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The 'ndrangheta is a mafia group from Calabria, Southern Italy. Considerable efforts have been made to understand the structures and the organisation of this mafia, not only in the province of Reggio Calabria where it originated, but also in other Calabrian provinces and even outside the Calabrian region. Building on judicial data from a recent maxi-trial (Rinascita-Scott) against 'ndrangheta clans in the province of Vibo Valentia, we build a theoretical approach based on narrative criminology applied to organisational studies of secretive organisations. We find a 'script of narratives' emerging from collaborators and affiliates' stories – about socialisation, discretion, and accreditation - which reveals how recognition and constitution of 'added' 'ndrangheta clans are thought to work. This script helps us understand the constitutive power of narratives in mafias and critically approach the study of such organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I address the significance of the key notions of coordination, constitution and convention. My aim in so doing is to provide a better understanding of their relation to conventionalism and to evaluate the prospects for a version of the relativized a priori based on a refinement of the notion of coordination. I stress the Kantian roots of all three concepts. Moreover, I argue that the link between the early logical positivist requirement for the uniqueness of coordination and the Kantian account of empirical objectivity provides an interpretive key that sheds light on the alleged incompatibility between constitutive principles and conventionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to renew the discussion about meaning in the field of psychology. A model is presented that, contrary to the classical view of meaning as an entity taken for granted, explains the dynamics through which it comes to be constituted, opening itself to the possibility of being experienced, as a psychological reality. The autoethnographic analysis carried out by von Fircks (IBPS 53(4):632–643, 2023) is used as example to show how such a model enables an understanding of local phenomena through the comprehension of the semiotic dynamics underlying them. Finally, this paper offers insights into the mechanisms that underlie the field of possibility of meaning-making processes, thus of human experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revolutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto constitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain Afghanistan's unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghanistan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use comparative constitutions project (CCP) data to explore whether Constitutions that follow revolutions are designed differently. We employ matching methods using 36 treatments (revolutionary Constitutions) and 162 control units (new Constitutional adoptions without a revolution). We find some evidence that revolutionary Constitutions are less rigid (i.e., their procedural barriers to amendment are weaker). Otherwise, revolutionary Constitutions seem similar to non-revolutionary ones. However, we do find strong evidence that revolutionary Constitutions are associated with a greater likelihood of ex post democracy. The results (less rigid, higher likelihood of democracy) hold for those not associated with ending colonial rule or the fall of the USSR. The greater ex post democracy result is reported for various democracy measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 led many American Indian tribes to adopt formal constitutional texts to govern life on reservations. Over the following decade, dozens of tribes ratified their constitutions in hopes that they would start a new age of tribal self-governance. Given the opportunities for constitutional design subject to constrains, we develop a theory of constitutional choice on reservations. Tribal constitutions varied substantially in content and structure. We evaluate the constitutional choices tribes made regarding four areas: membership requirements, direct democracy, restrictions placed on officials, and protection of private property. Our theory yields several hypotheses that we test against data on 117 tribal constitutions, most of which were ratified in the aftermath of the IRA. The results provide evidence for the validity of our hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown's example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentally constituted mentality. This solution is independently plausible and is available to physicalists of virtually all significant varieties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl "tendency" does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with "consciousness-of," a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl's distinction between intentionality as tendency (Tendenz), which he describes as a striving (Streben), and intentionality as consciousness-of (Bewusstsein-von), which he describes as a presentation (Vorstellung) of an intentional object. Then, I discuss Husserl's problematic way of relating these two universal modes of intentionality. Although he claims that intentionality as tendency presupposes intentionality as consciousness-of, I argue that the universal validity of this presupposition is put into question by the consideration of drives (Triebe), which Husserl describes as passive tendencies that originally lack any consciousness of the end strived toward, and, hence, do not seem to presuppose any presentation of it. I show that the lack of intentionality as consciousness-of poses two major problems in Husserl's account, in that it makes drives seemingly unintelligible as (i) strivings and as (ii) motivated experiences. Lastly, to find a possible solution to these problems and better clarify the relation between intentionality as tendency and intentionality as consciousness-of at the level of drives, I explore Edith Stein's account of drives as aimless strivings governed by experiential causality (Erlebniskausalität), discussing its advantages and potential drawbacks, as well as its compatibility with Husserl's account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Water Diversion Projects have become increasingly popular in improving water quality in various water ecosystems. However, these projects also require a more comprehensive evaluation. In this study, we introduced a digital stable marker tracing module and proposed a continuation-dynamic constitution analysis approach. We applied this approach to analyze the ecological tidal water diversion in Changshu town, China. The results showed that the mean diversion water age of the Yangtze River water source was 10.80 h, the residence time of the background water source in Baimaotang was approximately 4.0 h, and the contribution of inflow water sources from tributaries accounted for 15% of discharges. The results can demonstrate practicality of our approach in quantitatively evaluating water diversion impacts and optimizing cooperative diversion projects. Furthermore, our discussion led to the design of an ecological tidal water diversion based on optimized cooperative diversion, which showed element-complementary and whole-comprehensive effects. This indicates that the ecological tidal water diversion can extend the impact of cooperative diversion. The continuation-dynamic constitution analysis approach enhances the tracing capacity of inflow constitution and enables the distinction of different time-varying distributions of each inflow constitution. Therefore, this approach holds promise as an embedded "Digital stable marker tracing" module in the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gendered language is becoming a matter of serious concern for legal drafters and policymakers because 'it is always changing as societal views change' (The University of Calgary: Office of diversity, equity and protected disclosure 2017:1). Many western countries have made considerable progress towards using inclusive legal language. However, inclusive language is not implemented in other parts of the World; the Arab World is no exception. This may be due to the violation of language rules, the decline of language, and the lack of enough evidence that changing the language will change society (Brown in ABA J, 2019) and (Brown in ABA J: 24–26, 2018). In this paper, I explore the challenging socio-cultural and linguistic factors that may hinder the implementation of gender-inclusive language in Arabic and explain the current situation in two current constitutions of Egypt and Tunisia in particular. The main aim of this paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of terminology representing gender in the Egyptian (2014, amended 2019) and Tunisian (2014) Arabic-English Constitutions using corpus-based tools. The analysis shows inconsistent attempts at a more inclusive source text through using neutral terms and adding inclusive pre-modifiers to these terms. It also shows inconsistent translation of gender-specific terminology and pronominal references. Both constitutions explicitly stress the 'eradication of violence against women' and express parity between 'women' and 'men' in terms of 'equal rights' and 'appropriate political representation' (e.g. in the Egyptian House of Representatives (28%) and the Tunisian Assembly of People's Representatives (26%)) (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA 2021). Although these percentages are not far away from the representation of women in European countries such as the United Kingdom (35%) (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA 2021), it is the reality of women's actual roles, change they initiate and their impact in the society that counts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality's constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to clarify whether physical constitution affects masticatory function. A total of 251 healthy adults with completely natural dentition participated in this study. Height, weight, and body mass index (BMI) were used as parameters representing physical constitution, and the amount of glucose eluted from chewed gummy jelly and maximum occlusal force was used as parameter representing masticatory function. Handgrip strength was also measured. After comparing each parameter between male and female participants, the relationship between physical constitution and masticatory function was investigated in the combined (male and female) group, the male group, and the female group. The relationship between handgrip strength and masticatory function was also investigated. Stepwise multiple linear regression analysis was performed with masticatory function as the dependent variable and physical constitution as independent variable. The mean values of each parameter were significantly greater in the male group than in the female group. Regarding the relationship between physical constitution and occlusal force, the occlusal force tended to increase as the parameter value representing physical constitution increased, and a significant correlation was observed for all parameters. For masticatory performance, a significant correlation was observed in all parameters in the combined group, but no significant correlations were observed in the male group and in the female group. Multiple linear regression analysis showed that weight was significantly associated with occlusal force. Though occlusal force may be affected by physical constitution, masticatory