Dating back to the Civil War, the False Claims Act (FCA) is a powerful weapon that the U.S. government (government) wields to combat fraud. In particular, the FCA contains "qui tam" provisions wherein a whistleblower, known as a "relator," may bring claims in the government's name and retain a portion of any resultant recoveries. While the FCA allows the government to dismiss a qui tam claim notwithstanding the objections of relator, there is a four-way circuit split on the appropriate standard of review for such motions to dismiss. From 2003 through 2020, the split was only between the Ninth Circuit's Sequoia standard, which requires the government to demonstrate the dismissal is rationally related to a valid governmental objective, and the D.C. Circuit's Swift standard, which confers nearly unfettered deference to the government. The year 2020 ushered in a new era of judicial debate with the Seventh Circuit creating a third standard based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the First Circuit promulgating an entirely different standard-one that requires the government to provide reasons for dismissal. The First Circuit standard also requires dismissal to be granted unless there is a constitutional infirmity or evidence of fraud. This circuit split was thrust into the spotlight in 2018 when Michael Granston, Director of the Department of Justice (DoJ) Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, promulgated guidance instructing DoJ attorneys to consider dismissing qui tam cases to curb meritless qui tam cases, conserve government resources, and prevent unfavorable precedents. Senator Charles “Chuck†Grassley (R-Iowa), a life-long whistleblower champion, has publicly criticized these dismissals as pretextual and antithetical to the spirit of the FCA. In October 2021, Senator Grassley proposed an FCA amendment that essentially codifies the Sequoia standard. Shortly before this article was sent to the publisher, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this question. This article examines the historical context of the qui tam provisions that ultimately gave rise to the circuit split as well as the DOJ’s recent use of its dismissal authority. It further evaluates Senator Grassley’s proposed FCA amendment and argues that it does not substantively settle key nuanced issues that continue to drive judicial disagreement. In light of the evolution to a four-way circuit split and the recent increase in judicial divergence, this article argues that the government’s dismissal authority is well-suited for Supreme Court intervention. Finally, this article examines why the dismissal authority particularly matters now. With a newly emerging circuit split on whether a denied government motion to dismiss can be appealed and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) introducing significant opportunities to commit fraud against the government, it is imperative that all FCA litigants have clarity on the contours of the government’s dismissal authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]