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This study systematically examines, deconstructs, and maps the quotidian nationalist discourse among Chinese netizens and analyzes their 'liking' behavior on the social media platform, Zhihu, in order to investigate what and how they talk about nationalism. The analysis of the quotidian expression of nationalism marks a shift from the previous practice of relying on high-profile nationalist movements as evidence which may create an incomplete or inaccurate impression that much of Chinese nationalism is virulent and over-zealous. This study finds that Zhihu users are critical nationalists who are competitive but judicious. The existence of levelheaded nationalists in China's online space suggests the limits of strident nationalist contagion and nationalist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots 'patriotic' content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as 'high-level black' (gaoji hei) or 'low-level red' (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state's patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism increasingly dominates public debate in mainland China. This article examines the impact of this trend on Chinese policymaking by looking at the public consultation procedure for new regulations on foreigners' permanent residency in February 2020. Following an unexpectedly large online outcry of anti-immigrant sentiment in response to the draft regulations, government actors shelved the proposal, which constituted a long-delayed step towards a more comprehensive immigration framework. Drawing on textual analysis, expert interviews, and survey data, the article analyzes elite-public interactions before, during, and after the controversy, asking what factors contributed to this miscalculation of public sentiment, and what the P.R. debate can tell us about the role of public opinion in Chinese policymaking today. It argues that popular nationalists can play a bottom-up politicizing role on previously marginal policy issues such as immigration, surprising and constraining the state. Such politicisation further limits both public and elite policy debate, impairing state information gathering and exacerbating the tension between Chinese policy actors' desire to both control and understand public sentiment. In addition, the permanent residency debate demonstrates the relevance of public opinion to China's non-democratic immigration policymaking, which displays a trajectory of gradual politicisation similar to other early-stage immigrant-reception contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a rise in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the Philippines, Filipino perceptions of China have mainly remained negative during the Duterte period. This article examines why and how China's public diplomacy efforts have primarily failed despite President Duterte's pro-China position. It draws on constructivist approaches to demonstrate how national identity mediates the impact of Chinese influence. In particular, Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea, and an influx of China-based offshore gaming businesses in the country, have elicited a strong nationalist response from Filipinos, perpetuating perceptions of China as untrustworthy and threatening. Evidence is drawn to determine correlation between an increase in Chinese public diplomacy and a decrease in public trust towards China. This is followed by process-tracing how national identity dampens any positive effect Chinese public diplomacy may have on Philippine attitudes towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in relative power between the rising and dominant state have been consistently recognized as a key contributor to international conflicts, as they can lead to convergence within both societies in threat perceptions of each other. In the case of China, a dominant view assumes that China's increased power leads to wide social support for nationalism, which unifies the Chinese threat perceptions of key rivals such as the US and Japan. Based on a large-scaled survey among China's elite youth, this study examines the relationship between their perception of China's power asymmetry and threat with respect to the US and Japan. The findings show that the dominant view has clearly overlooked the divergent voices within the youth, and they also challenge the common assumption that China's growing power has fostered a generation of youth with unanimous support for more assertive Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the contemporary practice of nationalistic rhetoric in Chinese society through the singing competition franchiseThe Voice of China. By employing the concept of ideograph, the authors explore how the show successfully incorporates the Chinese Communist Party's nationalistic goal of promoting a unified and strong China to both the domestic audiences and the global Chinese community by relying on the persuasive and affective power of slogan. Specifically, the authors analyze and — two political and cultural slogans articulated in a variety of sonic representations and in contestants' performative statements. The authors argue that while popular culture products in contemporary China continue to be sites of political propaganda, they are able to apply new media-influenced rhetorical strategies to reflect popular sentiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing's long-running fight against 'localism' (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China's subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to the center regardless of their individual backgrounds? To address these questions, this article distinguishes between