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A study on the financial limitations on attaining arbitrage profits in a market with no liquidity is presented.

Usage of innovation processes to develop an evolutionary simulation model for knowledge transfer during analysis of market performance is described.

Linear programming is applied to analyze effective securities in a market characteristic of no arbitrage with bid ask prices at bankruptcy.

Clarifications relating various criticisms by David Colander, John Cullis, and Aaron Levine on a model for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct are presented.

The model presented by Morris Altman for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct is examined for its efficiency and the role that government can play for improving the ethical behavior.

An analysis of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

Critical review of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

A study examining the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented. Based on the study a behavior model duly incorporating the moral and altruistic behavior for individuals and firms is developed.

The market dynamics of a neoclassical production economy with heterogenous agents, convex technologies and idiosyncratic production risks are analyzed. The effects of endogenous fluctuations, precautionary savings, investment risks etc., on such an economy are examined.

The impact of consumer bargaining on seller's offer price from the study of wholesale fruit and vegetable market in Marseille is examined.

The soft budgets of economies in transition from socialistic system to capitalistic system are discussed. The need to provide social goods along with private goods and the political need to bail out firms with financial problems are also discussed. The presence of soft budget prevents efficiency in private goods market. However, greater competition is likely to make matters even worse.

An analysis of the effects of human capital and market imperfections on the labor employment and labor reallocation in the transition countries is discussed.

A market for pollution permits in which one firm has market power and one or more firms is noncompliant is examined. It is shown that the firm with market power may choose to hold more permits than it needs, and the one that is noncompliant may be socially desirable because it can mitigate the distortion caused by market power.

The industrial networt paradign, or marketing as networks concept, is explored as to its theory, development, and knowledge production.

This study looks at export performance based on market orientation, finding that it positively affects change in export sales, export profits, and change in export profits. Three environmental variables that affect export performance are market turbulence, competitive intensity, and technological turbulence. Obtaining and responding to market intelligence are critical for success in exporting.

This article discusses 'hot' and 'cold' real estate markets, and develops a corelation between them. The author asserts that the liquidity of cold markets can be good when price are high as in a hot market.

Using data on Asian equity markets, we observe that during periods of financial turmoil, deviations from the mean-variance framework become more severe, resulting in periods with additional downside risk to investors. Current risk management techniques failing to take this additional downside risk into account will underestimate the true Value-at-Risk with greater severity during periods of financial turmoil. We provide a conditional approach to the Value-at-Risk methodology, known as conditional VaR-x, which to capture the time variation of non-normalities allows for additional tail fatness in the distribution of expected returns. These conditional VaR-x estimates are then compared to those based on the RiskMetrics methodology from J. P. Morgan, where we find that the model provides improved forecasts of the Value-at-Risk. We are therefore able to show that our conditional VaR-x estimates are better able to capture the name of downside risk, particularly crucial in times of financial crises.

The structure of the critical equilibria subset is fixed and has a zero value in the equilibrium set. This conclusion has been derived by evaluating a two-period economy wherein the second period has uncertainty. The aforementioned economy has been likewise characterized by different financial mechanisms and an individual commodity for each nature state. To pursue the claim of the set's structure, demand functions, together with qualitative characteristics, have been presupposed. The demand functions determined the diversified equilibrium set.

A monetary propagation mechanism is considered showing that a low money growth rate increases steady state employment and output while a high money growth rate promotes the opposite. The mechanism considers an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search. It is found to produce persistent hump-shaped responses in the output of employment and not-so persistent outputs to money growth shocks.

A simulation of a sender/receiver game with common interest where players engage in anonymous, pairwise interactions reveals that there is a dynamic process where players climb an equilibrium payoff ladder. Moreover, the study finds that the players move successively from an equilibrium of one order to the next and eventually converging to an equilibrium on the highest possible order.

Analysis of the Dreze equilibrium reveals that the process may reach a Walresian equilibrium under standard assumptions on the primitive concepts of the economy and a non-degeneratie condition. The study takes into consideration an economy facing price rigidities and uses standard assumptions of the economy under non-degenerative conditions. In a market where either demand or supply is rationed, the process is shows to to a fixed price equilibrium and that this equilibrium, in turn, converges to a Walresian equilibrium in the long run.

A bilateral matching market was analyzed that is characterized by middlemen or matchmakers competing to serve the needs of agents. Middlemen have the tendency to shoulder agents' service expenses when the type of agents being handled have limited willingness to pay for matchmakers' service. In addition, agents may also stand to lose transaction cost during a match.

Actual trade gains and market exchange volume proved to be smaller than expected market assumptions. Based on two market simulations, actual gains obtained in exchange and trade volumes are less than half of market assumptions. Fewer than expected market tradings were also observed on actual market exchanges as shown by failure to complete by all Pareto-efficient exchanges.

