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This paper examines the constitutional possibility of providing ways to bring the autonomous State model closer to the Judiciary, following Constitutional Court Judgement 31/2010. To this end, the paper first presents the constitutional regulations of the Judiciary and the openings for the Autonomous State, shows the precedents and the current plans to this effect, and then presents and discusses the constitutional possibilities (TSJ and Council of Justice) for decentralising the Judiciary in order to implement the autonomous principle, and sets out the contents, issues and limits of a future legal reform in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Constitutional Court has analyzed the judgments issued in 2021 and has found that the resolution of jurisdictional disputes has decreased compared to amparo processes. Although constitutional doctrine is dense, the lack of clear limits for state institutions and the generation of jurisdictional conflicts continue to be a problem. In addition, the increasing trend of Spanish deputies and senators to use the legitimacy granted to them by the Constitution and the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court to file constitutional appeals is highlighted. The Court has issued several resolutions related to judicial decisions linked to the self-determination referendum in Catalonia and has resolved constitutional processes related to the participatory process carried out in Catalonia in 2014. It has also issued judgments related to state and regional provisions approved to address the COVID-19 crisis, including the declaration and extension of the state of alarm. In addition, it has resolved a constitutional appeal against decrees of the Government of Catalonia related to the housing law. The article summarizes several judgments of the Constitutional Court related to jurisdictional disputes in Spain. The complexity of the distribution of powers between the State and the autonomous communities in areas such as environmental protection, international adoption, environmental quality management, consumption, social security, and taxation is highlighted. The Court has recognized the broad scope of autonomous powers in these matters, but has also declared the unconstitutionality of certain regional laws that encroach on the competence of the State. In addition, cases related to the use of the bable/Asturian language in the General Assembly of the Principality of Asturias and the Budget Law of the Generalitat of Valencia are mentioned. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court issued a judgment on April 27, 2022, regarding an appeal filed by the Valencian Government. The appeal refers to the annulment of a decree approving the Territorial Action Plan for the Green Infrastructure of the Valencian Coast (PATIVEL) and the Catalog of Beaches of the Valencian Community. The judgment declared the decree null and void for not meeting certain requirements, such as the inclusion of an economic report and assessments on gender, family, and childhood matters. The Supreme Court clarified that PATIVEL is a territorial planning instrument and not an urban planning one, and that the unfavorable impact on gender, family, childhood, or adolescence is less likely in a territorial planning plan than in an urban planning one. Additionally, it was determined that the content of the environmental and strategic territorial assessment document of PATIVEL is sufficient and adequate. [Extracted from the article]

Judgment 18/2022 of the Constitutional Court determines that the Government of Catalonia has jurisdiction in the management of authorizations for the maritime-terrestrial public domain, respecting the general regime established by the State. The court rejected the appeal filed by the Spanish Government against the Catalan law on coastal planning, arguing that the Government of Catalonia can delegate to municipalities the authority to grant authorizations for the use of the maritime-terrestrial public domain. However, it is established that the Government of Catalonia does not have the authority to grant authorizations on the coast and beaches of Catalonia, as this contradicts the Coastal Law. [Extracted from the article]

The current ecuadorian constitutional control system limits the functions of judges in the application of rules contrary to the constitution. When a reasonable doubt arises, they must refer a query to the Constitutional Court. This research, based on the doctrinal conceptualization about constitutional control exercised in the legal system, was focused on analyzing the integral, complex and concentrated nature of the constitutional control system. Was applied a bibliographic analysis with a qualitative approach and from the use of the legal exegetical method. Was obtained about the importance of constitutional control in Ecuador and its integral, complex and concentrated nature, which has not made it possible to achieve effectiveness among the constitutional control guidelines, the content of jurisprudence and the results of constitutional judgments, therefore, a control system is necessary that ensures active judicial participation, that maintains the integral character and that allows resolutions without delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court Judgment of March 30, 2022 resolves the contentious-administrative appeals filed by several commercial entities against Royal Decree 27/2021, which modifies the decrees on batteries and accumulators and waste from electrical and electronic equipment. The Supreme Court rejects the arguments of the appellants and considers that the Government can establish the necessary measures to guarantee extended producer responsibility. The Royal Decree aims to transpose a Directive and improve the management of waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). The new Waste Law maintains the principle of extended producer responsibility and seeks to promote the reuse and recycling of waste. [Extracted from the article]

