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In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article addresses the issue of historical knowledge in relation to material evidence. More specifically, it asks, What objects capture the historian's attention and what knowledge is gained from those objects? What does the historian's gaze select as "things of history" and thus as removed from a world of object assemblages and fluid matter? Is it the case that only artifacts deliberately produced or modified by humans (regardless of the purpose) count as "things of history"? Or do physical entities produced by unintended human and nonhuman factors also display temporal endurance or alteration occurring over time and resonate with humans? Are "things of history" only entities endowed with shape, or do formless materials qualify too? In this article, I outline a theory of intentionality in relation to material items for two main reasons. First, it allows for a "critique of material evidence," which is still missing in the historical discipline. Second, it enables us to address any remaining epistemological, ethical, or political issues, biases, or contradictions associated with the multifaceted research on material culture that affect the way we do history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein's conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being. Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object's Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein's ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl's transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project "Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology" (GAČR 21-08256S). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a new approach to the study of Paleolithic minds. It is developed on the basis of the phenomenological concept of intentionality: the mind's central characteristic of being about or directed at something. In phenomenology, the world is considered not qua fact, but qua appearance, as a correlate of the mind's intentional activity. Both world‐appearance and the mind's directedness are further considered from a first‐person viewpoint, and in a scaffolding fashion, with more complex acts disclosing new types of objects or aspects of them. This paper develops a framework for applying intentional analysis to minds of the past. This way, the subjective "world‐having" of past subjects can be systematically reconstructed in a manner consistent with the empirical data available. This discloses a new field of inquiry that thus far has not been clearly grasped, even though the questions belonging to it are everywhere recognized as being of the greatest importance to the discipline. The intentional analysis of the scaffolding of acts and what they disclose can help to clarify essential concepts in cognitive archaeological debates, and to better understand the evolution of the hominin mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of "maximal grip" that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilisation of "grip" is a signal of impending loss and is offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner's Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel's account of experience exerts a significant and hitherto overlooked influence on his attempt to recast Phénoménologie de la perception 's account of intentionality. This reading informs two important claims of his later projects: that intentional relations are more fundamental than their relata, and that a metaphysical condition irreducible to consciousness or object constitutes the structure of intentionality. I argue that these positions inform key tenets of reversibility, and that a revisionary interpretation of Hegel's absolute offers Merleau-Ponty a model for the principle that individuates the basic conditions of experience. In addition to demonstrating that he was a more assiduous reader of Hegel than many commentators assume, and highlighting some overlooked debts to Hegel, these results show that Merleau-Ponty's later thought inherits significant idealist commitments, which should motivate us to reconsider its standing within post-Kantian philosophical currents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traces of you reach me through my senses. But without wondering in your presence, I cannot see you. For beings of sense and meaning such as ourselves, being stirred by another’s presence opens wondering. The implications of such claims are striking for what perception involves, for being in touch with another, and for good relationships. The paper proceeds as a series of “strobes,” from an ancient Greek word for whirling. Turning quickly about, words enact being stirred into wondering, interspersed with visual glimpses, a photographic series. Building on recent work by the author, the paper draws on Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology; Daniel R. Schein feld, Karen M. Haigh, and Sandra J.P. Scheinfeld’s early childhood educational theory, and a phrase by Martha C. Nussbaum describing the intentionality of wondering. This is deepened by attention to what the phenomenological tradition calls “passive synthesis,” and what the author, following F.W.J. Schelling, has called “positive anxiety,” the soul’s excitement around the possibility of sense and meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor explores the article in the issue on topics including intentionality in analytic philosophy, classical phenomenology and Cultural heritage.

