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Keywords: philosophy of chemistry; epistemology; experiment; classification; reference; prediction; technology; matter; material properties Abstract: The paper shows epistemological, methodological and ontologicalpeculiarities of chemistry taken as a classificatory science of materialsusing experimental methods. Without succumbing to standardinterpretations of physical science, chemical methods of experimentalinvestigation, classification, reference, theorizing, prediction andproduction of new entities are developed one by one as first stepstowards a philosophy of chemistry. Chemistry challenges traditionalconcepts of empirical object, empirical predicate, reference frame andtheory, but also the distinction commonly drawn between naturalscience and technology. Due to its many peculiarities, I propose totreat chemistry philosophically as a special type of science, apart fromother sciences. Article History: Registration Date: 08/09/2004

Article History: Registration Date: 05/10/2004

It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which is to model and test causal structures that explain correlational data; second, a 'manipulationist or interventionist strategy', that hinges upon the notion of invariance under intervention. It is argued that while the former can offer a solution the latter cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper justifies the concept of ’’thematic structure‘‘ or ’’order of knowledge‘‘ over the traditional ’’classification of sciences‘‘ due to the uncertainty of many classification criteria. The thematic structure of science has, of course, various levels and various dimensions. Arguments against any forms of separating the humanities from sciences in the traditional sense of the term are presented and discussed. Equally unacceptable are attempts at sharp separation of technical disciplines and humanities. The thematic structure of humanities is not created by some material aspects but rather through the interest – or problem-oriented aspects. In addition to the natural sciences and the humanities there exists an important sphere of sciences on artefacts or, using the term by H. Simon, the sciences of the artificial. For the contemporary research activities is typical what could be denoted as ’’interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary complex.‘‘ The paper traces a set of epistemological criteria for the justification of the relative independence of a scientific discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, Ancient Mesopotamian epistemic practices resulting in the vast corpus of cuneiform ‘lexical lists’ and other, similarly formatted treatises have been conceptualized as “ Listenwissenschaft” in Assyriology. Introduced by the German Assyriologist Wolfram v. Soden in , this concept has also been utilized in other disciplines of the Humanities as a terminological means to describe epistemic activity allegedly inferior to ‘Western’ modes of analytical and hypotactic scientific reasoning. Building on the exemplary evidence of a bilingual list of cuneiform compound graphemes from the early 2nd millennium BCE as well as on recent conceptualizations of ‘epistemic cultures’ and the instrumental function of material ‘representations’ in the context of epistemic practices, the present paper attempts to replace the essentialistic and teleological concept of an Ancient Mesopotamian “ Listenwissenschaft” with a new epistemological model describing the underlying epistemic practices as highly adaptive non-linear epistemic practices comparable to what has been described as ‘practices with »epistemic things«’ in recent epistemology and practice theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific essentialism holds that: (1) each scientific kind is associated with the same set of properties in every possible world; and (2) every individual member of a scientific kind belongs to that kind in every possible world in which it exists. Recently, Ellis (Scientific essentialism, ; The philosophy of nature ) has provided the most sustained defense of scientific essentialism, though he does not clearly distinguish these two claims. In this paper, I argue that both claims face a number of formidable difficulties. The necessities of scientific essentialism are not adequately distinguished from semantic necessities, they have not been shown to be necessities in the strictest sense, they must be relativized to context, and they must either be confined to a subset of scientific properties without warrant or their connection to causal powers must be revoked. Moreover, upon closer examination (1) turns out to be a trivial thesis that can be satisfied by non-kinds, and (2) is inapplicable to some of the most fundamental kinds in the basic sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific practices; (2) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a 'simple exemplar' of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. Keywords Calibration * Standard * Measurement * Scientific instruments * Measuring device * Scientific practices, 1 Introduction This paper (1) deals with calibration with a special focus on calibration in a certain kind of scientific practices, namely practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by [...]

My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known 'in principle' by a hypothetical entity like Laplace's Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I'll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility and practicability. For example, whether subjects can gain knowledge depends in some circumstances on whether they have the capability of gathering relevant evidence. In turn, the possibility of undertaking such investigative activities depends in part on factors like ethical constraints, economical realities, and available technology. In the second part of the paper, I'll introduce 'technological possibility' to analyze the set of actions made possible by available technology. To help motivate the problem and later test my proposal, I'll focus on a specific historical case, one of the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in a scientific investigation. I conclude that the epistemic possibility of gaining access to scientific knowledge about certain subjects depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for making responsible investigations. Keywords Epistemic possibility * Epistemic modality * Technological possibility * Responsibility * Practicability, Let me begin with a historiographical debate about how to understand the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in scientific investigations. Peter Galison argues for the necessity of the digital [...]

