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This paper develops a theoretical argument that explains the patterns of change in bothsocial insurance and social assistance in Mexico over the last two decades and explains some ofthe apparent contradictions in the existing literature on globalization, democratic institutions, andwelfare in Latin America. By comparing multiple social insurance and social assistance policyoutcomes during the Salinas (1988-1994), Zedillo (1994-2000), and Fox (2000-2006)administrations, the paper demonstrates that though globalization may constrain welfare policyoptions, its impact is often indirect, through its effect on the relative political capacity ofdomestic actors. Furthermore, political liberalization changes the incentives for politicians tosupply welfare. In addition, existing welfare institutions create powerful policy legacies thatinfluence the interests of some domestic political actors. The overall pattern that emerges inMexico is one of partial retrenchment of social insurance and the expansion of targeted socialassistance, a pattern that can be explained in light of economic liberalization, democratization,and policy legacies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to shed light on the relationship between democratic accountability and local public good provision in Mexico. I assess the way in which the system of intergovernmental finances has allowed municipal governments to remain rather unaccountable to citizens in the provision of public goods and services at the local level. By looking at the determinants of the reelection rates of the parties that control the municipal government, I explore the extent to which the process of decentralization and the way in which local governments use decentralized fiscal transfers is linked to the retention of municipal governments in the hands of the same party. Though this does not provide a direct test of the accountability of politicians to citizens, it suggests that the punishment of incumbents who fail to deliver in certain aspects of public policy is a critical tool that may allow Mexicans to align their interests with those of their representative governments. The findings, however, suggest a rather strong entrenchment of incumbents from all parties, based on the construction of clientelism and patronage networks, rather than the provision of public goods. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent wave of political transitions has often led to competitive elections, but not always to the minimal institutional guarantees of civil and political rights or the responsive policy outcomes that are generally associated with democratic regimes. Scholars have offered a range of explanations for the differences in the quality of these new democracies. Aspects of socioeconomic structure, institutional configurations, and the strategic choices of elite actors have each been proposed, but these hypotheses are rarely systematically tested against each other. In this paper, I draw on the experiences of Mexico’s thirty-one recently empowered state governments in the years since that country’s pivotal 1988 presidential election to provide just such a test. My statistical analyses indicate that legislative pluralism, the strength of radical opposition parties, and economic inequality each have an important effect on the quality of new democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the institutional legacies of the one-party regime in Mexico and Russia respectively as they make the transition to democracy and market economies. Despite their differing histories, the countries are responding to similar globalization pressures, in roughly similar ways. However the Soviet legacy of strict limits on institutional pluralism and lack of a mechanism for ensuring leadership rotation left Russia ill-prepared for the democratic transition in comparison with Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do dominant parties persist in power for decades and under what conditions do challengers expand enough to beat them at the polls, thus transforming these systems into fully competitive democracies with turnover? Unlike in one-party regimes, the world's 16 dominant party systems feature open and meaningful electoral competition; however, dominant parties have persisted despite enough social cleavages, permissive electoral institutions, negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent, and sufficient ideological space for challengers to occupy. I craft a resource theory of dominance that focuses on the incumbent's ability to divert public resources for partisan use. Using formal theory, I show how asymmetric resources and costs of participation force challengers to form as non-centrist and under-competitive parties. Only when these asymmetries decline do opposition parties expand. I test the theory's predictions using survey data of party elites in Mexico. I also extend the argument to Malaysia and Italy using aggregate data. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A flood of scholarship has demonstrated the importance of civil society to democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, and making democracy work. However, if civil society is important for democracy, what are the implications for countries where the state has historically controlled societal forms of organization? This research attempts to understand how civil society grows and develops in Mexico, a country with a traditionally weak third sector, which has grown exponentially since the decline of one-party rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When citizens lack firm dispositions to guide their thinking about politics, it is difficult for them to hold leaders accountable for public policies, and the quality of democratic governance is likely to suffer. In this article, we exploit a recent four-wave panel survey to examine patterns of attitude stability and change during Mexico’s 2000 presidential race. We find that the degree of attitude stability in Mexico depends heavily on the type of dispositions considered: partisan self-identification, presidential approval, ideology, or attitudes about salient public issues. Overall, however, Mexican public opinion is well formed enough on key dimensions for citizens to play the role of political protagonists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Without a majority in the Congress, the president's party looses the ability to direct policy change. With only one third of the vote, the president's party can prevent any initiative from turning into law. Individual opposition parties gain influence under divided government but lack the power to veto policy change. Contrary to what critics of presidentialism have argued, political parties in presidential regimes lack in incentives to cooperate and build policy-making coalitions. Coalition-building depends on the potential gains of cooperation that both the president's party and the opposition parties can capture if they modify the status quo. Two sufficient conditions for coalition-building can be identified: an extreme position of the status quo, and the location of the president's party at the median position. This explains law change and the size of lawmaking coalitions under divided government in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]