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The zecca mint: a self-enforcing monetary constitution in historic venice.

Authors :
Al-Bawwab, Rania Adel
Source :
Economics of Governance; Mar2022, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p1-15, 15p
Publication Year :
2022

Abstract

Monetary history is largely a repeated narrative of currency debasement. Yet historic Venice (1172–1797), ruled by elite patricians, stands out as an example of relative monetary stability. This paper provides a historical case of Venice's Zecca Mint which provided the elite patricians of Venice with a stable currency, playing a role in fostering the economic success of the Republic of Venice. This paper identifies three factors that together formed a self-enforcing monetary constitution to inhibit public currency debasement in historic Venice: (i) the assignment of public debt to patricians, (ii) the nearly uniform trade-centric focus of the patricians and (iii) the use of turn-taking in office for mintmasters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
14356104
Volume :
23
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Economics of Governance
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
156023241
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-021-00260-z