The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark's 'mathematical multiverse' are too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But the 'mathematical multiverse' is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have performed a number of experiments with cellular automata of complex behavior, which can be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what happens in some automata (in particular Conway's 'Game of Life') and the real world is very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we should expect to inhabit--in the context of the multiverse--a world in which at least some of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. Keywords Astrophysics * Cosmology * Multiverse * Fine tuning * Cellular automata, 1 Introduction The hypothesis that the universe we live in represents not the whole physical reality but a particular domain inside a much larger reality called 'multiverse,' which includes many [...]

In recent decades, the concept of coherence has become one of the key concepts in philosophy. Although there is still no consensus about how to explicate coherence, it is widely accepted that the appearance of anomalies significantly lowers the coherence of a propositional or belief system. In this paper, the relationship between coherence and anomalies is analysed by looking at a specific case study from astronomy. It concerns anomalies that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century during the attempt to develop a cosmic distance scale. These anomalies could not be removed until several decades after their appearance, which required a fundamental change in astronomical theory. During this process, the astronomical distance scale had to be adjusted by a factor of about 2. This paper focuses on the role that explanatory relations played with respect to the elimination of these anomalies. Thereby, special attention is paid to the explanatory work of astronomical theories or models that were not especially designed for this task. Keywords Anomaly * Cepheids * Coherence * Cosmic distance scale, 1 Introduction In the past decades, coherence has become one of the key concepts in philosophy. Regardless of the importance it has gained in theoretical as well as practical philosophy, [...]

The paper approaches the topic of what a general philosophy of science could mean today from the perspective of a historical epistemology. Consequently, in a first step, the paper looks at the notion of generality in the sciences, and how it evolved over time, on the example of the life sciences. In the second part of the paper, the urgency of a general philosophy of science is located in the history of philosophy of science. Two attempts at the beginning of the twentieth century are particularly highlighted: that of Karl Popper and that of Martin Heidegger. Both of them concentrate, albeit in widely different form, on the phenomenon of research as an open-ended process. This trend is even more pronounced in Gaston Bachelard's version of a historical epistemology, whose work is taken as a point of reference for a general historical epistemology of research. The paper concludes with a plea to look, with Georges Canguilhem, at the history of the sciences as a laboratory for epistemology. Keywords Historical epistemology * Scientific research * Generality in historical perspective * Karl Popper and research * Martin Heidegger and research * Gaston Bachelard and research * Georges Canguilhem * History as laboratory of epistemology, What prospects for a general philosophy of science? To begin with, I would like to tentatively locate the question itself in a broader cultural and historical context. If we ask [...]

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357-372) I have diseussed the arguments brought forward by Miehael Wolff against the interpretation given in the commentary by Ebert and Nortmann on Aristotle's syllogistie theory (Aristoteles Analytica Priora Buch I, ubersetzt und erlautert von Theodor Ebert und Ulrich Nortmann. Berlin 2007) and against the eritique of Kant's adaption of the syllogistie logie. I have dealt with Wolff's arguments concerning (Ebert/Nortmann's interpretation of) Aristotle in the paper mentioned and with his attempts to defend his critique in this subsequent article (part 1; see J Gen Phils Sei (2010) 41: 215-231). Part 2 (the paper below) is concerned with Wolff's renewed attempts to defend Kant as a logician. In particular I point out that if, as Wolff claims, the nota notae relation in Kant is restrieted to subordinated concepts, then it can hardly serve as a principle for syllogistie logie, as Kant claims. Against Wolff's attempts to defend Kant's claim that o-propositions are simpliciter convertible, I point out two arguments: (1) Even if Kant, following the Vernunftlehre by Meier, has assumed that an o-proposition can be turned into an i-proposition, this conversion is useless for the reduction to first figure syllogisms since we are no longer dealing with three syllogistie terms but with four. (2) It is quite unlikely that Kant has a conversion of this type in mind since the texts of his students always talk of the group of either the particular propositions or else of the negative propositions. Given Kant's mistakes concerning the convertibility simpliciter of o-propositions, it is no wonder that he overlooks the special status of the moods Baroco and Bocardo. Wolff's attempts to provide Kant with what he claims are direct proofs for these moods ean be shown to rely on a reductio ad impossibile. Kant mistook what are parts of the proofs for the validity of moods in figures two to four as parts of these moods themselves. Wolff--who tries to defend Kant on this point--is forced to an artificial and unconvincing reading of the Kantian texts. Keywords Aristotle * Wolff * Michael * Kant * Syllogistie * o-Proposition, 1 Michael Wolff zur Kritik an der Transitivitat der Merkmalsrelation bei Kant Michael Wolff hat meinem Gegenbeispiel zu Kants Rede von nota notae, von der Transitivitat der Merkmalsrelation, entgegengehalten, dass [...]

The paper shows how Karl Popper's critique of 'historicism' is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science, Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as 'pseudoscience', Popper's analysis has been infused with psychoanalysis when it comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation of the proponents of 'historicism' and the 'closed' society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories. Keywords Karl Popper * Freud * Psychoanalysis * Pseudoscience * Historicism, 1 Introduction Karl Popper conceived his theory of falsification as a crucial criterion to demarcate between science and pseudoscience. Popper strongly argues that scientific theories deserve to be qualified as [...]