different types of localism in contemporary China and the varying personnel 'risk factors' underlying them. Comparing the makeup of provincial party standing committees under Xi Jinping's 18th CPC Central Committee (2012–2017) with those from the 15–17th CPC Central Committees under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1997–2012), the analysis finds that Xi has accelerated personnel changes to address multiple forms of localism. At the same time, gaps in governance outcomes between local cadres and outsiders have faded since 2012 in several domains, implying that Xi-era institutional reforms have also played a role in curbing localism. Even under Xi, however, important personnel risk factors for localism have persisted and in some domains local-outsider differences in governance outcomes have actually increased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines popular nationalism and regime support in the Xi era by evaluating news comments from a major overseas Chinese website on the 2018 constitutional amendments removing presidential term limits. It finds that the event was not only contested among overseas and domestic Chinese, but also has alienated many nationalists who previously supported the regime. Even the subsequent pro-regime discourse is less focused on support for Xi or the regime, and more about distrust of the West and dissidents. However, some citizens have become less critical toward the regime out of the concern of external threats. The findings confirm the Xi Jinping effect on nationalist regime support, and show how China's international and domestic environments may activate nationalist sentiment differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the cultural representations of Chinese military-action films which re-interpret China's non-intervention policy and give China's foreign engagements rationality and legitimation. It involves two narrative strategies: (1) framing the protection of nationals abroad as the key incentive behind China's military actions; and (2) emphasizing an unquestioning commitment to sovereignty, to UN authorization, and to the consent of host countries during the intervening process.Then, it points out the propagandistic features of China's military-action films: framing the outside world as a threatening place in which individuals' survival depends on the protection of a powerful nation; cultivating collective narcissism and nationalism; and reframing China's global economic expansion through a"friendship narrative". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes China' and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s rationale in opening what it calls a 'logistical support facility' in Djibouti as well as the missions that it is supposed to fulfil. The author also presents this base's activities since its opening on 1 August 2017 and explores the potential role that the Chinese military stationed in Djibouti could play to secure Xi Jinping's Belt and Road initiative and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa or the Middle East. Finally, it assesses the PLA base's relations with other militaries present in Djibouti, particularly the US, the French and the Japanese, concluding that Djibouti operates as a microcosm of a multipolar world heading towards a bipolar, though asymmetrical, world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author puts forth an analytical framework called party-state realism for understanding how policy makers in the People's Republic of China approach foreign policy. It has four defining characteristics. In order of importance, they are: putting the interests of the Communist Party at the core of China's national interest calculation; and on this basis adopting an instrumentalist approach; adopting a party-centric nationalism; and adhering to a neoclassical realist assessment of the country's place in the international system and its relative material power in advancing national interest. In this conception, the putting of the Chinese Communist Party's interest at the core of national interest is a constant, not a variable, factor. This does not mean the changing international context and relative national power are irrelevant, just that they take secondary importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump's electoral victory once again brought xenophobic nationalism into the world spotlight. Surprisingly, in the United Kingdom and the United States, a dramatic increase in wealth inequality impelled the working poor to cling more tightly to nationalism. In recent times, China has also witnessed this correlation of resurgent nationalist aspirations and an increasing gap between rich and poor. In light of these international developments, the primary objective of this study is to explore how China's increasing inequality is influencing Chinese nationalism. The question of whether the Chinese youth who agonize over the trend of wealth inequality has paradoxically grown more attached to Chinese nationalism is also intriguing. Based on structural equation modeling, the estimated results show that, conversely, the increase in economic inequality in China has led to a decline in Chinese nationalism. In particular, disaffected Chinese youth with higher education who suffer from increasing economic disparity have been reluctant to embrace nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism remains strong in China. What drives this strong nationalistic sentiment? This is the key question this study attempts to answer. The authors are particularly interested in the connection between domestic politics and outward nationalist feelings among Chinese urban residents, specifically the relationship between democratic