Search

The definition of a brain state remains elusive, with varying interpretations across different sub-fields of neuroscience-from the level of wakefulness in anaesthesia, to activity of individual neurons, voltage in EEG, and blood flow in fMRI. This lack of consensus presents a significant challenge to the development of accurate models of neural dynamics. However, at the foundation of dynamical systems theory lies a definition of what constitutes the 'state' of a system-i.e., a specification of the system's future. Here, we propose to adopt this definition to establish brain states in neuroimaging timeseries by applying Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) to low-dimensional embedding of resting and task condition fMRI data. We find that ~90% of subjects in resting conditions are better described by first-order models, whereas ~55% of subjects in task conditions are better described by second-order models. Our work calls into question the status quo of using first-order equations almost exclusively within computational neuroscience and provides a new way of establishing brain states, as well as their associated phase space representations, in neuroimaging datasets.

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated 'interoceptive lesions' blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction.

Estimating the changes of epidemiological parameters, such as instantaneous reproduction number, Rt, is important for understanding the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. Current estimates of time-varying epidemiological parameters often face problems such as lagging observations, averaging inference, and improper quantification of uncertainties. To address these problems, we propose a Bayesian data assimilation framework for time-varying parameter estimation. Specifically, this framework is applied to estimate the instantaneous reproduction number Rt during emerging epidemics, resulting in the state-of-the-art 'DARt' system. With DARt, time misalignment caused by lagging observations is tackled by incorporating observation delays into the joint inference of infections and Rt; the drawback of averaging is overcome by instantaneously updating upon new observations and developing a model selection mechanism that captures abrupt changes; the uncertainty is quantified and reduced by employing Bayesian smoothing. We validate the performance of DARt and demonstrate its power in describing the transmission dynamics of COVID-19. The proposed approach provides a promising solution for making accurate and timely estimation for transmission dynamics based on reported data.

The propagation of epileptic seizure activity in the brain is a widespread pathophysiology that, in principle, should yield to intervention techniques guided by mathematical models of neuronal ensemble dynamics. During a seizure, neural activity will deviate from its current dynamical regime to one in which there are significant signal fluctuations. In silico treatments of neural activity are an important tool for the understanding of how the healthy brain can maintain stability, as well as of how pathology can lead to seizures. The hope is that, contained within the mathematical foundations of such treatments, there lie potential strategies for mitigating instabilities, e.g. via external stimulation. Here, we demonstrate that the dynamic causal modelling neuronal state equation generalises to a Fokker-Planck formalism if one extends the framework to model the ways in which activity propagates along the structural connections of neural systems. Using the Jacobian of this generalised state equation, we show that an initially unstable system can be rendered stable via a reduction in diffusivity-i.e., by lowering the rate at which neuronal fluctuations disperse to neighbouring regions. We show, for neural systems prone to epileptic seizures, that such a reduction in diffusivity can be achieved via external stimulation. Specifically, we show that this stimulation should be applied in such a way as to temporarily mirror the activity profile of a pathological region in its functionally connected areas. This counter-intuitive method is intended to be used pre-emptively-i.e., in order to mitigate the effects of the seizure, or ideally even prevent it from occurring in the first place. We offer proof of principle using simulations based on functional neuroimaging data collected from patients with idiopathic generalised epilepsy, in which we successfully suppress pathological activity in a distinct sub-network prior to seizure onset. Our hope is that this technique can form the basis for future real-time monitoring and intervention devices that are capable of treating epilepsy in a non-invasive manner.

In contrast to the symmetries of translation in space, rotation in space, and translation in time, the known laws of physics are not universally invariant under transformation of scale. However, a special case exists in which the action is scale invariant if it satisfies the following two constraints: 1) it must depend upon a scale-free Lagrangian, and 2) the Lagrangian must change under scale in the same way as the inverse time, [Formula: see text]. Our contribution lies in the derivation of a generalised Lagrangian, in the form of a power series expansion, that satisfies these constraints. This generalised Lagrangian furnishes a normal form for dynamic causal models-state space models based upon differential equations-that can be used to distinguish scale symmetry from scale freeness in empirical data. We establish face validity with an analysis of simulated data, in which we show how scale symmetry can be identified and how the associated conserved quantities can be estimated in neuronal time series.

Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.].

Living creatures must accurately infer the nature of their environments. They do this despite being confronted by stochastic and context sensitive contingencies-and so must constantly update their beliefs regarding their uncertainty about what might come next. In this work, we examine how we deal with uncertainty that evolves over time. This prospective uncertainty (or imprecision) is referred to as volatility and has previously been linked to noradrenergic signals that originate in the locus coeruleus. Using pupillary dilatation as a measure of central noradrenergic signalling, we tested the hypothesis that changes in pupil diameter reflect inferences humans make about environmental volatility. To do so, we collected pupillometry data from participants presented with a stream of numbers. We generated these numbers from a process with varying degrees of volatility. By measuring pupillary dilatation in response to these stimuli-and simulating the inferences made by an ideal Bayesian observer of the same stimuli-we demonstrate that humans update their beliefs about environmental contingencies in a Bayes optimal way. We show this by comparing general linear (convolution) models that formalised competing hypotheses about the causes of pupillary changes. We found greater evidence for models that included Bayes optimal estimates of volatility than those without. We additionally explore the interaction between different causes of pupil dilation and suggest a quantitative approach to characterising a person's prior beliefs about volatility.

Knowing how another's preferences relate to our own is a central aspect of everyday decision-making, yet how the brain performs this transformation is unclear. Here, we ask whether the putative role of the hippocampal-entorhinal system in transforming relative and absolute spatial coordinates during navigation extends to transformations in abstract decision spaces. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects learned a stranger's preference for an everyday activity-relative to one of three personally known individuals-and subsequently decided how the stranger's preference relates to the other two individuals' preferences. We observed entorhinal/subicular responses to the absolute distance between the ratings of the stranger and the familiar choice options. Notably, entorhinal/subicular signals were sensitive to which familiar individuals were being compared to the stranger. In contrast, striatal signals increased when accurately determining the ordinal position of choice options in relation to the stranger. Paralleling its role in navigation, these data implicate the entorhinal/subicular region in assimilating relatively coded knowledge within abstract metric spaces.

The locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI). We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm 'explore/exploit' task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level 'state-action' prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error-reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release-to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC that translates state-action prediction errors into an optimal balance between plasticity and stability.

Pathophysiological explanations of epilepsy typically focus on either the micro/mesoscale (e.g. excitation-inhibition imbalance), or on the macroscale (e.g. network architecture). Linking abnormalities across spatial scales remains difficult, partly because of technical limitations in measuring neuronal signatures concurrently at the scales involved. Here we use light sheet imaging of the larval zebrafish brain during acute epileptic seizure induced with pentylenetetrazole. Spectral changes of spontaneous neuronal activity during the seizure are then modelled using neural mass models, allowing Bayesian inference on changes in effective network connectivity and their underlying synaptic dynamics. This dynamic causal modelling of seizures in the zebrafish brain reveals concurrent changes in synaptic coupling at macro- and mesoscale. Fluctuations of both synaptic connection strength and their temporal dynamics are required to explain observed seizure patterns. These findings highlight distinct changes in local (intrinsic) and long-range (extrinsic) synaptic transmission dynamics as a possible seizure pathomechanism and illustrate how our Bayesian model inversion approach can be used to link existing neural mass models of seizure activity and novel experimental methods.

In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for 'epistemic foraging'; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did-and did not-contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did-and did not-allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.

The brain is thought to generate internal predictions to optimize behaviour. However, it is unclear whether predictions signalling is an automatic brain function or depends on task demands. Here, we manipulated the spatial/temporal predictability of visual targets, and the relevance of spatial/temporal information provided by auditory cues. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure participants' brain activity during task performance. Task relevance modulated the influence of predictions on behaviour: spatial/temporal predictability improved spatial/temporal discrimination accuracy, but not vice versa. To explain these effects, we used behavioural responses to estimate subjective predictions under an ideal-observer model. Model-based time-series of predictions and prediction errors (PEs) were associated with dissociable neural responses: predictions correlated with cue-induced beta-band activity in auditory regions and alpha-band activity in visual regions, while stimulus-bound PEs correlated with gamma-band activity in posterior regions. Crucially, task relevance modulated these spectral correlates, suggesting that current goals influence PE and prediction signalling.