Byline: Daniel McArthur (1) Keywords: Scientific realism; scientific theory change; structural realism; James Ladyman Abstract: In recent years Structural Realism has been revived as a compromise candidate to resolve the long-standing question of scientific realism. Recent debate over structural realism originates with Worrall's (1989) paper 'Structural Realism: The best of Both Worlds'. However, critics such as Psillos contend that structural realism incorporates an untenable distinction between structure and nature, and is therefore unworkable. In this paper I consider three versions of structural realism that purport to avoid such criticism. The first is Chakravartty's 'semirealism' which proceeds by trying to show that structural realism and entity realism entail one another. I demonstrate that this position will not work, but follow Chakravartty's contention that structural realism need not imply that scientific knowledge can only be of mathematical structure. I advance from this conclusion to sketch a version of structural realism that is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the scientific realism question. Finally, I consider a third approach to structural realism Ladyman's 'metaphysical structural realism' which tries to avoid the difficulties of earlier versions by taking structure to be ontologically primary. I show that the deflationary approach to structural realism undermines the rationale behind Ladyman's approach. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Philosophy Atkinson College, York University, 4700 Keele St., Toronto, ON, Canada, M3J 1P3 Article History: Registration Date: 25/09/2006 Received Date: 01/01/2006 Accepted Date: 15/08/2006 Online Date: 13/01/2007

Byline: Jan C. Schmidt (1) Keywords: chaos theory; complex systems; computability; methodology; nonlinearity; predictability Abstract: Between Calculability and Non-Calculability. Issues of Calculability and Predictability in the Physics of Complex Systems.The ability to predict has been a very important qualifier of what constitutes scientific knowledge, ever since the successesof Babylonian and Greek astronomy. More recent is the general appreciation of the fact that in the presence of deterministicchaos, predictability is severely limited (the so-called `butterfly effect'): Nearby trajectories diverge during time evolution small errors typically grow exponentially with time. The system obeys deterministic laws and still is unpredictable, seemingly aparadox for the traditional viewpoint of Laplacian determinisms.With the concept of deterministic chaos the epistemological issueabout an adequate understanding of predictability is no longer just a mere philosophical topic. Physicists on the one hand recognize the limits of (long term) predictability, computability and even of scientific knowledge, on the other hand they work onconcepts for extending the horizon of predictability. It is shownin this paper that physics of complex systems is useful toclarify the jungle of different meanings of the terms `predictability' and `computability' -- also with philosophical implications for understanding science and nature. Today, from the physical point of view, the relevance of the concepts of predictability seems to be underestimated by philosophers as a mere methodological topic. In the paper I analyse the importance of predictability and computability in physics of complex systems. I show a way how to cope with problems of unpredictability and noncomputability. Nine different conceptsof predictability and computability (i.e. open solution, sensitivity/chaos, redundancy/chance) are presented, compared and evaluated. Author Affiliation: (1) TU Darmstadt, Schloss, Institut fur Philosophie, D-64283, Darmstadt Article History: Registration Date: 05/10/2004

Byline: Dirk Greimann (1) Keywords: ontology of ethics; objective values; ethical subjectivism; Kantian constructivism; Brink; Habermas; von Kutschera Abstract: The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma. To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant's constructive objectivism, Jurgen Habermas' ``epistemic ersatzism'', Franz von Kutschera's ``confirmation pragmatism'', and David Brink's ``objectivist tour de force''. The paper's conclusion is that the dilemma cannot be solved because it rests on a clash of intuitions none of which can be given up. Author Affiliation: (1) Department fur Philosophie, Seminar fur Philosophie, udwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, Munchen, Germany Article History: Registration Date: 05/10/2004

Byline: Andras Kertesz (1) Keywords: hermeneutics; heuristics; naturalized epistemology; normativity Abstract: Starting from an overview of approaches tonaturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, thatQuine's programme yields a sceptical paradox. This means thatQuine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a ratherstrong argument for scepticism and thus against his ownprogramme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shownthat this paradox can be solved by an approach calledreflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raisessome fundamental problems which the solution proposed has toleave open. Author Affiliation: (1) University of Debrecen, Pf. 47, H-4010, Debrecen, Hungary(akertesz@fox.klte.hu) Article History: Registration Date: 30/09/2004

Byline: Peter Sas (1) Keywords: translation argument; use-mention distinction; propositional-attitude ascriptions; quotational theory; quotation; intensionality; Carnap; Church; Davidson; Dummett; Martin; Quine Abstract: According to quotational theory, indirect ascriptions ofpropositional attitudes should be analyzed as direct ascriptionsof attitudes towards natural-language sentences specified byquotations. A famous objection to this theory is Church'stranslation argument. In the literature several objections to thetranslation argument have been raised, which in this paper areshown to be unsuccessful. This paper offers a new objection. Weargue against Church's presupposition that quoted expressions,since they are mentioned, cannot be translated. In many contextsquoted expressions are used and mentioned simultaneously, and thequotational analysis of propositional-attitude ascriptions is sucha context. Hence the translation argument is unsound. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Article History: Registration Date: 16/10/2004