orientation and regime support on the one hand and nationalist feelings on the other. Descriptive findings from random survey data on Chinese urban residents in 34 Chinese cities reveal that democracy-oriented Chinese urbanites tend to show stronger nationalistic feelings. A large volume of literature on the relationship between democratic value and nationalistic sentiments, however, generally suggests that people with more liberal democratic values tend to be less nationalistic. How should one, then, reconcile and explain this seemingly contradictory relationship in China? Upon further research, the study finds that system support is a confounding factor affecting Chinese urban residents' nationalistic sentiments. People with more nationalistic feelings tend to be those who show less support for the current system in China. Popular political discontent with the Chinese domestic system may very well have a spill-over effect on Chinese people's nationalist feelings toward the outside world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders often invoke the feelings of the Chinese people in international disputes. However, most survey research on Chinese public opinion on international affairs has looked at measures of nationalist identity rather than beliefs about foreign policy and evaluations of the government's performance. Five surveys of Chinese citizens, netizens, and elites help illuminate the attitudes that the Chinese government grapples with in managing international security policy. The results suggest that Chinese attitudes are more hawkish than dovish and that younger Chinese, while perhaps not more nationalist in identity, may be more hawkish in their foreign policy beliefs than older generations. Netizens and elites are even more inclined to call on the Chinese government to invest in and rely more on military strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Winston Churchill once said, 'it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.' However, negotiations are particularly difficult when they are enmeshed in public opinion precommitments. The sharpest crisis between China and Vietnam in the last 30 years concerned the placement of a Chinese oil rig into contested waters in 2014. This study analyses the Chinese and Vietnamese propaganda efforts surrounding the crisis as examples of the instrumental use of propaganda in managing domestic public opinion on diplomatic crises. The article argues that despite very different approaches to public diplomacy during the crisis, both states were primarily concerned with avoiding escalation and ending the confrontation. The authors show how propaganda function as a pacifying device in dealing with rising domestic nationalism when executing a moderate foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a mixed-methods approach, this article surveys and compares how Chinese youth view China’s rise with how their Asian counterparts do. The quantitative analysis uses data from the Asian Student Survey to identify the differences in perception of China’s rise between Chinese and Asian youth. Qualitative interviewing is undertaken to probe and assess the reasons behind the gap. The results show that Chinese youth are more optimistic about political stability and nationalism accompanying China’s rise. Nevertheless, they are open to acknowledge a variety of social problems in the wake of economic growth. With regard to China’s international influence, most Chinese youth have a firm faith in China’s peaceful rise, but they also perceive threats from other countries that are normally ignored in the China threat thesis. Chinese youth tend to attribute the negative evaluations of China among Asian counterparts to external reasons rather than see them as reflections of China’s ‘problematic’ foreign policy. Interview materials show why and how Chinese foreign policy is justified among Chinese young people. They open a door for outsiders to understand Chinese public opinion toward international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many China analysts believe Beijing relies on nationalism to shore up its legitimacy of rule and its recent assertiveness, especially in salient territorial issues, is increasingly defined by such nationalism. However, based on a critical review of the existing studies, this article doubts the validity of this nationalism-foreign-assertiveness nexus because most questions that are important and necessary to elucidate the causal mechanisms remain largely unanswered, therefore making this popular narrative biased and somewhat flawed. This article addresses four questions as follows: what Chinese nationalism is, how 'rising' nationalism is in China, Beijing's attitudes towards nationalism, and its foreign policy implications. This article concludes that nationalism's foreign policy effects may be more moderate than most have assumed, and thus calls for intellectuals' efforts to move beyond the stereotyped image and make further rigorous analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many studies have investigated Taiwanese people’s attitudes towards cross-Strait relations, few studies explore how Chinese people on the other side of the Taiwan Strait perceive the Taiwan issue. Using data collected via a telephone survey that covers 2,000 respondents from ten major cities in China in 2013, this article presents empirical evidence to fill this gap. It finds that most Chinese citizens’ attitudes are aligned with the government’s propaganda on cross-Strait relations. In particular, Chinese citizens have inaccurate perceptions of Taiwanese support for reunification with China. This article also finds that when Chinese respondents think that the city