Electoral systems, seen as the most specific manipulative instrument of politics, thus come to the forefront of politicians' interests. Recently, the Parliamentary Electoral Act in Czechia was amended. The case study focuses on a brief reflection on this electoral system change enforced by Constitutional Court judgment. The shortcomings of the 2002 electoral system have been identified; discussed are changes in electoral legislation and the political consequences thereof, including by simulating electoral results since 2002 under the new electoral system and comparing them with those under the previous Parliamentary Electoral Act, e.g. by analysing the overall seats-votes proportionality, parliamentary parties' over-/underrepresentation or malapportionment, and confronting the political consequences of the new Parliamentary Electoral Act with the 2021 Constitutional Court judgment. Despite the many flaws in the Court's reasoning and the inconvenient timing, there was some space for the political elites to remedy the deficiencies of the 2002 electoral system. The case study concludes that the political representation did not take advantage of but rather missed the opportunity to remedy the Czech electoral legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2021, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic struck down key elements of the electoral system that had been in place for almost twenty years. Departing from the deferential tendency of most of its election case law, the Court ruled that the use of the D'Hondt highest average method and a scaled threshold for electoral alliances violated constitutional principles of proportionality and equality. This article offers a critical reading of the Court's reasoning, which did little to explain the departure from the line taken in earlier challenges to the electoral system but also refused to rethink the longstanding acceptance of the five-percent threshold as a constitutionally acceptable infringement of equality. This article also shows that the legislature chose a replacement for D'Hondt that would not be expected to result in a more proportional outcome, as was confirmed by the results of the October 2021 elections for the Chamber of Deputies. The article concludes that the decisions of the Court and the legislature leave the new electoral system open to future legal challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctioned by its constitution, India is home to the world's most comprehensive affirmative action program, where historically discriminated groups are protected with vertical reservations implemented as "set asides," and other disadvantaged groups are protected with horizontal reservations implemented as "minimum guarantees." A mechanism mandated by the Supreme Court in 1995 suffers from important anomalies, triggering countless litigations in India. Foretelling a recent reform correcting the flawed mechanism, we propose the 2SMG mechanism that resolves all anomalies, and characterize it with desiderata reflecting laws of India. Subsequently rediscovered with a high court judgment and enforced in Gujarat, 2SMG is also endorsed by Saurav Yadav v. State of UP (2020), in a Supreme Court ruling that rescinded the flawed mechanism. While not explicitly enforced, 2SMG is indirectly enforced for an important subclass of applications in India, because no other mechanism satisfies the new mandates of the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Crimen: Journal for Criminal Justice is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Supreme Court Judgment of February 23, 2022 resolves an appeal filed by Mr. Segismundo and Mr. Silvio against the City Council of Ferrol. The lower court's ruling had declared partial nullity of the Special Protection and Rehabilitation Plan for the Ferrol Vello neighborhood for not having undergone a strategic environmental assessment. However, it allowed for the rectification of the plan during the execution phase. The Supreme Court determined that the Plan was null and void for lacking a strategic assessment and annulled the lower court's ruling. The judgment establishes that essential procedural flaws in the development of urban plans result in the complete nullity of the plan, without the possibility of rectification. Although the judgment recognizes the importance of environmental protection, it also considers the implications for the municipality and its citizens. It emphasizes the need for urban planning instruments to be subordinate to the requirements of strategic environmental assessment in order to guarantee environmental protection. [Extracted from the article]

