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How many battlefield nuclear weapons would it take for Pakistan to stop a major armored attack by the Indian army? How big would each bomb have to be? Would the cost in civilian Pakistani deaths--not to mention deaths among its own military caught on the nuclear battlefield--be so great as to make it self-defeating for Pakistan to use the bombs? At first glance, the main advantage of Pakistan's new battlefield nuclear weapon--known as the Nasr missile--would appear to be its ability to slowdown and stop an armored attack by the Indian Army inside Pakistan, before it reaches vital cities. But deeper examination reveals that deploying this particular weapon on the battlefield against an advancing Indian armored column would cause substantial deaths and injuries to Pakistani citizens, rendering its purpose moot. If there is any value to a Pakistani nuclear weapon, it lies instead in the bigger strategic picture: Its mere presence means that Pakistan has the ability to threaten India's cities and military garrisons with retaliation in response to an Indian incursion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an international confrontation, nuclear weapons can provide leverage even if they are not used. The leverage comes from threats of use or increased risk of use. When the confrontation is successfully resolved without nuclear use, exploiting this latent, potential use of nuclear weapons appears to be cost free. But in fact, some fraction of the consequence of a nuclear war should be included in the cost-benefit calculation each time the tactic is employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the efforts of the Board of Directors of "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" periodical, along with other laureates in monitoring the progress on reducing dangers from nuclear weapons and fissile materials. They have also follow climate changes, including efforts to reduce carbon emissions and plans to mitigate climate change without increasing the dangers of nuclear materials proliferation. The Board of Directors asked the governments to actively engage the scientific community for sound, non-partisan technical advice and provide immediate attention to changes in climate. They also call on policy and opinion leaders as well as the public to place the dangers of nuclear weapons at the top of their agendas for action.

Addresses issues surrounding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Role of arms control in stemming nuclear weapons proliferation; Role for universal treaty regimes; Leadership that the U.S. government need to take in shaping global security. INSET: Yes ,but....

Discusses the decision of the British government to conduct the testing of nuclear weapons in Australia rather than in Canada. Reasons for choosing Australia as the testing site; Information on the plan drafted for testing atomic devices; Details of the tests conducted in Australia from 1952 to 1957.

Focuses on the nuclear weapons plans of Russia. Information on the Moscow Treaty; Renewal of the Russian nuclear weapons enterprise; Discussion of the weapons budget; Difficulty in getting information on Russian weapons development budgets.

Contends that under a United Nations-sponsored nuclear umbrella, nations could devote resources to improving the quality of life rather than the quantity of weapons. Collapse of Soviet Union has not reduced rate of weapons proliferation; Countries that manufacture nuclear explosives; Supply and demand sides of proliferation; Why the main focus of international attention must shift from proliferation to its causes; Demand; Supply-side failure; Eleven steps for the US.

Claims that while an international treaty banning nuclear weapons tests is important, a no-first-use agreement would be just as useful. Testing history of the nuclear states; China's testing program; Speculation that continued Chinese testing could result in total collapse of testing moratoria; Why the United States should not resume testing; Importance of the political intention of complying with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

This article discusses the steps that has been taken by U.S. President George Bush which imply the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons. Bush's announcement on September 27, 1991 and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's answer on October 5, 1991 responded to the changing world. Bush put forward an impressive package--accelerating the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons covered by Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, ending ground alert for nuclear-laden bombers, and removing ground-launched nuclear weapons, among others. Gorbachev answered in kind and further proposed eliminating all nonstrategic nuclear weapons and ending nuclear testing and fissionable materials production. The Bush initiative has been criticized on three grounds. The most common is that the president had to do what he did and therefore made a virtue of necessity. Whether he intended it or not, Bush has taken steps that mean the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons. His proposals significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the burdens associated with deploying and controlling them. And although he retains many of the options for continuing and regenerating the nuclear arsenal, he has exposed that fact that there are no longer any grand justifications or doctrinal needs for nuclear weapons and that the nuclear machine is choking on its economic, political, environmental, and human contradictions. The initiatives fundamentally altered the nuclear stance of both nations.

The article discusses the history of negotiations related to ban on test of nuclear weapons in order to achieve complete test ban. The U.S. rejected comprehensive test ban after examining it. Officials in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon, insisted that the development of nuclear weapons was necessary to counter Russia. Non-nuclear, nonaligned countries engaged in the arms control process with the superpowers for the first time on March 4, 1962 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. Focus of arms control discussions shifted from a test ban to limits on offensive and defensive strategic systems after 1968. The U.S. and Russia agreed upon restricting the yield of individual nuclear explosions to less than 150 kilotons through a treaty signed on April 1976.

