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The definition of a brain state remains elusive, with varying interpretations across different sub-fields of neuroscience-from the level of wakefulness in anaesthesia, to activity of individual neurons, voltage in EEG, and blood flow in fMRI. This lack of consensus presents a significant challenge to the development of accurate models of neural dynamics. However, at the foundation of dynamical systems theory lies a definition of what constitutes the 'state' of a system-i.e., a specification of the system's future. Here, we propose to adopt this definition to establish brain states in neuroimaging timeseries by applying Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) to low-dimensional embedding of resting and task condition fMRI data. We find that ~90% of subjects in resting conditions are better described by first-order models, whereas ~55% of subjects in task conditions are better described by second-order models. Our work calls into question the status quo of using first-order equations almost exclusively within computational neuroscience and provides a new way of establishing brain states, as well as their associated phase space representations, in neuroimaging datasets.

We present a hierarchical empirical Bayesian framework for testing hypotheses about neurotransmitters’ concertation as empirical prior for synaptic physiology using ultra-high field magnetic resonance spectroscopy (7T-MRS) and magnetoencephalography data (MEG). A first level dynamic causal modelling of cortical microcircuits is used to infer the connectivity parameters of a generative model of individuals’ neurophysiological observations. At the second level, individuals’ 7T-MRS estimates of regional neurotransmitter concentration supply empirical priors on synaptic connectivity. We compare the group-wise evidence for alternative empirical priors, defined by monotonic functions of spectroscopic estimates, on subsets of synaptic connections. For efficiency and reproducibility, we used Bayesian model reduction (BMR), parametric empirical Bayes and variational Bayesian inversion. In particular, we used Bayesian model reduction to compare alternative model evidence of how spectroscopic neurotransmitter measures inform estimates of synaptic connectivity. This identifies the subset of synaptic connections that are influenced by individual differences in neurotransmitter levels, as measured by 7T-MRS. We demonstrate the method using resting-state MEG (i.e., task-free recording) and 7T-MRS data from healthy adults. Our results confirm the hypotheses that GABA concentration influences local recurrent inhibitory intrinsic connectivity in deep and superficial cortical layers, while glutamate influences the excitatory connections between superficial and deep layers and connections from superficial to inhibitory interneurons. Using within-subject split-sampling of the MEG dataset (i.e., validation by means of a held-out dataset), we show that model comparison for hypothesis testing can be highly reliable. The method is suitable for applications with magnetoencephalography or electroencephalography, and is well-suited to reveal the mechanisms of neurological and psychiatric disorders, including responses to psychopharmacological interventions.

There are considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between human brain activity measured at different temporal and spatial scales. Here, electrocorticography (ECoG) measures were used to predict functional MRI changes in the sensorimotor cortex in two brain states: at rest and during motor performance. The specificity of this relationship to spatial co-localisation of the two signals was also investigated. We acquired simultaneous ECoG-fMRI in the sensorimotor cortex of three patients with epilepsy. During motor activity, high gamma power was the only frequency band where the electrophysiological response was co-localised with fMRI measures across all subjects. The best model of fMRI changes across states was its principal components, a parsimonious description of the entire ECoG spectrogram. This model performed much better than any others that were based either on the classical frequency bands or on summary measures of cross-spectral changes. The region-specific fMRI signal is reflected in spatially and spectrally distributed EEG activity.

Therapeutic affective touch has been recognized as essential for survival, nurturing supportive interpersonal interactions, accelerating recovery—including reducing hospitalisations, and promoting overall health and building robust therapeutic alliances. Through the lens of active inference, we present an integrative model, combining therapeutic touch and communication, to achieve biobehavioural synchrony. This model speaks to how the brain develops a generative model required for recovery, developing successful therapeutic alliances, and regulating allostasis within paediatric manual therapy. We apply active inference to explain the neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite the development and maintenance of synchronous relationships through touch. This paper foregrounds the crucial role of therapeutic touch in developing a solid therapeutic alliance, the clinical effectiveness of paediatric care, and triadic synchrony between health care practitioner, caregiver, and infant in a variety of clinical situations. We start by providing a brief overview of the significance and clinical role of touch in the development of social interactions in infants; facilitating a positive therapeutic alliance and restoring homeostasis through touch to allow a more efficient process of allostatic regulation. Moreover, we explain the role of CT tactile afferents in achieving positive clinical outcomes and updating prior beliefs. We then discuss how touch is implemented in treatment sessions to promote cooperative interactions in the clinic and facilitate theory of mind. This underwrites biobehavioural synchrony, epistemic trust, empathy, and the resolution of uncertainty. The ensuing framework is underpinned by a critical application of the active inference framework to the fields of pediatrics and neonatology.