Though the trademark holder registered his trademark as a domain name, legal scholars and courts did not clarify the legal character of the domain name. To this point, the debate about the nature of domain names was limited to whether the domain name is nonintellectual property or a kind of intellectual property. Even for those who believe that domain names would have intellectual property rights, the essence of this right is still wrapped up in mysteries. More often than not, the court’s decisions were limited to considering the domain name as intellectual property or not until the supreme high court in America decided to register the domain name booking.com as a trademark. This revolutionary decision would change the previous conceptions about the nature of domain names. This paper sheds light on how the supreme court decision would give the momentum to consider a domain name as a trademark, which paves the way as the author believes a domain name can be considered a digital trademark, bearing in mind that the medium, in which the domain names can be active, is the digital space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Varstvoslovje: Journal of Criminal Justice & Security is the property of University of Maribor, Faculty of Criminal Justice & Security and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Supreme Court of Norway has heard the parties in a case that a Latvian shipping company filed against Norwegian authorities because the company was not permitted to catch snow crab on the continental shelf around the Svalbard archipelago. This article provides a short comment on the court proceedings, placing emphasis on the international legal questions that the Supreme Court shall decide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court ruling of February 2, 2022 resolves an appeal filed by a company against a judgment of the High Court of Justice of Galicia. The case concerns the direct granting of mining exploitation and the viability of the project. The Supreme Court determines that mining regulations do not allow for the modification of the duration period of exploitation concessions and that, in this case, the ten-year concession is valid. The ruling also highlights the importance of submitting a resource utilization project when applying for a mining concession and the connection between mining exploitation projects and the Environmental Impact Assessment. [Extracted from the article]

This research is focused upon the evaluation of safe berth clause pursuant to US law, in conjunction with UK law, based on the recent US Supreme Court ruling over “ATHOS I”, which was fixed pursuant to an ASBATANKVOY charterparty to carry a cargo of heavy crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. The dispute arose during the final stretch of the voyage, as the vessel entered the Delaware River, an uncharted abandoned ship anchor ruptured the vessel’s hull causing 264,000 gallons of oil to spill. The Oil Pollution Act 1990 required the Owners to fund the clean-up costs in the first instance (limited to US$45 million) and the US Federal Government’s Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund reimbursed Owners for an additional US$88 million in clean-up costs. Owners and the US Federal Government filed suit against voyage charterers for breach of the ASBATANKVOY charterparty safe berth clause. The case went through two trials, and before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit twice, before the Supreme Court were asked to determine ultimate liability. The question before the Court was whether the safe berth clause was a warranty of safety, which meant that liability for an unsafe berth would be imposed on voyage charterers irrespective of whether they exercised due diligence. The answer to that question was yes; the language of the safe berth clause in this case was unambiguous and unqualified. The obligation on the voyage charterers was to designate a berth that was free from harm or risk such that the vessel come and go from always safely afloat. The Court went on to comment that “charterers remain free to contract around unqualified language that would otherwise establish a warranty of safety, by expressly limiting the extent of their obligations or liability. In the absence of any such qualifying language however the Supreme Court has made it clear that a charterer is liable to the owner for any consequences arising out of the ship being ordered to an unsafe berth, an obligation unfettered by any issues of due diligence or the degree of knowledge on the part of the charterer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctioning abortion is a challenging task because of the competing maternal and foetal interests. While the former asserts her right to autonomy and bodily integrity the latter relies on its right to personhood and sanctity of life. In order to reconcile the competing interests the Courts across the world have declared the foetal viability as the line of demarcation, clearly acknowledging that the woman’s autonomy does not include the right to sacrifice a viable foetus unless its continuance imperils the life of the woman. The U. S. Supreme Court's pronouncement on 1 September, 2021 refusing to injunct the Heartbeat Act enacted by Texas legislature, declaring the conceptus as "Unborn child", "from fertilization until birth", treating "fetal cardiac activity" as the relevant point to determine the fetal viability and equating an illegal abortion with "wrongful death" has created a storm in the ethico-legal circles and medical community. This article examines the salient features of the Texas anti-abortion law and the U.S Supreme Court's refusal to grant the interim relief, in the light of judicial decisions on abortion across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court made a groundbreaking decision on foreign surveillance by the Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The Court's first central finding was that the protection of fundamental rights is not limited to German territory. In addition, the ruling declared