The article presents information on the calling off a comprehensive nuclear freeze by the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, after the unsuccessful campaign against the nuclear freeze referendums. The administration officials stated that the total ban on testing and production in relation to freeze resolutions would be unverifiable. The U.S. Department of Defense while opposing the freeze resolution during the Conference of Mayors in June 1982 at Minneapolis, Minnesota, commented on the freeze resolution more precisely that a freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include essential elements that can hardly be verified using national technical means and might not be completely verifiable even with additional measures.

The article presents a response from Michael Schuman to the criticism of his article "The Mouse that Roared," published in the January issue of the journal. In the article, he suggests that non-nuclear nations can play an important in opposing arms race. The movement against nuclear weapons can be strengthened by involvement of 110 non-nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty members. They can start an international civil disobedience to urge nuclear nations to reverse all deadly weapons.

The article focuses on James Franck and his efforts to prevent the use of atomic bombs. Franck was one of the scientists working in the Manhattan Project which developed the atomic bombs. In 1945, he and other scientists presented a memorandum and a report on the social and political implications of using atomic bombs. They came up with a report and recommendations that was trying to persuade the government in using the atomic bomb against Japan. The author reflects that had the scientists realized the nuclear bomb, made their recommendations more specific, and approached legislators in time, the U.S. policy on control and use of atomic bombs may have been different.

The article presents an analysis of nuclear arms control verification. In this report, the author focuses on the design of arms limitation agreement which would significantly limit strategic armaments and increase real security. According to the author, arms limitation, together with its means of verification, should be designed to avoid continual alarms that violations were occurring, and that fears of minor infractions of the agreement should not be allowed to become a source of major international incidents. This can be attain by proper phasing of the agreement as by the mechanics of the verification.

The article provides information on the meetings of Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held in the U.S. for 1966. The meetings featured debates on disarmament items, and adopted disarmament resolutions. Some of the resolutions adopted by the general assembly include a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and urges all states to take all necessary steps conducive to the earliest conclusion to a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Some of the issues discussed at the meeting include gases and bacteriological weapons, comprehensive test-ban committee treaty, and study report on nuclear weapons.

The article discusses the development of nuclear technology in developed countries. It is said that many nations have the scientific capability, the economic capacity and the nuclear technology which would enable them to embark on the road to independent production of nuclear weapons with reasonable prospects for success. The author cited that nuclear weapons become an integral part of military systems. The fundamental problem is that the nuclear superpowers continue to rely on nuclear weapons as a major ingredient of their military forces and in the conduct of international relations.

The article analyzes the proposal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) by the U.S. government for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fleet of fixed-manned and Polaris-equipped surface ships. The proposal received opposition from the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries, Great Britain and Italy. Skepticism and doubt over the feasibility of the project arose. MLF is used by the U.S. as a means to control nuclear weapons through the NATO command, while maintaining its control of the nuclear weapons of the West. The proposal represents a political maneuver.

The author reflects on the possible outcomes when a nuclear war arises between the U.S. and Soviet Union. He believes that the atomic bomb explosion during the second world war had triggered Soviet Union to magnify its own nuclear armaments. It is in his contention that the U.S. must project even a minimal deterrent strategy in response for a possible attack from the Russians. He suggests that the two nations must come to a cut-off agreement in the production of their bombs and rockets.

The article discusses the role of a universal nuclear deterrent system in preventing the widespread nuclear diffusion. In this report, the authors examine the least explored of the extreme models of nuclear deterrence, a world in which a universal nuclear force existed with specific instructions to deliver nuclear punishment to any nation that first uses nuclear weapons against any other nation. An elaboration of this nuclear deterrent model was discussed during the eighteen-nation disarmament conference meeting in Geneva.

The article discusses about the annihilation concept, the strategy of overkill. In this report, the author emphasis the importance of achieving a stable peace. With regards to this nuclear dilemma, a nuclear arms race was established as a holding period to provide a temporary respite for mankind to solve its problems. Also, each of the great power nations has a monumental self-interest in seeing to it that no nuclear war occurs. All of which are motivated to seek some means of accommodation, to lessen arms race by some form of arms control or limitation.

The article focuses on issues concerning East-West disarmament negotiations. Such zonal disarmament negotiations calls for an inspection from both sides. Soviet-style inspection involves observation of weapons as they are destroyed, but with no direct verification of the numbers of retained weapons, while Western-style inspection involves free access and search for possible hidden weapons at an early stage. To meet these requirements from both the East and the West, it is suggested to use an appropriate system of zonal disarmament as opposed to zonal inspection.

