Search

This essay is to address the question how the "Goddess of Democracy" in 1989's China degenerated into "Demon of Liberty" after Belgrade bombing in 1999. By retrospecting the history after the Culture Revolution, this paper targets to unfold the difference between the "new" 1990s and the "old" 1980s. In 1980s, Chinese history witnessed the most pro-westernization episode since 1949. However, in 1990s China's nationalism changed remarkably. In contrary to the liberalists in 1980s, young nationalists have been seeking to come to terms with their personal pasts, defining themselves as "pragmatic" conservatives against narratives of "romantic" 1980s. The reemergence of this victim narrative has had real consequence for the friction between China and other major powers. Today, many Chinese nationalists are primed to view western actions as aggressive. Their quick judgments following the Belgrade bombing of 1999, the spy plane collision of 2001, and the most recent worldwide boycotting Torch Relay cannot be understood apart from the collective memory of "humiliation", which they actually never experienced in their own life. More significantly, the young generation's unprecedented national proud has been aroused by China's economic miracle, which is fostering the legitimacy of coercive self-assertion on the international arena. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will posit the argument that the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s between Japan and China are the product of a number of factors specific to both states. Using neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide in terms of ways out of this impasse, this thesis will contend that the heightened tensions over energy resources and maritime territory since the mid-1990s have developed as a result of a combination of state specific factors that have hindered Sino-Japanese attempts to find binding agreements on joint-developments and designated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea.Four major contributing factors to the East China Sea disputes are identified in this thesis. In the first place, there is the issue of the security structure in North-east Asia, a structure that remains closely related to one suited to a Cold War environment, where Beijing remains cautious of any real or imagined US-Japanese attempts to contain China; a fact that inhibits China's ability to engage in regional security activities. China thus views the security implications of the East China Sea disputes through both a traditional and non-traditional lens where new issues such as maritime piracy and terrorism provide both states with opportunities and challenges for co-operation. Secondly, there is the influence of domestic politics and nationalism in Japan and China on how the respective governments and populations perceive, address and formulate their maritime security policy . Yinan He highlights the importance of this second factor by claiming that the reason why nationalism has a strong role in this evolving era of Sino-Japanese relations is that 'the historically derived mutual antipathy and mistrust can worsen the security concerns generated by the high ambiguity in their current power balance and cause serious mutual threat perception' . A third issue relates to differing Japanese and Chinese interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) along with the importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs); factors closely linked to security concerns in the East China Sea. Lastly, another contributing factor is the clear lack of an adequate security management regime in the North-East Asia region . By choosing neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide and a way forward, this paper will also look at the part played by, distrust, the fear of being cheated on in negotiations, and uncertainties over Japan and China's post-Cold War roles, in contributing to the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts to illuminate diverse persepctives and images on China prevalent in contemporary Koreans by analyzing written materials by scholars and experts on the issue of China's Northeast Proejct. Historically, China and Korea have maintained good relationships which always accompany some sensitive tensions. The current China's Northeast Project has provoked national sentiment among contemporary Koreans. The paper is going to analyze the grounds of this Korean national consiousness and diverse images on China. This paper adopts a perspective of self-reflecting on contemproary Korean nationalism to identify its main distinnctions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elaborating on Liu Shih-diing's paper entitled "China 's popular nationalism on the internet: Report on the 2005 anti-Japan network struggles" in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (2006), this paper studies the anti-Japanese responses of the online public in Hong Kong as a comparison. Postings on four different public forums in Hong Kong, i.e. Hong Kong Discussion Forum, One Forum, Yahoo Blog and Xocat II Forum, will be compared with the Mainland Chinese posting used by Liu. The ideological, strategic and expressive contents of the forums of the two regions will be compared and contrasted in details. Reasons for the existence of such differences â€" such as the remnants of colonial mentality in Hong Kong and the utilization of anti-Japanese slogans to pressure the regime in China â€" will be explained in the conclusion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary Chinese nationalism has its roots in the country’s nation-building and identity-forming movements in the early 20th century that sought to establish China’s place in the community of nations. Today, nationalism in China can be characterized as falling into two major categories. On the one hand, there is nationalism embedded in patriotism with great pride in China’s civilization, major achievements, and confidence in the country’s future in embracing and meeting the challenges of globalization. On the other