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On several occasions, Finn Collin has engaged in discussions surrounding social constructivism, a relatively recent theoretical orientation emerging through the development of naturalized science studies from the 1970s. Inspired by Finn's work, this paper explores the distinction between 'social constructivism' and 'social constructionism' and their origins in various strands of the sociology of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a substantial literature in the tradition of constructivism and sociological new institutionalism that suggests the existence of shared EU norms. Yet, the issue of how EU norms are adopted and/or contested in EU member states remains underexamined. In the paper, we therefore study the public discourse on citizenship in Latvia and examine how the discourse relates to EU norms on citizenship, minority rights and in the broader sense human rights. The analysis takes its empirical starting point in the period after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and focuses on how the issue of statelessness was discussed in the Latvian online media. Looking at how the contested term ('statelessness') achieves different meanings in the Latvian discourse, and how the domestic actors try to reformulate the EU norms in question, we aim at a better understanding of the diffusion of norms within the context of a regional organization. The conclusion indicates that apart from the EU human rights norm, there are several different articulations of statelessness (i.e. othering, security and instrumental) that are present in the discourse. This has enabled Latvian governments to stress their commitment to human rights promotion, while simultaneously facing criticism regarding the country's stateless inhabitants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports the findings of a study examining the social/discursive construction of an author (Brenda Dervin) by an international community of researchers (information behavior researchers). A crucial conceptual starting point for the study was Michel Foucault's work on the discursive construction of power/knowledge. The study represents one attempt to develop a discourse analytic approach to the study of information behavior. The researcher carried out semistructured qualitative interviews, based in part on Dervin's ‘Life-Line’ and ‘Time-Line’ techniques, with fifteen information behavior researchers from eight universities in five countries in Europe and North America. The study's findings provide a case study in how discourse operates at the microsociological level. It provides examples of how community members engage with, accept, and contest both new and established ‘truth statements’ and discursive practices. They demonstrate that both participants' formal and informal information behaviors are the product of discursive power/knowledge relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we suggest that constructivism has the potential to inform research in strategic management. The realist paradigm currently dominates strategy research, and constructivism, a well-established tradition in the philosophy of science, is often ignored. However, a study of strategy literature and research reveals that it is drawn upon more frequently than is explicitly acknowledged. Constructivism occupies a methodological space characterized by ontological realism and epistemological relativism. Ontological realism is an important cornerstone of a field as applied as strategy, while epistemological relativism helps us explore the constructed nature of the field, where the researcher is an active participant rather than a reactor or information processor. In this paper, we demonstrate the precedents and possibilities for constructivist research in strategic management. We examine some of the existent constructivist works in the strategy literature, and point to specific techniques, including historical analysis, to demonstrate how this perspective may advance the boundaries of strategy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raskin and Debany (this issue) profess my failure to appreciate how constructivism does not warrant an “anything-goes” relativism. In this reply, I explain how whether any postmodernist doctrine endorses an “anything-goes” epistemology (or a radical relativism) depends on the nature of the constraints that warrant its propositions. I revisit the three core postmodernist claims that I criticized in previous work, which criticism Raskin and Debany now in turn criticize. Emphasis is given to how an objectivist epistemology, contrary to postmodernist belief, does not entail certitude, and moreover incorporates (a) active and indirect knowing, (b) the situated origins of all empirical knowledge, and (c) a subject/object distinction for certain kinds of human/social kinds. I use the example of racist rhetoric to illustrate how discourse can and does affect extradiscursive realities, thereby implicating our moral obligation to seek objective truth as best we can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don't state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant's moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant's answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, mathematicians Absalom and Consuela present their views on ethical aspects of mathematics. Topics discussed include difference in opinion between the two related to ethical implications of mathematical knowledge; explanation in support of mathematical ethics by Consuela such as mathematical proof to validate problems, refinement and development of mathematical concepts, and social constructivism as mathematical philosophy; and counter arguments of Absalom on the same.