in which they live is more economically advanced than Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, they would support: (1) a faster pace towards a resolution, and (2) the use of military force to resolve cross-Strait confrontations. These findings offer new perspectives on studies of cross-Strait relations and Chinese nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Resurgent nationalism has become an important driver of China’s foreign policy, and many countries are concerned about its evident new assertiveness. This article argues that closer attention to the vigorous internal debate among its international relations (IR) experts about their country’s future external strategies will add perspective to those concerns. It contends that the views of these experts provide probably the best available window into China’s thinking about its international options. China’s IR experts have been conspicuously divided about the appropriate balance of strategies for its transition from a previously cautious and inward-looking foreign policy to a more ambitious and proactive agenda. In particular, they differ about the relative emphasis that should be placed on the pursuit of national interests versus the advancement of international interests. This debate reflects contradictory elements in China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping, some of which may potentially lead to confrontation and conflict while others hold out the prospect of continuing constructive engagement. Greater understanding of expert views within China about managing and reconciling these contradictory trends is likely to provide valuable insights for researchers and decision-makers in China and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most studies of Chinese nationalism are based on an unstated and unexamined assumption that history education in Chinese schools can effectively instill the official memory of the anti-Japanese war into students. This article tests this assumption through a multi-method study based on a survey, a textual analysis and qualitative interviews with high school students and teachers. The findings show that history education (including both in-class and extracurricular forms) has limited effects on nationalism among Chinese high school students. The in-class textbook education is largely ineffective in forging nationalistic sentiments among students, whereas some extracurricular activities, such as visiting the ‘patriotic education bases’, have limited effects. The limited effects can be explained by four factors: (1) changes in the content and form of the new history textbooks; (2) the students’ and teachers’ actual uses of the textbooks; (3) the students’ cognitive and emotional agency in receiving history education; and (4) alternative information sources such as the media and family memory. This study contributes to the understanding of Chinese nationalism and historical memory by emphasizing the complexity involved in receiving official narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By most accounts, nationalism in China is on the rise, as seen in both patriotic displays and anti-foreign protests. This article disaggregates two types of nationalism: patriotism and victimization derived from the ‘century of humiliations’. An original, nationwide public opinion survey of urban China shows that these two types of nationalism are derived from similar attributes and attitudes (causes) but have dissimilar impacts on views toward foreign countries (effects). In order to understand properly the causes of rising nationalism in China and its possible implications, observers must begin with the recognition that patriotism and anti-foreign sentiments are not simply two sides of the same coin, but two separate and distinct types of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the role of state-nationalist discourse in the rise of online nationalism by looking at case studies of nationalist flesh searches. Nationalist flesh searches target those seen as traitorous, anti-China or anti-government, and expose the victims’ private information as well as their alleged crimes, to the online public. Through examination of this activity, the study contextualizes the rise of online nationalism within the historical and political context of the Party’s renewed emphasis on nationalism in education and state media, and the role that this state-nationalism plays in social management. Case studies follow the development of nationalist flesh searches, examining the motivations, language and goals of these online nationalists, as well as the actions of those targeted and the role, if any, of the state and the state media. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Employing national identity theories and survey data in Taiwan, this article explains national identity shift in Taiwan. Descriptively we find that most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called Chinese nationals, especially this China which is internationally recognized as the People’s Republic of China. In other words, most Taiwanese people do not identify themselves with the mainland Chinese state even though they still associate themselves with the Chinese nation. It is also noted that there is no consensus with regard to national identity in Taiwan, since close to one third of the population still do not object to be called zhongguoren. The author’s analytical findings further confirm that external sovereignty-related factors are related to the Taiwanese national identity shift. Specifically, a changed state boundary, separation desire from mainland China, and recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, not the distinctive cultural reconstruction inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