hand, there is the sentimental nationalism that reacts to what is perceived as injustice and insult done to China and it reflects a strong victim mentality. The domestic discourse of nationalism can be influenced by government propaganda, intellectual debates, popular displays of emotion and repulsion, or a mixture of all three. As China continues to grow in economic power and political influence, how nationalism is handled can have a significant impact on relations with its neighbors and beyond. The paper will discuss various scenarios and offer some recommendations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the two largest post-communist states that had experienced indigenous communist revolution, Russia and China today are both witnessing an increasingly prominent role of nationalism in politics. Nationalism, in the name of patriotism, has become a primary source of legitimacy for both the Russian state and the Chinese state, despite the former's official "democratic" trappings and the latter's authoritarian character. Moreover, the kind of nationalism growing in the society and fostered by the state in both countries thus far appears to be fundamentally incompatible with such core liberal values as tolerance and individual liberty. This paper focuses on the roots of illiberal nationalism in contemporary Russia, while taking into account the changing character of nationalism in China in order to generate a partial explanation for similarly illiberal forms of post-communist nationalism across different regime types and different levels of aggregate economic growth. It argues that the relatively successful fusion of communist principles and nationalist doctrines in these two countries unintentionally reinforced collectivist and particularistic elements of society that now provide a basis for illiberal nationalism in the post-communist period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War northeast Asia is shaped primarily by four key factors: realpolitik or balance of power politics, economic interdependence, nationalism and political leadership. How these factors figure out and how they combine with each other would shape the course of China's foreign policy toward either accommodative/cooperative or assertive/aggressive direction. Depending on whether Chinese realpolitik is more constrained by economic interdependence or more dominated by nationalist reactions, China's foreign policy would swing between cooperative and assertive courses. However, considering a firm consensus within Chinese leadership on the necessity of continuous economic growth for its political legitimacy, it is predicted that China would rather pursue a prudent realpolitik guided by balance of power politics and constrained by increasing economic interdependence. As a result, an accommodative/ cooperative course of behavior is more likely to be the normal course of China's foreign policy, though there still remains a possibility of swift swings toward assertive and aggressive course of behavior when vital Chinese nationalist interests are challenged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When half the employees of striking Venezuelan national oil company, PDVSA, were fired in 2002, President Chavez was then able to freely access its resources to support the Bolivarian program. But, PDVSA was in dire straights, lacking most of its technic ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the impact of nationalism on Chinese security policy, especially China’s pursuit of a blue water navy, and the effects of naval nationalism on Sino-U.S. rivalry in East Asia. The paper examines a larger comparative geopolitical pa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Tibet crisis and the demonstrations against the Olympic torch relay have generated a new tide of nationalism encompassing not only the younger generation inside China, but highly educated overseas Chinese. Why are these Chinese young people, ma ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inauguration of the Koizumi administration in 2001, China and Korea (ROK) have repeatedly protested against the visits by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. After he stepped down as Prime Minister last September, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first official visits to China and Korea helped to reduce, to some extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in both countries. Although he promised to construct a new relationship of 'strategic reciprocity' with China during his subsequent visit to Beijing in October, his public statement concerning the so-called 'comfort women' issue before the Diet session had revealed his conservative stance on 'statist' nationalism in Japan. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government established and pursued the fundamental national doctrine of maintaining the Japan-US security alliance and gaining economic prosperity under the peace constitution. In other words, Japan adopted and pursued the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine' as the political symbol of "Small Japan." However, the doctrine has undergone some changes under strong pressure from the conservative leaders like Former Prime Ministers, Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Junichiro Koizumi. Currently, Prime Minister Abe clearly shows his political will to change the gear in a step-by-step manner from 'Small Japan' to another stance, even if not of "Greater Japan." Even if Mr. Abe maintains "strategic ambiguity" vis-a-vis the neighboring countries, his assertively conservative agenda to change basic political values in Japan, as illustrated in his catch phrase "Beautiful Japan" might cause the neighbors to become more concerned about Japan's future. Their cyclical cautiousness toward Tokyo may very well have a negative impact on the ongoing attempt to build an East Asian community encompassing Japan, China, South Korea, and other countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poster / paper presentation is based on draft article examining