The article focuses on the impact of the success of the Soviet Union in the development of nuclear weapons on the national security in the U.S., in reference to the testimony of Dr. Ellis A Johnson, director of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. The testimony points out the profound interrelation of population survival and better defense policy, and that an effective civil defense is possible. Meanwhile, it is believed that because the White House is seemingly not asking for a sufficient budget to finance a national shelter program should there be a nuclear bomb attack, the means of civil defense will just be handed down to home defense of each American citizen.

The article focuses on the study pertaining to the peace movements in the U.S. against nuclear warfare. A study has been conducted, which is privately financed by the RAND Corp., has reached conclusions that seriously questioned the beliefs that an all-out thermonuclear war would inevitably result in mutual annihilation, and that nothing can be done to make it otherwise. The analysis has brought forth several results including that there are several combinations of military and nonmilitary measures which could provide valuable levels of protection in a nuclear war.

The article reports on the termination of war and maintenance of stable and lasting peace in the U.S. The universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests could be an important step toward the removal of the danger of atomic war and reduction of the danger of the occurrence of war in general. Nuclear weapons tests are dangerous not only because of the possible use of these weapons in the future. This is also the reason why people are desiring to end the experimental explosions of nuclear weapons. The Conference of Experts considered each method for the detection of weapons tests and the possibilities of simultaneous utilization of several methods.

The article focuses on the deliberation of scientific experts from the U.S., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Great Britain concerning the methods of monitoring nuclear weapon bomb tests. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, regarding the issue, expresses that the Americans are willing to stop nuclear tests for a year. Great Britain readily signifies to take the same action, while the Soviet Union announces that it will resume the action if other nations continue testing. Eisenhower suggested a moratorium unless the establishment of an effective monitoring system is provided. Furthermore, annual extensions are envisioned if general disarmament negotiations develop favorably.

The article discusses the possible consequences on the continuance of inventing nuclear weapons by the superpower nations. Each of this nation's aim focuses on national security. The system of thinking based on security through military dominance has been their core strategy in achieving world peace. However, this mode of analysis is becoming obsolete and is far more positively dangerous in that it will bring about catastrophic damages to the humanity. At a certain point, where tests of thermonuclear weapons in the Pacific and Siberia dramatized this transition. Understandably, accidents and misunderstandings are always a possibility should this misadventure continues, thus, the term stalemate.

The article discusses the official background of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's address to the United Nations (UN) on December 8, 1954, the immediate reaction to his nation address and his conversation with Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., U.S. representative to the UN, in relation to his atomic pool proposal. Welcoming a pooling of atomic knowledge for the general benefit of the people was the immediate reaction to the president's nation address. However, these reactions have indicated the fear of nucleonics to takeover the national state.

The article presents a reprint of "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments." The proposal was submitted by the United States to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and calls for world arms count through disclosure, verification, and inspection by the U.N. committee. The proposal covers armed forces, atomic and nonatomic armament, including manpower strength of reserve and regular military and the locations of all operational military installations. INSET: The Use of Tactical Atomic Weapons.

The article focuses on the proposals of the United States for a world arms census for control of atomic energy. The author reflects that the United States' proposal for arms count in its effort to control atomic armaments brings no significant change in the course of the negotiation. The proposal rather is a step back because it did not explicitly state that the complete arms count should be agreed upon in advance of the negotiation on limitation. He opines that the proposal is good only as a working paper for better plans in future negotiations. He suggests on the agreement to combine the arms count provisions with the limitations plan.

The author investigates the effects of atomic bomb destruction to the people in Europe. He discusses the mixed feelings of Europeans concerning their protection and safety against the destruction of atomic bomb. He added, that American program of air offense is created in response to their safety needs. Furthermore, he ended, that to resolve such conflict, the Americans should continue their superiority in armaments and continue develop various program that will useful in preventing such crisis.

The article discusses that the control of atomic energy weapons is an international problem. A detailed plan of prohibition and control has been prepared by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and majority of the General Assembly approved but Soviet Union refuses to accept the method. The prospects for obtaining international control then depends on the opening up of the Soviet Union. It is now clear to the Commission that control of atomic weapons cannot be accomplished immediately and the procedure of putting both prohibition and control into effect requires step by step process.