Byline: Dimitri Ginev (1) Keywords: global horizon of doing scientific research; hermeneutic fore-structure; unified narrative structures Abstract: This paper represents an attempt to articulate the basicprinciples of a hermeneutic philosophy of science. Throughout,the author is at pains to show that both (i) overcoming epistemologicalfoundationalism and (ii) insisting on the multiplicity, patchiness,and heterogeneity of the discursive practices of scientific research do not imply a farewell to an analysis of the constitution ofscience's autonomous cognitive structure. Such an analysisoperates in two directions: ``continuous weakening' ofepistemological foundationalism and ``hermeneutic grounding' ofa cognitive structure. Carrying out the analysis in bothdirections leads to a (post)foundational picture of science. Themain thrust of the first part of the paper is to outline thetenets of a constitutional analysis of scientific research. Thispart focuses especially on the notion of ``unified narrativestructures' which refers to the ``effective histories' of themain epistemic types of science. Author Affiliation: (1) Center for Culturology, University of Sofia, St. Kliment Ohridski, 15, Tzar Osvoboditel Blvd., 1000, Sofia, Bulgaria Article History: Registration Date: 16/10/2004

Byline: Ladislav Kvasz (1) Keywords: scientific revolutions; epistemic ruptures; epistemicframework; incommensurability; paradigm; Kuhn; Lakatos; Crowe; Dauben Abstract: The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. Author Affiliation: (1) Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Comenius University Mlynska Dolina, 84215, Bratislava, Slovak Republic Article History: Registration Date: 30/09/2004

Keywords: foundational epistemology; naturalized epistemology; Munchhausen-trilemma; ultimate foundations; deduction; non-deductive foundations; scepticism; justification of methodological norms W.V.O. Quine, R. Carnap. Abstract: This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology ('FE') can be replaced by naturalized epistemology ('NE'). First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Munchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that ultimate foundations (and, hence, FE) are unattainable. However, Karl-Otto Apel has shown that this trilemma is unconclusive since it uncritically presupposes the premise that all argumentation is deductive in nature. Apel's argument implies that FE is possible if and only if it is possible to devise a non-deductive foundation ('NDF'). It is argued, however, that the possibility of NDF cannot be demonstrated. This leads to a situation called the Multatuli-dilemma: we cannot prove the possibility of ultimate foundations nor can we prove the impossibility of ultimate foundations. This dilemma shows that the discussion about the possibility of FE is pointless. Thus, it suggests that it is legitimate to replace FE by NE. Barry Stroud and Henri Lauener, however, argue that this replacement is not feasible since NE is not capable of refuting scepticism (Stroud) or justifying methodological rules (Lauener). But these objections are shown to be mistaken: First, epistemological scepticism is practically impossible and, hence, does not pose a serious threat to NE. Second, NE is capable of justifying methodological norms if and only if it makes use of so- called internal justifications. Thus, the final conclusion of this paper is that FE can be replaced by NE. Article History: Registration Date: 29/09/2004

Keywords: (non-)idealized entities; (non-)idealized representations; synchronic theory-elements and -nets; idealized diachronictheory-elements and -nets; Boyle-Mariotte-law; Van der Waals-law Abstract: This paper deals with the connection between the Boyle-Mariotte-law andthe Van der Waals-law from the perspective of the Structuralist TheoryConception as well as the Pragmatic Idealization Concept (PIC). It wasinspired by an interesting paper by Martti Kuokkanen and Timo Tuomivaara,recently published in this journal..sup.1 One result of theKuokkanen-Tuomivaara-paper is that the Boyle-Mariotte-law is not anidealized law and therefore not an idealized special case of the Van derWaals-law, but that its models can be expanded to the models of an idealizedspecial case of the Van der Waals-law. From the perspective of idealizeddiachronic theory-elements and -nets the second part of this result shall bequestioned. Article History: Registration Date: 08/09/2004

Byline: TIMOTHY CLEVELAND (1) Keywords: Popper; induction; refutation; grue; truth Abstract: The present paper explores three interrelated topicsin Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aimof science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning.Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture.Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackleit by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferentialconsiderations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses andeducated guesses in an attempt to show that there is more toscientific conjecture than conjecture. The suggestion is made thatsome inductive considerations enter into the process of educatedguessing or scientific conjecture in such a way that the 'context ofdiscovery' cannot be sharply separated from the 'context of justification'. Thisdiscussion leads to a tension between Popper's negative method ofconjecture and his realism. Given Popper's (implicit) theory ofmeaning it seems Popper's epistemology (the conjecture andrefutation method) is incompatible with his metaphysical realism. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Philosophy, New Mexico State University, Box 30001/Dept 3B., Las Cruces, New Mexico, 88003-0001 Article History: Registration Date: 06/09/2004