the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and regional antiterrorist structure (RATS) and their roles in the fight against terrorism and other national security challenges in the framework of Russia â€" China relations. Both states have politically subscribed pragmatic nationalism, based on a firm defense of national interests, realpolitik worldview with a strong pro-reform economical emphasis. Accordingly both states on the regional level have defined terrorism, separatism and extremism as major threats to internal, regional and global stability. The establishment of SCO and RATS has therefore offered multilateral means for handling the two former / future great powers’ strategic environments. Tendencies of both states, Russia and China, to emphasize “their own special domestic conditions”, and “strategic room for maneuver” with “strategic diversity” in Central Asia may manifest tendency to normal great power behavior. But ambitions also seems to prevail for (re)creation of a new world order, based on multipolarity, challenging the US-led structure with alternative definitions and operational models, including ideas of more “democratic” and “just” world order. Presentation seeks to discuss following themes including regional and global fight against terrorism, military and economic cooperation and the role of energy within the scheme of Russia â€" China relations bilaterally and multilaterally within SCO / RATS. The main theoretical and methodological challenge of this proposal is to conceptualize the strategic bilateral and multilateral behaviors of Russia and China, at the present moment unsuitable to any traditional IR-approaches. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have interpreted the rise of Chinese nationalism as the result of the Chinese government’s promotion and the unfriendly actions taken by the United States in the 1990s. Chinese nationalism is viewed as a substitute for a declining communist ideology to be the legitimacy basis for the Chinese Communist Party. It implies that Chinese nationalism is an obstacle to democratization of China. However, this understanding is preconditioned by the hegemony of a master narrative of Chinese nationalism. This master narrative argues that modern China, as the inheritor of the Han-Tang civilization, has survived foreign humiliations, and it is pursuing its national revival by building China’s “comprehensive national capacity” and restoring its past glory. This paper views the imagination of China and the definition of Chineseness as a site of contestation. I argue that the master narrative of Chinese nationalism only defines a particular type of Chineseness, marginalizing other narratives about China. This paper attempts to deconstruct the master narrative of Chinese nationalism by interpreting alternative imaginations of China from the point of view of minority ethnic groups in mainland China as well as from the point of view of Hong Kong and Taiwan. They are on the border of the constructed Chinese national space, yet their voices about Chineseness may offer a broader range of possibilities for China’s future. Viewing the distinction between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism as a continuous spectrum, this paper also discusses the effects of Chinese nationalism on mainland China’s democratization and the relations between mainland China and Taiwan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005, China watchers witnessed thousands of anti-Japanese protesters marching in Shanghai, Shenzhen and dozens of other cities and millions of netizens pouring out their rage in cyberspace against right-wing Japanese textbooks and against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. While international news agencies were busy reporting the spectacular images of China’s nationalistic fever, bookstores and CD/VCD/DVD shops on Chinese streets sold hundreds of thousands of copies of books, CDs and DVDs that revealed the Japanese atrocities in the past and appealed to the dignity and pride of the Chinese nation. While the state news outlets such as Xinhua and Renmin Ribao maintained a determined but calm and reserved tone in criticizing Koizumi and Machimura, the books and evening tabloids on the streets were competing with each other in order to produce more sensational stories and express more anger against Japan. While Chinese authorities maintained a delicate tension with thousands of street protesters, the cultural market in China quickly jumped on the fever of nationalism. Since then, scholars around the world have focused on the Chinese party/state or student protesters to explain the rise of nationalistic fever in Chinese society. Nevertheless, few have noticed that the nationalistic discourses were massively manufactured and circulated by a fast-growing cultural industry in post-reform China. This study is on the commercial nationalism in contemporary China, a phenomenon represented by the huge successes of “Say No” publications, patriotic songs (i.e. “Great China”: Da Zhongguo) and nationalistic movies (i.e.“Hero”: Yingxiong). Though many China specialists have recently explored the nature of contemporary Chinese nationalism, few have placed appropriate emphasis on the role of the newly emerging Chinese cultural industry (wenhua chanye) in the production of popular nationalistic fever especially among the young population in large cities. To overcome the gap in the current scholarship, my study will investigate how nationalism as a cultural commodity was shaped between the double-pressure of market forces and the Chinese state’s vigorous ideological regulations. The cases under study in this project are the publishing, music and film industries, which have shown remarkable growth both in quantity and quality since the early 1990s. By analyzing the motivations and behaviors of various agents in the Chinese cultural industries, this study will show that commercialization of nationalism has been a remarkably successful strategy in the Chinese cultural market, ensuring both political safety and marketability