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This paper brings to light the ideas of a pioneering but largely forgotten social critic, C. E. Ayres. In his first book, Science: The False Messiah (1927), which was written in consultation with John Dewey, Ayres advanced a forceful and original critique of science and technology. He argued that technological change was occurring at a pace that had overwhelmed existing social institutions, and further claimed that efforts to solve the problem by educating citizens about science and technology would prove fruitless. The analysis presented in this paper outlines Ayres' key arguments, examines the mutual influences between Dewey and Ayres, and makes a case that many of Ayres' innovative arguments remain surprisingly relevant today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A main implication of C.E. Ayres tool-combination principle is that the goal of technical progress is best served by a non-proprietary, open science public policy. Joseph Schumpeter claimed that new combinations are consequential only when they have been successfully commercialized. The capacity to privatize knowledge is, moreover, a powerful stimulus to innovation. This paper reexamines the Ayresian and Schumpeterian positions using evidence from the Bayh Dole experiment. The Bayh Dole Act, which gave universities title to inventions resulting from federally-sponsored research, created a laboratory wherein the trade-offs between diminution of the appropriable knowledge fund (due to patenting) and incentives to commercialization can be appraised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clarence Ayres wished to avoid moral relativism or agnosticism in the social sciences, yet he also rejected what he called the 'transcendental' epistemology of classical philosophy, an epistemology grounded in the desire to know absolute or ultimate truths. He wanted to find a middle ground between absolutism and relativism by separating 'technology' from 'ceremony,' and by replacing the ends/means dichotomy with an ends/means continuum. This paper examines his articulation of the issues, and in this context also examines the work of two more recent theorists, Gary Becker and Richard Posner. We conclude that Ayres' epistemological middle ground remains elusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the origins and continued relevance of Clarence Ayres’ definition of technology as a process involving both physical tools and a scientific method of reasoning, where science is understood to achieve cross-cultural explanatory power by virtue of technological validation. Ayres’ concept of technology derived from his training as a Pragmatist and was primarily philosophical rather than descriptive, but is congruent with the work of modern historians of technology and remains useful in addressing a variety of concerns about both the promise and dangers of technological change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the work of Clarence Ayres is held in high regard within the tradition of American Institutionalism, it has made little impact upon the study of technology more generally. Moreover, even within the Institutionalist tradition, his work is seen to embody a tension - on the one hand his dichotomy between technology and institutions is too strict, but to the extent that it is "softened," his main contributions are undermined. This paper argues that Ayres' work does have something to contribute to current technology debates, but that this contribution cannot be made if his conception is "softened" in the way that recent contributions suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the Clarence E. Ayres (1891-1972) papers at the University of Texas, this study traces the continuity among thinkers such as Kant, Hegel Veblen, Dewey, and Ayres; the latter was a leading institutional economist following Veblen's death. Publicly acknowledging his intellectual debt to Veblen and Dewey, Ares drew from these men some idealistic assumptions as well as the historicism that is implicit in his technological determinism or instrumental theory of knowledge. Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey owed a great deal to the philosophical tradition of idealism, regardless of the devotion to naturalism in their systems. The origins of Ayres's technological theory of value are found in Veblen and Dewey writings and back of them the legacy of German idealism. The vital link was a mutual acceptance that freedom was expressed in a cultural and historical form, realized in human activity. It was a process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Theory of Institutional Change as elaborated by P.D. Bush in the tradition of Veblen, Ayres and J.F. Foster provided an important device for analysis, with its clarification of the value bases and of forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. Bush pushed institutionalism to a certain limit. Coming from different "galaxies," formal approaches, such as system dynamics, network analysis, graph theory, or game theory have been further developed by institutional and evolutionary economists in order to close gaps and to further operationalize, formalize, and develop institutionalism. This paper strives to demonstrate that we can bridge gaps between the theory of institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of game theory. This allows for a deeper analysis of institutions, the value base in game theory, the instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, ceremonial dominance and encapsulation, and the institutionalist policy conception. So, it is part of a broader project for the extension of institutionalism's reach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents response of the author on comments made by Lewis E. Hill on the papers "Toward a Reconciliation of Institutional Economics and Its Critics" and "Beyond the Market Economy Building Institutions That Work," by Clarence E. Ayres that were published in the March 1970 issue of the periodical "Social Science Quarterly." Under appropriate arrangements for doing things, that is, under an appropriate institutional structure, the propensity to truck and barter naturally entails the creation of markets, which are themselves arrangements for effecting exchange. In the U.S., the institutional structure is such that markets permeate most of the economy. For example, in August 1970, nearly 84 per cent of total civilian employment was in the private sector, all of which consists of regulated and more or less unregulated markets. Thus, employing scholar Robert L. Heilbroner's system of classification, the economy of the U.S. would be appropriately designated as essentially a market system, as the author did in his introduction to Ayres' classic. "Institutionalism and Economic Development." But Ayres objects to him, that the U.S. economy is an industrial economy. Unfortunately, his is not intended to be a cross-classification, which, if correct, would be a suitable complement rather than a substitute for the one that the author employed, since Ayres says prefatorily, and the author flatly denies that the U.S. economy is a market economy.

