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The article discusses the potential implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the international security environment and highlights assessments by the U.S. intelligence community. It identifies various areas where the pandemic could bring about changes, including shifts in global governance, impacts on U.S. global leadership, alterations in great power competition, changes in democratic and authoritarian governance, economic effects, and shifts in military operations.

Congress has long been concerned about challenges to U.S. security posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, like Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Policy issues have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. Since 1991, Beijing has taken steps to mollify concerns about its role in proliferation. Steps include the: 1991-1992 promise to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); March 1992 accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); January 1993 signing and subsequent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); October 1994 statements on the MTCR and fissile material production; November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament; May 1996 reiteration on making only safeguarded nuclear transfers; July 1996 announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing; signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996; October 1997 entry to the Zangger Committee; and November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge. Nonetheless, as the Director of Central Intelligence reports, the PRC remains a “key supplier” of technology inconsistent with nonproliferation goals — particularly missile or chemical technology transfers. China has aggravated trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Some transfers raise questions about violations of the NPT and/or contradictions of the MTCR or U.S. laws, which may require sanctions. China is not in the MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group, nor Australia Group. Successive Administrations have pursued a policy of “engagement” with Beijing, while some have argued that the policy needs a tougher approach to advance non-proliferation interests. In 1998, President Clinton issued certifications to implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The Clinton Administration encouraged the PRC to join the MTCR and proposed to allow more PRC satellite launches. In November 2000, the State Department agreed to waive sanctions and consider new satellite exports in return for a missile non-proliferation pledge from China. Congress passed the Iran Non-proliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). Under this law, on June 14, 2001, January 16, and May 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions for PRC weapons proliferation in Iran. On September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions (denying satellite exports), after China apparently violated its November 2000 pledge and transfers continued to Pakistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks added an urgent U.S. interest in weapons nonproliferation. The PRC President is expected to visit in October. See also CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis; and CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export Policy – Actions and Chronology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service on potential implications of COVID-19 for the international security environment. It discusses various areas of potential change, including shifts in world order, global governance, U.S. leadership, relations with China and Russia, government forms, economic dynamics, and more, with a focus on how these changes could impact U.S. foreign and defense policy.

The article defines American strategic goals in Iraq and Syria, determines the minimum necessary conditions for terminating the conflicts there, and compares U.S. goals with those of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in order to comprehend actual convergences and divergences. It adds that the differences mean that the U.S. cannot depend on international partners to attain its goals.

The article discusses the contribution of nuclear restraint at low numbers to international security. It mentions that the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament established by Japan and Australia submitted its report in December 2009, which supported continued delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. It informs that disarmament policy adopted by Barack Obama, President of the U.S. faced resistance from the U.S. and members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The article focuses on nuclear restraint at low numbers in seven nuclear-armed states. It mentions that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides a platform for discussions between its nuclear and non-nuclear members regarding the nuclear arm reduction. It mentions that among non-armed states Israel have arsenals comparable in size to India and Pakistan ranging around 100 warheads. It states that nuclear arms are threat to international security.

The article focuses on the core challenges and issues regarding the newly renewed Global Partnership (GP) multilateral threat reduction programme. It says that the challenges include changing the role of the GP Working Group and moving the GP beyond the Group of 8 (G8) to be engage with other key countries such as India and China. It highlights the importance of the completion of ongoing GP projects in Russia and expansion of former Soviet Union (FSU) beyond 2012.

The article discusses the security related matters concerning the Arctic region. The transformation of the sea-ice boundary of the Arctic Ocean will have both positive and negative outcomes. The ex-president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, suggested six principles to address the political, economical and cultural instabilities in Arctic Ocena including nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, restricting naval activities and cooperation in development of the resources of the Arctic region.

The article reports on the ability of a nation to respond to a changing geo-political landscape. It states that responding to climate change will call for fundamental changes in the practice of international relations and will change much of the focus of international security policy. The article also mentions the basic taxonomy of strategic responses which countries can adopt: buffering, isolation, reaction, prevention.

