1. The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism
- Author
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Carlo Burelli, Chiara Destri, Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) (CEVIPOF), Sciences Po (Sciences Po)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Genova [Genova, Italy], European Grant H2020-MSCA-IF-2018, project number 836571, title: VoiCED (Voting Citizens and the Ethics of Democracy), and European Project: 836571,H2020,H2020-MSCA-IF-2018,VoiCED(2019)
- Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject ,Normativity ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,Article ,Reasons ,Politics ,Nothing ,050602 political science & public administration ,Sociology ,Political philosophy ,media_common ,Sources of Normativity ,Epistemic Normativity ,05 social sciences ,[SHS.PHIL]Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy ,Instrumental Normativity ,Political Realism ,06 humanities and the arts ,16. Peace & justice ,Morality ,[SHS.SCIPO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Political science ,0506 political science ,Epistemology ,Philosophy ,Philosophy of medicine ,060302 philosophy ,Normative ,Social Sciences (miscellaneous) ,Realism ,Coherence (linguistics) - Abstract
This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgements that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to pursue. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is (empirically) true, this gives us a reason to believe it. In politics, there are certain empirical regularities that ought to be acknowledged for what they are. Both sources are flawed. Instrumental normativity only requires coherence between attitudes and beliefs, and one can hang on to false beliefs to preserve attitudes incompatible with reality. I may desire to eschew power relations, and accordingly I may imagine politics to be like a camping trip. Epistemic normativity, on the other hand, operates critically, striking down existing normative claims. It shows us that politics is nothing like a camping trip, but it doesn’t tell us what we should do about it (beyond abandoning some false beliefs). We conclude by showing that if the two are taken together, they remedy each other’s flaws.
- Published
- 2021