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This paper examines changes in the in the composition of the North Korean elite from 1997 to 2012, a particularly tumultuous period in the history of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Specifically, the paper assesses the changing composition of the leadership networks around both Kim Jong II and Kim Jong Un, using data from the entourages that accompanied the great leaders on their "on the spot guidance" inspection tours. The paper finds that there have been significant changes in the leadership elite since the succession of Kim Jong Un. The paper offers some observations regarding the implications these changes have on the receptivity of the regime to a normalization of relations with the West and future economic and political reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military-first politics has been at the heart of the unexpected regime stability in North Korea under Kim Jong-il and his son Jong-un. This article analyzes Kim Jong-il's military-first politics as a strategic choice for regime survival, in which the locus of political power switched from the party to the military. At the same time, Kim Jong-il formulated a complex system of circumventing the possibility of the armed forces' political domination, including personalistic control using sticks and carrots, fortifying security and surveillance institutions, and compartmentalizing the security institutions for intra- and inter-organizational checks and balances to prevent the emergence of organized opposition to the regime. Although an effective short-term solution, military-first politics could never be a long-term strategy for building gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation). The current Kim Jong-un regime needs to conduct sweeping reforms to address dire economic difficulties, which might result in a departure from his father's legacy and downgrade the military's power. In this process, the current regime's (in)stability will depend on how it maintains a balance between revoking military-first politics and preserving the armed forces' allegiance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soon after the death of Kim Jong-il on 17 December 2011, his youngest and previously least-known son, Kim Jong-un, was declared the next leader of North Korea. At least for now, it seems clear that the Kim Jong-un regime is determined to uphold the established policies and ideologies of its predecessor. The present study attempts to explain why that is the case using path-dependence theory. Obviously, the old policies and ideologies are intimately bound up with the political processes of the present regime. North Korea’s unique monolithic system, comprising theJucheideology and the military-first policy, which was constructed during the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il regimes, has exerted a comprehensive influence on the country’s political and socioeconomic development processes for decades, and it is clear that the existing policy and the institutional framework based on it wield a powerful influence on the current political processes. This greatly restricts the autonomy and the range of choices of the new incumbent, suggesting that path dependence is relevant in the case of the North Korean regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article describes the dynastic succession in North Korea and U.S. perceptions of the reign of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. It is suggested that since the early 1990s, every crisis involving North Korea has drawn comments that it is on the verge of collapse or a power struggle might emerge, and passing superficial judgment on Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un as young and unworthy successors to their fathers. Instead of a coup or a revolution as Westerners predicted, North Koreans reportedly wept on the death of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The author suggests that American policy makers have proved over seven decades that they do not understand North Korea as a modern monarchy realized in a highly nationalistic, postcolonial state.

This article examines the Confucian component of the North Korean juche ideology, appraising the national-Stalinist doctrine in view of its relation to the Reformed Confucianism of Cho˘ng Tasan. A representative of the indigenous sirhak (practical learning) school in the late Choso˘n era, Tasan merits attention because he was politically endorsed in Kim Il Sung’s 1955 juche speech and was popular in the 1960s. Studying the rise, fall, and revival of Tasan; Kim Jong Il’s statements on behalf of the North Korean state bureaucracy; and the juche and Tasanist conceptions of ‘‘man,’’ the author concludes that Tasan’s Neo-Confucianism was assimilated into juche and that the sirhak scholar is being ideologically re-appreciated for regime legitimacy in North Korea today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses foreign relations between North and South Korea, which have become strained in 2010 because of the sinking of the South Korean Navy vessel Cheonan by North Korea and its nuclear program. Particular attention is paid to North Korea's foreign relations strategy regarding its neighbor, the military policy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to increase forces, and economic conditions within the nation. The foreign policy of the United States regarding North Korea and its reaction to its nuclear weapons are discussed as is the possibility of a unified Korea.

By citing North Korean sources, the South Korean media have recently delivered the news that Kim Jong Il had already chosen his third son, Kim Jong Un, as his political successor in late 2008 or early 2009. He selected a son who was still young and inexperienced. What was the reason behind this decision? This paper attempts to provide a convincing answer to this perplexing question. According to institutionalists, individual actors develop an institution, and the institution in turn affects the actors and restrains their choices. We argue that, among the many political institutions in North Korea, those closely linked to the cult of the Kim Il Sung family are directly related to the logic behind the political succession decision. The institutionalization of the cult of the family provides a justification for political succession in the state. Kim Jong Il has been one of the chief architects of the institutionalization of the cult, and the institutionalization in turn has limited his choice in selecting his successor, leading to the recent dynastic decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past decade, the author has examined North Korean primary public documents and concludes that there have been changes of identities and ideas in the public discourse of human rights in the DPRK: from strong post-colonialism to Marxism-Leninism, from there to the creation of Juche as the state ideology and finally 'our style' socialism. This paper explains the background to Kim Jong Il's 'our style' human rights in North Korea: his broader framework, 'our style' socialism, with its two supporting ideational mechanisms, named 'virtuous politics' and 'military-first politics'. It analyses how some of these characteristics have disappeared while others have been reinforced over time. Marxism has significantly withered away since the end of the Cold War, and communism was finally deleted from the latest 2009 amended Socialist Constitution, whereas the concept of sovereignty has been strengthened and the language of duties has been actively employed by the authority almost as a relapse to the feudal Confucian tradition. The paper also includes some first-hand accounts from North Korean defectors interviewed in South Korea in October–December 2008. They show the perception of ordinary North Koreans on the ideas of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the political personality of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-Il, particularly in the context of his succession from his father, the founding leader Kim Il-Sung. Drawing upon what is known of Kim Jong-Il's childhood and family life, the paper examines the key personality formations that have shaped his political persona and leadership style, particularly his narcissism, paranoia and lack of empathy. Eccentric, reclusive and self-indulgent, Kim is depicted as an emotionally volatile, narcissistic personality who indulges in hedonistic behavior while ignoring the privations of his people. Copyright © 2004 Cornell University Press. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion on the future of North Korea's economy and politics. It is noted that the country will suffer the same fate as the Soviet Union, en economic implosion will take place resulting to the collapse of the government. It is asserted that reforms to economic policies will not prevent the fall of the economy and the regime of Kim Jong Il.

The unexpected durability of North Korea, the world's last unreformed Stalinist polity, is attributable to Kim Jong Il's prudent balancing act between political forces. His balancing act, which is embodied in inclusive politics, honour-power sharing arrangements, and divide-and-rule tactics, has turned out to be effective in clearing away potential cleavages built into the ruling circle and thus in concluding the prolonged succession plan. As long as the balancing act continues to work, the dynasty, albeit defective, could survive in adversity for a longer period than expected. However, once the delicate balance artificially designed by Kim Jong Il is broken down for any reason, Pyongyang's power circle will slip into a centrifugal spiral, followed by internecine power struggles and the collapse of the regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the economic and political conditions of North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong Il in the 1990s. The author mentions that the unpredictability and manic-depressive personality of Kim Jong Il has raised many concerns regarding his leadership. He states that Kim has intended to revive the economic abundance of North Korea by focusing on its agricultural sector, particularly on exports. He also talks about the nuclear projects and negotiations during the time of the Korean leader.