5(2) TMD is presented.

The CJEU has provided valuable guidance on the interpretation of ‘due cause’ (under Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 (now replaced by Directive 2008/95)) where a sign that is identical or similar to a registered trade mark with a reputation was already being used in good faith before the registered trade mark was applied for. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the Japanese court cases Delta K.K. v Commissioner of Japan Patent Office, Fuji Heavy Industries K.K. v Toyo Systems K.K., and Automobili Lamborghini SpA v Liberty Walk K.K., which dealt with third-party unauthorized trademark registrants in the automobile industry. Topics include trademark protection in Japan, the problem of trademark confusion or infringement, and the court's determination on the similarity of trademarks.

In OHIM v riha WeserGold Getränke, the CJEU held that the enhanced distinctiveness of an earlier mark is irrelevant to the assessment of a likelihood of confusion between dissimilar marks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the European court case IPC Media Ltd. v. Media 10 Ltd., which dealt with the concurrent use of retail trademarks. Topics include the interpretation of European Union (EU) trademark law by the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court, trademark confusion, and the establishment of double identities in trademark law.

The German Federal Supreme Court referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the scope of information claims a trade mark owner can invoke against third parties in cases of alleged trade mark infringement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the European court case Aveda Corp. v. Dabur India Ltd., which dealt with trademark confusion under the British Trade Marks Act of 1994. Topics include the law governing community trademarks, the likelihood of public confusion test applied to trademark infringement claims, and the precedent set by the European court case Medion v. Thomson.