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated 'interoceptive lesions' blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction.

Estimating the changes of epidemiological parameters, such as instantaneous reproduction number, Rt, is important for understanding the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. Current estimates of time-varying epidemiological parameters often face problems such as lagging observations, averaging inference, and improper quantification of uncertainties. To address these problems, we propose a Bayesian data assimilation framework for time-varying parameter estimation. Specifically, this framework is applied to estimate the instantaneous reproduction number Rt during emerging epidemics, resulting in the state-of-the-art 'DARt' system. With DARt, time misalignment caused by lagging observations is tackled by incorporating observation delays into the joint inference of infections and Rt; the drawback of averaging is overcome by instantaneously updating upon new observations and developing a model selection mechanism that captures abrupt changes; the uncertainty is quantified and reduced by employing Bayesian smoothing. We validate the performance of DARt and demonstrate its power in describing the transmission dynamics of COVID-19. The proposed approach provides a promising solution for making accurate and timely estimation for transmission dynamics based on reported data.

The propagation of epileptic seizure activity in the brain is a widespread pathophysiology that, in principle, should yield to intervention techniques guided by mathematical models of neuronal ensemble dynamics. During a seizure, neural activity will deviate from its current dynamical regime to one in which there are significant signal fluctuations. In silico treatments of neural activity are an important tool for the understanding of how the healthy brain can maintain stability, as well as of how pathology can lead to seizures. The hope is that, contained within the mathematical foundations of such treatments, there lie potential strategies for mitigating instabilities, e.g. via external stimulation. Here, we demonstrate that the dynamic causal modelling neuronal state equation generalises to a Fokker-Planck formalism if one extends the framework to model the ways in which activity propagates along the structural connections of neural systems. Using the Jacobian of this generalised state equation, we show that an initially unstable system can be rendered stable via a reduction in diffusivity-i.e., by lowering the rate at which neuronal fluctuations disperse to neighbouring regions. We show, for neural systems prone to epileptic seizures, that such a reduction in diffusivity can be achieved via external stimulation. Specifically, we show that this stimulation should be applied in such a way as to temporarily mirror the activity profile of a pathological region in its functionally connected areas. This counter-intuitive method is intended to be used pre-emptively-i.e., in order to mitigate the effects of the seizure, or ideally even prevent it from occurring in the first place. We offer proof of principle using simulations based on functional neuroimaging data collected from patients with idiopathic generalised epilepsy, in which we successfully suppress pathological activity in a distinct sub-network prior to seizure onset. Our hope is that this technique can form the basis for future real-time monitoring and intervention devices that are capable of treating epilepsy in a non-invasive manner.

In contrast to the symmetries of translation in space, rotation in space, and translation in time, the known laws of physics are not universally invariant under transformation of scale. However, a special case exists in which the action is scale invariant if it satisfies the following two constraints: 1) it must depend upon a scale-free Lagrangian, and 2) the Lagrangian must change under scale in the same way as the inverse time, [Formula: see text]. Our contribution lies in the derivation of a generalised Lagrangian, in the form of a power series expansion, that satisfies these constraints. This generalised Lagrangian furnishes a normal form for dynamic causal models-state space models based upon differential equations-that can be used to distinguish scale symmetry from scale freeness in empirical data. We establish face validity with an analysis of simulated data, in which we show how scale symmetry can be identified and how the associated conserved quantities can be estimated in neuronal time series.

Being confident in whether a stimulus is present or absent (a detection judgment) is qualitatively distinct from being confident in the identity of that stimulus (a discrimination judgment). In particular, in detection, evidence can only be available for the presence, not the absence, of a target object. This asymmetry suggests that higher-order cognitive and neural processes may be required for confidence in detection, and more specifically, in judgments about absence. In a within-subject, pre-registered and performance-matched fMRI design, we observed quadratic confidence effects in frontopolar cortex for detection but not discrimination. Furthermore, in the right temporoparietal junction, confidence effects were enhanced for judgments of target absence compared to judgments of target presence. We interpret these findings as reflecting qualitative differences between a neural basis for metacognitive evaluation of detection and discrimination, potentially in line with counterfactual or higher-order models of confidence formation in detection.

Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.].

