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This paper aims to conceptualize a framework for better understanding the challenges, actions and rationales of the African and Asian small powers in the post-1989 global order. The paper will be divided into three parts. First, it will review the literature on small power/state studies. Second, following a critique of the major approaches in small power studies, we will argue for the need for a critical realist perspective to better capture the relationships between domestic politics and foreign relations of the small power in Africa and Asia. Third, against the comparative trajectories in which the U.S. has attained global hegemony after 1991 and China has gradually become a great power after 2000, in light of the recent U.S. containment policy shift towards China which has stirred up versatile dynamics of East Asian small power politics, in favor of a global multi-polarity, we will highlight the foundation of our approach for building the strong small powers in terms of two main aspects of economic nationalism: resource-focused and sovereignty-asserting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'Silk Road' had predominantly been a series of trade routes that intertwined their way through Europe, Central Asia, Persia to China to facilitate exchanges of trade, commerce, culture and knowledge roughly between 130 BC and 1453 AD. Known for trades of silk and spices, it was a significant economic corridor for almost one-and-half millennium connecting major regions of the world. In 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping resurrected the idea to re-open trade corridors between China and its neighbors in the west and notably Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe, and put-forth the idea of 'The New Silk Road'. In May 2017 China held first summit of 'Belt and Road Forum' (BARF) to unveil the idea of 'New Silk Road' before world. The New silk routes are different from the historic silk routes as the former served as a mode of connection for trade and cultural exchange with little political significance. Contrarily, the New Silk Road (also called Belt and Road Initiative-BRI) is an overt expression of China's power ambitions in the 21st century and is regarded as hedging strategy of China against the eastward move of USA. It is assumed a game-changer strategy with a potential to shift the center of geo-economics towards Eurasia instead of Asia-pacific region which is dominated by the USA and its allies. The New Silk Road has brought certain apprehensions with it. The idea of 'New Silk Road' by many nations is viewed as a form of neo-colonialism to grab local resources. Contrary to 'Old Silk Road', it is opaque and ambiguous for it is motivated in the power politics of China. Against this backdrop, the paper will make a comparative study of old and New Silk Road and examine various challenges to the New Silk Road. There is a need to analyse the implications of the New Silk Road and also explore the future prospects of the same amid the challenges that it faces presently, this paper shall try to meet these objectives [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past two years, the Asia-Pacific seems to have returned to the back seat in U.S. foreign policy priorities because of crises in Europe and the Middle East, and Washington's own fiscal problems. Given both global and domestic developments, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is still valid. This paper asserts, "Yes, it is." Washington has made steady progress across military, diplomatic, and economic realms of the rebalancing. It has strengthened and expanded military ties with regional states and prepared for its naval forces to operate more intensively. It has become a member of major multilateral institutions and expanded support for appropriate organizations. And it is striving to complete the most important trade deal in a generation, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Despite budget pressures, the Obama administration has kept the Asia-Pacific high on its foreign policy agenda, and the rebalance has enjoyed bipartisan support. While the high-profile rebalancing moves have been relatively modest so far, the Obama administration's achievements should not be understated. More balancing effort is certain to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This reseat ch applies a neoclassical realist framework to explore the causes and consequences of Russia's recent "reorientation to Asia." Based on an analysis of publications and fieldwork conducted in Russia, the paper examines both the international systemic and the Russian domestic factors that have conti ibuted to this important change in Russia's foreign policy. At the system level, Russia's turn to Asia can be understood as a part of its longer campaign of balancing against American unipolar domination. At the unit level, economic demands to develop Russia's eastern territories, together with the complex socio-political processes of post-Soviet identity formation, generated a political environment that was conducive to Asia-oriented policies. Russia s reorientation to Asia implies not only comprehensive strategic cooperation with specific Asian powers, such as China, South Korea, or Japan, but also a "reinvention" of Russia as a Eurasian power. Given Russia s cross-continental spread and economic and military capabilities, its reorientation to Asia may have significant implications for the balance of power in the current world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific on Canada's strategic thinking and maritime posture. It highlights elements of the US rebalance before examining Canada's recent past, present, and future strategic and military engagement. Canada wants to be able to contribute to crisis de-escalation if regional tensions lead to conflict, yet the Royal Canadian Navy has less deployment capacity today than it has had in 25 years. To contribute to mediatory influence, and provide warfighting capability, a recapitalized navy should increase deployments to the region, forward deploy some naval assets, and ensure interoperability with its US counterpart. In the event of a crisis, a choice might have to be made between a neutral, honest-broker stance and a more likely decision to contribute forces to a US-led coalition. The first step in either case is to be in the Asia-Pacific region with capable and credible naval forces. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introductory article provides rationales and contextual background for the special issue which examines how weak states in Asia actualise and exercise their agency in the twenty-first century regional or global environments. The article opens with a consideration of why attention is drawn to the agency of the weak. Weak states are often treated as 'objects' of international politics rather than 'subjects', and their foreign policy actions are commonly taken to be 'reflexive' of external constraints, such as fluctuations in the balance of power in the international system. We disagree with this view. We argue that weak actors can demonstrate varieties of agency regardless of their position in the international system in terms of material capabilities. To clarify this point, the article reflects on the changed and changing global and regional environments and order. Rather than seeing them through the lens of great power politics and its signature concept of 'polarity', the article offers an alternative notion, namely a 'multiplex' world, and identifies the key nature of order therein: multiplicity and fluidity. Both material and normative power have already and continue to become fragmented, decentralised, and dispersed within and across states. While emphasising that such a multifaceted and fluid world opens up a wide avenue of agency for weak actors, this article also notes that the weak has varieties of agency as potentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to explore the micropolitics of middle managers in influencing the development and outcome of a centre-led change initiative. This study was empirically based on a novel context in a Malaysia based multinational company (MNC) and four of its Asian subsidiaries. This qualitative study was conducted through a multiple embedded case study approach. The findings demonstrate that middle managers have within their powers to influence the development and eventually the outcome of change. This was achieved through control of middle managers on resources such as business knowledge and networking in influencing the meaning of change itself. This article allows the authors to investigate an in-depth exploration of how subsidiary managers operate. It contributes to the change literature by expanding the knowledge about the tight coupling between power and politics of organizational sensemaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article has two objectives. Drawing on the framework provided by macrosecuritization, this article first explores global responses to AMR. Secondly, in shifting the analytical lens to Asia, the article then evaluates how successful this process has been in a regional context. Considering the two objectives, two inter-related arguments are proposed. First, even though AMR can be considered a quintessential and successful macrosecuritization case at the global level, within Asia the operationalisation of AMR strategies is limited by power and resource politics within the states. Second, the anthropocentric nature of health security is limited when it comes to address the threat posed by AMR. Overcoming this limitation requires a One Health approach. However, the successful articulation of this approach has proven challenging in Asia where middle-level actors pull away from the process in pursuit of other agendas. As a result, while macrosecuritization provides a useful tool for understanding how AMR and similar health threats are addressed, it is necessary to understand the local realities within which the process is embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A big question looming large over policy and theory in Asian security is how China will use its newfound wealth and power in the region and with what consequences. The United States has concluded the negotiation of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); ASEAN has promoted the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Both frameworks seek to shape China’s regional behavior and manage rising China. In late 2013, China inaugurated the new Silk Road initiative, which has rapidly gained momentum in the country and among China’s neighbors. American public and policy makers, however, are largely unaware or baffled by the new Silk Road. The article, based on field surveys and extensive documentary analysis, provides the first roadmap on how China views TPP, RCEP, and the new Silk Road. It offers important exploration of how China acts and reacts to regional contestation and what are implications for the region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Because of rapid economic growth and close economic interdependence, East Asia has recently been in the spotlight of regional integration theorists. Currently, East Asia is being remapped in two ways: one is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); and the other is the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). This article aims at predicting the winner of inter-institutional balancing between the two tracks from a viewpoint of power politics. To do so, realist hypotheses are made of regional integration and they are tested against the Integration Achievement Score (IAS) data. As a result, newly suggested hypotheses and some conventional ideas are strongly supported. These findings hold, regardless of model specifications and measurement of variables. Next, after analyzing how much the RCEP and the TPP accord with those findings, probabilities are presented showing that the two tracks can achieve regional economic integration. In conclusion, the TPP is expected to become the winner of inter-institutional balancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalising models, but their import and arrival have posed stiff political challenges for many countries, including China and India, Asia’s two heavyweights. With these two initiatives, the regional trade of Asia is entering an interesting phase of liberalisation and integration. In fact, it is gradually becoming clear that the facets and nuances attached to these two trade liberalisation models will impact regional power politics massively in times to come. While the success of TPP hinges on