unconstitutional the regulations governing the transfer of information to foreign intelligence services. The ruling will therefore also have consequences for the cooperation of intelligence services, making it relevant abroad as well. In the ruling, the Court focused primarily on the role of human rights and ruled that the BND must check whether its cooperation partners respect human rights. The German parliament was given the task of implementing the Court's demands. The law adopted in response to the Court's demands came into force at the start of 2022. This article analyzes the ruling and the new law, and addresses the question what concrete requirements must be placed on the BND's cooperation with foreign intelligence services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of 'equivalence' is not new to translation studies and terminology but has been studied differently in these two disciplines, since translation equivalence and terminological equivalence do not coincide: while the former establishes a relationship between source-language (SL) and target-language (TL) units, segments or full texts, the latter assesses the relationship between terms and concepts embedded in conceptual systems. However, in the translation process, terminological resources are used to solve translation problems, so information on terminological equivalence is crucial for making the most appropriate choices in terms of translation equivalence. While playing a fundamental role in the building of bi- or multilingual terminological resources, equivalence has frequently failed to receive the visibility it deserves. In many resources, terms in two or more languages are presented as if they were characterized by full equivalence, even when this is not the case, while it would be better for the degree of equivalence to be specified. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the debate over the notion of equivalence in translation studies and in terminology, with special emphasis on legal terminology. The role of equivalence in legal terminological repositories is discussed in order to introduce "stipulative correspondence" (Magris 2018), a category that identifies the lexical relation between a term referring to a concept embedded in a specific legal system and a term used in a target language - which is not a language in which the legal system is generally expressed - to refer to the same concept. Stipulative correspondence is illustrated by examples extracted from an Italian-English parallel corpus of judgments delivered by the Italian Constitutional Court (Schiavi 2017- 2018). It is argued that stipulative correspondence should be taken into account when designing (or restructuring) terminological resources and when describing information relevant to legal translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human dignity as a value to guide criminal justice reform emerged strikingly in the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata. But with Justice Kennedy retired and courts generally reluctant to go far down the road to practical reforms, its future lies in the political realm shaping policy at the local, state, and national levels. For human dignity to be effective politically and in forming policy, we need a vocabulary robust enough to convey a positive vision for the penal state. In this essay, I discuss three concepts that can provide more precision to the potential abstractness of human dignity, two of which the Supreme Court has regularly used in decisions regarding punishment: the idea of a "decent society," the idea of a "civilized system of justice," and the idea of a "condition of dignity." In brief, without a much broader commitment to restoring a decent society, and to civilizing our justice and security systems, there is little hope that our police stations, courts, jails, and prisons will provide a condition of dignity to those unfortunate enough to end up in them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In King v De Jager 2021 5 BCLR 449 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a clause in a private will that unfairly discriminated against beneficiaries based on gender was unlawful and unenforceable. This note considers the implications of the judgment for religion-based discrimination in wills, and in particular wills that incorporate the genderdiscriminatory Islamic system of inheritance. After explaining the Constitutional Court judgment, the note argues that the Court was well within its powers to consider the enforceability of discrimination in the private sphere. More importantly, we argue that the case rings a bell of caution regarding genderdiscriminatory provisions in private wills. Gender-based discrimination in Islamic inheritance law perpetuates disadvantage against a historically disadvantaged group, and the courts and legislature have been emphatic in their stance against gender discrimination in inheritance. The note thus argues that a testator's religious beliefs are not enough to tip the scales and render gender discrimination justifiable. We urge individuals who want to dispose of their assets following their religious beliefs to seek estate planning advice, cognisant of the potential impact of King v De Jager CC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike in the constitutions of other African countries such as Botswana and Lesotho, where the relationship between the High Court and courts martial is stipulated, the Ugandan Constitution 1995 (the Constitution) does not deal with this relationship. The Constitution is also silent on the question of whether