Empirical evidence suggests the incentive value of an option is affected by other options available during choice and by options presented in the past. These contextual effects are hard to reconcile with classical theories and have inspired accounts where contextual influences play a crucial role. However, each account only addresses one or the other of the empirical findings and a unifying perspective has been elusive. Here, we offer a unifying theory of context effects on incentive value attribution and choice based on normative Bayesian principles. This formulation assumes that incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, where predictions are based upon expectations about reward. We show that this scheme explains a wide range of contextual effects, such as those elicited by other options available during choice (or within-choice context effects). These include both conditions in which choice requires an integration of multiple attributes and conditions where a multi-attribute integration is not necessary. Moreover, the same scheme explains context effects elicited by options presented in the past or between-choice context effects. Our formulation encompasses a wide range of contextual influences (comprising both within- and between-choice effects) by calling on Bayesian principles, without invoking ad-hoc assumptions. This helps clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and choice behaviour and may offer insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional decision-making, such as addiction and pathological gambling.

Normative models of human cognition often appeal to Bayesian filtering, which provides optimal online estimates of unknown or hidden states of the world, based on previous observations. However, in many cases it is necessary to optimise beliefs about sequences of states rather than just the current state. Importantly, Bayesian filtering and sequential inference strategies make different predictions about beliefs and subsequent choices, rendering them behaviourally dissociable. Taking data from a probabilistic reversal task we show that subjects' choices provide strong evidence that they are representing short sequences of states. Between-subject measures of this implicit sequential inference strategy had a neurobiological underpinning and correlated with grey matter density in prefrontal and parietal cortex, as well as the hippocampus. Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence for sequential inference in human cognition, and by exploiting between-subject variation in this measure we provide pointers to its neuronal substrates.

We are remarkably adept at inferring the consequences of our actions, yet the neuronal mechanisms that allow us to plan a sequence of novel choices remain unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how the human brain plans the shortest path to a goal in novel mazes with one (shallow maze) or two (deep maze) choice points. We observed two distinct anterior prefrontal responses to demanding choices at the second choice point: one in rostrodorsal medial prefrontal cortex (rd-mPFC)/superior frontal gyrus (SFG) that was also sensitive to (deactivated by) demanding initial choices and another in lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), which was only engaged by demanding choices at the second choice point. Furthermore, we identified hippocampal responses during planning that correlated with subsequent choice accuracy and response time, particularly in mazes affording sequential choices. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses showed that coupling between the hippocampus and rd-mPFC increases during sequential (deep versus shallow) planning and is higher before correct versus incorrect choices. In short, using a naturalistic spatial planning paradigm, we reveal how the human brain represents sequential choices during planning without extensive training. Our data highlight a network centred on the cortical midline and hippocampus that allows us to make prospective choices while maintaining initial choices during planning in novel environments.

Given the amount of knowledge and data accruing in the neurosciences, is it time to formulate a general principle for neuronal dynamics that holds at evolutionary, developmental, and perceptual timescales? In this paper, we propose that the brain (and other self-organised biological systems) can be characterised via the mathematical apparatus of a gauge theory. The picture that emerges from this approach suggests that any biological system (from a neuron to an organism) can be cast as resolving uncertainty about its external milieu, either by changing its internal states or its relationship to the environment. Using formal arguments, we show that a gauge theory for neuronal dynamics--based on approximate Bayesian inference--has the potential to shed new light on phenomena that have thus far eluded a formal description, such as attention and the link between action and perception.