2012–2013 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-Japanese sentiment in Mainland China, followed by a toughening of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Diaoyu Islands policy. Did popular nationalism influence the PRC’s military escalation? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts a definitive answer to this question beyond our reach. However, this article utilizes qualitative and quantitative analyses of anti-Japanese discourse and deeds in both cyberspace and on the streets of urban China to argue that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of China’s Japan policy. The demands of nationalist legitimation appear to pressure the elite to respond to popular nationalism. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force, therefore, the popular pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than China’s leaders can manage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How will China influence world politics in the twenty-first century? Many people answer this question by looking to Chinese history, and particularly to traditional models of Chinese world order. This essay seeks to complicate this question by asking which history, and which tradition? While it is common to look at China's pre-modern history as ‘tradition’, this essay argues that we also need to appreciate how ‘socialism’ is treated as a tradition alongside Chinese civilization. It does this by examining how China's public intellectuals appeal to two seemingly odd sources: Mao Zedong's 1956 speech ‘Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions’, and the ‘Great Harmony’ passage from the two millennia-old Book of Rites. It will argue that these two passages are employed as a way of salvaging socialism; the ideological transition thus is not from communism to nationalism, but to a curious combination of socialism and Chinese civilization. This new socialist/civilization dynamic integrates equality and hierarchy into a new form of statism, which is involved in a global competition of social models. Or to put it another way, what these two passages have in common is not necessarily a positive ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the West and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This Xinjiang Class is a four-year, national-level boarding school program established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the year 2000. The overarching aim of the program is clear: the CCP intends to train a core group of young Uyghurs who have internalized the ideals of the Party. This article, which is based on interviews and regular interaction with over 60 graduates of the Xinjiang Class, casts doubt on whether the boarding schools have been effective in ‘interpellating’ young Uyghurs as compliant members of the Chinese Nation (Zhonghua minzu). This article contends that Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class have instead embraced a non-Chinese ethno-national identity—an identity bound by Central Asian and Islamic cultural norms—and have largely rejected the Zhonghua minzu identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the emergence of distorted memories of Imperial China. Through popular online sites and media, populist nationalists have obtained exaggerated yet extremely sensational knowledge of Chinese history, which portrays Imperial China as benevolent, strong and more advanced than the western world. Based on these distorted memories, they blame all diplomatic controversies on other countries—western nations for their imperialist exploitation and especially neighboring countries for their ungratefulness to the Chinese empire. Due to the declining appeal of communism, as well as the corruption and isolation of official academia, the Chinese government is under heavy pressure to follow the distorted memory and restore China's historical glory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Hong Kong's reunification with the People's Republic of China in 1997, debates about patriotism have erupted from time to time in Hong Kong. Considering Hong Kong's socio-political background, the feelings and attachment of Hongkongers towards their motherland are unsurprisingly complex. We therefore need a multidimensional concept to capture the complexities of Hong Kong patriotism. Based on survey data, we propose that the term ‘liberal patriotism’ best describes the type of patriotism in Hong Kong society, which is that love of the homeland and the state are qualified by liberal democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China's counterinsurgency strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang relies heavily on hard power and imposition. Well-functioning vertical coordination in the security sector of China's political system and assimilationist nationality dynamics combine to favour the use of force against ethnic groups that do not accept the political legitimacy of China's Communist Party. Transnational links contribute to China's difficulties with implementing counterinsurgency in Tibet and help China implement its strategy in Xinjiang. Development strategies aimed at improving living standards are crowded out due to a lack of horizontal coordination between civilian and security agencies and a bias towards unitary nation-building in Chinese nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I address the question of how Chinese scholars participate in scientific knowledge production by appropriating Western IR theories, primarily by examining interactions between North American theories that claim universality and China-specific IR efforts. Drawing on post-Mao era