Three models are employed to analyze the concept that if governments submit to conditions where markets failed, reintroducing markets by backdoor of systems will again lead to market failure. The first model is focused on congestion-prone public goods and indicates that fiscal competition may be dangerous for the governments. The second, which emphasizes insurance function of redistributive taxation, suggests that adverse selection may affect systems competition. Finally, the last focuses on the role of quality regulation, indicating that systems competition may be a competition of laxity leading to incompetently low quality standards.

Non-cooperative tax policies imposed by independent jurisdictions in a chain of markets result to a decrease in trade volume, assuming that the different organizations set taxes at levels that maximizes their net revenues. A similar level of revenue and increased trade volume, however, could be achieved by monopolization of the chain of markets and sharing of revenues.

The equilibria of general economic models with incomplete asset markets or GEI can be calculated by utilizing an algorithm based on the existence of a route of zeros of a homotopy. The domain of the homotopy includes a Grassmann Manifold and the price simplex. Relocalization may be necessary after localization and following diffeomorphic pieces in Euclidean space.

The existence of a general equilibrium in a two-period economy with infinite-dimensional space and incomplete financial markets presents no problem, as long as securities are purely financial. The assumption is that trading occurs in the sequence of spot markets and futures markets for securities payable in units of account, with unlimited short-selling permitted. The existence of such an equilibrium is proved for an economy with Mackey continuity, weak convexity, strict monotonicity, complete preferences and strictly positive endowments.

A theory is developed on ambiguous property rights in which property owners have to contest the actual control right in all situations. The highly successful non-state sector of China is a prime example of ambiguous property rights, which arise because of a market environment that is imperfect. It was suggested that in China's undeveloped market environment, ambiguous property rights are more efficient than clearly defined private property rights.

A direct test on the equality of variance-covariance matrices and correlation matrices is used to study the intervalling effect on the intertemporal stability in stock return relationships in six emerging Asian markets and four developed markets. Empirical analysis indicates that diversifying into the Asian emerging markets is beneficial and that correlation matrices of stock returns are more stable than variance-covariance matrices. The patterns of stock market co-movement are more stable as the time period considered becomes shorter.

The three concepts of organizations, markets and institutions are analyzed together with their structural properties to gain a better understanding of how free market economies work. A mathematical model is employed to compare the structures of these concepts and analyze how they are related to each other. Results indicate that it is important to maintain distinct concepts to accurately determine how economies emerge and stabilize.

There are several factors that influence the capability and willingness of a firm to acquire and process information. These include the nature of the firm's strategic markets, the cost involved in its transactions, the level of competition offered by rivals and the coordination and cooperation among the firm's key officials. All of these factors determine the policy of a firm with regard to information acquisition and use.

Agents possessing finite sets of transactions comprise a market. Statistical equilibrium can be derived from the distribution of agents over the offer sets which can be attained in the largest number of ways. It exists if there is a Gibbsian canonical distribution and a feasible market transaction. Pareto-efficiency is estimated by statistical equilibrium and requires the modification of the First and Second Theorems.

A discussion of the market factors which affect consumer behavior is presented. A definition of market is not easy to arrive at because of the rapid changes changes among manufacturers, suppliers, consumers and by internationalization and segmentation. Some of the major market changes discussed are the increasing number and varieties of product categories, the technological advances attained by many products and the variety of meanings which brands are called upon to convey.

An analysis of a decision support system is presented. The analysis establishes the need for such a system which will explain marketplace possibilities of sizeand time. The methodology presented focuses on the customer for product class under consideration and the transition of a marketplace life cycle for such a class. It is shown that a vital difference between the two variables emerge as part of the marketplace life cycle.

Decentralized market equilibria are examined in detail under conditions where buyers possess private information relating to exchange opportunity values.

A method which focuses on the distribution of goods which circulated through the market system is proposed to understand the role of markets within the ancient economy. How different types of market systems move goods through the regional system in different ways, and distinct patterns of commodity distribution are predicted and metrics for monitoring exchanged based on artifact assemblage similarity are proposed.

Discusses the role of mediators and mediation mechanisms in commodity exchange and the distinction between firms and markets.

The structure of industries in terms of levels of centralization is examined in detail in a context where there are several production stages. The problem of informational diseconomies is discussed.

General equilibrium markets, where the number of consumers is N, the number of goods is L and the dimension of the space of admissible trades is K, were investigated. K = (L -1) for the case of complete markets. It was shown that, if N > or = K, any non-vanishing analytic function satisfying the natural extension of the Walras law is, locally at least, the excess demand function of such a market.

Autonomous agents should be market aware in the sense that they should be adept in interacting with and through software market institutions. The argument for market awareness is based on the premise that resource allocation play an important part in the design of multiagent systems and that price systems provide structure to the allocation problem. The rationale and implications for the market-based approach affect various issues on the design of computational markets.