A REFUTATION OF PURE CONJECTURE

Byline: TIMOTHY CLEVELAND (1) Keywords: Popper; induction; refutation; grue; truth Abstract: The present paper explores three interrelated topicsin Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aimof science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning.Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture.Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackleit by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferentialconsiderations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses andeducated guesses in an attempt to show that there is more toscientific conjecture than conjecture. The suggestion is made thatsome inductive considerations enter into the process of educatedguessing or scientific conjecture in such a way that the 'context ofdiscovery' cannot be sharply separated from the 'context of justification'. Thisdiscussion leads to a tension between Popper's negative method ofconjecture and his realism. Given Popper's (implicit) theory ofmeaning it seems Popper's epistemology (the conjecture andrefutation method) is incompatible with his metaphysical realism. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Philosophy, New Mexico State University, Box 30001/Dept 3B., Las Cruces, New Mexico, 88003-0001 Article History: Registration Date: 06/09/2004