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This chapter, in which the first two chapters converge and culminate, analyses Hegel’s interpretation of the mystical philosophy of Bohme in greater detail. The study sets out from two principal theses: that Hegel’s interpretation evolves substantially, and that this evolution is particularly evident in Hegel’s choice of themes and concepts drawn from the writings of Bohme. The inquiry proceeds in an approximately chronological order, from the Jena Wastebook to Hegel’s references to Bohme in published works, and finally to his most comprehensive analysis in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hegel’s interest in Bohme first surfaces during his period in Jena and develops over the subsequent years. It is clear from the comparison of various manuscripts relating to Hegel’s lecture course on the History of Philosophy that his study of Bohme’s writings is still in process during the Berlin years. In particular, Hegel increasingly focuses on the theme of negativity: the way Bohme conceives of the element of negativity within God turns his mysticism, for Hegel, into an exceptionally vital dialectical approach. This important conclusion is at the heart of Hegel’s interest in the philosophy of Jakob Bohme and can only be adequately grasped by carefully retracing the stages in Hegel’s progressive discovery of Bohme’s thought.

This chapter distinguishes four phases in the reception of phenomenology among French academic philosophers between 1910, when Husserl’s work was first mentioned in a French publication, and Husserl’s death in 1938 and the outbreak of World War II the following year—the period that Herbert Spiegelberg has called the “receptive phase” of the French phenomenological movement. Following Husserl’s own lead, French academic philosophers interpreted phenomenology as representing a continuation of the Cartesian tradition. This trend is shown through the discussion of essays published by the eight thinkers who did the most to introduce Husserlian phenomenology to French philosophical circles prior to 1939. In order to organize and highlight their variously nuanced interpretations of phenomenology, they are grouped into contemporaneous pairs representing four distinct phases in the awareness and appreciation of Husserlian phenomenology among French philosophers: Leon Noel and Victor Delbos , who introduced Husserl as a combatant against psychologism ; Lev Shestov and Jean Hering , who debated the Platonic and idealist character of phenomenology; Bernard Groethuysen and Georges Gurvitch , who offered popularizing accounts of phenomenology against the backdrop of contemporary German philosophy; and the original appropriations of phenomenology by Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Paul Sartre . Where appropriate in the overall chronological framework of the chapter, other relevant events are introduced, such as the publication of Husserl’s own works, visits by Husserl and Scheler to France, and translations of essays by German phenomenologists, including Heidegger . A concluding section calls attention to the contributions of a few other scholars not mentioned elsewhere in the chapter.

This chapter proposes to distinguish the different forms of scepticism recognized by Kant: Baylean, Humean, and Cartesian scepticism. In order for his critical philosophy and indeed for the Enlightenment to stand, all three must be neutralized, if not refuted. Each of these three forms of scepticism is presented, in each case identifying its modern source and Kant’s elaboration of it. In all three cases, Kant distinguishes between the scepticism itself and the useful part of it that he integrates into his critical project. Thus, first Kant extracts “Hume’s problem” from Humean scepticism; then he isolates the sceptical method from Baylean scepticism; and finally, he distinguishes transcendental idealism from sceptical idealism. Subsequent German philosophy, including both post-Kantian scepticism and German idealism, would depend on his transcendental-idealist answer to these three modern forms of scepticism; his response to each would be made subject to detailed examination, as if the conflict between sceptics and anti-sceptics is destined never to end.

The subject and its cognitive faculties play a prominent role in the German philosophy and logic of the eighteenth century, including Wolff and Kant. This is due to the central place they granted to the notion of judgement. Ignoring the details, they considered a judgement to be made when two concepts or representations are united in thought. This aspect, already present in Wolff, comes more to the fore in the philosophy of Kant. Nevertheless, both also adopted a more formal approach to judgements. This chapter shows how both Wolff and Kant seek to combine the epistemological role of the subject with a formal analysis of the notion of judgement. As a result, I defend the claim that the criticism of metaphysics Kant elaborates in his dissertation De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis of 1770 relies on a transformation of this formal analysis to the meta-level of the human faculties.

This report surveys the theoretical genealogy of the Clinical Theory on Human Becoming. The emergence of this new discipline was within the Pedagogy of the Kyoto School. The Kyoto School was a local branch of the German philosophy and accepted the new ideas in their own way in their own Japanese context, where the traditional thought of Buddhism and the social hardships of poverty and illness prevailed. The Kyoto School itself became known as a factory of philosophical study, also produced the pedagogy, beginning with Motomori Kimura’s (1895–1946) ‘Ichida no Nomi’ (‘One Carving of a Chisel’) (1933) and culminating with Akira Mori’s (1915–1976) Theory of Seimei Tuzumihashi (the Human Lifecycle as an Arch Bridge) (1977). The Clinical Theory on Human Becoming was conceived in the context of the unfolding and eventual dissolution of the Pedagogy of the Kyoto School. This is one of the beams in Japan’s unique structure of educational theory—a beam which was chiseled out of native Japanese timber but lathed according to the templates of Europe and America.