Corporeality and historicity in our very experience are focal points of the phenomenological movement as it becomes attentive to human existence. In existential and hermeneutic phenomenology, historicity is understood as experienced meaning: temporality. This actualizes the Aristotelian conception of historical development as the realization of power potentials, where culture and reason are associated with human nature. Of interest is also the post-Hegelian thinking of history as both de-centered and centered existence. In the face of contemporary difficulties (ever since Hegel) in grasping historicity as connected nature and reason, phenomenology points to the bodily intentionality, with which meaning as well as experience are structured on different levels of being in human existence: aesthetic presence, body-in-the-world, speech, praxis, action, and thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception can have some aspects that are intentional (it is linked to attention, it encapsulates sometimes beliefs that are intentional attitudes), he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of the mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der- Welt-sein, and as Erwin Straus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasized, perception is rather an innerently bodily relation to world itself, that is, to the world as it exists independently of the mind and beyond all representations. Only such an approach can do justice to our ordinary and philosophical intuitions about the perceived world and leads us to a genuine variety of phenomenological realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I seek to retrace Jocelyn Benoist’s philosophical trajectory, starting from his first project of a phenomenological realism towards the elaboration of a non-phenomenological realism. I show the role played by the theme of the limits of intentionality and why it is abandoned. I also show how the grammatical difference between the normative and the real makes it possible to diagnose a confusion of categories reaching the notion of appearance in phenomenology. Finally, I show how this difference affects the problem of perception and leads the author to defend an ontological autonomy of the sensible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Franz Brentano's project in descriptive psychology and phenomenology, highlighting its relevance to the questions of intentionality and consciousness. Topics include Brentano's theory of intentionality and its influence on Husserl and other continental philosophers, as well as discussions on the reducibility of the mental, the qualitative nature of intentionality, and the structure of intentionality.

The grounds of religious diversity and pluralism have mainly been sought out from without, i.e., from outside the human mind. A striking example is Hick's idea of the one ultimate reality, which is posited to embrace all the semi-ultimate realities appearing in individual religions. However, the present inquiry adopts a different strategy for coping with the above-mentioned issue. Specifically, in this inquiry, I attempt to find a substantial clue to religious diversity and pluralism from within, i.e., from the intentionality of the mind. This idea, as a descriptive and explanatory hypothesis, consists of the following theses: (I) As suggested by the Husserlian phenomenology interpreted by Sokolowski, there are at least two forms of directedness of the mind: filled and empty intentionalities. (II) In connection with them, two distinct types of religious spirituality emerge: the intentionality of transcendental filling (ITF) and that of transcendental emptying (ITE). (III) The diversity of religion that gives rise to pluralism is, at least in part, due to the different ways in which those two forms of religious minds are combined. With these considerations, we reach a new philosophical foundation of the issue in question, and also obtain a possible theoretical basis for securing an adequate method of religious—and particularly interreligious—studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his explanation of human action Alfred Schutz resorts mainly to Max Weber's notion of subjective meaning and Husserl's notion of type. For him subjective meaning seems more important to understand human action than the fact that social actors internalize normative values. Accordingly, validity has mainly to do with projects of action, with fulfilled (or unfulfilled) expectations and to the stock of knowledge available, along with the actor's system of relevances. This raises two characteristic Schutzian problems: 1) the relation between the subjective meaning of an action and the objective criteria (namely, the juridical and the ethical ones) according to which any action can be evaluated; 2) the relation between an actor and his fellow human beings that arguably share the same system of relevances and act in the same normative framework. In this paper, I intend to offer an analysis of these issues, resorting mainly to Schutz's 1934 book Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, and in some unpublished manuscripts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a historical reading dedicated to rescuing aspects of Husserl's phenomenology and defending its reflexive advantages over a naturalistic and calculative view of the question of meaning. After presenting those aspects of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality that are compatible with a syntactic and computational structuralism, we present Husserl's idealized view of the structure of meaning