Living creatures must accurately infer the nature of their environments. They do this despite being confronted by stochastic and context sensitive contingencies-and so must constantly update their beliefs regarding their uncertainty about what might come next. In this work, we examine how we deal with uncertainty that evolves over time. This prospective uncertainty (or imprecision) is referred to as volatility and has previously been linked to noradrenergic signals that originate in the locus coeruleus. Using pupillary dilatation as a measure of central noradrenergic signalling, we tested the hypothesis that changes in pupil diameter reflect inferences humans make about environmental volatility. To do so, we collected pupillometry data from participants presented with a stream of numbers. We generated these numbers from a process with varying degrees of volatility. By measuring pupillary dilatation in response to these stimuli-and simulating the inferences made by an ideal Bayesian observer of the same stimuli-we demonstrate that humans update their beliefs about environmental contingencies in a Bayes optimal way. We show this by comparing general linear (convolution) models that formalised competing hypotheses about the causes of pupillary changes. We found greater evidence for models that included Bayes optimal estimates of volatility than those without. We additionally explore the interaction between different causes of pupil dilation and suggest a quantitative approach to characterising a person's prior beliefs about volatility.

Successful behaviour depends on the right balance between maximising reward and soliciting information about the world. Here, we show how different types of information-gain emerge when casting behaviour as surprise minimisation. We present two distinct mechanisms for goal-directed exploration that express separable profiles of active sampling to reduce uncertainty. ‘Hidden state’ exploration motivates agents to sample unambiguous observations to accurately infer the (hidden) state of the world. Conversely, ‘model parameter’ exploration, compels agents to sample outcomes associated with high uncertainty, if they are informative for their representation of the task structure. We illustrate the emergence of these types of information-gain, termed active inference and active learning, and show how these forms of exploration induce distinct patterns of ‘Bayes-optimal’ behaviour. Our findings provide a computational framework for understanding how distinct levels of uncertainty systematically affect the exploration-exploitation trade-off in decision-making.

Knowing how another's preferences relate to our own is a central aspect of everyday decision-making, yet how the brain performs this transformation is unclear. Here, we ask whether the putative role of the hippocampal-entorhinal system in transforming relative and absolute spatial coordinates during navigation extends to transformations in abstract decision spaces. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects learned a stranger's preference for an everyday activity-relative to one of three personally known individuals-and subsequently decided how the stranger's preference relates to the other two individuals' preferences. We observed entorhinal/subicular responses to the absolute distance between the ratings of the stranger and the familiar choice options. Notably, entorhinal/subicular signals were sensitive to which familiar individuals were being compared to the stranger. In contrast, striatal signals increased when accurately determining the ordinal position of choice options in relation to the stranger. Paralleling its role in navigation, these data implicate the entorhinal/subicular region in assimilating relatively coded knowledge within abstract metric spaces.

The locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI). We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm 'explore/exploit' task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level 'state-action' prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error-reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release-to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC that translates state-action prediction errors into an optimal balance between plasticity and stability.

Pathophysiological explanations of epilepsy typically focus on either the micro/mesoscale (e.g. excitation-inhibition imbalance), or on the macroscale (e.g. network architecture). Linking abnormalities across spatial scales remains difficult, partly because of technical limitations in measuring neuronal signatures concurrently at the scales involved. Here we use light sheet imaging of the larval zebrafish brain during acute epileptic seizure induced with pentylenetetrazole. Spectral changes of spontaneous neuronal activity during the seizure are then modelled using neural mass models, allowing Bayesian inference on changes in effective network connectivity and their underlying synaptic dynamics. This dynamic causal modelling of seizures in the zebrafish brain reveals concurrent changes in synaptic coupling at macro- and mesoscale. Fluctuations of both synaptic connection strength and their temporal dynamics are required to explain observed seizure patterns. These findings highlight distinct changes in local (intrinsic) and long-range (extrinsic) synaptic transmission dynamics as a possible seizure pathomechanism and illustrate how our Bayesian model inversion approach can be used to link existing neural mass models of seizure activity and novel experimental methods.

In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for 'epistemic foraging'; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did-and did not-contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did-and did not-allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.

The brain is thought to generate internal predictions to optimize behaviour. However, it is unclear whether predictions signalling is an automatic brain function or depends on task demands. Here, we manipulated the spatial/temporal predictability of visual targets, and the relevance of spatial/temporal information provided by auditory cues. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure participants' brain activity during task performance. Task relevance modulated the influence of predictions on behaviour: spatial/temporal predictability improved spatial/temporal discrimination accuracy, but not vice versa. To explain these effects, we used behavioural responses to estimate subjective predictions under an ideal-observer model. Model-based time-series of predictions and prediction errors (PEs) were associated with dissociable neural responses: predictions correlated with cue-induced beta-band activity in auditory regions and alpha-band activity in visual regions, while stimulus-bound PEs correlated with gamma-band activity in posterior regions. Crucially, task relevance modulated these spectral correlates, suggesting that current goals influence PE and prediction signalling.