Twenty years ago Russia and fourteen other newly-independent states emerged from the ruins of the Soviet empire, many as nations for the first time in history. As is typical in the aftermath of the collapse of an empire, this was followed by a period of chaos, confusion, and corruption. As the saying went at the time, “everything is for sale.” At that same moment, as the Soviet state imploded, 35,000 nuclear weapons remained at thousands of sites across a vast Eurasian landmass that stretched across eleven time zones. Today, fourteen of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union are nuclear weapons-free. When the U.S.S.R. disappeared, 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, most of them atop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that stood on alert, ready to be fired at targets in the U.S. Today, every one of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus has been deactivated and returned to Russia, where they were dismantled and the nuclear material in the warheads blended down to produce fuel for civilian reactors. Strategic nuclear weapons are nuclear warheads aimed at an adversary’s nuclear weapons, cities and military infrastructure. Typically, they are large in yield and heavy. Of greater interest to terrorists, however, were the former U.S.S.R’s 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons with smaller yields and shorter ranges. These were designed primarily for battlefield use, with some small enough to fit into a duffel bag. Today, all of these have also been returned to Russia, leaving zero nuclear weapons in any other state of the former Soviet Union. Former Czech president Vaclav Havel observed about the rush of events in the 1990s: “things have changed so fast we have not yet taken time to be astonished.” Perhaps the most astonishing fact about the past twenty years is something that did not happen. Despite the risk realistically estimated by former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 3 What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit December 1991, two decades have passed without the discovery of a single nuclear weapon outside Russia. This paper will address the question: how did this happen? Looking ahead, it will consider what clues we can extract from the success in denuclearizing fourteen post-Soviet states that can inform our non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts in the future. These clues may inform leaders of the U.S., Russia, and other responsible nations attending the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26-27, 2012. The paper will conclude with specific recommendations, some exceedingly ambitious that world leaders could follow to build on the Seoul summit’s achievements against nuclear terrorism in the period before the next summit in 2014. One of these would be to establish a Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.

The article reports on the geo-strategic influence of China in the Asia Pacific region, focusing on its military strategy in the Solomon Islands. It raises international concerns over the bilateral security agreement between China and Solomon Islands including the possible establishment of a Chinese naval base and operation of Chinese military and police. It identifies geopolitical considerations in the decision of the government of Solomon Islands to switch allegiance from Taiwan to China.

The article examines that existential threats being posed by al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)to the U.S. and Europe. It says that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute made an intensive multi-week exercise to determine the potential courses of action that the U.S. could pursue to defeat the threat from the ISIS and al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria.

The article presents the text of the opening remarks given by Ting Joseph Shih, deputy foreign minister of Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Timothy C. T. Yang, secretary-general of the Office of the President, at the 2013 Taiwan-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue held in Taipei, Taiwan in October. Topics of the speeches included the strategic security relations of Taiwan with the U.S. and Japan, the role of Yang in the creation of the dialogue and the economic strategy of Taiwan.

The article offers insights from Taiwanese and Japanese legislators on the current U.S.-Taiwan-Japan security situation in 2013. According to Bi-Khim Hsiao of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, the cost of defense and maritime disputes are some of the challenges facing Taiwan in relation to its relationship with the U.S. and Japan. The opportunities and security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region are discussed by Democratic Party of Japan's Akihisa Nagashima.

The article discusses election updates across the world. It mentions the presidential elections be held in Somalia on February 8, 2017 which will focus on issues such as corruption, security, and travel ban. It also discusses the presidential election to be held in Turkmenistan on Feb. 12, 2017, in which Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is supposed to win.