performance is not easily affected by physical constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because climate change can be seen as the blind spot of contemporary philosophy of technology, while the destructive side effects of technological progress are no longer deniable, this article reflects on the role of technologies in the constitution of the (post)Anthropocene world. Our first hypothesis is that humanity is not the primary agent involved in world-production, but concrete technologies. Our second hypothesis is that technological inventions at an ontic level have an ontological impact and constitutes world. As we object to classical philosophers of technology like Ihde and Heidegger, we will sketch the progressive contribution of our conceptuality to understand the role of technology in the Anthropocene world. Our third hypothesis is that technology has emancipatory potential and in this respect, can inaugurate a post-Anthropocene World. We consider these three hypotheses to develop a philosophical account of the ontology of technology beyond an abstract and deterministic understanding. This concept enables us to philosophically reflect on the role of technology in the Anthropocene World in general, and its contribution to the transition to the post-Anthropocene World in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main issues in the debate on urban constitutionalism is how constitutions can recognize the increasingly important role of cities in relation to the nation-state. This paper examines what we talk about when we talk about city autonomy. This is a pressing question, particularly in the context of European unitary states. This paper pays special attention to the context of two of such states, namely the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (especially England). First, it explores the notion of subsidiarity, which implies that consideration should be given to the distinctiveness of the city as regards the allocation of power to the central and regional levels respectively. However, this idea in itself cannot justify the case for city autonomy, as the claim that the attribution of autonomous powers to cities may improve the quality of decision-making in the state as a whole needs additional empirical evidence. Second, it investigates the concept of city autonomy by exploring the fuzziness of the notion of the city. In addition, it introduces the concept of 'spatial identities' in order to explain the interdependence of (large) cities and their surrounding (rural) areas. Lastly, it concludes that if the importance of cities as constitutional actors is to be increased, it should be done so in an informal way rather than by the introduction of formal constitutional arrangements both from a pragmatic and a normative perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay addresses Brexit as a constitutional and jurisgenerative moment. It provides an alternative reading to that traditionally used to assess its impact on the Anglo-British constitution. Politics and legalism have trapped Britain in a formalistic approach without offering innovative responses to the challenges posed by Brexit, persuading the public that there are no alternatives to an out-of-Europe approach. The essay adopts a different stance, exploring Brexit with less formalism and more attentiveness to its impact on British society. It uses novels and essays, political pamphlets, and other writings prompted by Brexit to examine the conditions underlying this event. Their analysis may nurture the productive imagination needed to support Britain's constitutional creativity during the post-Brexit scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A tradition in political economy holds that constitutions should be designed under the assumption that politicians are knaves. A criticism of this position says that a constitution so designed will cause political actors to behave worse than they otherwise would. Designing a constitution for knaves creates knaves. I critique this argument in the current paper. I advance two claims. First, all constitutions create knaves, because the activity of politics itself creates knaves. Second, knavish constitutions better cultivate virtue when compared to constitutions that lack knavish constraints and guardrails. Put together, the two arguments imply the criticism has it exactly backwards: if you want virtuous politicians, design constitutions under the assumption that they are knaves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should economic policy be guided by rules? In this paper, we take the perspective of the Freiburg School and trace its argument for rule-based Ordnungspolitik back to the roots of the concept. In doing so, will not offer a comprehensive review of the literature, but argue closely along the works of Walter Eucken, whose contributions are central to understanding the founding generation of the Freiburg School. We argue that not having rules is costly and therefore that the main thrust of the Freiburg approach remains valid. Good empirical arguments can be found for pursuing a rule-based Ordnungspolitik in order to avoid the costs of discretionary policymaking. Furthermore, we argue that reliance on stable rules does not incapacitate democratic decision-making. Rules rely on democratic support, and rule-based Ordnungspolitik also leaves substantial material scope for discretionary democratic decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach "privileges the status quo" in two problematic ways: (1) alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo requires a smaller coalition to be "chosen" than any other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and (2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who happen to support the status quo have excessive power to impose their will on the larger group, implying that a minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and constitutionalism more generally) "privilege the status quo". Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the "privileged position of the status quo", critics must confront an equally challenging task: Providing a "measuring stick" by which the legitimacy of the status quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in Buchanan's thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to transgress constitutional constraints. Here, we introduce the concept of militant constitutionalism, which suggests a number of constitutional rules that could make constitutions more resilient to attempts to undermine them. A first empirical evaluation, however, can link only few constitutional paths to enhanced constitutional resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indian Constitution, as a grand document, promised rights and interests. The members of the Constituent Assembly were divided on situating socio-economic rights such as education and healthcare as judicially enforceable rights due to budgetary constraints. Therefore, the Indian Constitution, entrenched these interests as part of Directive Principles of State Policy – the guiding principle but judicially non-enforceable. In the aftermath of Second World War, and declaration of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), many jurisdictions experimented by making Socio-Economic interests as judicial enforceable rights within the framework of their Constitutions. South Africa, and Colombia, stand tall in that order of nations. Notwithstanding their declaration as judicially enforceable, most of these nations including South Africa and Colombia have struggled in developing a coherent jurisprudence on the enforcement of these rights and penumbral claims emanating from them. In this paper, we traverse the jurisprudential journey of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, and Colombia, and juxtapose them with the Indian experience, to sum up the jurisprudential underpinnings constituting the rationale behind the enforcement of these claims or otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the widespread view that contradictions have semantic content. I argue that contradictory sentences in natural language, taken literally and occurring within assertoric contexts, lack content. I present an extended twofold argument, which rests on a set of considerations about the fundamental connection between meaning-constitutivity in natural language and the semantic status of contradictions. First, I argue that the contradictory negations of analytic statements cannot have semantic content as a necessary condition for the possibility of meaning-constitutive facts in natural language. Second, I argue that the special role of contradictions in the constitution of sameness and difference of content in natural language is incompatible with the view that non-analytic contradictions could have semantic content. These two arguments jointly imply that all contradictions in natural language lack content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One's constitution—whether one is generous or miserly, temperate or intemperate, kind or mean, etc.—is beyond one's control in significant respects. Yet one's constitution affects how one acts. And how one acts affects one's moral standing. The counterintuitive inference—the so-called problem of constitutive moral luck—is that one's moral standing is, to some significant extent, beyond one's control. This article grants the premises but resists the inference. It argues that one's constitution should have no net impact on one's moral standing. While a bad constitution lowers the chance that one will act morally, it offers significant gains to moral standing should that chance materialize. A good constitution increases one's chance of performing good acts but for correspondingly more modest gains. This effect should smooth out, and possibly eliminate, the expected impact of constitution on moral standing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 4, 2022, Chilean voters massively turned down a constitutional proposal that responded to widely shared criticisms of the 1980 constitution and emerged from a consensual and participatory process. This result is paradoxical because ex ante, the odds seemed largely in favor of changing the status quo. We argue that three factors, which derived from the interaction between rules and political contingency, explain the outcome: a Convention under the control of party-less independents, the exceptional underrepresentation of the political right, and a highly decentralized and public writing process. We extract some lessons from the failed experience that can be useful for countries seeking to deepen democratization through constitutional change and for a future constitution-making process in Chile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU's role is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), the emergency or State of Exception (Ausnahmezustand) is the ultimate test of political power and reveals in whom that power is vested. The State of Exception determines who is truly sovereign in a given state. Schmitt defines the sovereign act as a decision on the question of the exception, and further classifies sovereignty as a liminal term, a borderline concept (Grenzbegriff), suggesting a geometric metaphoricity underlying his conceptualization. On this theoretical basis, he develops the concept of decisionism, whereby the actual content or "what" of a decision is not the germane element, but rather the "who" of the decision and whether a given "who" (or decider) is the proper authority and possessor of the