production as a point of detachment from purely computational views. We compare this theory with the problem of the linguistic-semantic object of study, showing that it inevitably evokes skepticism about the (natural) reality of this semantic-object. We introduce transcendental reflection as an alternative to the problematization of this (nonnatural) non-reality. We then show that this path opens the access to study the articulations of this (unnatural) objetc as institutionalized sociocultural consensuses. We assume that Husserl's attempt to draft a Theory of Science in the form of transcendental phenomenology canonised a model of critique of the technicality of European science that became a paradigm for bringing together subgroups of philosophical reflection that can tie the question of meaning back to both its gnostic past and its future as a study of circular presuppositions of interpretation - philosophical hermeneutics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie is the property of Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: 'Meinongians' (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while 'Hildebrandians' (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special 'value feelings', and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl's position is not reducible to Meinong's and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present article I aim to make a new contribution to our phenomenological understanding of the foundation between intentional experiences. In order to accomplish this goal, I discuss Husserl's effort to avoid the conflation of the class of non-objectifying acts, i.e., evaluations and volitions, with the class of objectifying acts, i.e., cognitions. Through the analysis of the transition from his early to his mature account, I explore how Husserl, by readdressing the idea of foundation in relation to the shift from the practical-evaluative to the theoretical attitude, clarifies how evaluations and volitions can exert their intentionality only on the basis of a foundation on cognitions without thereby being reduced to a mere special case of founded representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to distinguish emotions such as envy, disgust, and shame from sentiments such as love, hate, and adoration? While the standard approach argues that emotions and sentiments differ in terms of their temporal structures (e.g., Ben-ze'ev, 2000; Deonna & Teroni, 2012), this paper sketches an alternative approach according to which each of these states exhibits a distinctive intentional structure. More precisely, this paper argues that emotions and sentiments exhibit distinct forms of affective intentionality. The paper begins by examining the temporal criteria of duration, etiology, and phenomenology widely employed to distinguish between both states. It demonstrates that none of them provides a clear-cut distinction between emotions and sentiments. Next, it presents the intentional approach as an alternative. To this end, it discusses what I call the axiological account (De Monticelli's 2006; 2020), before introducing my version of the intentional approach according to which emotions and sentiments exhibit different forms of affective intentionality. The main findings are summarized in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From its very beginnings, Husserl's philosophical life was characterised by the interweaving between ethical reflection and logical-argumentative rigour. It is not just a matter of the constant efforts that were put into a theoretical formulation that was always aimed at constant formal coherence, but also and above all, of the progressive association of a rigorous ethics with the value of the individualpersonal dimension. The phenomenological analysis of the values - intertwined with those of perceptiveintellective experiences, feeling and volition - gradually find a common denominator that progressively takes shape in the ethical-non-formal theme of personal motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one of the most seminal works of philosophy, Husserl's Logical Investigations, light mention is made of the acts of command, and one can't keep count of how many times their summon ends up with a kind of murky dismissal, dispensed by an eidetic epistemology enamored with the objectifying, meaning-constitutive acts of a logically bound consciousness. This paper tries to show that Husserl's works are amenable to a more complicated and rich theory of commands that views them from at least three different perspectives: as non-objectifying acts, social acts, and practical acts. This fertile reading is abetted by the concept of intentionality whose facets and multi-thematic development cast many nourishing theoretical seeds for a phenomenology of command. At the same time, this paper tries to cull a few scattered ideas on command of such thinkers as the Munchen phenomenologists, Alexander Pfander and Adolf Reinach, as well as Eric Voegelin and Hans Kelsen, who all showed an interest in a theory of command. The first two influenced Husserl's thinking on social and practical acts, whereas the latter two were both avid readers of Husserl's works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issue 78 of the Universitas Philosophica magazine presents ten research articles in the fields of ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as contemporary philosophy. The articles explore new objects, methodologies, and approaches in these areas of study. Some examples include the analysis of dialectical reasoning forms in Aristotle's