Empirical evidence suggests the incentive value of an option is affected by other options available during choice and by options presented in the past. These contextual effects are hard to reconcile with classical theories and have inspired accounts where contextual influences play a crucial role. However, each account only addresses one or the other of the empirical findings and a unifying perspective has been elusive. Here, we offer a unifying theory of context effects on incentive value attribution and choice based on normative Bayesian principles. This formulation assumes that incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, where predictions are based upon expectations about reward. We show that this scheme explains a wide range of contextual effects, such as those elicited by other options available during choice (or within-choice context effects). These include both conditions in which choice requires an integration of multiple attributes and conditions where a multi-attribute integration is not necessary. Moreover, the same scheme explains context effects elicited by options presented in the past or between-choice context effects. Our formulation encompasses a wide range of contextual influences (comprising both within- and between-choice effects) by calling on Bayesian principles, without invoking ad-hoc assumptions. This helps clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and choice behaviour and may offer insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional decision-making, such as addiction and pathological gambling.

Normative models of human cognition often appeal to Bayesian filtering, which provides optimal online estimates of unknown or hidden states of the world, based on previous observations. However, in many cases it is necessary to optimise beliefs about sequences of states rather than just the current state. Importantly, Bayesian filtering and sequential inference strategies make different predictions about beliefs and subsequent choices, rendering them behaviourally dissociable. Taking data from a probabilistic reversal task we show that subjects' choices provide strong evidence that they are representing short sequences of states. Between-subject measures of this implicit sequential inference strategy had a neurobiological underpinning and correlated with grey matter density in prefrontal and parietal cortex, as well as the hippocampus. Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence for sequential inference in human cognition, and by exploiting between-subject variation in this measure we provide pointers to its neuronal substrates.

We are remarkably adept at inferring the consequences of our actions, yet the neuronal mechanisms that allow us to plan a sequence of novel choices remain unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how the human brain plans the shortest path to a goal in novel mazes with one (shallow maze) or two (deep maze) choice points. We observed two distinct anterior prefrontal responses to demanding choices at the second choice point: one in rostrodorsal medial prefrontal cortex (rd-mPFC)/superior frontal gyrus (SFG) that was also sensitive to (deactivated by) demanding initial choices and another in lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), which was only engaged by demanding choices at the second choice point. Furthermore, we identified hippocampal responses during planning that correlated with subsequent choice accuracy and response time, particularly in mazes affording sequential choices. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses showed that coupling between the hippocampus and rd-mPFC increases during sequential (deep versus shallow) planning and is higher before correct versus incorrect choices. In short, using a naturalistic spatial planning paradigm, we reveal how the human brain represents sequential choices during planning without extensive training. Our data highlight a network centred on the cortical midline and hippocampus that allows us to make prospective choices while maintaining initial choices during planning in novel environments.

Substantial evidence indicates that incentive value depends on an anticipation of rewards within a given context. However, the computations underlying this context sensitivity remain unknown. To address this question, we introduce a normative (Bayesian) account of how rewards map to incentive values. This assumes that the brain inverts a model of how rewards are generated. Key features of our account include (i) an influence of prior beliefs about the context in which rewards are delivered (weighted by their reliability in a Bayes-optimal fashion), (ii) the notion that incentive values correspond to precision-weighted prediction errors, (iii) and contextual information unfolding at different hierarchical levels. This formulation implies that incentive value is intrinsically context-dependent. We provide empirical support for this model by showing that incentive value is influenced by context variability and by hierarchically nested contexts. The perspective we introduce generates new empirical predictions that might help explaining psychopathologies, such as addiction.

Given the amount of knowledge and data accruing in the neurosciences, is it time to formulate a general principle for neuronal dynamics that holds at evolutionary, developmental, and perceptual timescales? In this paper, we propose that the brain (and other self-organised biological systems) can be characterised via the mathematical apparatus of a gauge theory. The picture that emerges from this approach suggests that any biological system (from a neuron to an organism) can be cast as resolving uncertainty about its external milieu, either by changing its internal states or its relationship to the environment. Using formal arguments, we show that a gauge theory for neuronal dynamics--based on approximate Bayesian inference--has the potential to shed new light on phenomena that have thus far eluded a formal description, such as attention and the link between action and perception.