The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has affiliates in several other countries, has attracted a network of global supporters, and disrupts international security with its campaigns of violence and terrorism. The U.S.-led coalition military campaign against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria has adapted since 2014, as Administration officials and coalition partners have implemented changes in strategy and tactics that have reduced the area controlled by the group and eliminated thousands of its personnel. While the Islamic State has suffered losses on the ground in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, a series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group or to individuals it has inspired have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, including in the United States. A number of countries, including the United States, share an interest in further weakening the group and preventing future attacks. Members of Congress, executive branch officials, and their international counterparts continue to debate a range of proposals for extending battlefield gains made to date and preventing the Islamic State from succeeding in its stated objectives of "remaining and expanding." President Obama's goals for U.S. strategy were to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State through U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. The U.S. military has conducted operations against the group in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Parallel U.S. diplomatic efforts have promoted political reconciliation in each country among local factions. In other countries, such as Egypt and Nigeria, the United States provides security assistance to partner governments in support of operations against Islamic State affiliates. Evolving counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing efforts among a wider network of concerned governments seek to further limit the ability of IS supporters to carry out transnational terrorist attacks. President-elect Donald Trump has signaled that his Administration may reexamine and redefine U.S. goals and strategies, with a goal of defeating the Islamic State quickly and decisively. The interdependent nature of conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where the Islamic State operates complicates efforts to address and durably eliminate the threats posed by the group. Military operations may eliminate IS fighters and liberate IS-held territory, but underlying political disputes and development challenges that have been exploited by the Islamic State and other extremist groups may remain unaddressed or become amplified if postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction needs go unmet. Governments may continue to share fears about IS-related transnational terrorist threats, but leaders also may continue to face difficult decisions about the potential risks and rewards of military, law enforcement, surveillance, intelligence sharing, financial, border security, refugee admission, and consular countermeasures. This report provides background on the Islamic State organization, discusses its goals, operations, and affiliates, reviews U.S. legislative and policy debates, and describes select FY2017 legislation from the 114th Congress (H.R. 5325, H.R. 2028, S. 2943, H.R. 5293, and S. 3000). For more information, see CRS Report R44513, Kurds in Iraq and Syria: U.S. Partners Against the Islamic State, coordinated by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report R43980, Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, and Liana W. Rosen; CRS Report R44135, Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State, by Kathleen J. McInnis; CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals, by Matthew C. Weed; CRS Report R44003, European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States, coordinated by Kristin Archick; and CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, coordinated by Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the foreign relations of Argentina as of 2012 including the country's international economic relations and policy, regional economic assumptions, and international security.

The article focuses on the global partnership topics discussed at the G8 Summit, which was held in Kananaskis, Alberta on June 27, 2002. It states that during the summit, the Group of Eight (G8) launch the 68 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. It mentions that the initial geographic emphasis of Global Partnership is on projects in Russia. Moreover, it says that Global Partnership was formed to improve international security and safety.

The article focuses on the evolution of the Group 8 (G8) as a nonproliferation actor from 1977 through September 9, 2001 terrorist attacks. It discusses the U.S. and European activities related to threat reduction during the period between 1990 and 2001. It mentions the 2002 Kananaskis agreement which enables both G8 and non-G8 countries to secure funding for their Global Partnership (GP) contributions to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) proliferation.

The article presents the background of the international security environments. Topics discussed include previous environments as represented in the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War Era, the current international security environment which reflects a shift from U.S. as the unipolar power to power competition with Russia and China, and emerging implications for defense such as defense funding levels, emphasis on grand strategy and geopolitics, and military capabilities in Europe and the U.S.

The article discusses the shift in international security environment to a feature which includes power competition with Russia and China and other entities that challenge U.S.-led international order. The Cold War Era and the Post-Cold War Era of the previous international security environment are also discussed. Topics include the emerging features of the new international security environment, and the participation of U.S. Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) in defense reassessment.

The article focuses on the aspects of the U.S. military forces and its operations during and after the Cold War. Topics include the submission of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a legislative mandated review of the budget related to the military by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in February 2010, the development of the national strategy implementation plan for the Arctic region, and the cooperation of DOD with Canada and other countries in promoting Arctic activity awareness.

The article explores a shift in the international security environment that could have implications for U.S. defense programs and plans. The annexation of Crimea by Russia have resulted to a renewed focus by policymakers on U.S. and National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military capabilities in Europe. A shift in the international security environment might also generate implications for areas such as Department of Defense (DOD) reliance on Russian-made components and nuclear weapons.

The article provides an overview of the shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era. Observers who conclude on the shift of the international security environment view the period as a multipolar condition characterized by renewed competition among Russia, China and the U.S. Other emerging characteristics of new international security include 21st century forms of authoritarianism and new form of aggressive military operations by China and Russia.

The article describes developments in U.S. economic and military support for Jordan. Topics covered include the 3-year memorandum of understanding approved by the U.S. and Jordanian governments to render 1 billion dollars worth of aid to Jordan for economic development and regional security, economic support for Jordan through cash transfer and U.S. Agency for International Development programs, and loan guarantees to Jordan worth a total of 3.75 billion dollars since 2013.