The concept of “style of thought” or Denkstil is today probably primarily associated with the Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck and his writings from the 1930s. It was however used quite extensively already by Karl Mannheim in his writings on the sociology of knowledge from the 1920s. Quite interestingly, the concept of style of thought was also used twice by Rudolf Carnap in the preface to Der logische Aufbau der Welt from 1928. No doubt, the concept must have been in the air during the interwar period. In what follows I will characterize the early positivism in Nordic philosophy in terms of a certain style of thought or as a certain habitus of thought. I will single out six basic convictions about philosophy and how to do philosophy that make up a more or less common ground and starting point for the early philosophical positivists in the Nordic countries. However, to begin with I will motivate why I prefer to use the designation “the positive spirit” rather than “positivism”. In the latter part of the article I will then dwell on some more specifi c topics and fi gures relating to the positive spirit or positivism before Logical positivism in Nordic philosophy. (Less)

It was in the English speaking world that Karl Popper first caught the attention of broader philosophical circles, and it is primarily in this same world that his views still continuously elicit a response, whether positive or negative. However, in Central Europe the slightly delayed Popper's influence has been quite often if not mediated then at least supported by other developments within German philosophy. Not surprisingly, from the very beginning Popper's philosophical return ran up against the prevalent local philosophical tendencies of the times, from a selective but mostly negative Marxist attitude to a patent disinterest and disregard by most existentialists, phenomenologists, and Heideggerians. A rather important role in this complex situation has been played by Hans Albert; from the late 1950s on he has been an outspoken protagonist for Popper's philosophy. The scope of Albert's activities extends from expository endeavors to critical exchanges with the opponents; of the latter the best known being his early involvement in the so-called "Positivismusstreit", covering a substantial part of the 1970s. However, Albert's role was never one of a mere apologist, his own scholarly background allowed him to expand the sphere of problems dealt with as well as the range of thinkers involved in such critical discussions. To discuss those less known aspects of critical rationalism will be the task of this chapter.

The chapter studies the concepts of the self, the soul and the subject as they were developed around the first half of the nineteenth century in German philosophy presiding over the birth of psychology as a science. The topic is addressed by examining particularly the leading roles that Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Franz Brentano played in this development. Both thinkers worked out an original conception of the soul through recourse to Aristotle’s theories of the soul, combining them with insight stemming from the modern tradition of the philosophy of subjectivity, particularly Kantianism. The first part of the chapter explicates Friedrich Trendelenburg’s argument, that psychology constitutes an independent discipline, and show how his arguments contributed to the general discussion about the status of psychology. The second part consists of an explication of Franz Brentano’s reinterpretation of the Aristotelian tradition and provides a critical comparison between his position and that of Trendelenburg. The main argument of the chapter is that Trendelenburg had an important mediating role in the post-Aristotelian tradition, which developed further and culminated in idealistic theories of subjectivity and self-consciousness.

I think that it is very proper to include a paper about truth in a volume dedicated to Jaakko Hintikka even if it does not deal directly with his highly original ideas about this topic that are related to IF logic. This essay considers the problem of truth in a conservative way, so to speak way. I will focus on properties of the predicate ‘is true’ derived from very elementary logical insights. It is convenient to start with Frege’s view (see Frege 1979a, Frege 1979b) that logic is the science of truth. This thesis should be understood to mean that logic concerns formal principles of truth (the distinction between formal truth and material truth was very common in German philosophy of the 19 century). Putting this in more contemporary terminology, formal truth consists in truth defined by purely structural criteria and transmitted by principles of logical entailment (logical consequence) as codified by logical calculus. These principles always guarantee the truth of conclusion if premises are true; technically speaking, logical entailment preserves truth, that is, transmits it from premises to conclusion. Is the view that logic is the science of truth the only possibility? Surprisingly enough, the answer is no, because it is not difficult to define the consequence relation as preserving falsehood (see also Wolenski 1995). Consider the formulas

Any attempt to deal with the relationship of French science to German science in the Romantic period has to come to grips with the increasingly ethno-national self-consciousness that comes to pervade intellectual and cultural work in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic decades. Artists, poets, and critics measured their work against national origins. They cast themselves in a history of Europe defined by the mixture, conflict, and succession of peoples, each animated by a particular character or spirit, reciprocally determining and determined by physical environment, political institutions, religion, and art.1 So too did natural philosophers.2 Neglecting this dimension of cultural activity in the period runs the risk of attributing the prominent role of national categories in philosophical discourse to actually existing national differences and missing their internal, discursive function in the definition of nationhood in this critical period. In particular, we risk losing the constitutive role that scientific activity and the increasingly explicit discussions of “scientific method” played in the construction of national identities in the period. As Frederick Gregory notes in his essay in this volume, Orsted was preoccupied from the 1800s on with concerns about defining an authoritative approach to knowing Nature, concerns which we tend to associate more with the 1830s and 1840s and the British context. Implicit in Gregory’s account of Orsted’s debate with the Danish theologian and popular educator Frederik Grundtvig, and explicit in Andrew Jackson’s detailed exposition of the lateEnlightenment Danish church controversies that motivated Orsted’s first ventures into natural philosophy, is that Orsted’s “early” concern with defining a “scientific method” reflects a much broader contemporary debate about the place of church