the global economic authority of the US and how the negotiation process unfolds, the future dynamism of RCEP will depend heavily on how China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) conduct their negotiation process and accommodate the interests of other regional powers, including India. Hitherto, it has been no secret that both RCEP and TPP will greatly affect and influence ASEAN and the role of its free trade agreement (FTA) partner countries, including China and India. In this regional stratagem, China–India relations may witness new dynamics and power politics in East Asia or in the broader Asia-Pacific region. It may also open a new window of opportunity for India’s greater integration with the East Asia region. India needs to analyse carefully the efficacy and implications of both RCEP and TPP to see how far they serve New Delhi’s own regional interests. RCEP may eventually facilitate India’s ‘Look East’ policy more effectively than TPP. The former allows New Delhi to coordinate with ASEAN+6 countries more effectively, to which China has so far been fundamentally opposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, Vietnam's China policy has been shaped by a combination of approaches which can be best described as a multi-tiered, omni-directional hedging strategy. The article argues that hedging is the most rational and viable option for Vietnam to manage its relations with China given its historical experiences, domestic and bilateral conditions, as well as changes in Vietnam's external relations and the international strategic environment. The article examines the four major components of this strategy, namely economic pragmatism, direct engagement, hard balancing and soft balancing. The article goes on to assess the significance of each component and details how Vietnam has pursued its hedging strategy towards China since normalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the coming years, Asian balance of power will be significantly tested. China's new attitude in the region has created some tensions among countries fearing that the "peaceful rise" era is over. The United States have clarified their intention of strengthening their position in the region, a move that has pushed other nations, such as Vietnam, Japan, Australia, India, and Russia to become more active not to lose the chance of being involved in the Asian restructuring. In Asia any adjustment can have political, strategic, and economic consequences. Accordingly, this article analyses how feasible and effective a rapprochement among India, Japan and Australia could be. Aware that these countries cannot disregard the economic and political connections they have with China, following the consequences of the most recent evolutions of U.S. Asian strategy, the article evaluates the reasons why, while keeping on deepening their connections with China, these countries might be interested in strengthening their multilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A rising Asia brings to the global arena a new set of increasingly influential players with their own values, histories and strategic considerations. It remains to be seen if these shifts will lead to a clash or convergence in the management of global issues. The critical issues include Asian actors' treatment of sovereignty, their preferences on institutional design, and conceptions of their role in global governance. Global health is fraught with a whole range of collective action problems, which we are failing to address effectively with existing institutional arrangements. This is in part because these institutions are embedded in an anachronistic world order in which Asia is governed rather than governing. Bridging this disconnect will require multiple adjustments. Existing actors involved in setting global health rules will need to adjust to take into account opportunities, constraints and perspectives from the Asian region that may have thus far been neglected. At the same time, Asian state and nonstate actors need to be engaged as co-shapers of the global order - not just in terms of material contributions to existing initiatives, but also in terms of leadership and ideas for reforming and strengthening current institutions. Policy Implications Sovereignty is asserted in a variety of ways across different global health issues, and policy responses should therefore be similarly diverse, tailored to the specific factors present in each context., Governance structures at the global level are not only shaped by state actors, but can be shaped in part by bottom-up policy processes. This is a reflection of the degree to which domestic environments allow for non-state actor participation, as well as how these local actors are connected to transnational networks and discourses., The implementation of global rules remains dependent on local capacity and political will. As such, more donor attention (including Asian donors) could be called to the institutional weaknesses in the Asian region., While regional organizations remain focused on maintaining stability, the FCTC experience has shown that regional distrust can be overcome in the presence of leadership and with inclusive national-level policy processes., Emerging multipolarity threatens to deepen strategic competition between powerful and rising states, thereby further fragmenting efforts to govern global health. Such competition could be mitigated by empowering a greater range of actors in Asia with interests in advancing health needs., Asian state and non-state actors have an opportunity to play a bigger role in reforming existing global health governance institutions. One way to facilitate this stronger governance role is to foster inclusive dialogue and constructive debate on the importance of global health governance in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author analyses the balance of political power in Asia in the 1970s from an Indian perspective and discusses the growing nationalism among the Asian societies. Extrapolation of expenditure in China on military forces from 1967-1968 is estimated to be 6.0 to 6.5 billion Chinese yuan. One study suggests that the size of allocation for the defence effort by China in the 1970s can be between 12 to 18 billion Chinese yuan. India widened its armed forces consequent on the Chinese attack in 1962.

