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Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology.
- Source :
- Erkenntnis; Dec2023, Vol. 88 Issue 8, p3259-3289, 31p
- Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- HOLISM
PHENOMENALISM
CONSERVATISM
LIBERALISM
PHENOMENOLOGY
CONSTITUTIONS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01650106
- Volume :
- 88
- Issue :
- 8
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Erkenntnis
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 172971150
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00501-x