publications and books, I discuss how increasingly independent Chinese IR scholars are portraying their country's rising status in international politics and identifying China's national interests, while still emphasizing socialist concepts such as anti-hegemonism. The result is a form of Chinese IR scholarship that combines Western IR language with a worldview that emphasizes a modern China within the context of traditional socialist foreign policy norms. I will argue that Chinese scholarly discussions about IR theory building reflect efforts to present ‘their rising China’ (as individually perceived) in the study, research, and development of IR theory in response to the appearance of modern IR methods that require new definitions and new roles for old socialist forms. In this context, identity concerns are more important than the actual theories being established or appropriated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The development of China's online game industry provides an example of the interaction of new technologies and politics in the commercialization and globalization of China's cultural economy. The analysis of online games about China's Resistance War against Japan (1937–1945) highlights the interplay of the state's political agenda, business interests, and nationalistic sentiments as online games are planned, designed, and consumed in contemporary China. It reveals that the Party-state has candidly integrated online game technology into its expanding propaganda domain and utilized it for propagating official ideology and sustaining economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000–2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese party-state officials now openly speak of the importance of increasing the country's soft power. This raises questions, however, about how the soft power concept relates to the party-state's existing propaganda system. This article investigates how the party-state interprets the soft power concept and how this fits into its broader approach to propaganda work. It argues that the way the party-state has interpreted the concept of soft power conforms to its approach to both foreign and domestic propaganda work. Like foreign propaganda, increasing soft power for the party-state involves improving international communication capabilities and is undertaken with domestic objectives in mind; like domestic propaganda work, policies designed to increase soft power are expected to balance the goal of promoting cultural creativity and variety with the goal of strengthening national cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the 2008 China Survey, this paper examines Chinese respondents' feelings toward their country and how such feelings are related to their democratic values. First, it compares Chinese nationalism with that of 35 countries and regions in the 2003 National Identity Survey. Second, it looks at the origins of Chinese nationalism as embedded in the social and political characteristics of individuals. Third, it further examines the impact of nationalism on people's political attitudes. The findings show that nationalism in contemporary China is better predicted by the political and economic characteristics of an individual rather than cultural attributes, and that nationalism serves as a powerful instrument in impeding public demand for democratic change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article assesses the rise of China by exploring a number of recent popular Chinese political texts to go beyond explanations that take the international system as the level of analysis. It proposes that a merging of nationalism and geopolitical thinking is taking place, resulting in the emergence of a new form of nationalism that can be categorised as 'geopolitik nationalism' because it deploys many of the themes evident in the political thought of Germany and Japan before the two world wars. By considering the impact of such ideas, it is possible to gain new insights into recent assertive actions in Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the uses of YouTube by Uyghur nationalist movement activists and studies various ideological codes used by different communities to promote their messages. It argues that several ideological codes are produced in order to challenge the dominant ideologies promoted by the Chinese government, which create a ground for Uyghur 'imagined solidarity' across physical borders. Analysis of the production of audio-visual messages by the dispersed ethnic group provides an important window into how ethnic identity is forged by means of Web 2.0. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese migration, 'assimilationist' policies and 'cultural imperialism'. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing's policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the long-running saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the immediate focus of the organization was to combat the so-called 'three evils'-ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism-the SCO's long-term viability and effectiveness in promoting regional stability and economic development depend on how member states build up common identity and cooperate on issues of mutual concern. This article looks at China's role in initiating the Shanghai-5/SCO structure within the broader framework of Beijing's foreign and security policy interests and priorities in Central Asia and seeks to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles to its efforts in achieving key objectives for this new regional organization: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; and promotion of economic prosperity. In addition, the article will also