The article discusses early twentieth-century Pacific history in Asia by focusing particularly on commerce and the economic relationships involving Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as Japan, China, and the Unites States. The author considers subjects including maritime shipping routes in the Pacific Ocean between the U.S., Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, the construction of the Panama Canal and its effect on Pacific trade, the rise of Japanese power in Asia during the period, and American imperialism.

Two decades of improvement in relations have given strategic significance to the relationship between China and Russia. Taken together, their power projection capabilities are worrying adjacent nations in Central Asia and the Far East, especially when compounded with US regional policies. However, there remain doubts as to the extract nature and extent of the “partnership” between the two giants. To determine whether their “partnership” should be a cause for concern, the authors assess the views each one holds of the other, the consistency of those views over time, and how they have shaped their actual policies. The authors conclude that the relationship between Russia and China is not based on an equal “partnership” where cooperation is the norm. Instead, the relationship is akin to a zero-sum game where each attempts to outmatch the other in their respective quests for power and prestige. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the chronology of the interwar decline of European influence and power, arguing that its origins outside Europe are to be found as much in the paradoxical status of international administration of colonial and post-colonial areas as in the direct challenges posed to European stability by revisionist states in the early 1930s. It demonstrates that an inherent ambivalence toward the interwar colonial world and its relationship to Europe presaged and conditioned the collapse of Europe's own balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neo-realists often appeal to a presumed unity and harmony in political realism. This imagined wholeness, with a modest allowance for diversity, conveniently ignores the ambivalent and contradictory aspects of realist discourse. Why this is so has to do with the rationalist–positivist commitment to the notion that some deep structure that is autonomous, objective, extra-historical and extra-political underlies and unifies the realist tradition. Conversely, the writings of the late Michael Leifer on order and power serve as a compelling reminder that antinomies and tensions animate that tradition in ways many realists either downplay or simply ignore. Thanks to the open-ended ‘nature’ of Leifer's oeuvre , this essay argues, we find in it a basis for reflective examination of our own prior suppositions of realism as a tradition. Contra much of what stands for realism today, Leifer's work, when subjected to a deconstructive reading, demonstrates a commitment to dialoguing with the world of Asian security even as it contributes to its objectification, as evidenced in his ambivalent reflections on regional order and the balance of power in the Southeast Asian, East Asian as well as Asia-Pacific contexts. In that respect, Leifer's work draws critical attention to some of the metaphysical conceits of rationalist–positivist international relations theory and practice, which at times seems more interested in the pursuit of a purely instrumentalist control over an objectified reality rather than hearing what the ‘real world’ has to say in return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the international security in Asia. Attempt of the Asian states' to balance a rising China; Pathway of Asia to national sovereignty and regional order; Impact of hierarchy to international security.

Discusses the international relations in Asia. Role of history in international relations; Hierarchy and balancing in international relations; Discussion on the theory of international politics.

Analyzes three models that explain for the peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. Discussion on the notion of geographic balance of power in the region; Examination on the notion of complexity of national interests in the post-Cold War era in the region; Nuclear deterrence in asymmetric power structure; Power relations between China and Russia and Japan and the U.S.; Regional security policy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Interstate rivalries in the Third World cannot be fully understood apart from the global context in which they evolve and endure. This study examines the link between the superpowers' Cold War competition and regional rivalry by focusing specifically on arms-transfer relationships. Poisson regression analysis highlights the inter-relationships between superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional rivalry in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Horn of Africa from 1950 to 1990. Many of the observed patterns are consistent with a realist explanation of interstate alignment and conflict, but a more holistic theory is required to detail the mechanisms by which Third World rivalries are nested in great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]