for those agents. My study will also discuss two profound outcomes of the phenomenon of commercial nationalism in China. First of all, the boom of nationalism in the Chinese cultural market produced new types of intellectuals, including writers, directors, composers, those independent from the state payroll but not necessarily against the state’s ideological doctrine. Secondly, market-driven political discourses such as commercial nationalism will eventually loosen the Chinese state’s control over the ideological realm, as market plays a role in the production of political discourses in the Chinese society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does nationalistic sentiment intensify? Collective history and memory play significant role in intensifying nationalistic sentiment. It is said that China-Japan political relations falls to their lowest point in years. I believe that lack of sharing history is a major cause of this. In November, 2003, the skit performed by Japanese students and teacher upset Chinese. The skit itself was nothing to do with Japanese atrocity or nationalism. But it ended up provoke anti-Japanese sentiment. Why did this incident become nationalism issue? Why did this incident become issue of Japanese wartime atrocity? I will answer my questions by analyzing how this incident was understood by Chinese and Japanese. I study English, Japanese and Chinese sources to answer my research questions. It is said that X’ian skit showed the recent evidence of Chinese distrust for Japan. By analyzing this incident, I will examine how history and war memory of Chinese and Japanese affect nationalism. The Xian skit brought up the revival of Chinese suffering past and memory of the war which lead to huge anti-Japanese protests. This skit also exhumed Japan’s inability to face history. I will show that how significant for Japan to acknowledge wrongdoing in the past and truly respects the Chinese emotion relate to the past in order to build the relationship of trust. Shared historical understanding is most necessary for the future relationship between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite improved relations between China and Japan since Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister in September 2006, nationalism remains a major force in driving the future direction of bilateral relations. On the surface, both Tokyo and Beijing talk with carefully guarded diplomatic language amid strong undercurrents of antagonistic feelings from both sides that range from historical to stratigic to territorial issues. This paper explores the bottom-up anti-Japanese sentiment in China alongside the top-down right-wing views aimed against the rise of China in Japan, which thereby explains how such nationalistic agendas relate to a number of dilemmas that impact profound influences on both policy-making and long-term strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that coming to terms with the nature of China's "rise" requires a much closer examination of what Beijing wants the current world order to look like, and how it defines China's place within such a system. It argues that at the core of such issues lies an emerging struggle over defining contemporary Chinese national identity. Simply put, the paper will demonstrate that the diversity of competing identity constructs in China today is staggering, such a plurality makes it exceedingly difficult to define what those in China today want, and this trend has been largely overlooked in the existing secondary literature on China's rise and Chinese nationalism ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will analyze how a totalitarian state like China in its imperial period would also be constrained by its domestic elements in making foreign policies. Although the state with centralized power may have strong inclination in pursuit of its interests in international arena, the study of the Boxer Rebellion and the evolvement of nationalism in the late Qing China showed us that the masses could still intensively pressure the government to react in a specific but somewhat inconsistent and irrational way to external shocks. This paper tries to argue that even a state with highly concentrated power like the imperial China could not act unitarily and rationally in foreign policy making. The policy process, however, had to be conditioned by some seemingly infinitesimal elements despite elites? claim that these constraints could be detrimental to national interests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration has been progressing rapidly in Northeast Asia, particularly among Japan, China, and South Korea, and a large volume of industrial and cultural products flow across the region. Despite high-level economic integration, the three countries have not developed an institutional arrangement to stabilize regional politics. To the contrary, Japan and the other two countries continue to dispute over issues related to Japan?s wartime past, including controversies over Yasukuni shrine and Japan?s history textbooks. Based on the constructivist approach, this paper explains why the three countries fight over these issues, focusing on state identity and politics of recognition. Japan developed its state identity mainly through interactions with the United States. Japanese leaders emphasize that Japan, as a liberal democratic country, has developed a pacifist stance after World War II. They want other countries to recognize that their actions, including the prime minister?s visit to the shrine, are consistent with the pacifist stance. In contrast, the memory of Japan?s past colonial rule plays an important part in China and South Korea?s state identity formation. State leaders in each country denounce the colonial rule as unjust invasion while praising past nationalist leaders? fight against it as patriotic. They demand Japan?s current leaders to recognize (acknowledge) wrongdoings of Japan?s colonial rule, opposing any actions that imply Japanese leaders? support for or tolerance of the colonial rule. Through the