The processes of globalization and regionalization worldwide require new forms of regulation, which must overcome, coordinate and organize the current institutional normative structures characteristic of modernity. The present work is an epistemological essay, based on Jean Piaget, that proposes the need to extend the current normative structures, namely moving from an institutional modern stage to a postmodern systemic stage. This proposal is based, first, on the existence of sociocognitive stages that determine the essential characteristics of any social structure of regulation. Second, the proposal is based on the global construction of a new stage of sociocognitive regulatory structures: the constructivist-systemic stage. Third, the approach predicts the emergence of a new state structure with a systemic character: the International-State. This new structure of systemic governance would only be able to arise on the basis of the institutional normation structures of the current nation-state. The neopiagetian methodological analysis - with dialectical character - that this article exposes aims to demonstrate the mentioned sociocognitive thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the article "What Can the Global Observer Know?" by Diana Gasparyan published in the current issue of the journal. Topics include key notions of radical constructivism, elimination of notions including omniscient interpreter, and the doubt created by constructivism due to how it describes one's relationship with reality.

Ordinary normative discourse includes talk about the reasons for action we had in the past but only came to discover in hindsight. In some cases, we come to discover these reasons not because new information has come to light, but because our values have changed. Contemporary metaethical views, namely Street's Humean constructivism and Blackburn's and Gibbard's quasi-realism, have some difficulty accounting for these reasons and the claims we make about them. This difficulty hinges on the diachronic complexity of these reasons and claims. It cannot be the case that these reasons were constructed by the perspective we had in the past before our values changed. If there were no extant reasons in the past, then it would seem that our claims about them in the present cannot be true. Quasi-realists can account for the way in which reason claims purport to be true by appealing to a deflationary sense of truth and so can remain agnostic on the actual existence of these reasons. Nevertheless, Street argues that this agnosticism is inconsistent with the quasi-realists' naturalism that should have them reject the existence of such reasons. I argue that Street would suffer from an even more acute form of this inconsistency were she to account for reasons only discovered in hindsight. At best her view does no better than the view of her chosen rivals. At worst, it discounts reasons that are so central to our moral development that it fails to be plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Context The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are "wicked problems," such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response to commentaries on his article on the need for a new scientific method or a second-order science. He explains his position on the existence of several epistemologies and that constructivism is more versatile compared with the other epistemologies. He also discusses the four models used in science and supports the suggestion that second-order science will preserve the practical powers of current science.

Problem The inclusion of the observer into scientific observation entails a vicious circle of having to observe the observer as dependent on observation. Second-order science has to clarify how its underlying circularity can be scientifically conceived. Method Essayistic and conceptual analysis, sporadically illustrated with agent-based experiments. Results Second-order science -- implying science in general -- is fundamentally and ineluctably circular. Implications The circularity of second-order science asks for analytical methods able to cope with phenomena of complex causation and "synchronous asynchrony," such as tools for analyzing non-linearly interacting dynamics, decentralized, clustered networks and in general, systems of complex interacting components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay presents a long, detailed, in many ways critical but also appreciative account, of David Bloor's recent book The Enigma of the Aerofoil. I take that work as the crowning statement of ideas and principles developed over the past four decades by Bloor and other exponents of the 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge. It therefore offers both a test-case of that approach and a welcome opportunity to review, clarify and extend some of the arguments brought against it by critical realists. This purpose is particularly well served by Bloor's having here assembled such a wealth of scientific, historical, political and socio-cultural data concerning one specific, very crucial period of research into theories of aerodynamic lift. His book thus provides an exceptionally useful point of engagement for anyone seeking to adjudicate these issues from a critically angled but engaged and constructive standpoint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the notion of communicative action on the basis of Alfred Schutz' writings. In Schutz' work, communication is of particular significance and its importance is often neglected by phenomenologists. Communication plays a crucial role in his first major work, the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt from 1932, yet communication is also a major feature in his unfinished works which were later completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann: The Structures of the Life World (, ). In these texts, Schutz sometimes refers to 'communicative action,' and he comes to ascribe a crucial role to communication within the domain of the life world he calls everyday life. Based on Schutz' texts, I shall first attempt to critically reconstruct the defining features of his notion of communication and communicative action. As a result, it emerges that Schutz' notion of communication, particularly in its early incarnation, seems to be, at first glance, characterized by a dichotomy between virtual communication, that is communicative action in a narrow sense, and non-virtual communication. As I want to show with respect to the seemingly established dichotomous distinction between 'mediated' and 'immediate social action,' Schutz himself started to overcome this dichotomy. Based on this thesis, I will try to sketch a basic outline of a theory of communicative action, a theory less formulated by Schutz' than built on Schutz' writings. As the idea of communicative action, and particularly the transgression of the distinction between mediated and immediate action, affects the very structures of the life-world described by Schutz and Luckmann, I will ultimately demonstrate that any mundane phenomenology of the life-world requires a triangulatory method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociologia del Lavoro is the property of FrancoAngeli srl and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article critiques constructivist approaches to the international relations of the Middle East and sets out an alternative interpretation of the role of ideas based on political economy and the sociology of knowledge. It cautions against using constructivism as a way of ‘building bridges’ between IR and Middle East Studies and disputes the claim that the norms of ‘Arabism’ as a putative regional identity are in contradiction with those of sovereignty. The article shows that this assumption is based on the combined influences of modernisation theory and Orientalist assumptions about the power and continuity of regional culture that have persisted in Middle East IR. This is despite the fact that there is no reason to believe the Arabs constitute a more ‘natural’ nation than do the Syrians, Iraqis or Egyptians. The political role and resonance of ideas can be better established by viewing the modern history of the Middle East in terms of domestic structure and social change, and in particular emphasising the role of rising middle classes in revolutionary nationalist movements. The findings of this article raise questions for the utility of ‘moderate’ constructivist interpretations of International Relations as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this work, through a review of the debate carried out between Michel Lynch and David Bloor in 1992, as well as a re-reading of Peter Winch's work ''Understanding a primitive society'' (1964), I will argue that the processes of demystification of the knowledge that took place in the past decades shows a positive proposal. This consists in the possibility of offering a critical focus that would permit the social studies of science and technology to transcend their descriptivist limits. It makes possible that, even accepting that the epistemic practices are culturally dependent, that they are invaluable in the light of other cultures. [TRANSLATION]