necessary sovereignty. This political philosophy is usually read in (and arguably tainted) by the immediate historical context in which it was conceived, namely 1930s Germany and the rise of National Socialism. Nevertheless, it has been reinvigorated recently as a paradigm used to explain government decisions taken under evolving COVID-19 pandemic conditions. The current use of Schmitt to understand the suspension of the normal order of things coincides with intense controversy about the work of one of his arch-critics—the surprising hero of the anti-lockdown anti-vaccination movement, Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1942 –). The COVID State of Exception will be situated here between the competing philosophies of Schmitt and Agamben, with illustrative examples from, amongst other things, challenges to the Irish Constitution under pandemic conditions, in an attempt to reveal the rhetorical constructions of exceptionalism at work in political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas' economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of "states and thick markets" versus "anarchy and thin markets." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the relationship between international law and national law, the normative framework enshrined in the Indian Constitution is of formal dualism. Thus, international law does not become part of the Indian legal regime until it goes through a process of transformation i.e. the parliament passing a legislation to implement international law. However, the Supreme Court of India has moved away from this formal dualism to the monist tradition of incorporating international law in the domestic legal regime provided the international law is not inconsistent with domestic law. This paper traces this journey. It argues that while the Supreme Court has indeed moved towards the doctrine of incorporation, this shift is riddled with several inconsistencies and incoherence. While judicial incorporation of international law may not be a bad thing, the court needs to demonstrate greater analytical rigour in dealing with international law, both treaty law and binding customary norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the tension between the internalization of a violent border regime intent on preempting migrant arrivals and the everyday democratic struggle against that regime. It builds on ethnographic fieldwork in Rome to illuminate conflicting political imaginations and existing practices of the already plural, albeit unequal, Italian polity. On the one hand, we see a bordered democracy. This democracy keeps investing in nationalizing itself, by fortifying the Mediterranean as a lethal border and by shoring up social, economic, and racialized boundaries. On the other hand, there is also an emerging migrant democracy. This migrant democracy actively works on two interrelated fronts: to build a more democratic, pluralistic, and egalitarian polity, and to reform how legal and physical access to the polity is governed in the first place. The article argues that, on both fronts, the anti-Fascist Constitution of Italy offers a viable political and ideological framework. More generally, the article proposes that if democratic politics and constitutional arguments are to produce more than a rhetorical edifice for democracy, they need to attend to the social, economic, and racialized inequalities of life in common. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to clarify the role the double plays in the constitution of identity, focusing on the movement between the individual and the collective level. Notably, the latter today is often considered through the lens of identity politics. The double, I argue, poses an alternative to this type of politics, by showing the interdependence of groups. As a case study, this paper focuses on the complex relationship between the anti-Semite and the Jew as depicted by Sartre. I begin with a psychoanalytical examination of the figure of the double,follow on with an analysis of Sartre's work in the light of the double, and conclude with Girard's theory of mimetic desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges a tendency prominent in critical theory—one that holds that being "vague and strange" constitute qualities of life opposed to the grid-like systems of coercive control intrinsic to the operation of modern power regimes which, by their ascriptive nature, are compelled to suppress all life which exhibits these traits. Consequently, vagueness represents not only the antithesis of modern power, but a source of resistance against it. This article contests this assumption by exploring the vague regimes of power (which, following William Burroughs, we call "interzones"), which also exist within the fabric of the administered order. The article examines how these interzones function and explores two incarnations: zones of entrapment and zones of impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Helena De Preester's "Subjectivity and Transcendental Illusions in the Anthropocene" aims to rethink fundamentally the human–technology relationship against the backdrop of the Anthropocene. Essentially, the essay is concerned with the current form of subjectivity that characterizes humankind in the Anthropocene, and analyzes how it embeds knowledge, desire and behavior. De Preester indeed succeeds in creating a potent and engaging reflection on the current form of human subjectivity characteristic for the age of the Anthropocene, by referring to Vilém Flusser's apparatuses, McKenzie Wark's vectoralist class, Stiegler's savoir-vivre and object of addiction, Robert Pfaller's notion of interpassivity; Williams' attention economy, etc. However, De Preester throughout her essay, although discussing thoroughly the