The article provides information on the development of India's nuclear program. It cites the announcement that India had made 10 years ago, in which it declared itself as a nuclear weapon state and expressed its intent to establish and deploy a nuclear triad. It discusses the growth of India's nuclear program consists of a three-stage land-based ballistic missile, a nuclear-powered submarine, and a nuclear-capable cruise missile. An overview of the Safeguards Agreement between India and the International Atomic Agency is also presented. Details about the features of India's nuclear delivery systems as well as the basis of its nuclear doctrine are also provided. Moreover, facts about India's Nuclear Command Authority founded in 2003 and the Indian arsenal are given.

We argue that the framework of norms has generated a progressive research agenda in the field of global nuclear politics, providing important insights that traditional realist and materialist analyses ignore or dismiss. These insights are not on the margins of nuclear politics; rather, they answer central questions about nuclear non-use, possession, and the nonproliferation regime at large. These findings are not a fluke; instead, they stem from the powerful analytical framework of norms, which provides complexes of linked propositions about actor expectations and behavior in global nuclear politics. This article examines three of those propositions: the importance of the logic of appropriateness, the role of norm contestation, and the changes brought about by norm entrepreneurs. Finally, we identify other norms-related ideas that can further illuminate the dire policy crises facing global nuclear governance, as well as specific areas of nuclear politics that would benefit from norms-related scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses six challenges to enforcing norms regarding nuclear weapons. Three challenges reflect generic problems in international politics. These are differences in power, the collective action problem, and trade-offs with other interests. Three additional dilemmas reflect specific characteristics of the nuclear realm. First, membership in international treaties connected to the norms is not universal, raising questions about the appropriateness of enforcement against states that have not signed the treaties. Second, different implications of the norms can come into conflict with each other. In particular, there can be tensions between the requirements of nonproliferation and disarmament norms. Finally, some common options for norm enforcement become quite problematic when dealing with nuclear weapons. For example, if states respond to defections by starting their own nuclear weapons programs, this tit-for-tat response would defeat the purposes of the nonproliferation regime. Despite these challenges, nuclear norms enjoy widespread support and some enforcement is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the debate regarding the nuclear policy of the U.S. Proposal of U.S. President George W. Bush to build nuclear weapons; Debate on the defense budget; Policy directives and statements issued by the Bush administration.

Reports on the state of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a nuclear testing moratorium which bans any tests that produces a nuclear yield. Opposition of former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to the treaty; Purpose of forming the Stockpile Stewardship Program in relation to nuclear weapons; Question raised in comparing a nuclear weapon with a car engine.

This article reports how North Korea's on-again, off-again approach to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards is receiving renewed attention, as a U.N. special commission struggles to uncover the truth about a secret nuclear program in Iraq. As an NPT party, Iraq pledged not to make nuclear weapons and concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, accepting international verification measures-the IAEA safeguards system-designed to insure that states do not use the material in their nuclear installations to make nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea's demands have varied: Pyongyang has alternately called for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the region, or the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Korea, or a U.S. guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, and/or U.S. acceptance of international inspection of nuclear weapons it may or may not have deployed in South Korea.

The article focuses on the impact of India's three-pronged policy on nuclear weapons. The country has a policy providing that it will not create atomic weapons and will not accept the guarantees of protection from the superpowers. The policy is considered to be justified since it helps the country to keep its option open. Its option tends to deter no one because it has no defense purpose and no international status symbol. Moreover, the country objects the resolution, promising nuclear security, that it amounts to an amendment of the United Nations Charter.

The article discusses issues concerning the nuclear threat posed by China and stresses the importance of a universal law banning production of nuclear weapons. The author contends that an effective world law is the only resolution for nuclear terror. That this goal to be achieved, resolution banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection, should be created. To avoid another strategic arms race, it is suggested that China will be put within the scope of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The author enumerates the ultimate goals of China. He also sees a possibility of a nuclear between U.S. and Soviet Union should the former support Israel's campaign against Egypt.

The article discusses the proposals for a no-first-use pledge for the nuclear weapons on the military nuclear nations which include the U.S. and Soviet Union. The pledge was based on two arguments which include military-strategic argument and the political argument. The military-strategic argument is for the peaceful settlement of conflicts among military nuclear powers while the political argument is used without any means of enforcement or guarantees of compliance. According to the author, the pledge is most significant for nonnuclear nations because it suggested to protect them against nuclear aggression.

The article assesses the future of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a division of the United Nations amidst controversies that it is facing. The controversy is caused on the system of safeguards adopted by the agency. The system mandates that agency safeguards can be applied to fissionable material and equipment it supplied for use in small nuclear reactors below 100 thermal megawatts. The acceptance of the Soviet government of the system has led to the improved credibility of the agency. However, it should realize its main goal of making nuclear and conventional power competitive.