The discussion in this essay is the result of a dialogue between William Gavin and the Cologne program of interactive constructiveism. First, we give an introduction to language in James and Rorty combined with constructivist reflections. Second, we provide an extended and deepened exploration of the relation of language and experience. Here we expand the discussion and also include perspectives from Dewey. Third, we draw conclusions to the important philosophical issues of relativism and arbitrariness as questions to which pragmatism as well as constructivism must give constructive responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Despite many obvious advantages (radical) constructivism seems to have over other philosophies - such as a dynamical understanding of knowledge, the inclusion of interdisciplinary aspects, and practical applications such as tolerance and pluralism as well as active learning - it has failed to become a mainstream philosophy that is widely taught and discussed. > Problem • What are the reasons for this failure? Can we identify attributes that make it difficult for scholars to accept and even embrace radical constructivist ideas? What is the best way to characterize, explain, and eventually refute objections? > Method • By collecting articles from both proponents and opponents of radical constructivism, the editors of this special issue have tried to present a range of answers to these questions. > Results • Some problems are due to known objections to radical constructivism, in particular the idea that being responsible for one's own constructions opens doors to a "whatever" attitude. Another important insight is that constructivism seems to resemble a river delta with ever branching new sub-disciplines that become increasingly incompatible with each other. Its practical aspects seem to find wider acceptance than its philosophical assumptions. > Implications • The insights gained from the contributions to this issue may lead to a re-orientation of (radical) constructivism, which will include fewer misunderstandings among its critics, and to a higher acceptance of radical constructivism in the academic community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • A number of objections that are frequently raised in the literature against radical constructivism, including: the charge of solipsism, allegations of self-refutation, social and moral reservations, and the accusation that RC cannot explain the success of science. > Problem • These four objections are sought to be refuted. > Results • 1. Solipsism is only troublesome against the background of a realist ontological perspective. 2. The truth-value of any proposition is only defined relative to some ontological context; hence self-refutation, as constituting a logical problem, does not arise. 3. Any ethical argumentation derives from one's own personal views on ethical matters: their construction being a personal responsibility such that no one else can tell a person how to construct the "right ethics." 4. In the relativist ontology of radical constructivism, a scientific theory is regarded as a model imposed on natural phenomena; its success is due to the capabilities of its constructor (the scientists). > I mplications • It is found that the objections to radical constructivism are based on an (overt or tacit) adoption of the antithetical viewpoint of scientific realism. In other words, radical constructivism is being criticised for not promoting a realist ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem • An answer to the question of whether or not Radical Constructivism RC can or will become a mainstream endeavour is difficult, because what is called RC is a bundle of quite divergent approaches and not a homogenous (super) theory. Therefore the article concentrates upon "classical" RC as developed first of all by von Glasersfeld, von Foerster and Maturana and Varela. The pros and cons of their approaches are discussed and evaluated. > S olution • In order to overcome the most obvious problems of RC, a strict process-oriented kind of argumentation is developed that replaces is/is not assertions with descriptions of processes and their results, thus answering the question of what might reasonably be called "construction." > Benefit • The paper presents a way of rewriting RC, i.e., avoiding its evident problems, without abandoning the insights that RC thinkers have gained in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is ethical knowledge. In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for responding to this objection. My conclusion is that, although both constructivists and expressivists can capture other surface-level features of ethical thought and discourse, the possibility of ethical knowledge causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. I end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a response to these special problems, which points, somewhat surprisingly, towards an alternative inferentialist form of irrealism about epistemic and ethical thought and discourse, which is inspired by Sellars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "Holistic Constructivist Approach" is a proper analytical framework for explaining Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Contrary to Systemic and Domestic Constructivism, Holistic Constructivism examines the effects of both domestic and systemic normative environments on states' foreign policy. The article argues that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is driven by revolutionary values and ideological perspectives at the domestics level and confrontational or non-confrontational normative environment at the systemic level. In order to understand Iranian foreign policy behavior, one should try to understand the basic characteristics of the country's normative and discursive structures on the one hand, and the nature of international normative environment on the other hand. To this end, the article applies Holistics Constructivism as the most applicable theory for explaining the country's foreign policy behavior. This approach help us to understand why Iranian foreign policy towards the Western countries in general and the United States in particular, even when under systemic pressure, has remained relatively unchanged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