The article discusses developments in the international security environment worldwide since late 2013 as of mid-2015, as well as their major effects on the U.S. defense plans and programs under the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and issues for the U.S. Congress. Among the policy and oversight issues for Congress are the shift in strategic situations, congressional role in reassessment, and the potential effect on plans and programs.

The article focuses on the security threats and concerns of Israel involving the neighboring Arab states as of June 1, 2015. Topics covered include the security measures undertaken by Israel, impact of the U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations on the country, and threat of the nuclear activities in Iran. Also mentioned are the conflicts with Iraq, Syria, Libya and Lebanon, and importance of the U.S.-Israel defense relations.

The article discusses the arms control agreements and arrangements affecting non-nuclear weapons which have been concluded by the international community. Topics covered include the key limits and restrictions imposed by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the provisions of the Treaty of Open Skies signed by the U.S., Canada and other European nations and the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Sunni Islamic extremist militants, under the aegis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS), have seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory. In Iraq, ISIL held sway - from Falluj ah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tifcrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Across the border in Syria, ISIL was proving to be the most successful anti-government force in that country. It was consolidating territory held either by the Assad regime or by rival rebel entities, even ousting other Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups in the process. These gains collectively constituted a spectacular victory for ISIL, which seeks to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in territory that includes Iraq and Syria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information in relation to global security. It highlights details regarding the U.S.-led global coalition fight against the Islamic State organization, the Jihadist terror group. Other critical information such as the ongoing uprising that began in the Arab Spring of 2011 is provided.

This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, provides an overview with analysis of the major issues in U.S. policy on Taiwan. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The State Department claims an "unofficial" U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements of policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the "Six Assurances" of 1982. (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.) For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12th-largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention). While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is an important autonomous actor. Today, 22 countries have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan's 23 million people enjoy self-governance with democratic elections. Democracy has offered Taiwan's people a greater say in their status, given competing politics about Taiwan's national identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections in January 2012. Belonging to the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) candidate. The KMT also has a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY). Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed the need to take steps by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen cooperation to advance U.S. interests. Another approach has viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales to and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan cooperation. President Ma has sought U.S. support, including for Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S. strategic "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific, international organizations, talks on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Other policy issues are whether and when to approve arms sales, and how to bolster economic cooperation and resolve disputes, such as through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks (last held in April 2014). The United States has been concerned about Taiwan's restrictions on U.S. beef and pork, even as Taiwan has claimed attention to international organizations and standards. Since March 2013, Chairmen Ed Royce and Robert Menendez of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, and other Members, have supported a bilateral investment agreement (BIA). On September 23, 2014, 29 Members in the House sent a letter to the Secretary of State, calling for expanding engagement with Taiwan. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.J.Res. 109, H.R. 419, H.R. 772, H.R. 1151 (P.L. 113-17), H.R. 1960, H.R. 3470, H.R. 4435, H.R. 4495, H.Con.Res. 29, H.Con.Res. 46, H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 185, H.Res. 494, H.Res. 704, H.Res. 714, S. 12, S. 579, S. 1197, S. 1683, S. 2410, S.J.Res. 31, S.Res. 167, and S.Res. 412. (See also CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the text of a speech by Tsuneo Watanabe of Japan at the 2013 Taiwan-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue held in Taipei, Taiwan on October 13, 2013. Topics of the speech included the role of Japan and the U.S. in ensuring regional security in Asia, tensions between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and Japan's plan to engage in capacity-building with Southeast Asian countries.

The article reports on U.S. security policy in relation to Central America as of May 2014. Topics discussed include history of U.S. security aid to Central American nations from the 1990s to the 2010s, focus of U.S. security policy in Central America on strengthening the latter's governments and potential risks faced by the U.S. as a result of rising crime rates in Central America. Also discussed are the features, goals and impetus behind the U.S.-Central America security cooperation efforts.

The article reports on issues for the U.S. Congress with regards to the country's Central American security policy. Topics discussed include factors considered by the U.S. Congress when allocating funds for security assistance to Central America, amount appropriated by the U.S. Congress to Central American security efforts during the 2008-2012 period and criticisms against U.S. security policies. Also discussed are human rights concerns in Central America and their implication for U.S. aid.

The article presents the May 2014 U.S. Congressional Research Service study "Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress" by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke. Topics discussed include scope of the security problems in Central America, factors that contribute to the emergence of such problems in the region and policy approaches adopted by the region to address the problems. Also discussed are U.S. policies concerning Central American security.