The article reports that the Atomic Energy Commission has declassified a document entitled "Worldwide Effects of Atomic Weapons: Project Sunshine" in the U.S. The declassified document is undated, but it is an amended version of a secret report dated August 6, 1953. The existence of the project has been known since January 19, 1956 when Willard F. Libby revealed it in a speech. Libby is credited as the prime mover for the conference and subsequent project. Scientists and officials present at the project's conference urged that a pilot program for sampling strontium fallout and defining the guidelines of the problem must be tackled first.

The article comments on the views of Mr. Marseille related to the possession of nuclear weapons. The author emphasized that Marseille attacks the Russell-Einstein appeal which was signed by ten eminent scientists. The author pointed out that the whole doctrine of liberty of opinion contended that there should be free competition among ideas and that the competition should be conducted by argument not by force. The author believed that the changed circumstances have compelled a change of policy, but the new policy has precisely the same sincerity as the old one and has the same main purpose which is to preserve the human race.

The article presents a discussion on the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 particularly the amendment made to the said law. The amendment lessened restrictions on the management of pertinent information regarding atomic energy utilization. The act legitimizes the flow of restricted information outside the United States, provided detailed procedures are observed. The author provides a summary of the amendment in three parts which includes the scope of the information covered, the procedures, and companion amendment.

The article discusses the standpoints of several nations regarding the atomic explosion that happened in the Soviet Union. Following the announcement of U.S. President Harry S. Truman that there had been an atomic explosion in the country, several queries were raised on the international control of atomic energy. In fact, nuclear control has become the priority in the Fourth United Nations Assembly. The declarations of U.S. Secretary Dean G. Acheson and the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union sum up in general the positions of four powers on atomic control. According to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, the problem of atomic control remains in an impasse and is liable to remain unless there is a radical change in the mind of people.

The article presents a discussion on whether the United Nations Charter can provide protection against atomic bomb attacks beyond that protection which can arise from mutual fears of retaliation and from measures of passive defense such as demobilization of cities, redistribution of populations, and developing factories underground. The UN Charter includes two types of provisions including the rules and principles imposing legal obligations on members and non-members, and provisions conferring legal powers on organizations.

The article focuses on the internal debate in the US Administration as Israel Approached and passed the Nuclear threshold in 1968–1969. The article is based on recently released American Defense and State Departments documents and also on Presidential and National Security Advisor documents hitherto unavailable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the Clinton administration (1993–2001) toward India. It is argued that initially President Clinton was focused on a “capping, rollback, and eliminate” approach toward Indian nuclearization. But, after India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, there was a discernible change in Clinton's policy toward India, which has largely gone unrecognized. The Clinton administration considerably shifted the nuclear goalposts—from the cap, rollback, and eliminate Indian nuclear weapons—to merely the exercise of nuclear restraint by India. This, in turn, implied a tacit acceptance of the nuclear weapons possessed by India. The Clinton administration cleared the languishing nuclear debris and created space for the next administration to reset the anomalous nuclear relationship with India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay was written under the impact of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear catastrophe to locate the nuclear power issue in a context broader than energy and environment. “Peaceful use of nuclear energy” was brought in by the US in the mid-1950s as part of its “psy” warfare to cleanse atomic power of the horrifying image of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki massacre. “Peaceful use” as such was accepted as a symbol of progress even by left-wing intellectuals. However, the Japanese ruling groups situated such use in their long-term military context. In the ensuing decades, the government carried out huge national nuclear programs and said they were genuinely for energy supply. But in 1965–72, the government undertook serious studies on Japan's nuclear arms, concluding that although Japan would stay non-nuclear “for the time being,” it would keep its techno-economic capacity ready to produce nuclear bombs any time they were needed. This essay examines Japan's nuclear power in reference to the major defining factors of the postwar Japanese statehood—the US–Japan security alliance(Anpo), Okinawa as the pivot ofAnpo, the rightists' ambition to revive the glory of the prewar Empire, and Japan's position in the US–China relationship. TheFukushimadisaster and Okinawa's resistance to military colony status rocked this whole structure, bankrupting the postwar statehood. People are now urged to define what comes next. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept and process of valuing and devaluing nuclear weapons. It states that there should be a deeper understanding of how nuclear weapons are valued to determine what a process of devaluing looks like. It says that the devaluation has emerged in global nuclear discourse in 1960 as well as international commissions in 1900 and 2000 which have deployed the practice.