A recent and growing discussion in philosophy addresses the construction of models and their use in scientific reasoning by comparison with fiction. This comparison helps to explore the problem of mediated observation and, hence, the lack of an unambiguous reference of representations. Examining the usefulness of the concept of fiction for a comparison with non-denoting elements in science, the aim of this paper is to present reasonable grounds for drawing a distinction between these two kinds of representation. In particular, my account will suggest a demarcation between fictional and non-fictional discourse as involving two different ways of interpreting representations. This demarcation, leading me to distinguish between fictional and non-fictional forms of enquiry, will provide a useful tool to explore to what extent the descriptions given by a model can be justified as making claims about the world and to what degree they are a consequence of the model's particular construction. Keywords Fiction * Representation * Denoting * Reference * Philosophy of science, A fast growing debate in the philosophy of science has taken an interest in fictionalisation strategies for scientific reasoning. Unlike other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, ontology, aesthetics, philosophy [...]

In this paper I demonstrate that the causal structure of flagpole-like systems can be determined by application of causal graph theory. Additional information about the ordering of events in time or about how parameters of the systems of interest can be manipulated is not needed., Author(s): Alexander Gebharter[sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS), Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany Introduction The length of a flagpole's shadow can be causally [...]

Scientists use visualisations of different kinds in a variety of ways in their scientific work. In the following article, we will take a closer look at the use of photographic pictures as scientific evidence. In accordance with Patrick Maynard's thesis, photography will be regarded as a family of technologies serving different purposes in divergent contexts. One of these is its ability to detect certain phenomena. Nonetheless, with regard to the philosophical thesis of theory-ladenness of observation, we encounter certain reservations concerning the status of photography and that of photographic pictures in the process of measurement in science. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is twofold: We will discuss suggested solutions both for the technological and for the psychological part of the problem of theory-ladenness appearing in the context of the use of photography in scientific observations. The essential proposal will be to follow Christian Suhm in his advice to make a distinction between theory-relativity and theory-ladenness. Keywords Evidence * Patrick Maynard * Photography * Scientific observation * Technology * Theory-ladenness, 1 Introduction A variety of different kinds of visualisations play an important role in science. They are related to a no less extensive realm of technology producing such images. Recently, [...]

This paper defends the Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument against two objections raised by Penelope Maddy. The objections concern scientific practices regarding the development of the atomic theory and the role of applied mathematics in the continuum and infinity. I present two alternative accounts by Stephen Brush and Alan Chalmers on the atomic theory. I argue that these two theories are consistent with Quine's theory of scientific confirmation. I advance some novel versions of the indispensability argument. I argue that these new versions accommodate Maddy's history of the atomic theory. Counter-examples are provided regarding the role of the mathematical continuum and mathematical infinity in science. Keywords Atomic theory * Infinity * Maddy * Mathematical indispensability * Quine-Putnam * The continuum, 1 Introduction The Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument asserts that mathematical entities are on par with other scientific entities from our best scientific theories. This argument is an argument for mathematical [...]

In this paper, we examine what is to be said in defence of Machamer, Darden and Craver's (MDC) controversial dualism about activities and entities (Machamer, Darden and Craver's in Philos Sci 67:1-25, 2000). We explain why we believe the notion of an activity to be a novel, valuable one, and set about clearing away some initial objections that can lead to its being brushed aside unexamined. We argue that substantive debate about ontology can only be effective when desiderata for an ontology are explicitly articulated. We distinguish three such desiderata. The first is a more permissive descriptive ontology of science, the second a more reductive ontology prioritising understanding, and the third a more reductive ontology prioritising minimalism. We compare MDC's entities-activities ontology to its closest rival, the entities-capacities ontology, and argue that the entities-activities ontology does better on all three desiderata. Keywords Activities * MDC * Machamer, Darden and Craver * Capacities * Ontology * Metaphysics of science * Understanding * Minimalism, 1 Introduction Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC) (2000) claim that: 'Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish [...]

I give a response to Adrian Wuthrich's critical review of my analysis of the Higgs mechanism, in which I try to clarify some possible misunderstandings. I concede that, as Wuthrich points out, many physicists see the Higgs mechanism as the roll-over from a symmetrical potential in the initial Lagrangian to a symmetry-breaking potential, while my former analysis had basically focused on the gauge-invariant transformation of the initial Lagrangian into the intended form. My main contention, however, still is that neither Higgs story has (as yet) much explanatory power. Keywords Higgs mechanism * Gauge invariant account * Explanatory power * Neutrinos, 1 Short Reprise of the Abelian Higgs Mechanism I'm particularly glad for Adrian Wuthrich's critical review (Wuthrich 2010) of my analysis of the Higgs mechanism as presented in my paper [...]