THE ONGOING DEBATE on Deaf epistemologies reflects two major paradigms in deaf education: positivism and constructivism. The present article investigates Deaf epistemologies through a metaparadigm, which should blur the boundaries among different paradigms and connect the epistemological inquiry to instructional practice for d/Deaf students. The author states that researchers and educators should not be obsessed with defending a particular paradigm and attacking others, but should move toward paradigmatic integration. If successful instructional practices are to be fully understood, each paradigm needs insights from the others. Furthermore, effective classroom instruction should be based on the goal of the educational activity and the ability of the students in the classroom. Mainstream theories and research in English literacy education can and should be applicable to d/Deaf students; furthermore, using appropriate instructional tools, teachers of the d/Deaf can and should teach phonologically related skills to their students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a response to an article by Wolfgang Sander, published in volume 20, issue 2 of this journal, and discusses the relationship between scholarly research, legal guarantees of academic and intellectual freedom, and the problems of partisanship and ideological indoctrination in civics education. Reflections on the epistemological assumptions of the original article, especially with respect to the philosophical concept of constructivism, are also offered.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the account of the fact presented by Václav Černík. First, the author outlines the views of the defenders of the naïve realism, constructivism (or narrativism), and critical realism in historiography. The leading proponents of narrativism hold, that what the historians construe is not single facts, but general narrative interpretations. The second part offers a critical analysis of some notions and distinctions introduced by Černík in his theory of the social fact. The most questionable are his concept of observation statements and his way of differentiating between observational and theoretical statements. The author's conclusion is that the most reliable is the middle ground between naïve realism and constructivism in their radical forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is a great discrepancy between experts and public in the perception of science risks, the interpretation of the discrepancy is in argument where the "realism" and "constructivism" are basically the two opposite theories. However, it is found that the interpretation based on the two theories is so defective that it is unable to settle the argument. From the perspective of sociology, the discrepancy between the risk perception of experts and of public is actually resulting from the divergent views between social and scientific rationality, and the root cause is the trust crisis in the risky society. To solve the problem, a social consensus including both social and scientific rationality is required by way of opening the public forum for democratic consultation and public participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Goldman's project of a veritistic social epistemology is based on a descriptive-success account of truth and a weak notion of knowledge as mere true belief. It is argued that, contrary to Goldman's opinion, pragmatism and social constructivism are not necessarily ruled out by the descriptive-success account of truth. Furthermore, it is shown that it appears to be questionable whether Goldman has succeeded to show that there is a weak notion of knowledge. But even if such a weak notion of knowledge can be defended, this notion can result in a complete separation of knowledge from epistemic value, which does not seem to be in accordance with Goldman's concept of societal knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivist political theory, championed most prominently by John Rawls, builds up a conception of justice from the minimal requirements of political life. It has two powerful attractions. It promises a kind of civic unity in the face of irresolvable differences about the good life. It also offers a foundation for human rights that is secure in the face of those same differences. The very parsimony that is its strength, however, deprives it of the resources to condemn some atrocities. Because it focuses on the political aspect of persons, it has difficulty cognizing violence done to those aspects of the person that are not political, preeminently the body. Constructivism thus can be only a part of an acceptable theory of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While universalist theories have come under increasing attack from relativist and post-modern critics, such as Walzer, MacIntyre and Rorty, Kantian constructivism can be seen as a saviour of universalist ethics. Kantian constructivists accept the criticism that past universalist theories were foundational and philosophically comprehensive and thus contestable, but dispute that universalist principles are unattainable. The question then arises if Kantian constructivism can deliver a non-foundational justification of universal principles. Rawls, the first Kantian constructivist, has seemingly retreated from the universalist ambitions of Kantian constructivism. However, others have taken tip the project of Kantian constructivism. One of them is O'Neill, who argues that she can succeed where Rawls failed and provide a truly universal non-foundational constructivism. Her requirements for such a constructivism are a constructive justification of the procedure of construction and the use of only abstract, non-ideal starting points. I will argue that O'Neill fails on both accounts. Instead of justifying the principle of practical reason constructively she gives an instrumental and therefore conditional justification. Instead of relying on purely abstract starting points her account builds on an underlying value assumption. This indicates inherent contradictions within constructivism, and might force defenders of universalism to look elsewhere to answer the relativist and post-modern critic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article expresses basic agreement with pedagogue Wolfgang Sander's adoption of the Beutelsbach Consensus on political education and teaching methods. The author, however, takes issue with Sander's adoption of constructivist principles to extend that pedagogical foundation to education in general, which arguably is a task better accomplished through principles formulated by philosopher Immanuel Kant.