courts martial have jurisdiction over civilians. The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces Act (the UPDF Act) creates different types of courts martial with varying jurisdictions (section 197). The Act also provides (section 119) for the circumstance in which the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over civilians and appeals against the decisions of the General Court Martial lie to the Court Martial Appeal Court, which is the final appellate court except in cases where the offender is sentenced to death or life imprisonment. According to Regulation 20(2) of the UPDF (Court Martial Appeal Court) Regulations, in case an offender is sentenced to death or life imprisonment and his/her sentence is upheld by the Court Martial Appeal Court, he/she has a right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Since 2003, Ugandan courts have grappled with the issues of whether courts martial are courts of judicature within the meaning of article 129(1) of the Constitution or organs of the UPDF and, therefore, part of the Executive under article 210 of the Constitution and whether courts martial have jurisdiction over civilians. Judges of the Supreme Court Constitutional Court and Court of Appeal have often disagreed on these issues. In this article the author relies on the drafting history of Articles 129 and 210 to argue that courts have erred by holding that courts martial are not courts of judicature under article 129(d) of the Constitution; and that courts martial are subordinate to the High Court. The author also relies on the drafting history of the Constitution and on international human rights law to argue that courts martial in Uganda should not have jurisdiction over civilians because they lack the necessary independence and impartiality and were established for the single purpose of enforcing military discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe recently handed down a judgment on the determination of whether the law that governs testamentary dispositions of estates binds a testator to bequeath his or her share of property to the surviving spouse. This was an appeal case against the judgment of the High Court which had held that a testator is bound to leave his or her property to the surviving spouse. Albeit the fact that section 5(1) of the Wills Act establishes the doctrine of freedom of testation, section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act prohibits a testator to execute a will that disinherits a surviving spouse. The provision has been interpreted inconsistently by the High Court for the past years. One category of judgments held that a testator could disinherit a surviving spouse based on freedom of testation and that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act are not applicable to testamentary dispositions. In contrast, the other set of dissenting judgments held that a will that disinherited a surviving spouse was invalid. Further, the courts held that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act, in particular section 3A which grants a surviving spouse the right to inherit the matrimonial home applies to testate succession. In overturning the High Court decision, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act could not be interpreted to mean that a surviving spouse cannot be disinherited in a will. The Court based its decision on the doctrine of freedom of testation entrenched in the Wills Act and the Constitution. The Supreme Court also conclusively held that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act are not applicable to testamentary dispositions. In arguing her case in the Supreme Court, the surviving spouse among other arguments contended that section 26 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for equality of rights of spouses and the protection of children and spouses upon the dissolution of marriage through death or divorce. The Supreme Court disapproved the previous High Court decisions which held that a will that disinherited a surviving spouse was invalid as it contravenes section 26 of the Constitution. The Court held that section 26 of the Zimbabwean Constitution is not directly enforceable, does not bestow rights on individuals and does not prohibit the disinheritance of a surviving spouse. The Court held that the provisions of section 26 are found under the National Objectives which are intended to guide the state in the formulation of laws relating to dissolution of marriage through death. In this article, I argue that the Supreme Court decisively answered the discordant questions on whether a surviving spouse can be disinherited through a will and whether the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act apply to testamentary dispositions. However, the Court missed an opportunity to develop the Zimbabwean jurisprudence on the enforcement of National Objectives, in particular section 26 of the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2021 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Bwanya v Master of the High Court, Cape Town. The court ruled that survivors of life-partnerships "in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support" would be entitled to claim benefits under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act (the MSSA) and the Intestate Succession Act (the ISA). This case note focusses on the phrase "in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support." It examines the jurisprudential development of the phrase through the case law. It considers whether reliance on the phrase is likely to present an obstacle to potential