examine the extent to which Beijing has used the opportunity to exercise leadership and whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using the SCO as a vehicle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that how President Chen Shui-bian's provocative initiatives have impacted cross-strait stability since 2003 generates crucial lessons, not available in the past, for understanding the propelling and constraining dynamics of a cross-strait military conflict in the long run. The lessons are grounded in three interrelated sets of interactive logic: between the Chen Administration and the Taiwan electorate; between Taiwan people's aspiration for an exclusive national identity and their risk-averse proclivity in the face of China's military threat; and between Washington's and Beijing's acts of signaling toward Taipei. Specifically, this article demonstrates that Taiwan's voters at first backed the Chen Administration's provocative initiatives in order to seek a national identity instead of de jure independence, and that such popular support receded dramatically once such initiatives came to be perceived, amidst domestic and international developments, by the voters as drifting away from the identity quest and toward evoking their choice between the status quo and independence. The risk-averse voters turned away from the altered character of the initiatives and thus restrained the reckless politicians, largely because of both Washington's signaling which highlighted the change and the ensuing risk of war, and Beijing's refraining from saber rattling toward Taiwan. The voters' decisions foiled the 2004 and 2008 referenda, and forestalled the DPP in 2004 from acquiring a parliamentary majority necessary for legislating its provocative initiatives such as renaming the country and creating a new constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. It identifies a three-P incentive structure that is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic prosperity, and Beijing's pursuit of power and prestige. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. Although the official line in Beijing is still the mild ‘peaceful development’, after a fling with the more majestic idea of ‘peaceful rise’, the rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically appraises the narrative of nationalist resurgence in China in the 1990s that structures much of the secondary literature on Chinese politics since Tiananmen. Adopting a post-structuralist method, Chinese texts from the 1990s are treated as discursive rather than as expressions of a common consensus, emergent ideology or political movement. This makes it possible to bring out the disparate points of view concerning the desirability of nationalism for China and to understand the strategies that are being deployed by authors within the context of everyday Chinese politics. It also reveals the significance of the absence from both the primary and the secondary texts of any mention of the advocacy of nationalism by the political leadership. When this hidden discourse is taken into account, it becomes evident that many of the texts that have been taken as expressions of a nationalist revival are either not particularly interested in nationalism or are highly sceptical concerning its possibilities for solving the problems faced by the Chinese state. Particularly significant is the way in which many of the texts locate themselves in relation to the official discourse on nationalism by appropriating its themes in order to promote and legitimate a wide range of other discourses with which it can be bound up, ranging from democracy to authoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging at the turn of the twentieth century, overseas Chinese nationalism played an important part in the evolution of the overseas Chinese community and modern history of China. It is generally held that overseas Chinese nationalism had died out and had become ‘a historical phenomenon’ by the 1950s, when the China-centered allegiance of the overseas Chinese was replaced by a local-oriented identity. The fundamental change of the Chinese diasporic communities over the last two decades, however, has put this conventional wisdom into contestation. This essay is concerned with the emergence of the xin yinmin (new migrants) and corresponding manifestations of a reviving overseas Chinese nationalism since 1980. It is divided into two main parts. The first is empirical, examining the rise and characteristics of the new migrants, who are composed of four main types: students-turned-migrants, emigrating professionals, chain migrants, and illegal immigrants. The second section is conceptual and comparative, looking at the manifestations and limitations of the reviving overseas Chinese nationalism and placing them in a historical perspective. It also considers the embedded tensions between nationalism and transnationalism and the strategies employed by both the Chinese state and new migrants in tackling these tensions. I argue that there are complex reasons behind the re-emergence of overseas Chinese nationalism. From overseas, it is a by-product of the formation of sizeable new migrant communities, particularly in the West. As the first-generation immigrants who have extensive links with the homeland, they remain culturally, and often, politically, attached to China (as a nation-state and/or site of transnational imaginary) and are concerned greatly with Chinese matters. Through such intermediaries as Chinese-language newspapers, websites and TV programs, they form a borderless and imagined greater China that is bound by both the ideas of sovereignty and transnational culture. From the mainland, a series of policies