analysis of the current controversies between the three countries, this paper develops a theoretical discussion of identity and recognition in international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental objective of this research is to reveal the role of institutional adaptation invented by communist regime in the face of the great famine: how institutional adaptation bridges the crisis management of communist regiems and its impact on the regime stability in the post-famine period. For this research project, the theory of path dependence will be advanced as a main tool for comparative-historical analyses to analyze the development and persistence of institutions at a given historical juncture - the outbreak of the great famine. Nationalism or neo-traditionalism will be applied to two communist regimes in East Asia as the secondary framework analyzing that the incremental and path-dependent nature of institutional change lies in the ideologies or national collective identity held by institutional entrepreneurs. The interactive processes between institutional rearrangements and natioanl identity for regime survival will be investigated by a comparative study of China (1959-1961) and North Korea (1996-1998), all of which experienced severe catastrophe of the famine. Interestingly, against the assumption of the potential unrest that would be ignited by the famine, communist regimes faced no serious social protests and succeeded in maintaining political legitimacy in spite of the nationwide catastrophe. During and after the period of the famine in China, the famine-stricken society was totally controlled by Mao's regime both through mass mobilization and the ideological purge. Likewise, despite the expectation of its total collapse, North Korea has been successfully muddling through in managing economic disasters under strong control over the society. In this context, the paper will explore how institutional adaptation and its associational natioanlism, which are designed by the political regime, shape justifiable causes for legitimacy maintenance in the domestic realm and influence economic and political reforms in the post-famine societies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between terrorism and human rights from the perspective of the People's Republic of China (PRC). China's continuing support for the war on terror has had implications not only for its relations with other states but also for the relationship between the Chinese government and its people. It demonstrates how China has used its support for the international war on terror both to cope with an immediate domestic problem, ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang, and to lay an internationally sanctioned basis for dealing with future domestic instability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's relationship (politically, militarily, economically, socially and culturally) with it neighbors is surveyed in this paper. Through newfound diplomatic finesse and the irresistible lure of its economic expansion, Beijing has skillfully turned around relations with its neighbors in East, Southeast and South Asia who have begun to see China's rise as an opportunity rather than a threat. Indeed, many both within and outside the Asian Pacific region already contend the future belongs to China as evident by it?s increasingly ability to leverage its economic clout to support its political preferences. Key concepts and issues discussed/examined in this chapter include: technology piracy, resurgent nationalism, foreign direct investment, wartime atrocities, Sino Japanese tensions (racial prejudice and cultural competition), security threats, Tibet, Taiwan relations, and North Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since China is a rising power, there has been an increased amount of attention paid to the role of Chinese nationalism in China's foreign policy. This has led to a debate over whether China is a threat, or not. While most writers take the meaning of ?China threat? as self-evident, and then proceed either to agree or disagree with it, this essay examines the discursive politics of ?China threat theory?. While there has been much criticism of the American/western side of this debate, no research has been done on the discourse's Chinese-language texts. I argue that a close reading of these texts demonstrates that they are involved in more than simply refuting the foreign criticism. Rather, the negative images of the PRC that are continually circulated in Chinese texts serve to construct Chinese identity through a logic of estrangement: Chinese identity is consolidated against foreign enemies. Although this is effective in generating national feeling within China, the discourse actually tends to reproduce China as a threatening power abroad. Rather than engaging in critical security studies to question the international order, these refutations of ?China threat theory? end up generating a new set of foreign threats, and thus buttress the existing geopolitical framework of international relations. I argue that we need to question how Realism has colonised both the 'Chinese nationalism' and the ?rise of China? debates by using theory to open up critical space for a non-state-centric view of security and identity. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism has been used in clichéd and hegemonic discourses of the West to describe China’s national feeling. In this article, the author first analyzes the epistemological, political and globalization origins of the myth of Chinese nationalism, which are embodied in political nationalism, ethnic nationalism and cultural nationalism. He argues that to shape a new Chinese national identity through modifying the so-called “new nationalism” is merely to continue the myth of Chinese nationalism in the new era. The author then puts forward a new analysis of framework of “of the nation-by the nation-for the nation” and “nationalization stage – modernization stage – internationalization stage”. He points out that the future of Chinese national identity should include three aspects: an open and inclusive national spirit, a harmonious national character, and a moderate sense of national pride. As the largest developing country in the world and a rising world power, China has to achieve modernization and internationalization at the same time and to unite the motherland, accomplishing the whole task at one stroke and binding together the trinity of historical traditions, international trends and world identity. In the course of building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity, China is seeking her new identity as a responsible country. Finally the author concludes that China’s peaceful development is shaping China’s new identity and will necessarily destroy all kinds of myths about Chinese nationalism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-colonialism may be understood as a status of political oppression, economic dependence, and cultural subaltern even after a nation has obtained its formal independence. Alternatively, post-colonialism stands for disillusions over the above neocolonialism after the departure of the past colonist. Finally, post-colonialism represents a commitment to forge a new national identity while endeavoring to get rid of structural and cultural violence inherited by the native elites. After a brief recapitulating of the development of the Taiwan Independence Movement after the War, we will construct a conceptual framework of settersÂ’ society to understand the triple task of undoing the internal colonialism waged on the Austronesian indigenous peoples by the Han settlers, reconciling historical cleavages between the natives and the Mainlanders, and resisting irredentism from its fatherland, China. We argue that this is a three-pronged mission at the same time: while making all efforts to secure state-making in the international society, both nation-building and state-building are actively pursued. As a result, we shall first look into how the Taiwanese are withstanding military threats and economic attractions from China. Secondly, we shall examine how the native government is ready to make its way to replacing the regime of the Republic of China implanted by the Nationalist Chinese. Thirdly, we shall inquiry into how an inclusive national identity is imagined out of competing ethnic representations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 marked a new low in Sino-Japanese relations. A grassroots petition in China, South Korea and around the world gathered more than 30 million signatures in a matter of weeks. Violent demonstrations in China displayed Chinese people's deep resentment of Japan on a range of issues. Both Beijing and Tokyo have traded charges against each other while trying to control the situation from getting worse. This paper examines these developments, and focuses on how nationalism manifested itself in both China and Japan, what are behind the emotional outbursts of public sentiments, and why there is no single model that can explain the nationalistic behavior in either China or Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated in recent years, driven by clashes over the interpretation and commemoration of war history. This stands in contrast to the growth in economic ties between the two countries, and appears to run counter to liberal theories that emphasize the pacifying effects of commerce.In this paper we examine recent trends in Sino-Japanese relations utilizing the theoretical lenses of commercial peace and nationalism. We suggest that economic interdependence is a weaker factor than nationalism in determining the direction of future relations for three reasons. First, although bilateral aggregate levels of trade and investment are increasing, we argue that the structure of these economic interactions suggest that increased commercial ties may not have the pacific power posited by commercial liberal theories. Second, evidence suggests that the attempt by both states to separate economic ties from political ties has been only partially successful, and that nationalism has trumped commercial interests when the two have clashed. Third, we argue that although deepening economic interactions may have increased the costs of conflict, they have not dampened increased relative gain concerns and bilateral threat perceptions. This has generated higher expectations within each state of future militarized disputes, and raised the risk of inadvertent military confrontation in territorial and resource-driven disputes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China?s incorporation into the European international society at the turn of the twentieth century was accompanied by the rise of Chinese nationalism. In the 1910s, particularly during and after the Paris Peace Conference, China staged its early revolt against the West by demanding the application of such principles of national self-determination and equal sovereignty and the abolition of the treaty system in China. This presented an unusual challenge to the diplomatic corps in Beijing, which routinely took a unified stance in its representation to the Chinese government. This paper looks at how the diplomatic corps in Beijing collectively and individually responds to this early revolt and deals with both official and popular nationalist demands. It argues that such mutual engagement is no longer just part of the expansion of the European society of states. More importantly, it functions as the early production of the global international society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ?rise? of China and Japan in the international political sphere through the theoretical lens of the English School. One of the most important insights provided by the English School approach of International Relations is its notion that ?Great Powers? hold special responsibilities in the Society of States. However, studies of ?great power responsibilities? have not sufficiently problematised or historicised what exactly these ?responsibilities? entail. Building on a recent study by Roland Paris which