It can be shown that certain kinds of classical deterministic and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent. Then the question arises: which description is preferable relative to evidence? This paper looks at the main argument in the literature for the deterministic description by Winnie (The cosmos of science--essays of exploration. Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, pp 299-324, 1998). It is shown that this argument yields the desired conclusion relative to in principle possible observations where there are no limits, in principle, on observational accuracy. Yet relative to the currently possible observations (of relevance in practice), relative to the actual observations, or relative to in principle observations where there are limits, in principle, on observational accuracy the argument fails. Then Winnie's analogy between his argument for the deterministic description and his argument against the prevalence of Bernoulli randomness in deterministic descriptions is considered. It is argued that while the arguments are indeed analogous, it is also important to see they are disanalogous in another sense. Keywords Determinism * Indeterminism * Observational equivalence * Randomness * Underdetermination, 1 Introduction Consider the motion of a particle on a two-dimensional square. When one observes this motion, one obtains a sequence of observations. Figure 1 shows such a sequence, namely [...]

This paper combines naturalized metaphysics and a philosophical reflection on a recently evolving interdisciplinary branch of quantum chemistry, ab initio molecular dynamics. Bridging the gaps among chemistry, physics, and computer science, this cutting-edge research field explores the structure and dynamics of complex molecular many-body systems through computer simulations. These simulations are allegedly crafted solely by the laws of fundamental physics, and are explicitly designed to capture nature as closely as possible. The models and algorithms employed, however, involve many approximations and significant degrees of idealization of their target systems. Therefore, for philosophers of science the pivotal question of whether relying only on the fundamental laws of physics supports a reductionist or realist stance arises. One conceivable answer to this question is that the irreducible approximations and idealizations support rather anti-realist positions. After reviewing an influential attitude in the philosophy of computer simulations and the debate concerning scientific realism, I offer a fair interpretation of such ab initio modelling in quantum chemistry within a naturalistic metaphysical framework that gives rise to a specific type of ontic structural realism. Keywords Quantum chemistry * Computer simulation * Structural realism, 1 Introduction Over the last decades, the historical, philosophical and sociological study of computer simulations has become a growing research field. The occurrence of a scientific revolution (with respect to [...]

The paper compares ontic structural realism in quantum physics with ontic structural realism about space-time. We contend that both quantum theory and general relativity theory support a common, contentful metaphysics of ontic structural realism. After recalling the main claim of ontic structural realism and its physical support, we point out that both in the domain of quantum theory and in the domain of general relativity theory, there are objects whose essential ways of being are certain relations so that these objects do not possess an intrinsic identity. Nonetheless, the qualitative, physical nature of these relations is in the quantum case (entanglement) fundamentally different from the classical, metrical relations treated in general relativity theory. Keywords Entanglement * Hole argument * Metric * Modes * Ontic structural realism * Relations * Structures * Weak discernibility, 1 Introduction: OSR as a Metaphysics for Fundamental Physics Quantum mechanics (QM), together with quantum field theory (QFT), and general relativity (GR) are our current fundamental and experimentally extremely successful [...]

Relativity allegedly contradicts presentism, the dynamic view of time and reality, according to which temporal passage is conceived of as an existentially distinguished 'moving' now. Against this common belief, the paper motivates a presentist interpretation of spacetime: It is argued that the fundamental concept of time--proper time--cannot be characterized by the earlier-later relation, i.e., not in the B-theoretical sense. Only the presentist can provide a temporal understanding of the twins' paradox and of universes with closed timelike curves. Keywords Twins' paradox * Closed timelike curves * Presentism, 1 Introduction Relativity challenges traditional views of time and reality. In special relativity (SR) 'the breaking down of spacetime into spaces at different times is not of fundamental import, but [...]

Astroparticle physics is a recent sub-discipline of physics that emerged from early cosmic ray studies, astrophysics, and particle physics. Its theoretical foundations range from quantum field theory to general relativity, but the underlying 'standard models' of cosmology and particle physics are far from being unified. The paper explores the pragmatic strategies employed in astroparticle physics in order to unify a disunified research field, the concept of observation involved in these strategies, and their relations to scientific realism. Keywords Astroparticle physics * Observation * Pragmatic unification * Realism, Astroparticle physics makes the bridge between astrophysics and particle physics. It is a 'mixed' discipline that combines the methods and models of astrophysics (including nuclear and plasma physics), particle physics, [...]

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different 'degrees of contingency'. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. Keywords Idealization * Epistemic virtues * Scientific models * Modeling in biology * Population genetics * Wright-Fisher Model, 1 Introduction Although there is unanimous consensus with respect to the fact that idealization is a usual resource in scientific reasoning and an essential aspect in the construction of theories, [...]

According to Hempel's raven paradox, the observation of one non-black nonraven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Bayesians such as Howson and Urbach (Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach, 2nd edn. Open Court, Chicago, 1993) claim that the raven paradox can be solved by spelling out the concept of confirmation in the sense of the relevance criterion. Siebel (J Gen Philos Sci 35:313-329, 2004) disputes the adequacy of this Bayesian solution. He claims that spelling out the concept of confirmation in the relevance sense lets the raven paradox reappear as soon as numerous non-black non-ravens are observed. It is shown in this paper that Siebel's objection to the Bayesian solution is flawed. Nevertheless, the objection made by Siebel may give us an idea of how Bayesians can successfully handle situations in which we observe more than one non-black non-raven. Keywords Bayesian epistemology * Confirmation * Probability * Raven paradox * Relevance criterion, 1 Introduction Sainsbury (1995, 1) characterises a paradox as an 'apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises'. A textbook example for a paradox in this [...]