The article focuses on the foreign policy in Iran, Israel, West Bank-Gaza Strip, and the U.S. Topics include the Iranian nuclear deal represented a sea change between the relationship of Iran and the U.S., the greater security to be provided by the U.S. to Israel, and the Jewish settlements in West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The article discusses the treaties and agreements entered into by the U.S. concerning arms control and nonproliferation as of July 2013. It claims that such treaties and agreements are used by the country to implement its national security strategy. It focuses on the arms control deals between the U.S. and the states of the former Soviet Union, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The article explores U.S. policy issues related to Taiwan. In the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Taiwan was among those who contributed in delivering relief supplies. The U.S. is eyeing to work with Taiwan on international security, as demonstrated by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Taiwanese Ministry of Finance and Directorate of Customs' installation of a radiation detection equipment at the port of Kaohsiung. Taiwan faces increased tensions with its neighbors, Japan and the Philippines.

The article explores the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan. While Taiwan is not diplomatically recognized by the U.S. government, it has been a significant security, economic and political interest to the U.S. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama enacted various strategies to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan, which includes Cabinet-level visits in 2013. The U.S. and Taiwan are looking to work together in terms of international security.

The article presents the arguments for and against the enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Proponents of the treaty argue that the U.S. stockpile stewardship program can maintain existing, tested nuclear weapons without additional testing. They also hold that advances in monitoring will make it difficult for evading parties to conduct testing. Those against the CTBT believe that clandestine tests can jeopardize international security.

The article explains U.S. Congressional interest in Iran, particularly its acquisition of ballistic missiles and its pursuit of a space launch capability. It notes Iran's military efforts as part of a policy direction to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the Arab region and assesses the significant threat posed by Iran on U.S. and global security and on the U.S. military. It also notes U.S. Congressional appropriations and international initiatives that seek to address the Iranian threat.

The article discusses the political developments in Bahrain. It examines the handling by the Bahraini government of the uprising that started on February 14, 2011, including its rejection of the U.S.' advice, the declaration of a state of emergency, and requesting direct security assistance from other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. It cites the criticism made by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama on the human rights abuses by the Al Khalifa regime.

The article offers a summary of common patterns of crime-terrorism interaction, and cites examples from court cases and reports. It discusses motivations for collaboration like strengthening their capabilities, infrastructure and wealth, as well as disincentives like the potential for distrust and competition which can be exploited by international security authorities. It talks about tactics common to both groups like the use of violence for political effect and crime-for-profit activities.

The article discusses the issue of Iran emerging as a top security issue for the U.S. generated by the growing suspicion in the international community regarding its nuclear program. It traces Iran's political history, structure, institutions and political oppositions and examines the country's human rights records. The article also discusses Iran's strategic capabilities, its support for international terrorism and U.S. foreign policy approaches to Iran's threat.

The article discusses U.S. security policy in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Central America. The primary focus of U.S. security efforts has been preventing narcotics from reaching the U.S. in the aftermath of the Cold War. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama has developed collaborative partnerships with countries throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The article discusses the scope of Central America's problem on security. It states that the drug-trafficking-related violence in Mexico has attracted U.S. policymakers' attention but the security situation in many Central American countries have not received financial support from the U.S. Poverty, inequality and unemployment have reportedly destroyed the social fabric in many Central American countries.

The article presents a Congressional Research Service report for the U.S. Congress on Central America regional security initiative. It discusses the criminal threats, political and judicial systems, and social hardships in the region. Potential policy issues for congressional consideration are examined including funding levels, human rights concerns, and how the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) relates to other U.S. government agencies.

The article analyzes the key aspects of Beyond Mérida, the new U.S.-Mexican bilateral security strategy. The criticisms against the original Mérida Initiative strategy are mentioned. Some of the events that have strained U.S.-Mexican relations are also presented. A discussion on the effort of the government of Mexican President Felipe Calderón on dismantling the power of drug trafficking organizations is given as well.

The article discusses a framework for examining the current status and future prospects for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. The scope of the threat that drug trafficking and related crime and violence pose to Mexico and the U.S. is discussed. Also analyzed are the key aspects of the U.S.-Mexican security strategy. Some policy issues that may affect U.S.-Mexican security cooperation are explored as well.