The author considers how constructivism, presently known to us essentially as a theory for generating rules of social cooperation, embodies a certain conception of justification that in turn may be thought of as a general theory. It is argued that moral realism and projectivism are by turns platitudinous and unsatisfactory as conceptions of justification; by contrast the general conception of justification in constructivism makes sense of reason giving and coherent rivalry. The author argues that once the right picture of justification is in place, the picture constructivism illustrates or embodies, the problem of moral ontology disappears. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from the environment correctly represents features of mind independent objects. With regard to the first condition, I have argued elsewhere that a part of visual processing, which I call “perception,” is theory-neutral and nonconceptual. In this paper, facing the second demand, I argue that a part of the nonconceptual content of perception presents properties that are the properties of mind independent objects. I claim first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis of the issue at the level of beliefs about the world. Then I claim that a subset of the nonconceptual content presents features of objects in the environment as they really are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Swiss Journal of Sociology / Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The status of constructivism as an open and accommodating intellectual approach is at odds with its aim of becoming the most appropriate site for a theory-practice synthesis. As an exemplar of the social concern that forms the ontology of constructivism, human rights is well placed to provide the context of a critique. More often than not, human rights are taken to be an unreliable variable within differently conceived international political schema. It is now an appropriate time to look again at the opportunities that human rights offers in establishing the cohesion of constructivism. Challenging the limitations of preconceived notions of social knowledge, the focus of the article will be on the human-rights side of the equation; namely, its features as a universal and its manifestation as a power, and what they tell us about the requirements for "becoming theory." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first-order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation-specific” and yet retain truth-independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses meaning per the "constructivist world view." The author breaks down communication into three steps on both the "sender" and the "receiver" side, and the problems that can affect these steps and thereby distort meaning. The constructivist view comes into play because people need to categorize information and to fit it into their structure of reality.

The article focuses on the important issues regarding functional contextualism of Eric J. Fox. The author mentions the important issues of functional contextualism including assessment of the current conceptual framework wherein instructional designers are doing development and research, different conceptual framework to guide them and specific examples of the paths within the framework. He also comments on the failure to distinguish separate various constructivism and the lack of theoretical clarity in the constructivist writing.