fragmentary work, the study of the role of intentio in Avicenna, and the cosmological and ethical correlation of the concepts of limit and measure in Platonic philosophy. The deconstruction of the concept of one's own body is also examined from the perspective of Stoic oikeiosis to the phenomenology of the flesh. The article "The Concept of Despair and Love as an Ethical Project in Søren Kierkegaard" by Diego Orlando Hoyos Cardona focuses on the conceptualization of despair in relation to finitude, infinity, becoming, freedom, necessity, and possibility in Anti-Climacus' The Sickness Unto Death. The conception of the "self" in the Non-Scientific Postscript and Definitive to Philosophical Fragments is also explored, as well as the proposal of authentic love in Works of Love as an ethical project opposed to despair. Other articles included in the presentation address topics such as the experience of suicide from Emmanuel Levinas' perspective, the rationally responsible worldview according to John Henry Newman, the interpretation of the image in art, and the problematization in Michel Foucault's late philosophy. The last article examines the anarchic community of testimonial metaphor in moral and symbolic reparation. [Extracted from the article]

The debate about mental content is not well framed as internalists versus externalists, because there is both internal and external mental content. There is also a question about how best to draw the line between them, and this paper argues that this line is not usually drawn in the right place. It proposes a new alignment: the expression 'internal content' is to be taken to denote actually occurring, concrete, immediately phenomenologically given content. Absolutely everything else that can be said to be the content of experience is to be classified as external content. It turns out, under this new alignment, that internal content can be external content; this is the case when I think about your pain, or indeed my own pain. But this is as it should be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a reading of Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenology in light of Jean-Luc Marion's more recent phenomenology. It may seem odd to compare Sartre to Marion, given that Sartre is well-known for his avowed atheism and his account of intentionality while Marion is primarily known for his work on religious phenomena and counter-intentionality. However, this article shows that there are many ways in which Sartre anticipates Marion's work on phenomenological reduction and excessive phenomenality. By reading Sartre's phenomenology in light of Marion's, and particularly Sartre's analysis of the viscous slime in Being and Nothingness in relation to Marion's account of 'saturated phenomena', this article presents a fresh interpretation of Sartre as a phenomenologist who has invaluable insights not only on the structures of consciousness and phenomenality, but also for the contemporary theoretical interest in the relationship between human and nonhuman entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Miguel Armando Martínez Gallego presents Max Scheler's theory of tendential experiences and addresses the problem of its cognitive foundations. Scheler distinguishes between theoretical, affective, and tendential experiences, and argues that these represent genuine forms of irreducible intentionality. Martínez Gallego analyzes the delimitation of tendential experiences and proposes corrections to Scheler's proposal, especially regarding the foundation of pre-volitional tendencies in affective and theoretical acts. He considers that this theory can be of great interest to current philosophy by opposing tendential irrationalism. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Cauriensia: Revista Anual de Ciencias Eclesiásticas is the property of Instituto Teologico San Pedro de Alcantara de Caceres and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this study is to examine the phenomenological method as it applies to the philosophy of history. This leads me to divide my inquiry into two parts. I shall begin by examining the phenomenological method in a general way, explaining how I view the essential features of the method and its status in the context of philosophy generally conceived. Then, in a second part, I shall turn to its application to the philosophy of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading's derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob's alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger's aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a review of Michel Henry's phenomenology of life and its relation to Husserl's concept of intentionality. It begins with the latter's view of the phenomenology of life before passing to an examination of Henry's concepts of life, selfdonation, self-revelation, truth, originary or absolute body, etc. The thesis is that Henry does not offer an inversion of intentionality, in the strict sense, but rather an "absorption in itself". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to offer a basic analysis of the peculiar kind of intentionality involved in the experience of joy. First, I deal with the two meanings of joy. Secondly, I point out some questions related to the object of joy and with the rightness or legitimacy of this experience. Thirdly, I refer to the so-called "laws of joy." Lastly, I offer some thoughts on the relation between joy and alterity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies affective intentionality in Max Scheler, showing that the "phenomenology of values" does not only deal with values but also includes a complete theory of the good. In this theory, Scheler performs a genetic analysis that begins with the Sache (understood as wertvolles Ding, valuable thing) in order to define the notions of Ding (theoretical thing) and Gut (the good), understood as Wertding (thing of value). This approach indicates the possibility of improving on classic descriptions of the good and offers an interesting alternative to current "pragmatist" proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to show that a phenomenological account of animal behavior can shed light on an ethological approach to alterity, and vice versa. The interface between ethology and phenomenology -which, as it is argued, is intelligible only with reference to a shared dimension of affection- is framed by means of the phenomenological concept of intentionality (Intentionalität), which appears as a generative force (Bildungstrieb) of the organism, its behavior and surrounding world (Umwelt). This means that intentionality does not shape stable structures, but plastic and dynamic processes that bound both the genesis of an organism and its surrounding world. Formation is thus understood as an epigenetic development, which suggests that natural forms are the result of a movement that goes from the general to the particular, from the most broad and regular structures of experience, to the multifarious proliferation of perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Japanese moral philosopher Tetsuro Watsuji's discussion and rich characterization of intentionality which also refers to the capacity of conscious states to be about things. Topics covered include an analysis of his view on the social character of intentionality and the dynamics of betweenness and the relevance of his characterization of intentionality in phenomenological psychopathology.

The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research manuscripts, but was only fully developed in Ideen. In this paper I claim that the noema is an ambiguous notion, the result of a theoretical operation, the epoché, whose aim is contradictory. In an effort to keep open the epoché, and therefore maintain distance with respect to every transcendent object, Husserl is forced to multiply intentional objects and complicate the notions of sense and noema. Given that, I propose to overcome the paradoxes of noema through the language of game theory. Game theory offers a very fruitful descriptive model that allows us to save the original Husserlian approach without the contradictions of the epoché. For this reason, I propose to re-interpret intentionality as social game, and the noema as Nash equilibrium. By replying to possible objections, I will show that this approach gives us many theoretical advantages. The general aim of the paper is a global reformulation of the phenomenalogical method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I focus on proxy acts' plural agency and argue that it is a particular case of plural agency, irreducible to that of collective agency. I start from Reinach's phenomenological account of proxy acts, according to which they are an eidetic modification of social-speech acts. I point out that as social-speech acts, proxy acts are also spontaneous acts and at least second-degree position-takings; but I argue that, unlike social-speech acts, their agency is modified. Such modification involves different agents at different times, different degrees of authorship, and different extensions of efficacy. I conclude that proxy acts' plural agency is constituted by several layers of agency that are bound together in the temporally expanded unity of the proxy act as a whole. • Spontaneous-social-acts: position-takings, agency as authorship, uptake. • The agency of proxy-social acts: eidetic modification of the heterotropic agency. • Qualitative modification of the agency: degrees of authorship. • Grounds and layers of the spontaneous agency of the proxy. • Proxy social acts vs. collective social acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as "the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions" that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories of collective intentionality, because what happens is not planned in advance but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. The second and no less decisive reason is that jazz musicians act together in a very distinctive way, which casts into clear relief the interplay between togetherness and agonism, individual freedom and group commitment, which is contained in every human interaction. In other words, in free jazz we find what Hannah Arendt calls the "paradoxical" or "twofold" character of "human plurality." Starting with the analysis of two paradigmatic case studies—Charles Mingus's Folk Forms No. 1 and Ornette Coleman's Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation—my main concern in this paper is to provide a phenomenological account of the individual-yet-plural intentionality that emerges and runs through the improvisatory process in the free jazz case. After having made the negative point that this phenomenon represents a challenge to the analytical theories of collective intentionality, I shall argue that it can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. My basic thesis is that the overall cohesiveness of the improvisatory process must be regarded as a meaningful realization of an overall feeling, shared and shaped together by musicians over time—and not as the execution of an advanced plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]