claimants or whether the phrase can be interpreted in a way that broadens the protection provided by the MSSA and ISA so as to ensure that all vulnerable partners can be protected. The note suggests that the optimal way in which to interpret the requirement that the life-partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support would be to focus on the claimant's needs and financial dependence and to assess how the law can provide protection and redress to those who have incurred relationshipinduced dependence because of the particular form and nature of the reciprocal support provided in the intimate relationship. Previous court judgments have noted the typically gendered nature of the contributions made by family members. The law must ensure that it furthers the constitutional goal of achieving substantive equality between men and women, while also acknowledging and responding to the intersectional forms that discrimination and disadvantage assumes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2017-2019 Romania faced a controversial justice laws' 'reform', undermining the rule of law and independence of justice principles, challenging the commitments established under Commission Decision 2006/928/EC in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption. In the context of democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, Romanian evolutions could be seen as following a regional pattern. The study proposes a critical analysis of the most important legislative evolutions in the area of justice and fight against corruption in the region, as reflected by the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Romania (CVM) and Rule of Law Reports, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights judgements. The analysis focuses on some controversial decisions of the Constitutional Court, concerning justice laws 'reform' and the application of primacy of EU law principle. The study expresses a strong concern related to Romanian Constitutional Court's tendencies to walk along the authoritarian path of politically captured courts of Poland and Hungary. The conclusions reveal the requirement for new political instruments of EU supranational intervention to safeguard democratic EU core values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court declaring unconstitutional in parts the Federal Climate Change Act of 2019 has generated great interest due to its implications for state policies on the control of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as for its underlying dogmatic and interpretative aspects. Particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of considerations on the effects of the course of time in the assessment of violations affecting freedom in the context of climate change, as well as the specification of a state aim obligation to protect the environment in interest of future generations. This idea can be synthesised in the paradox of guaranteeing time-unlimited freedom in a world of time-limited resources. In order to give an account of the arguments of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the present analysis will start with a brief description of the controversy that led the Court to declare the Federal Climate Protection Act partially unconstitutional, and then move on to an analysis of the main dogmatic and interpretative aspects on which the Court based its decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court Judgment of December 2, 2021 resolves an appeal in cassation filed by a sole proprietorship against a dismissive judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid. The case refers to a penalty imposed on the company for a serious offense in the hydrocarbon sector. The Supreme Court, aligning itself with the Community of Madrid and the High Court of Justice of Madrid, dismisses the appeal in cassation. The article analyzes the interpretation of Article 110 of Law 34/1998, which establishes serious offenses in the hydrocarbon sector. It is argued that this article typifies not only cases where there is a manifest danger to people, property, or the environment, but also those where there is no danger at all. It is maintained that this interpretation is necessary to guarantee control and safety in gas installations. A Supreme Court judgment supporting this interpretation is mentioned. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of Spain dated October 29, 2021 resolves an appeal filed by the Community of Madrid against a judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid. The main issue is whether the lack of approval of an urban planning plan can invalidate an authorization for the installation of electrical energy. The Supreme Court establishes that the lack of said plan would only invalidate the resolution in the terms of article 48.2 of Law 39/2015, since it is not expressly established that the effectiveness of the authorization is subject to the approval of the plan. Furthermore, the judgment points out that the authorization in energy matters can be granted without the prior approval of the corresponding urban planning plan, although its effectiveness is conditioned on obtaining the necessary authorizations in terms of territorial planning and environmental protection. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of October 27, 2021 resolves an appeal filed by the Junta de Castilla y León against a previous sentence. The court addresses two main issues related to the inclusion of a species in the list of huntable species and popular action in cases of environmental damage. It concludes that it is not necessary to provide specific justification for including a species in the list of huntable species and that those authorized to file a popular action cannot request economic compensation for environmental damages. The judgment sides with the Junta de Castilla y León and dismisses the association's appeal. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of May 17, 2011 resolves an administrative appeal filed by the Association of Neighbors and Friends of Llanes-Avall against Royal Decree 1999/2009. The Supreme Court considers that the Association has standing to bring the appeal, but dismisses the annulment claims of the Royal Decree. The appeal refers to the declaration of a provisional reserve zone for the exploration of carbon dioxide storage resources in the "Central Asturias" area. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of June 29, 2011 resolves an appeal filed by the entity SNIACE, S.A. against a judgment of the High Court of Justice of Cantabria. The Supreme Court considers that the regional sanitation fee and the state fee for waste control are compatible, as they have different taxable events. In addition, the Court dismisses the allegations of the appellant entity and does not admit the specific infringements alleged. This judgment adds to previous ones that have resolved similar cases regarding the compatibility of state and regional fees. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of July 15, 2011 resolves an appeal filed by the entity Producciones Eléctricas S.A. (PROELSA) against a resolution of the Northern Hydrographic Confederation that denied the concession of a water flow for a hydroelectric project in Cantabria. The Supreme Court dismisses PROELSA's claim and confirms the contested resolution due to the lack of environmental viability of the project. The judgment highlights the importance of environmental protection and the application of the principles of caution and precaution in cases that affect protected and endangered species. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of May 24, 2011 resolves an administrative appeal filed by the Provincial Council of Álava against the Agreement of the Council of Ministers of November 28, 2008. The agreement declares the construction project of a penitentiary center in Iruña de Oca, Álava, excluded from the environmental impact assessment procedure due to urgency and general interest. The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal and argues that the project has complied with the appropriate environmental assessment and necessary compensatory measures. Furthermore, it establishes that the exclusion from the environmental assessment procedure does not apply to projects that affect areas of the Natura 2000 Network. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court Judgment of July 14, 2011 resolves an appeal filed by the Insular Council of Menorca against a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice of the Balearic Islands. The appeal refers to the installation of mobile phone antennas and the competences of the Insular Council to establish limitations based on the protection of health interests. The Supreme Court rejects the alleged grounds for appeal and dismisses the appeal, citing previous judgments on the same subject. The judgment highlights that the Insular Councils do not have competences in health matters and that the municipal regulations of Menorca were annulled for being contrary to municipal competence ownership. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court's ruling on June 14, 2011 declares null and void Royal Decree 1666/2008, which transferred functions and services from the General State Administration to the Autonomous Community of Andalusia regarding the resources and hydraulic uses of the Guadalquivir River. The Supreme Court bases its decision on the unconstitutionality of Article 51 of the Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia. Although there is a collaboration agreement between both administrations, it does not affect the validity or nullity of the Royal Decree. The current situation of the Guadalquivir River Basin Authority is independent of the validity of the challenged provision. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court ruling of June 13, 2011 declares null and void Royal Decree 1666/2008, which transferred ownership and management of the reservoirs in the Guadalquivir basin to the Andalusian Regional Government. However, the management of the Guadalquivir is still unresolved after the rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. A provisional agreement has been reached between the Ministry of Environment and the Autonomous Community of Andalusia to entrust the latter with the management of water resources and hydraulic uses in the Guadalquivir basin, but it is expected that reconciling Andalusia's management will not be easy with the judicial pronouncements and the distribution of competences in water matters. [Extracted from the article]

The Supreme Court's ruling on May 20, 2011 confirms the classification of certain lands as special protected rural land for natural spaces, as they are part of the Natura 2000 Network. The Supreme Court establishes that the classification of rural land is a regulated power and must be protected when there are landscape, historical, archaeological, scientific, environmental, or cultural values. In this case, the inclusion of the lands in the Natura 2000 Network justifies their classification as non-buildable land, which is important for environmental protection. [Extracted from the article]