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In the wake of financial, sovereign debt and health crises, public interventions in the European economy have taken on a new level of breadth, marking a reentry in force of the state in economic life that goes beyond the regulatory state. Yet, these interventions do not follow the old Keynesian interventions neither, being shaped through a particular logic of investment that link public and private actors in a particular configuration. The introduction to this special issue lays out this configuration for the case of the EU and its Member States through the concept of "European Investor state." By this concept, we refer to the redefinition of the role of European states in the economy as an "investor," in reference to private investment funds, which the state seeks both to imitate and to enroll. The paper embeds this redefinition of state intervention in the context of the 2010s in Europe, characterized by worries about "secular stagnation" and growing concern about an "investment gap," interpreted as the failure of financial markets to invest in productive sectors, especially when risky. The budgetary constraints and the ideological outlook then shaped the specific financial and off-balanced sheet tools of the investor state. Finally, the paper explores the implications of the Covid-crisis on this intervention model. It concludes that despite major changes in fiscal policy at the EU level, this approach is likely to persist, because of the lasting interpretation in terms of "investment gap," which only public-private collaborations are seen to be able to fill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the paradoxical nature of post-2008 fiscal policies, where there is a simultaneous emphasis on valuing public investment on the one hand, and maintaining austerity on the other. It sheds light on this paradox through the concept of "Investor State," which refers to contemporary states' ambition to redefine their role in the economy by no longer limiting themselves to a regulatory role but rather seeking an active role as "investor." We argue that this redefinition of the state's role is of piece with the elevation of investment as a new standard for legitimizing state actions. On the flipside, by making investment the main criteria of public policy legitimacy, it simultaneously delegitimizes spending that is not deemed an investment. Because the adopted economic definition of investment is limited to traditional "productive investment" related to industrial policy, other policy sectors—that is the majority of state intervention—are subject to spending cuts. Thus the Investor State suggests an evolution of the fiscal order that Streeck described as the "consolidation state": the primary goal is no longer to reduce public debt and deficits. But the neoliberal objective to reduce the "size" of the public sector in the economy absolutely remains. Drawing on the case of France, the article shows how the right-wing government started placing investment at the core of its fiscal policy after 2008. The article then highlights the continuation of this dual fiscal policy discourse to date despite changes in government leadership and the pandemic crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]