The Heidelberg School and the Limits of Reflection

267 Analytical philosophy of mind is currently engaged in a renewed and intensified debate about such issues as subjectivity, phenomenal consciousness, and the nature of selfhood. While it is undeniable that its discussion of these topics has reached a high level of complexity and sophistication, it is however, a discussion that has also remained rather inward looking. Apart from some occasional references to historical figures such as Locke or Kant or James, it has largely been a discussion for and among analytical philosophers. There has been a lack of any real interest in the parallel discussions to be found on the Continent, even though there is a long and rich tradition for discussing and analyzing the very same problems in Austrian, German, and French philosophy. In this chapter, I wish to present and discuss some of the contributions to a theory of self-awareness that can be found on the Continent. I will focus on the work of a group of German philosophers known as the Heidelberg School. However, my point of departure will be contemporary analytical philosophy. I will start out by briefly outlining an account of consciousness that has recently enjoyed great popularity – the so-called higher-order theory. I will then turn to the Heidelberg School, which not only has formulated an incisive criticism of the higher-order theory, but also has developed a position of its own that arguably stands as the most important contribution to a clarification of self-awareness in recent German philosophy. I will analyze this contribution in detail, and then end the chapter by drawing attention to some of its specific limitations.