This discussion paper proposes that a meaningful distinction between science and technoscience can be found at the level of the objects of research. Both notions intermingle in the attitudes, intentions, programs and projects of researchers and research institutions--that is, on the side of the subjects of research. But the difference between science and technoscience becomes more explicit when research results are presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific interest they hold. When an experiment is presented as scientific evidence which confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis, this agrees with traditional conceptions of science. When organic molecules are presented for their capacity to serve individually as electric wires that carry surprisingly large currents, this would be a hallmark of technoscience. Accordingly, we propose research on the ontology of research objects. The focus on the character and significance of research objects makes this a specifically philosophical project. Keywords Ontology Research objects * Technoscience * Dispositions * Affordances * Philosophy of scientific experimentation, Das Wesen des Erkennens fordert schlechthin, dass derjenige, der es ausuben will, sich in eine Ferne und eine Hohe uber die Dinge begebe, von der aus er ihre Beziehung zu [...]

According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological 'challenge,' that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological 'challenge,' I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each. Keywords Aims of science * Axiological realism * Scientific realism * Underdetermination of theories by data, 1 Introduction The contemporary scientific realism debate pivots around two key questions: (1) What is the primary aim of science? (2) What can one justifiably believe about successful scientific theories? [...]

This paper aims to cast light on the reasons that explain the shift of opinion--from scepticism to realism--concerning the reality of atoms and molecules in the beginning of the twentieth century, in light of Jean Perrin's theoretical and experimental work on the Brownian movement. The story told has some rather interesting repercussions for the rationality of accepting the reality of explanatory posits. Section 2 presents the key philosophical debate concerning the role and status of explanatory hypotheses c. 1900, focusing on the work of Duhem, Stallo, Ostwald, Poincare and Boltzmann. Section 3 examines in detail Perrin's theoretical account of the molecular origins of Brownian motion, reconstructs the structure and explains the strength of Perrin's argument for the reality of molecules. Section 4 draws three important lessons for the current debate over scientific realism. Keywords Atomism * Hypothesis * Scientific realism * Jean Perrin * Brownian movement * Metaphysics, 1 Introduction Heinz Post (1968) drew a useful distinction between two types of atomic theory in the late nineteenth century: what he called 'essentially atomic theories', which do allow the [...]

The paper explores the defence by the early sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck against the charge of relativism. It is shown that there are crucial and hitherto unnoticed similarities between Fleck's strategy and the attempt by his contemporary Karl Mannheim to distinguish between an incoherent relativism and a consistent relationism. Both authors seek to revise epistemology fundamentally by reinterpreting the concept of objectivity in two ways: as inner- and inter-style objectivity. The argument for the latter concept shows the genuine political background and intent of Fleck's sociology of science and its ambition to relieve the cultural struggles of his time. Keywords Karl Mannheim * Ludwik Fleck * Relationism * Relativism * Sociology of knowledge * Sociology of science, 1 Relman and Absman Here is what I take to be the typical structure of one of the oldest debates in philosophy: someone, let's call him 'Relman', claims for example [...]

This paper offers a refutation of J. C. Pinto de Oliveira's recent critique of revisionist Carnap scholarship as giving undue weight to two brief letters to Kuhn expressing his interest in the latter's work. First an argument is provided to show that Carnap and Kuhn are by no means divided by a radical mismatch of their conceptions of the rationality of science as supposedly evidenced by their stance towards the distinction of the contexts of discovery and justification. This is followed by an argument to the effect that the fact that Carnap's own work concentrated on formal aspects of scientific theories does not licence the conclusion that he thought historical investigations and concerns irrelevant for what we nowadays would rightly call 'philosophy of science'. Keywords Rudolf Carnap * Distinction of contexts of discovery and justification * History of science * Thomas Kuhn * Logical empiricism, In a recent article Pinto de Oliveira (2007) formulated a critique of revisionist Vienna Circle and particularly Carnap scholarship that is of considerable interest. If it were correct, his criticism [...]

This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (metaphysical) realist semantics leads to semantic agnosticism in the sense that we are unable to grasp the proper meanings and referents of our linguistic expressions. Having established this, I will focus more specifically on the question of whether scientific realism--in its state-of-the-art account--has the resources to make reference to scientific concepts intelligible such that the semantic challenges can be answered. Keywords Causal-descriptive theory of reference * Internal realism * Metaphysical realism * Scientific and structural realism * Ramsey account of scientific theories * Theoretical concepts, 1 Introduction In investigation of the semantics of linguistic expressions, a distinction emerged between scientific realism and a more general conception of realism. The latter conception also includes, among other [...]

