A Resource Theory of Single-Party Dominance.

Why do dominant parties persist in power for decades and under what conditions do challengers expand enough to beat them at the polls, thus transforming these systems into fully competitive democracies with turnover? Unlike in one-party regimes, the world's 16 dominant party systems feature open and meaningful electoral competition; however, dominant parties have persisted despite enough social cleavages, permissive electoral institutions, negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent, and sufficient ideological space for challengers to occupy. I craft a resource theory of dominance that focuses on the incumbent's ability to divert public resources for partisan use. Using formal theory, I show how asymmetric resources and costs of participation force challengers to form as non-centrist and under-competitive parties. Only when these asymmetries decline do opposition parties expand. I test the theory's predictions using survey data of party elites in Mexico. I also extend the argument to Malaysia and Italy using aggregate data. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]