267 Analytical philosophy of mind is currently engaged in a renewed and intensified debate about such issues as subjectivity, phenomenal consciousness, and the nature of selfhood. While it is undeniable that its discussion of these topics has reached a high level of complexity and sophistication, it is however, a discussion that has also remained rather inward looking. Apart from some occasional references to historical figures such as Locke or Kant or James, it has largely been a discussion for and among analytical philosophers. There has been a lack of any real interest in the parallel discussions to be found on the Continent, even though there is a long and rich tradition for discussing and analyzing the very same problems in Austrian, German, and French philosophy. In this chapter, I wish to present and discuss some of the contributions to a theory of self-awareness that can be found on the Continent. I will focus on the work of a group of German philosophers known as the Heidelberg School. However, my point of departure will be contemporary analytical philosophy. I will start out by briefly outlining an account of consciousness that has recently enjoyed great popularity – the so-called higher-order theory. I will then turn to the Heidelberg School, which not only has formulated an incisive criticism of the higher-order theory, but also has developed a position of its own that arguably stands as the most important contribution to a clarification of self-awareness in recent German philosophy. I will analyze this contribution in detail, and then end the chapter by drawing attention to some of its specific limitations.

List of Contributors. Introduction: Taking Metaphysics Seriously W. Sweet. Part One: Issues in Classical Metaphysics. 1. Does Being Have a Nature? (Or: Metaphysics as a Science of the Real) L. Dewan, O.P. 2. Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchthon to Hegel R. Pozzo. 3. Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Pre-Established Harmony R. Feist. Part Two: Modern Challenges to the Scope of Metaphysics. 4. The Integration of History and Metaphysics K. Schmitz. 5. Suffering, Metaphysics, and Nietzsche's Path to the Holy D. Ahern. 6. Can Creation' be a Metaphysical Concept? P. Harris. 7. Metaphysics West and East: Bosanquet and Sankara G. Satapathy. Part Three: On the Road to Metaphysics - Freedom, Agency, And Existence. 8. Metaphysics and the Origins of Arendt's Account of Evil and Human Freedom C. LePage. 9. Agents, Causes, and Explanations: The Idea of a Metaphysical System L. Armour. 10. Speculative and Analytical Philosophy, Theories of Existence, and the Generalization of the Mathematical Function J. Bradley. Part Four: Metaphysical Theories In A Contemporary Context. 11. Jacques Maritain and the Metaphysics of Plato F. O'Rourke. 12. Metaphysics and Idealism W.J. Mander. 13. Empiricism: Principles and Problems F. Wilson. Part Five: The Possibility of Metaphysics. 14. Metaphysics as 'de Insolubilibus' M.M. Tweedale. 15. Designing Metaphysics E. Trott. Index.

When we think about our subjectivity, we do so using words and expressions taken from our mother tongue. While doing so, we also reflect on the inherited meaning of the terms used. We find possible ambiguities, evolution of meanings, and so forth. Frequently, as a side result of our work with those terms, we proceed to a reformulation or transformation of a traditional meaning.

German philosophy in the second half of the 20th century has been affected by historical events that are regularly evoked in order to emphasize the necessity for renewed ethical reflection. These events include—no less than the atrocities of the World War II and the Shoah—the development of technology, and above all, nuclear technology. In this light, one must mention, among others, the writings of Martin Heidegger, especially his The Question Concerning Technology,1 the engagement of Karl Jaspers, and later of Ernst Tugendhat as well as others concerned with the danger of nuclear weapons. The installation in the mid-1980s of Pershing II missiles in West Germany provoked the political engagement of many “professional philosophers.” Several phenomenologists, from Antonio Aguirre to Bernhard Waldenfels, clearly and on good grounds protested the installation in the “Declaration of German Philosophers on the Stationing of Missiles.”

While there is nowadays some appreciation for the vast and significant influence of the philosophical and psychological writings of Rudolf Hermann Lotze,1 there is at the same time an ever growing need for more detailed considerations of various aspects of his work. For there can be little doubt that he was by far one of the most important philosophers in the post-idealist phase of nineteenth century German philosophy. In the following I shall attempt to make a contribution that will to some extent meet the need just indicated. Here I shall discuss his efforts to explain the sensory representation of space by means of the theory of local signs, which is vividly and succinctly described by William James as: The theory which denies that there can be in a sensation any element of actual locality, of inherent spatial order, any tone as it were which cries to us immediately and without further ado, ‘I am here,’ or ‘I am there.‘2