The aging brain shows a progressive loss of neuropil, which is accompanied by subtle changes in neuronal plasticity, sensory learning and memory. Neurophysiologically, aging attenuates evoked responses--including the mismatch negativity (MMN). This is accompanied by a shift in cortical responsivity from sensory (posterior) regions to executive (anterior) regions, which has been interpreted as a compensatory response for cognitive decline. Theoretical neurobiology offers a simpler explanation for all of these effects--from a Bayesian perspective, as the brain is progressively optimized to model its world, its complexity will decrease. A corollary of this complexity reduction is an attenuation of Bayesian updating or sensory learning. Here we confirmed this hypothesis using magnetoencephalographic recordings of the mismatch negativity elicited in a large cohort of human subjects, in their third to ninth decade. Employing dynamic causal modeling to assay the synaptic mechanisms underlying these non-invasive recordings, we found a selective age-related attenuation of synaptic connectivity changes that underpin rapid sensory learning. In contrast, baseline synaptic connectivity strengths were consistently strong over the decades. Our findings suggest that the lifetime accrual of sensory experience optimizes functional brain architectures to enable efficient and generalizable predictions of the world.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a differential brain response to violations of learned regularities. It has been used to demonstrate that the brain learns the statistical structure of its environment and predicts future sensory inputs. However, the algorithmic nature of these computations and the underlying neurobiological implementation remain controversial. This article introduces a mathematical framework with which competing ideas about the computational quantities indexed by MMN responses can be formalized and tested against single-trial EEG data. This framework was applied to five major theories of the MMN, comparing their ability to explain trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude. Three of these theories (predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection) were formalized by linking the MMN to different manifestations of the same computational mechanism: approximate Bayesian inference according to the free-energy principle. We thereby propose a unifying view on three distinct theories of the MMN. The relative plausibility of each theory was assessed against empirical single-trial MMN amplitudes acquired from eight healthy volunteers in a roving oddball experiment. Models based on the free-energy principle provided more plausible explanations of trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude than models representing the two more traditional theories (change detection and adaptation). Our results suggest that the MMN reflects approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regularities, and that the MMN-generating process adjusts a probabilistic model of the environment according to prediction errors.

In systems biology, questions concerning the molecular and cellular makeup of an organism are of utmost importance, especially when trying to understand how unreliable components--like genetic circuits, biochemical cascades, and ion channels, among others--enable reliable and adaptive behaviour. The repertoire and speed of biological computations are limited by thermodynamic or metabolic constraints: an example can be found in neurons, where fluctuations in biophysical states limit the information they can encode--with almost 20-60% of the total energy allocated for the brain used for signalling purposes, either via action potentials or by synaptic transmission. Here, we consider the imperatives for neurons to optimise computational and metabolic efficiency, wherein benefits and costs trade-off against each other in the context of self-organised and adaptive behaviour. In particular, we try to link information theoretic (variational) and thermodynamic (Helmholtz) free-energy formulations of neuronal processing and show how they are related in a fundamental way through a complexity minimisation lemma.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is an event related potential evoked by violations of regularity. Here, we present a model of the underlying neuronal dynamics based upon the idea that auditory cortex continuously updates a generative model to predict its sensory inputs. The MMN is then modelled as the superposition of the electric fields evoked by neuronal activity reporting prediction errors. The process by which auditory cortex generates predictions and resolves prediction errors was simulated using generalised (Bayesian) filtering--a biologically plausible scheme for probabilistic inference on the hidden states of hierarchical dynamical models. The resulting scheme generates realistic MMN waveforms, explains the qualitative effects of deviant probability and magnitude on the MMN - in terms of latency and amplitude--and makes quantitative predictions about the interactions between deviant probability and magnitude. This work advances a formal understanding of the MMN and--more generally--illustrates the potential for developing computationally informed dynamic causal models of empirical electromagnetic responses.

The role of dopamine in behaviour and decision-making is often cast in terms of reinforcement learning and optimal decision theory. Here, we present an alternative view that frames the physiology of dopamine in terms of Bayes-optimal behaviour. In this account, dopamine controls the precision or salience of (external or internal) cues that engender action. In other words, dopamine balances bottom-up sensory information and top-down prior beliefs when making hierarchical inferences (predictions) about cues that have affordance. In this paper, we focus on the consequences of changing tonic levels of dopamine firing using simulations of cued sequential movements. Crucially, the predictions driving movements are based upon a hierarchical generative model that infers the context in which movements are made. This means that we can confuse agents by changing the context (order) in which cues are presented. These simulations provide a (Bayes-optimal) model of contextual uncertainty and set switching that can be quantified in terms of behavioural and electrophysiological responses. Furthermore, one can simulate dopaminergic lesions (by changing the precision of prediction errors) to produce pathological behaviours that are reminiscent of those seen in neurological disorders such as Parkinson's disease. We use these simulations to demonstrate how a single functional role for dopamine at the synaptic level can manifest in different ways at the behavioural level.

Cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits are severely disrupted by the dopamine depletion of Parkinson's disease (PD), leading to pathologically exaggerated beta oscillations. Abnormal rhythms, found in several circuit nodes are correlated with movement impairments but their neural basis remains unclear. Here, we used dynamic causal modelling (DCM) and the 6-hydroxydopamine-lesioned rat model of PD to examine the effective connectivity underlying these spectral abnormalities. We acquired auto-spectral and cross-spectral measures of beta oscillations (10-35 Hz) from local field potential recordings made simultaneously in the frontal cortex, striatum, external globus pallidus (GPe) and subthalamic nucleus (STN), and used these data to optimise neurobiologically plausible models. Chronic dopamine depletion reorganised the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuit, with increased effective connectivity in the pathway from cortex to STN and decreased connectivity from STN to GPe. Moreover, a contribution analysis of the Parkinsonian circuit distinguished between pathogenic and compensatory processes and revealed how effective connectivity along the indirect pathway acquired a strategic importance that underpins beta oscillations. In modelling excessive beta synchrony in PD, these findings provide a novel perspective on how altered connectivity in basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits reflects a balance between pathogenesis and compensation, and predicts potential new therapeutic targets to overcome dysfunctional oscillations.

In medical practice, diagnostic hypotheses are often made by physicians in the first moments of contact with patients; sometimes even before they report their symptoms. We propose that generation of diagnostic hypotheses in this context is the result of cognitive processes subserved by brain mechanisms that are similar to those involved in naming objects or concepts in everyday life.To test this proposal we developed an experimental paradigm with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using radiological diagnosis as a model. Twenty-five radiologists diagnosed lesions in chest X-ray images and named non-medical targets (animals) embedded in chest X-ray images while being scanned in a fMRI session. Images were presented for 1.5 seconds; response times (RTs) and the ensuing cortical activations were assessed. The mean response time for diagnosing lesions was 1.33 (SD ±0.14) seconds and 1.23 (SD ±0.13) seconds for naming animals. 72% of the radiologists reported cogitating differential diagnoses during trials (3.5 seconds). The overall pattern of cortical activations was remarkably similar for both types of targets. However, within the neural systems shared by both stimuli, activation was significantly greater in left inferior frontal sulcus and posterior cingulate cortex for lesions relative to animals.Generation of diagnostic hypotheses and differential diagnoses made through the immediate visual recognition of clinical signs can be a fast and automatic process. The co-localization of significant brain activation for lesions and animals suggests that generating diagnostic hypotheses for lesions and naming animals are served by the same neuronal systems. Nevertheless, diagnosing lesions was cognitively more demanding and associated with more activation in higher order cortical areas. These results support the hypothesis that medical diagnoses based on prompt visual recognition of clinical signs and naming in everyday life are supported by similar brain systems.

Generative models of neuroimaging and electrophysiological data present new opportunities for accessing hidden or latent brain states. Dynamic causal modeling (DCM) uses Bayesian model inversion and selection to infer the synaptic mechanisms underlying empirically observed brain responses. DCM for electrophysiological data, in particular, aims to estimate the relative strength of synaptic transmission at different cell types and via specific neurotransmitters. Here, we report a DCM validation study concerning inference on excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission, using different doses of a volatile anaesthetic agent (isoflurane) to parametrically modify excitatory and inhibitory synaptic processing while recording local field potentials (LFPs) from primary auditory cortex (A1) and the posterior auditory field (PAF) in the auditory belt region in rodents. We test whether DCM can infer, from the LFP measurements, the expected drug-induced changes in synaptic transmission mediated via fast ionotropic receptors; i.e., excitatory (glutamatergic) AMPA and inhibitory GABA(A) receptors. Cross- and auto-spectra from the two regions were used to optimise three DCMs based on biologically plausible neural mass models and specific network architectures. Consistent with known extrinsic connectivity patterns in sensory hierarchies, we found that a model comprising forward connections from A1 to PAF and backward connections from PAF to A1 outperformed a model with forward connections from PAF to A1 and backward connections from A1 to PAF and a model with reciprocal lateral connections. The parameter estimates from the most plausible model indicated that the amplitude of fast glutamatergic excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (IPSPs) behaved as predicted by previous neurophysiological studies. Specifically, with increasing levels of anaesthesia, glutamatergic EPSPs decreased linearly, whereas fast GABAergic IPSPs displayed a nonlinear (saturating) increase. The consistency of our model-based in vivo results with experimental in vitro results lends further validity to the capacity of DCM to infer on synaptic processes using macroscopic neurophysiological data.