aforementioned ideas of subjectivity and transcendental illusions in the Anthropocene (as much as the essay format allows for this), falls short in her ambitious aspiration to rethink fundamentally the human–technology relationship against the backdrop of the Anthropocene. Although De Preester provides excellent examples, they do not seem cohesive enough to support this conclusion, primarily as the analysis of the Anthropocene's triad, as pointed out in the introduction (Earth–Technology–Humankind), requires a thorough insight into the role that Technology plays in its constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article explores how liberalism and modern thoughts entered Iran and how they influenced political thought and institutions in contemporary Iran. It also briefly considers how Iran's traditional religious and historical discourse addressed modernity and liberal constitutional theories that were distinct from its own. During most of the past 150 years, the traditional discourse regarded modernity and liberalism to be "the other." Some of these thinkers rejected modernity and liberalism entirely, others attempted to discriminate between good and bad elements of modernity and liberalism, and took account of the good, while rejecting the bad. A few adopted both liberalism and modernity wholeheartedly. Each of these assessments generated new or revised strands of political thought in Iran. In the end, liberalism failed to attract sufficient support to sustain itself, but indirectly affected Iranian politics through refinements in earlier traditional and religious political discourse and by placing Iran's governance on constitutional foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Palmer (Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0046-0) defends the 'Constitution View' of omissions. According to this view, every omission is constituted by, though not identical to, some positive event. I argue that Palmer's version of this view can't do all the work he wants it to do. First, it can't provide an answer to the ontological question to which he addresses himself: 'What kind of thing is an omission?' Second, it doesn't give us the resources to determine which positive events serve as the ultimate constituters of omissions which seem to occur over long periods of time (e.g. my omission to mow my neighbour's lawn over the summer); at least, not without embracing consequences Palmer wishes to avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper outlines a model of the basic cognitive process of the constitution of experience - the Affective Pertinentization Model (APER). The constitution of experience is intended as the basic cognitive process underpinning the meaning-maker's experience of mental representations as self-contained, stable, substantive entities standing for something in the external reality. Framed within the general family of theories highlighting the embodiment of cognition, the APER model claims that affects are the basic mechanism at the basis of the constitution of human experience. The first part of the paper outlines the APER model; the second part reviews some preliminary evidence supporting it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the first half of the 19th century, Western Texas was a "trap baited with grass" that attracted migrants hoping to farm. When settlers on the wrong side of an unknown, invisible line could not build successful farms, residents in those counties voted to remain in the Union at far higher rates than residents in neighboring counties who could farm. The connection between the vote and economic interest was obvious, as those without suitable land could not make use of enslaved labor, which was too expensive given the implicit marginal product of labor. Because the location of settlement was plausibly random, these results highlight the importance of economic interest as a determinant of even fundamental moral beliefs that affect vote choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monetary history is largely a repeated narrative of currency debasement. Yet historic Venice (1172–1797), ruled by elite patricians, stands out as an example of relative monetary stability. This paper provides a historical case of Venice's Zecca Mint which provided the elite patricians of Venice with a stable currency, playing a role in fostering the economic success of the Republic of Venice. This paper identifies three factors that together formed a self-enforcing monetary constitution to inhibit public currency debasement in historic Venice: (i) the assignment of public debt to patricians, (ii) the nearly uniform trade-centric focus of the patricians and (iii) the use of turn-taking in office for mintmasters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should procedural barriers to constitutional amendment be more onerous than those to the policy changes of ordinary politics? – i.e., should constitutions be entrenched? One criterion by which to evaluate these questions is economic performance. Using data on countries worldwide and constitutional adoptions from 1973 to 2017, we estimate the effect of constitutional entrenchment (rigidity) on economic growth. We employ matching methods to make causal inferences. The adoption of a constitution that is meaningfully more rigid than its predecessor defines a treatment. In our benchmark estimations (based on 19 treatments), post-treatment effects on growth are generally small and statistically insignificant. However, when we examine a subsample that excludes autocracies (13 treatments), post-treatment effects are always negative and sometimes statistically significant. The same is true when we exclude treatments associated with coups (12 treatments). Contrary to many scholars' priors, the evidence suggests