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This concluding chapter examines the repercussions of meeting Governor Andrew Cuomo's deadline for the Second Avenue subway. A month after the subway opened in 2017, MTA Capital Construction was tracking a mind-boggling 17,260 discrepancies between items the contractor was required to address and the actual work completed. Federal officials overseeing the MTA's efforts found that such a large number of discrepancies indicated a breakdown in the contractors' quality-assurance programs and the subcontractors' quality-control programs. In a rush to meet the New Year's deadline, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) did not have enough time to follow all of its standard procedures and testing protocols. MTA officials circumvented their own process for certifying the safety of the Second Avenue subway before passenger service began. Quality, federal officials concluded, was clearly compromised to accelerate the schedule. After the line opened, fixing problems became more expensive and time consuming because trains were running all day and all night. In early 2017, subways were delayed more than seventy thousand times a month. The chapter then assesses how the Second Avenue subway became the most expensive subway in the world. It also highlights the turning points in the subway's history, which have been marked by transportation leaders who developed comprehensive plans and then built support to pursue them.

This chapter discusses how the creation of an urban transportation system transformed New York City. After private railroad companies built tracks for elevated railroads (Els) above the city's streets in the 1870s, the city's population spread out and grew rapidly from Lower Manhattan. To continue growing, however, the city had to build electric-powered rail lines, underground, that would travel faster and further and would accommodate even more people than the Els. Thus, the City of New York paid the construction costs for its first subway and in 1900 entered into a long-term lease with the Interborough Rapid Transit Company (IRT) to build and operate it. In 1913, the City of New York entered into contracts with two companies—the IRT and the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company (BRT)—to build more lines in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. However, in the early twentieth century, New York's politicians took a shortsighted approach to the transit system. Instead of raising fares, they raised false expectations that New Yorkers could have high-quality subway service with low fares. The repercussions would last for generations. The chapter then looks at the establishment of the Office of Transit Construction Commissioner, the construction of a city-owned and city-operated “Independent” (IND) subway system, and the planning for a Second Avenue subway.

This chapter recounts how New York City Transit Authority rail service planners Peter Cafiero, Chuck Kirchner, Glenn Lunden, and Jon Melnick resurrected the Second Avenue subway in 1988. Even though the Transit Authority was in the early stages of its 1987–91 capital program, the planners' bosses wanted to start getting ready for the next program, which would run from 1992 to 1996. The first step would be to create a document that assessed the authority's long-term needs and identified projects that would rehabilitate the subway system, increase ridership, improve productivity, and expand system capacity. One proposal the planners wrote to address the Lexington Avenue's problems was an idea that the MTA planner Bob Olmsted had first championed in 1975—a Second Avenue subway north of 63rd Street. As the Second Avenue subway proposal moved up the Transit Authority hierarchy, the authority's president, David Gunn, agreed that the time was right to begin thinking about expanding the subway system. Before he could devote significant resources to advancing the Second Avenue subway, however, it would have to compete with other potential megaprojects under discussion at the MTA's agencies.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of New York's near-mythical subway under Second Avenue. Since the 1930s, the line has symbolized New York's inability to modernize its infrastructure and accommodate its residents. While the number of people living and working in New York City has grown, its rapid transit system of underground and elevated rail lines has shrunk. Moreover, while politicians have repeatedly promised a Second Avenue subway to help advance their own careers, they have failed to acknowledge the enormous challenges involved in paying for it. Nevertheless, the first three of sixteen planned Second Avenue subway stations opened to the public on New Year's Day in 2017. On a per-mile basis, the completed section of the Second Avenue subway was the most expensive subway extension ever built anywhere in the world. Given its limited resources, New York has to make tough decisions about prioritizing subway improvements. Ultimately, the Second Avenue subway story reveals how rebuilding and expanding the subway requires visionary leaders. Transportation officials must develop comprehensive plans, civic and business leaders need to generate public support, and elected officials must champion improvements and secure resources.