argues that international peacebuilding constitutes the modern ?mission civilisatrice?, I argue that the English School theoretical framework can offer us a fresh perspective in understanding the political ambitions of China and Japan to play a greater political role in International Society. Moving beyond conventional explanations which trace these movements to domestic nationalism, I explore through a comparative case study of Chinese and Japanese participation in international peacekeeping whether China or Japan?s recent actions for ?a greater international political role? is informed by both states? interaction with a international normative consensus of what constitutes a ?civilised? Great Power in twentieth and twenty first-century International Society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs the case of ChinaÂ’s recent anti-Japanese sentiments to answer: (1) What is the nature of ChinaÂ’s current nationalism? And (2) if it were not inherently xenophobic, how would the Chinese leadership deal with nationalistic sentiments toward Japan? The first part of this paper briefly depicts the nature of Chinese nationalism, attributing the emergence of radical nationalistic views to the CCPÂ’s patriotic education campaigns, economic development and commercialization, and technological advancement. Given that ChinaÂ’s recent antagonism toward Japan results from the history-related issues such as textbooks and interest-related UNSC issues, this paper contends that the nature of Chinese nationalism is not predetermined but lies in interactions between China and Japan. This paper further suggests that how the CCP manages these anti-Japanese sentiments is decisive to future Sino-Japanese relations. Nationalism helps the CCP in getting the upper hand in Sino-Japanese relations: on the one hand, the CCP co-opts and channels up anti-Japanese sentiments to deter JapanÂ’s political ambitions; on the other hand, as an authoritarian regime, the CCP is less than hesitant to oppress any radical movements considered as a threat to its party survival. In other words, by cooptation and oppression, it seems that the CCP astutely controls this double-edged nationalism. Thus, future Sino-Japanese relations depend not on the nature of Chinese nationalism but on the leadershipÂ’s cost-benefit calculations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Chronicle of Chinese Cyber Nationalism (1994-2005)Chinese cyber nationalism is a non-government sponsored ideology or movement that has originated, existed, and developed on China?s online sphere in the past decade (1994-2005). It is a natural extension from China?s century-long nationalism movement, but it is different from the CCP?s official version of patriotism. Taking advantages of the online technology, Chinese cyber nationalism has been utilizing the Internet as a communication center, organizational platform, and execution vehicle to promote the nationalism causes among Chinese nationalists around the world. Politically, it aims primarily at those international issues involving China and strives to retain China?s historical position as a respectable power in Asia and in the world. The combination of China?s distinctive culture and tradition, online technology?s reach and power, and nationalism?s broad appeal and ideological approach made it a powerful and unpredictable factor in China?s overall policy decision-making process. Within the time span of about ten years (1994-2005), the researcher classified five different historical phases. They are (1), period of ?enlightenment in the ivory tower? (1994.4?1996.12); (2), period of ?say no to Indonesia?s Anti-Chinese riot? (1997.1?1999.3); (3), period of ?Sino-U.S. online wars? (1999.4?2001.9); (4), period of ?post-9/11 transition of priority? (2001.9?2003.8); and (5), period of ?direct confrontation with Japan? (2003.9?2005.4). Each of the five periods was examined in terms of its distinctive characteristics, major online events, overall political background, and representative figures or arguments. A special event occurred in each historical period was case-studied on its origin, development, and respective influence. Each case study serves as a supplemental example to the general themes. To establish an accurate, comprehensive, and valid historical account of Chinese cyber nationalism, several research steps were taken to guarantee the accuracy of the historical details as well as the representativeness of the timeline structure. First of all, the developmental history of dozens of major Chinese web sites operated by people both inside and outside China were reviewed and synchronized. Second, the literature on China?s online sphere and analyses on China?s foreign policy decision making process in the past decade were compared in order to put the chronicle into a larger perspective. Third, relevant reports by foreign media on China?s online communities and online activities were searched and reviewed. Period I: ?enlightenment in the ivory tower? (1994.4?1996.12)In summary, Chinese online sphere was still in its infancy during this period of time. Correspondingly, the Chinese cyber nationalism was mainly restricted on the ivory towers both at home and abroad. The online discussions of political issues, especially for those mainland-based online BBS, were sporadic, superficial, and mostly reflective of what had been promoted by the government. The online activities, including those that were unsuccessfully tried by the domestic BBS and those that were successfully organized by overseas Chinese online journals, were nonetheless experimental and mostly symbolic. Moreover, the government had much control over the content as well as the channel of those domestic online BBS, and could either suspend the operation of those unruly offenders or cut off the linkage between the campus Intranet and the global Internet. (Case Study I: ?China Cay Say No? -- A small book published in May 1996 capped the overall sentiment in China?s online and offline spheres at that time... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]