In a companion paper [1], we have presented a generic approach for inferring how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations correspond to "posterior" beliefs, which result from integrating (sensory) information with subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden or unknown) state of the world. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. In this paper, we describe a concrete implementation of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions) and demonstrate its utility by applying it to both simulated and empirical reaction time data from an associative learning task. Here, inter-trial variability in reaction times is modelled as reflecting the dynamics of the subjects' internal recognition process, i.e. the updating of representations (posterior densities) of hidden states over trials while subjects learn probabilistic audio-visual associations. We use this paradigm to demonstrate that our meta-Bayesian framework allows for (i) probabilistic inference on the dynamics of the subject's representation of environmental states, and for (ii) model selection to disambiguate between alternative preferences (loss functions) human subjects could employ when dealing with trade-offs, such as between speed and accuracy. Finally, we illustrate how our approach can be used to quantify subjective beliefs and preferences that underlie inter-individual differences in behaviour.

In this paper, we present a generic approach that can be used to infer how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. This approach induces a distinction between a subject's perceptual model, which underlies the representation of a hidden "state of affairs" and a response model, which predicts the ensuing behavioural (or neurophysiological) responses to those inputs. We start with the premise that subjects continuously update a probabilistic representation of the causes of their sensory inputs to optimise their behaviour. In addition, subjects have preferences or goals that guide decisions about actions given the above uncertain representation of these hidden causes or state of affairs. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations are so-called "posterior" beliefs, which are influenced by subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden) state of affair. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. Critically, this enables one to "observe the observer", i.e. identify (context- or subject-dependent) prior beliefs and utility-functions using psychophysical or neurophysiological measures. In this paper, we describe the main theoretical components of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions). In a companion paper ('Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide'), we describe a concrete implementation of it and demonstrate its utility by applying it to simulated and real reaction time data from an associative learning task.

Mathematical models of scientific data can be formally compared using Bayesian model evidence. Previous applications in the biological sciences have mainly focussed on model selection in which one first selects the model with the highest evidence and then makes inferences based on the parameters of that model. This "best model" approach is very useful but can become brittle if there are a large number of models to compare, and if different subjects use different models. To overcome this shortcoming we propose the combination of two further approaches: (i) family level inference and (ii) Bayesian model averaging within families. Family level inference removes uncertainty about aspects of model structure other than the characteristic of interest. For example: What are the inputs to the system? Is processing serial or parallel? Is it linear or nonlinear? Is it mediated by a single, crucial connection? We apply Bayesian model averaging within families to provide inferences about parameters that are independent of further assumptions about model structure. We illustrate the methods using Dynamic Causal Models of brain imaging data.

Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas (extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.

BACKGROUND:Generalised spike wave (GSW) discharges are the electroencephalographic (EEG) hallmark of absence seizures, clinically characterised by a transitory interruption of ongoing activities and impaired consciousness, occurring during states of reduced awareness. Several theories have been proposed to explain the pathophysiology of GSW discharges and the role of thalamus and cortex as generators. In this work we extend the existing theories by hypothesizing a role for the precuneus, a brain region neglected in previous works on GSW generation but already known to be linked to consciousness and awareness. We analysed fMRI data using dynamic causal modelling (DCM) to investigate the effective connectivity between precuneus, thalamus and prefrontal cortex in patients with GSW discharges. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:We analysed fMRI data from seven patients affected by Idiopathic Generalized Epilepsy (IGE) with frequent GSW discharges and significant GSW-correlated haemodynamic signal changes in the thalamus, the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus. Using DCM we assessed their effective connectivity, i.e. which region drives another region. Three dynamic causal models were constructed: GSW was modelled as autonomous input to the thalamus (model A), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (model B), and precuneus (model C). Bayesian model comparison revealed Model C (GSW as autonomous input to precuneus), to be the best in 5 patients while model A prevailed in two cases. At the group level model C dominated and at the population-level the p value of model C was approximately 1. CONCLUSION:Our results provide strong evidence that activity in the precuneus gates GSW discharges in the thalamo-(fronto) cortical network. This study is the first demonstration of a causal link between haemodynamic changes in the precuneus -- an index of awareness -- and the occurrence of pathological discharges in epilepsy.