This chapter assesses the roles played by New York governor Nelson Rockefeller and New York City mayor John Lindsay, as well as William Ronan, in transforming the transportation system. Ronan, Rockefeller, and Lindsay all realized that improving public transportation was critical to strengthening the economy of the city and the region. They were also well aware of the benefits of a Second Avenue subway, since all three of them lived on the Upper East Side. After Lindsay failed to reorganize the transportation agencies, Rockefeller and Ronan developed their own grand vision for the region's transportation network, and in December of 1966, Ronan stepped down from his post as secretary to begin implementing their plan. At the beginning of the state's 1967 legislative session, Rockefeller and Ronan announced their two-pronged approach. First, they proposed integrating the New York City Transit Authority and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) into the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA). In addition, Rockefeller and Ronan would seek voter approval to borrow $2.5 billion that would be dedicated for roadway and public transportation improvements across the state. In 1967, the governor and Ronan obtained the support they needed to transform the transportation network, a feat that Lindsay had not been able to accomplish.

This chapter examines how parks commissioner Robert Moses had been a powerful player in Fiorello La Guardia's administration and a dominant force under William O'Dwyer. Moses simultaneously held multiple public-sector positions that gave him enormous power over public works projects in the New York metropolitan area. During the four years and eight months of the O'Dwyer administration, O'Dwyer and Moses convinced New Yorkers, the media, and even state legislators that the city would soon begin building a Second Avenue subway. However, New York City was in a precarious financial situation. Not only was New York City getting less federal aid, but it was also reaching the maximum amount of money it could borrow, a level defined in the New York State constitution. To generate support for raising fares and building the new subway, O'Dwyer's team lied, claiming the Second Avenue subway would be self-sufficient and that the fare increase would create a financially sustainable and growing subway system. In 1950 and 1951, the state legislature authorized a constitutional amendment that would allow the city to borrow an additional $500 million over and beyond its constitutional debt limit. After the amendment passed, city officials knew that the city could not afford to proceed with the Second Avenue subway. By 1953, the city's business leaders and their allies in the state capital had lost faith in the city's ability to manage the transit system.

This chapter recounts how, in late 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo decided to prioritize the Second Avenue subway, pressuring the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to complete the project by January 1, 2017. When making decisions about the Second Avenue subway, MTA officials always had to balance various factors, including budget, schedule, and quality. Cuomo changed the MTA's priorities to emphasize speed. As a result, some factors were deemphasized, such as New York City Transit's concerns about maintainability, budget officials' worries about cost overruns, and engineers' expectations that they would thoroughly test every single component. The governor's insistence on meeting the New Year's deadline would consume the MTA as it turned its attention from other projects, other escalators, and other signal systems. Ultimately, Governor Cuomo had pressed the right buttons to open up the Second Avenue subway on first day of the New Year. But New Yorkers did not realize what happens when a public agency pours too much of its attention and resources into expediting one megaproject.

This chapter details the beginning of the construction of the Second Avenue subway. In October of 1972, Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Mayor John Lindsay presided over the Second Avenue subway's groundbreaking ceremony at Second Avenue and 103rd Street. However, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) chair, William Ronan, was dishonest about both the timeline and the funding of the construction. While Ronan raised false expectations about the city's contribution, the governor misled people about the federal government's contribution. By 1973, the financial health of both the MTA and the city had become so dire that not only was the Second Avenue subway's future in jeopardy, but so was Ronan's entire expansion program. Meanwhile, New York City Comptroller Abe Beame was elected New York City's new mayor. After telling David Yunich—Ronan's successor at the MTA—that he planned to reallocate funds that had been designated for the Second Avenue subway, Beame set up a transportation policy committee consisting of his deputy mayors and senior officials. Beame's six-year transit construction program would not include any more funds for the Second Avenue subway.

