Kant’s Criticism and the Legacy of Modern Scepticism

This chapter proposes to distinguish the different forms of scepticism recognized by Kant: Baylean, Humean, and Cartesian scepticism. In order for his critical philosophy and indeed for the Enlightenment to stand, all three must be neutralized, if not refuted. Each of these three forms of scepticism is presented, in each case identifying its modern source and Kant’s elaboration of it. In all three cases, Kant distinguishes between the scepticism itself and the useful part of it that he integrates into his critical project. Thus, first Kant extracts “Hume’s problem” from Humean scepticism; then he isolates the sceptical method from Baylean scepticism; and finally, he distinguishes transcendental idealism from sceptical idealism. Subsequent German philosophy, including both post-Kantian scepticism and German idealism, would depend on his transcendental-idealist answer to these three modern forms of scepticism; his response to each would be made subject to detailed examination, as if the conflict between sceptics and anti-sceptics is destined never to end.