The brain's decoding of fast sensory streams is currently impossible to emulate, even approximately, with artificial agents. For example, robust speech recognition is relatively easy for humans but exceptionally difficult for artificial speech recognition systems. In this paper, we propose that recognition can be simplified with an internal model of how sensory input is generated, when formulated in a Bayesian framework. We show that a plausible candidate for an internal or generative model is a hierarchy of 'stable heteroclinic channels'. This model describes continuous dynamics in the environment as a hierarchy of sequences, where slower sequences cause faster sequences. Under this model, online recognition corresponds to the dynamic decoding of causal sequences, giving a representation of the environment with predictive power on several timescales. We illustrate the ensuing decoding or recognition scheme using synthetic sequences of syllables, where syllables are sequences of phonemes and phonemes are sequences of sound-wave modulations. By presenting anomalous stimuli, we find that the resulting recognition dynamics disclose inference at multiple time scales and are reminiscent of neuronal dynamics seen in the real brain.

This paper questions the need for reinforcement learning or control theory when optimising behaviour. We show that it is fairly simple to teach an agent complicated and adaptive behaviours using a free-energy formulation of perception. In this formulation, agents adjust their internal states and sampling of the environment to minimize their free-energy. Such agents learn causal structure in the environment and sample it in an adaptive and self-supervised fashion. This results in behavioural policies that reproduce those optimised by reinforcement learning and dynamic programming. Critically, we do not need to invoke the notion of reward, value or utility. We illustrate these points by solving a benchmark problem in dynamic programming; namely the mountain-car problem, using active perception or inference under the free-energy principle. The ensuing proof-of-concept may be important because the free-energy formulation furnishes a unified account of both action and perception and may speak to a reappraisal of the role of dopamine in the brain.

This paper introduces a model of 'theory of mind', namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a 'game theory of mind'. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a 'stag-hunt'. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution.

In this paper, we suggest that cortical anatomy recapitulates the temporal hierarchy that is inherent in the dynamics of environmental states. Many aspects of brain function can be understood in terms of a hierarchy of temporal scales at which representations of the environment evolve. The lowest level of this hierarchy corresponds to fast fluctuations associated with sensory processing, whereas the highest levels encode slow contextual changes in the environment, under which faster representations unfold. First, we describe a mathematical model that exploits the temporal structure of fast sensory input to track the slower trajectories of their underlying causes. This model of sensory encoding or perceptual inference establishes a proof of concept that slowly changing neuronal states can encode the paths or trajectories of faster sensory states. We then review empirical evidence that suggests that a temporal hierarchy is recapitulated in the macroscopic organization of the cortex. This anatomic-temporal hierarchy provides a comprehensive framework for understanding cortical function: the specific time-scale that engages a cortical area can be inferred by its location along a rostro-caudal gradient, which reflects the anatomical distance from primary sensory areas. This is most evident in the prefrontal cortex, where complex functions can be explained as operations on representations of the environment that change slowly. The framework provides predictions about, and principled constraints on, cortical structure-function relationships, which can be tested by manipulating the time-scales of sensory input.

This work examines the computational architecture used by the brain during the analysis of the spectral envelope of sounds, an important acoustic feature for defining auditory objects. Dynamic causal modelling and Bayesian model selection were used to evaluate a family of 16 network models explaining functional magnetic resonance imaging responses in the right temporal lobe during spectral envelope analysis. The models encode different hypotheses about the effective connectivity between Heschl's Gyrus (HG), containing the primary auditory cortex, planum temporale (PT), and superior temporal sulcus (STS), and the modulation of that coupling during spectral envelope analysis. In particular, we aimed to determine whether information processing during spectral envelope analysis takes place in a serial or parallel fashion. The analysis provides strong support for a serial architecture with connections from HG to PT and from PT to STS and an increase of the HG to PT connection during spectral envelope analysis. The work supports a computational model of auditory object processing, based on the abstraction of spectro-temporal "templates" in the PT before further analysis of the abstracted form in anterior temporal lobe areas.