relating to the Chinese overseas facilitate the connections between China and its population overseas, thus providing a potential ground for the revival of overseas Chinese nationalism. I argue that the key agendas of this reviving overseas Chinese nationalism are China's economic prosperity, cultural regeneration, and national unification. This nationalism, furthermore, is characterized by its reactive nature and embedded contradictions with the simultaneous process of transnationalism, which in turn reduces the centrality and intensity of nationalism. As a result, it is unlikely to constitute a unified ideology or a movement with centralized leadership such as that in the 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the interplay between nationalism and foreign policy in China—but with a twist. It seeks to loosen up analytical categories to expand from cultural nationalism to see how civilization constructs identity in national and transnational ways. It examines the limits of Chinese trans/nationalism according to the main Chinese expression of inside/outside—‘civilization/barbarism’—as it constructs Chinese nationalism and Greater China. The purpose is to both critically examine Chinese nationalism and to trace what our focus on the nation-state obscures: namely, transnational politics. Rather than recounting one master narrative of Chinese nationalism, the essay argues that civilization and barbarian define Greater China according to four narratives—nativism, conquest, conversion and diaspora. Hence, the essay does not merely deconstruct the notion of Greater China and Chinese nationalism, but shows how these four grids of meaning can help us to understand identity politics and foreign policy debates in China. Nationalism thus turns from being the Answer about the true intent of China, to being a series of questions which define different terrains of political inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of China, the importance of understanding Chinese nationalism increases. Assessing Chinese nationalism, many people claim that it has grown stronger and more intense in recent years. Some believe that this is the case because the Chinese Government deliberately promotes nationalism to serve its own purposes. This paper argues that the reality with Chinese nationalism is much more complicated than many assume. It has grown stronger in some respects but weaker in others. The role of the Chinese Government is at best mixed. In explaining the development of Chinese nationalism, one needs to look at external as well as internal and historical causes. Only by doing so can one gain a fuller and more balanced understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of nationalism in shaping Chinese foreign policy in the history of contemporary China over the last 100 years. Nationalism is used here as an analytical term, rather than in the usual popular pejorative sense. By tracing the various expressions of contemporary Chinese nationalism, this article argues that nationalism is one of the key enduring driving forces which have shaped Chinese foreign policy over the period; as China increasingly integrates herself into this globalized and interdependent world and Chinese confidence grows, the current expression of Chinese nationalism is taking a more positive form, which incorporates an expanding component of internationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which China's 'Fourth generation' leadership might be inclined to place a greater emphasis on nationalist rhetoric both in China's international relations and in domestic policy. It explores two different views of nationalism, namely state-centred and popular. With the decline in the public impact of official ideology, the Party-state has given tacit recognition to nationalism as one potential source of regime legitimisation. However, this article argues that by placing the Party at the centre of the official discourse the state-centred view of nationalism restricts the extent to which the Party-state can mobilise nationalist symbolism in support of its leadership and makes the Party vulnerable to criticism from more popular conceptions of nationalism. The priority given to developing the economy means China's leaders must downplay popular criticism which can focus on the negative consequences of China's growing interaction with the wider world. Under China's 'Fourth generation' leadership this tension may deepen. China's new leadership are unlikely to resort to 'wrapping themselves in the flag' as some commentators have suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of Chinese nationalism is very popular--both in China and the West. This article introduces a special section of seven articles (four of which are in this issue) on 'The Limits of Chinese Nationalism', arguing that our understanding of nationalism in China is problematic. This special section aims to explore the limits of many of the statements about Chinese nationalism that have now become 'common sense': the rise of Chinese nationalism, nationalism filling an ideological vacuum, elites manipulating nationalism to gain legitimacy, and so on. Using critical IR theory this Introduction explores the concept of limits to argue that borders in China are not just territorial, but cultural, economic and thus political. It seeks to change the objective of our discussion of Chinese nationalism from seeking an Answer--either as a measure of the objective nature of Chinese nationalism or as a moral judgment of it as good or evil--to seeing 'nationalism' as a provocation which pushes us to think about China and identity in a host of different and productive ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]