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt's account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block 'verificationist antirealism' because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism. Keywords Realism * Ontology * Verificationist antirealism * Mind-independence, 1 Introduction It is widely held that realism is primarily a metaphysical thesis and should be understood as a view about what there is. A realist position, we are told, [...]

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction--traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism--can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies. Keywords Biomedical sciences * Epistemic interests * Explanatory pluralism * Reductive explanations * Social sciences, 1 Introduction In the chapter on reductionism of Thinking about Biology, Stephen Webster defines reductionism as follows: Let us label this philosophy straight away: it is called reductionism, and can [...]

The paper discusses three different ways of explaining the referential stability of concepts of physics. In order to be successful, an approach to referential stability has to provide resources to understand what constitutes the difference between the birth of a new concept with a history of its own, and an innovative step occurring within the lifetime of a persisting concept with stable reference. According to Theodore Arabatzis' 'biographical' approach (Representing Electrons 2006), the historical continuity of representations of the electron manifests itself by the numerical stability of experimental parameters like the charge-to-mass ratio, and the continued acceptance of earlier experiments as manifestations of electron properties. I argue, against Arabatzis' approach, that the stability of experimental parameters justifies the assumption that there exists a chain of representations of a unique theoretical entity only if this stability occurs against the background of evidence for theoretical continuity. The Bain/Norton approach proposes to add exactly this element to the picture, but fails to reach its aim by focusing on formal similarities of Hamiltonians as an indicator of theoretical continuity. I shall argue that theoretical continuity has to be demonstrated rather on the level of particular solutions. This task is accomplished by the semantic embedding approach by means of defining a co-reference criterion for theoretical terms requiring the existence of semantic embedding relations between the terms that occur in particular solutions of different theories. Keywords Concepts * Co-reference * Physics theories * Reference * Theory change, 1 Introduction Since the 1960s the identity of concepts of physics across theory changes has been the subject of intense discussion both in the philosophy of science (e.g. Achinstein 1968; [...]

This paper is a reply to Michael Wolff's refusal of my critique of his 'Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlusse bei Aristoteles und Kant', as far as Aristotle concerned. Wolff claims [...]

This paper follows the circuitous path of theories concerning the origins of viruses from the early years of the twentieth century until the present, considering RNA viruses in particular. I focus on three periods during which new understandings of the nature of viruses guided the construction and reconstruction of origin hypotheses. During the first part of the twentieth century, viruses were mostly viewed from within the framework of bacteriology and the discussion of origin centered on the 'degenerative' or the 'retrograde evolution theory.' However, concomitantly, in the context of origin-of-life theorizing, the notion that viruses are vestiges of a prebiotic world was also being contemplated. In the 1960s the idea that viruses were genetic elements that 'escaped' from cells became prevalent. These traditional hypotheses are being revisited nowadays by evolutionary virologists, who have placed them within a new conceptual framework that is supported by cutting-edge genomic and proteomic data. Two current, opposing scenarios of virus origin are presented. The philosophical dimensions of 'revisiting' the original hypotheses are briefly discussed. Keywords Protovirus * Retrograde evolution * Revisiting * RNA world * Virus origin, 1 Introduction A major topic addressed in this special issue relates to the question of whether the gap between functional biology and evolution has been successfully bridged. Powerful technologies such [...]

This paper discusses some philosophical and historical connections between, and within, nineteenth century evolutionism and microscopical research. The principal actors are mainly Darwin, Schleiden, Whewell and the 'London Doctors,' Arthur Henfrey and Edwin Lankester. I demonstrate that the apparent alliances--particularly Darwin/Schleiden (through evolutionism) and Schleiden/Whewell (through Kantian philosophy of science)--obscure the deep methodological differences between evolutionist and microscopical biology that lingered on until the mid-twentieth century. Through an understanding of the little known significance of Schleiden's programme of microscopical research and by comparing certain features of his methodology to the activities of the 'London Doctors,' we can identify the origin of this state of affairs. In addition, the outcome provides an insight into a critique of Buchdahl's view on Schleiden's philosophical conception. Keywords Evolutionism * Microscopy * Reliabilism * Schleiden * Whewell * Darwin, 1 Introduction The emergence of nineteenth and twentieth century biology represents a highly complex phenomenon of which every narrative, focusing on particular ideas, methods, findings and heroes, falls far short. [...]

According to a common belief concerning the Mach-Boltzmann debate on atoms, the new experiments performed in microphysics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries confirmed Boltzmann's atomic hypothesis and disproved Mach's anti-atomic view. This paper intends to show that this belief is partially unjustified. Mach's view on atoms consists in fact of different kinds of arguments. While the new experiments in microphysics refute indeed his scientific arguments against the atomic hypothesis, his epistemological arguments are unaffected. In this regard, Mach's epistemological approach remains relevant for today's discussion on the status of the notion of atom. Keywords Mach * Atomism * Anti-realism * Instrumentalism * Boltzmann, 1 Introduction In the last part of the 19th century, the question of the existence of atoms was at the core of an intense debate between the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann [...]