This chapter details the challenges brought about by the construction of the Second Avenue subway. Despite the extensive efforts of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to minimize impacts, the businesses and residents along Second Avenue had little patience for the construction. Residents lived with loud noises outside their windows and they also complained about dust. Moreover, water, electricity, cable, and telephone services were periodically halted. Manhattan's Community Board 8, which covers the Upper East Side between 59th and 96th Streets, served as a conduit between the community and the MTA. In response to the complaints from residents, MTA Capital Construction president Michael Horodniceanu implemented what was by far the most ambitious community outreach effort the MTA had ever conducted. Horodniceanu's efforts helped Upper East Siders understand the project's enormous scale and the MTA's extensive efforts to minimize construction impacts. Likewise, construction officials became much more sensitive to the community when they heard directly from residents and business owners at workshops.

This chapter explores how the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) relied on debt to pay for 65 percent of its 2000–2004 capital program, compared to 37 percent in the previous program. When negotiating the MTA's $17.1 billion five-year capital program, Governor George Pataki and the legislative leaders agreed to place a $3.8 billion bond referendum on the November 2000 ballot. The referendum failed, but instead of eliminating funding for the Second Avenue subway, Pataki wanted the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to help pay for the new subway by selling off some of its extensive real estate holdings, most notably the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At the same time, the governor was turning over the reins of the MTA from Virgil Conway to a real estate developer named Peter Kalikow, who would be the first MTA chair to champion the Second Avenue subway since William Ronan in the early 1970s. In early 2001, the MTA said it would begin construction on the Second Avenue subway in 2004. On September 11, however, building a Second Avenue subway was not a priority to anyone, anywhere. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the September 11 attacks highlighted how the subway had prevented the city's economy from collapsing.

This chapter describes how, in the 1970s, the New York City subway system continued the downward spiral of fewer riders, budget cuts, and reduced service, which led to a loss of more riders, further budget cuts, and even worse service. Despite carrying fewer passengers, the transit system's operating costs kept increasing. David Yunich's successor at the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), Harold Fisher, failed to address the MTA's slide, although he claimed that his programs were making public transportation travel more efficient, comfortable, and safe. By 1980, New York City's subway riders had more to complain about than ever before. New York City's subway system was not just unreliable, crowded, and filthy; it was also the most dangerous in the world. Moreover, the ongoing deterioration of the subways was threatening the city's economy. The chapter then focuses on the role of house developer Richard Ravitch as MTA chair. Ravitch had no interest in restarting the Second Avenue subway, and the project was a low priority for many of the communities it would serve. Instead, under Ravitch's leadership, the MTA took care of the abandoned tunnels below Second Avenue. More importantly for the future of the neighborhoods that the Second Avenue subway had been designed to serve, Ravitch rescued the existing subway system and the city along with it.

Decade after decade, New York’s elected officials have deliberately raised false expectations about their ability to build a Second Avenue subway line. As a result, the city and state have wasted resources, eliminated critical transit infrastructure, and nearly ruined the nation’s most important transit system.

By integrating literature on transportation planning, megaprojects, and public choice theory, this article identifies the following eight factors that can cause delays in planning transportation megaprojects in the United States: impacts to neighborhoods and the environment, laws and regulations relating to the environment and planning, insufficient funding, changes in scope and design of a project, government bureaucracies and conflict between agencies, overly optimistic expectations, uncertainty involved in identifying the best alternative, and the absence of an effective public sector champion.

The literature on metropolitan governance is replete with examples of collaborative efforts that have fallen short of expectations and grim prognoses of the potential for voluntary forms of regional governance. This article analyzes something often sought, and rarely found, in American metropolitan politics: successful, effective, and sustained interjurisdictional and interagency cooperation. TRANSCOM, a non-profit transportation organization, stands out as an instance of successful collective cooperation. Operating behind the scenes in one of the world’s most politically fragmented metropolitan areas, its secret has been (a) engaging and building upon a clear and focused mission; (b) demonstrating organizational legitimacy by providing tangible benefits to members; (c) executing its mission without impinging on members’ organizational autonomy; (d) creatively tapping into available resources; (e) sustaining buy-in by developing strong relationships with members; and (f) seeking out champions and empowering decisive and strategic leadership.