that, if anything (and based on the limited number of available treatments), greater entrenchment causes less economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nine out of 10 constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, intended to help governments cope with extraordinary events that endanger many people or the existence of the state. We ask two questions: (1) does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chile is a country crossed by economic inequalities. The constitutional process has opened a space to problematize the institutions that reproduce these inequalities. This paper joins into this discussion arguing that a nuanced focus on the right of access to healthcare under international law would fit the future Constitution better. I label this focus 'nuanced', in reaction to international law's limited ability to address justice claims located at the core of Chile's social and constitutional discontent. I argue that the right to health under international law is unlikely to address the problem of unequal enjoyment of healthcare services. The paper argues that a better approach would be to integrate a solidaristic understanding to this human right. The added value of solidarity translates in a more substantive conceptualization of social rights where they become at the service of the liberty of all. Through a critical discussion about the inception of the right to health under Chile's current Constitution, the paper shows the limitations of today's understanding and the underlying reasons for the transformation it proposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay seeks to contribute to the literature that asks how interim constitutions can become self-enforcing norms capable of producing a successful constitution-making process. It uses the Chilean constitution-making process as an example to theorize on how the political narratives associated with the November 2019 Agreement, which sets the framework for constitutional change, can influence its self-enforcing capacity. The authors identify and reconstruct the two prevailing normative theories underlying the Chilean constitution-making process: the evolutive and the revolutionary narratives. These present themselves in both radical and moderate versions. While evolutive ideas emphasize institutional continuity, consensus-building, and an incrementalist approach to constitutional change, revolutionary arguments rely on the constituent power theory and push for a profound social transformation that can break with the past. Even though these narratives are in tension with each other in many respects, they have both influenced the design of the rules of the constitution-making process. The authors claim that the self-enforcing capacity of the interim constitution partly depends on whether, and to what extent, the moderate versions of these narratives succeed or prevail in the political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social movements have contested the elitist character of Chilean political institutions in the streets for the past two decades. Citizens have distanced themselves from conventional participation, and turnout rates dropped dramatically. Protesting against unequal treatment and demanding "dignity," the social uprising in 2019 in Chile consisted of massive protests marked by large-scale demonstrations and violent riots alike. Lasting many weeks, the protest-driven crisis opened up the opportunity for a constitutional change. Political elites agreed on a referendum on a new constitution to channel heterogeneous demands put forward by leaderless and inorganic protests and demonstrations. This critical juncture brought about by the social uprising set in motion institutional change that, confirming theoretical expectations, entirely departs from the status quo. Furthermore, amidst a profound representation crisis, social organizations pushed for reforms in the electoral system to select conventional delegates to restore confidence and legitimacy in representative institutions. Based on evidence that diversity in elective bodies boosts perceptions of legitimacy, proposals included gender parity in both nominations and results, the possibility for independent candidates to run in lists, and reserved seats for indigenous peoples. The result was a constitutional assembly with 50% of women, delegates from ten indigenous peoples, and many independent candidates elected. Time will tell if this constitutional assembly manages to rebuild Chileans' trust in politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response to mass mobilizations against the political and social status quo, a multiparty agreement activated a process to replace the constitution in Chile, three decades after the country's transition to democracy. I argue that this process has three features that are not only desirable on normative grounds but also shared by successful episodes of constitutional replacement in democratic regimes: the drafting of the new text in an assembly bound by preexisting rules, inclusive mechanisms of representation and decision making, and direct citizen involvement. These features, in interaction with the popular repudiation of the elite-biased institutions inherited from the Pinochet era, might lead to a new constitutional arrangement that deepens democratization by expanding citizen rights, strengthening executive constraints, and removing restrictions on majority rule. Yet the realization of the full democratic potential of this constitutional change depends on the still uncertain ability of constitution makers to compromise on a text that is not only seen as legitimate among ordinary citizens but also promotes coherent goals, effective institutions, and good governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]