Relativism or relationism? A Mannheimian interpretation of Fleck's claims about relativism

The paper explores the defence by the early sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck against the charge of relativism. It is shown that there are crucial and hitherto unnoticed similarities between Fleck's strategy and the attempt by his contemporary Karl Mannheim to distinguish between an incoherent relativism and a consistent relationism. Both authors seek to revise epistemology fundamentally by reinterpreting the concept of objectivity in two ways: as inner- and inter-style objectivity. The argument for the latter concept shows the genuine political background and intent of Fleck's sociology of science and its ambition to relieve the cultural struggles of his time. Keywords Karl Mannheim * Ludwik Fleck * Relationism * Relativism * Sociology of knowledge * Sociology of science
1 Relman and Absman Here is what I take to be the typical structure of one of the oldest debates in philosophy: someone, let's call him 'Relman', claims for example [...]