The paper reviews several evolutionary theories of technological change, gathering them in two groups: (a) historical and philosophical; (b) economic. The goal is to determine and analyze the philosophical issues, themes and vocabulary common to such theories. These theories are contrasted with the pseudo-evolutionary and social-constructivist theories. The study moves from deterministic, linear evolutionary theories, to the bi-directional and multi-linear evolutionary theories. An analogy between technological change and the theory of evolution is established. Based on this revision, the paper upholds an evolutionary theory of technological change denominated the Third Way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the presence of technology's image problem among young females. The trend in the field of technology suggests an imbalanced and stratified condition especially in terms of gender quality. It is indicated that the technology has been associated with men while women suffers from underestimated representation. As a constructive remedy, theoretical foundations of essentialism and constructivism approaches are introduced to reshape the technology by utilizing women's extensive incorporation.

The article presents a counter argument regarding the author's philosophical views. Philosophers Fred Ellet and Dave Ericson criticized the author for developing a Popperian constructivist framework that is deficient and cannot accommodate pragmatic realism. However, according to the author, the framework was only descriptive and does not explain his position on issues related to constructivism. Besides, he did not advocate any philosopher's position, even that of Karl Popper. Ellet and Ericson also endorsed the use of tables in epistemological and ontological discussions. The author disagree with their views that tables can replace a detailed preparatory discussion. With regards to the relevance of Bloom's taxonomy in epistemology, the author claimed that the former was never intended to be a handbook in the latter.

Explores the idea of plurealism. Discussion of the presumable educational implications of the constructivist views of Nelson Goodman as well as of those same ideas commonly accepted in educational contexts; Defense of Israel Scheffler on realism; Rejection of monism and reductionism.

Abstract: Three approaches to the problem of how intercultural dialogue on ethics can be effectively conducted among people who embrace different cultural beliefs and values are examined. Universalist approaches contend that it is possible to formulate a set of norms which apply to all cultures equally, but fail as a framework for intercultural dialogue on ethics because there is in fact no agreement across cultures about what is “universal.” Relativist approaches are based on the idea that each culture has its own particular values and norms, which are incommensurable with those of other cultures, but also fail because they provide no real way for people from different cultures to effectively work together in resolving common problems. The paper argues in favor of a third approach, constructivism, which suggests that since the rules necessary to govern cross-cultural interactions do not yet exist, they can only be created through a dialogical process in which the participants attempt to critique existing norms and arrive at a more adequate set of norms which are capable of resolving the specific problems they face. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Presents an overview of articles related to the potentialities and limits of realist constructivism in general.

In recent years, constructivists in International Relations have been attempting to 'seize the middle ground' between positivist objectivism and postmodernist relativism. Yet, while useful in rendering the approach more palatable to mainstream researchers, these efforts risk leading to premature ontological closure. We therefore propose that constructivist research be extended to a 'sociational' research agenda. Based on Georg Simmel's process theory of Vergesellschaftung, it joins contemporary constructivists on the epistemological middle ground while liberating itself from some of their ontological restrictions. The sociational perspective endogenizes the actors' corporate identities as a way to trace 'entity processes' such as the creation and dissolution of actors as well as boundary change. Such an analytical shift makes it possible to imagine, and thus also to analyze, past, present and even future worlds constituted by co-evolving social formations, such as nations, ethnic groups, supranational organizations and states. We show how sociational analysis complements and surpasses conventional explanations of cooperation and conflict as applied to the democratic peace and ethnic conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world empirical evidence shows a total slump of the promotion of development programs, at least in the period of 1941 -2001, period in which the theoretic concept of development turns in a political concept. The different intervention forms and the unlimited costs resources show a pathetical separate world within a limited number of "winners" and a great joint of "losers". The author affirms that from now on it must be considered the development fomentation as a Kantian "categorical imperative". Also, it must be put in first place the axiological dimension of development, showing its state and intangible process character, subjective, dependent of the trajectory and the territory. The reasons of the collapse of the last sexennium are centered, according to the author, in "the weight of the Cartesian night", it means, in the unrestrictive adhesion to positivistic paradigm and to the analytic method. When it has took to action, it has been traduced in the "disjunctive increasing" of Lindblom. The author suggests a radical change in the approach, suggesting a paradigm that combines the complexity of constructivism, that considers the development as an emergent propriety of a complex territorial system, ant that uses concepts and instruments like "the neuronal synapses, the cognitive synergy", and "the social conversation" as means to raise an "engineer of territorial interventions" that gender the development effectively. It suggests complex reforms in the manner of doing government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]