The article presents information on an unpremeditated symposium on the economic theory of Clarence E. Ayres. The article argues that Ayres and the Tower on the campus of the University of Texas are two of the dominant features of the academic landscape in the Southwest. Both have been centers of controversy, ranging in intensity from mild to boiling. It seems that few who have considered either have escaped partisan reaction for, or against. The article informs that this issue of the "Southwestern Social Science Quarterly" deals with four examinations of Ayresian economic theory, which range from bitter attack to capable defense, with a note of mildness in between. Together, they should give the reader a fairly complete view of this scholar's ideas. These papers were not solicited, and there was no idea of a symposium on Ayresian theory, when the first of the four, that by Jack Robertson was received. This paper was soon followed by that of Manuel Gottlieb. Both were highly recommended for publication by economists respected for their competence in the field.

The article presents comments of the author on the papers "Toward a Reconciliation of Institutional Economics and Its Critics," by Coldwell Daniel and "Beyond the Market Economy Building Institutions That Work," by Clarence E. Ayres that were published in the March 1970 issue of the periodical "Social Science Quarterly." The author's purpose in writing this comment is to attempt again the reconciliation of institutional and conventional economics. The first step in reconciliation is to differentiate the two theories. Ayres' great contribution to economic theory is his application of scholar John Dewey's instrumental theory of normative value to economics. Ayres' methodology is pragmatic and inductive, and his theory is clearly in the category of normative economics--the theory of what ought to be. It is equally clear that conventional theory uses a deductive methodology and that the resulting theory is positive economics-the theory of what is. It is obviously true that there are positive implications of Ayres' institutional theory and normative implications of conventional theory; but these implications are not essential to the respective theories. If these non-essential implications are eliminated, then Ayres' institutionalism and conventional theory become completely compatible. There are, also, deductive normative economic theories.

The article presents a discussion on the paper titled "Institutionalism and Economic Development," written by Clarence E. Ayres. It is a clear and more or less complete statement of the position taken and emphasis given by a distinguished and influential scholar. The author does not attempt here a detailed appraisal of this article. Once a critic of institutional economics, Benjamin Higgins notes in his introduction that Professor Ayres and his fellows, it is now clear, have long been doing the sort of thing all development economists now find it necessary to do. Perhaps equally important is the observation that Ayres has, in the article which follows, provided the basis for a "reconciliation" of his position with that of his "hostile" critics. Specifically, the author agrees that Professor Ayres' position or approach is economic, a theory of what the economy is and how it works. That is, technically, the job of an economist is to explain, describe, and predict the workings of economic systems and, therefore, Ayres is a practicing economist.

The Argentine political economy has experienced a number of adverse developments, especially during the last three decades. We analyze the country's development trajectory with the help of a framework based on the writings of C. E. Ayres. This framework integrates the cumulative nature of technological progress and the ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy in the nature of institutions. An improved understanding of the causes as well as consequences of the development process is gained as we can identify more clearly how agents' decisions led to a weakening of the skill-and equipment-base in the country, significantly weakening its economic potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses how Clarence Edwin Ayres and Everett Hale ran the department Texas Institutional in 1950s. He examines the attitudes of both leaders when it comes to operating the department, as well as their political and social views. The author argues on Ayres' attitude of being arrogant when Texas legislature wanted to fire them, while applauds Hale of being quiet.