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This study explores the development of English textbooks in North Korea through corpus-based analysis aimed at illuminating the differences between materials produced during the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un regimes. In the context of educational reforms and changing political ideology, this study investigates BNC/COCA-based lexical coverage and the key lexical features of North Korean middle school English textbooks, highlighting the complexity, vocabulary, and readability of the learning materials. The findings revealed that the Kim Jong-un regime had implemented reforms to improve English language education, with increased lexical diversity, textual complexity, and vocabulary exposure. Although no significant differences were found between the two regimes regarding the lexical coverage of textbooks, the Kim Jong-un regime's textbooks exhibited improvements in diversity, readability, and complexity. This study contributes to a broader understanding of the interplay between political ideology and English language education in North Korea, offering insights that have implications beyond the North Korean context and encouraging reflection on the nation-driven educational reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose--Scholars note that understanding the political philosophy, interests, and objectives of North Korea's leaders has been extremely difficult and a long list of frustrated attempts by other nations to deal with its regimes is a testimony to that fact. The purpose of this paper is to establish a quantitative baseline of key narrative themes in the political discourse used by North Korea's rulers, track key shifts in these themes through time, and test hypotheses about leader similarities and differences. Design/Methodology/Approach--This study uses a quantitative discourse analysis methodology derived from thematic analysis, discourse analysis, and quantitative content analysis methods applied to 144 speeches and writings of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un to assess the relative importance of issues and cultural themes in a North Korean leader's discourse. Finding--The political narratives of North Korea's leaders are grounded in core themes of Juche political philosophy and this study reinforces the quasi-religious nature of Juche philosophy and the Kim family cult of personality. However, Kim Il-sung and to a lesser extent Kim Jong-un, have exhibited an ability to adapt their narratives to changing circumstances. Themes central to the early Kim regime such as democracy and the fight against Western imperialism decreased through time. Recent narrative shifts by Kim Jong-un closely track his antagonistic relations with U.S. presidents from 2012 to 2018, then exhibit a rapprochement early in 2018, although this fades in both words and deeds by the summer of 2019. Practical Implications--Western policy makers have found understanding North Korean political leaders extremely difficult. Once a leader's worldview is understood, it should be easier to understand the leader's interests and perhaps even anticipate strategic objectives and political actions. Originality, Value--This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the majority of available speeches and writings produced by North Korea's leaders. The quantitative discourse analysis method presented was expressly developed to provide policymakers with guidance and produces quantitative and reproducible results useful for testing hypotheses about the Kim regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose—While many scholars have studied how the Kim regimes have absorbed the Korean War into North Korea’s national narrative, no one has conducted a systematic study of how the Kims wield that history as part their policy toolbox. The purpose of this paper is to compare how and how often Kim Jong- Il and Kim Jong- Un reference the Korean War between 1998 and 2018 to advance their policy objectives. Design, Methodology, Approach—Drawing from the literature on availability and representative heuristics, this paper argues that Kim Jong- Un will reference the Korean War more often than Kim Jong- Il. To test that theory, this paper applies quantitative content analysis to KCNA articles between 1998 and 2018 to determine how often KCNA under both Kim Jong- Il and Kim Jong- Un cite the Korean War. Then, this paper applies Yuen Foon Khong’s analytical framework (2009) to assess how the two Kims used the Korean War for diagnosis, advocacy, and justification in policy decisions. Findings—The results confirm the author’s theory on who uses the Korean War more often: KCNA under Kim Jong- Un highlights the Korean War 1.8 times more frequently than it does under Kim Jong- Il. In addition, the Kims wield the Korean War most often to advocate policy positions. Practical Implications—This study confirms the utility of the availability and representative heuristics in understanding how Kim Jong- Un and Kim Jong- Il perceive their environment. The study also provides support that the heuristics are useful for predicting how individuals might behave in the presence of certain conditions. Based on these findings, the study observes there are both troubling and useful implications for policymakers to leverage awareness of these operating heuristics in the mind of North Korean leaders. Originality, Value—This paper makes an original contribution to the understanding of the frequency and use of the Korean War by North Korean leaders. Using a quantitative and qualitative approach, this paper provides a framework which can be applied to extract new insights into North Korea across wider periods and different topics. This paper also contributes to the literature of how policymakers use history as a tool to advance their objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kim Jong Un assumed power and gradually transformed the policymaking environment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). While some analysts expected the young and inexperienced leader to face greater hardship than his father in managing the country, in this article I argue that Kim Jong Un faced an easier transition. Kim Jong Un inherited an economy, inter-Korean relationship, and strategic landscape in foreign affairs in a relatively favorable position relative to his father's formal succession. From this position of strength, Kim Jong Un has centralized governance in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and his personal leadership. Drawing on internal documents and media, I show that inter-institutional debate previously observable between the party, military, and government has largely vanished under Kim Jong Un and the political roles of the military and government have receded from a comprehensive set of national policy questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article explores the possibility of predicting the on-the-spot guidance visits of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the military sector and other sectors under military-first politics. It examines the origins of military-first politics in the country. Among the suggested predictors are U.S. and South Korean aid to North Korea and Chinese food aid to North Korea. It notes the use of a predictive model to give an estimate of the frequency of these visits.

The article presents a report on the international relations between Japan and Korea in late 2011. Leadership change in North Korea following the death of leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011 is highlighted. The election of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in September 2011 is also emphasized. A chronology of events about the Japan-Korea relations from September-December 2011 is offered.

The article provides an overview on the bilateral relations in East Asia. The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in 2011 is highlighted. The efforts of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama in strengthening its relations with Asia are outlined. The visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to Burma is emphasized.

The article presents a report on the international relations between China and Korea in late 2011. The commitment of China to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011 is highlighted. A chronology of events about the China-Korea relations from September-December 2011 is offered.

The article presents a report on the international relations between the U.S. and Korea following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011. The visit of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to the U.S. is highlighted. A chronology of events about the U.S.-Korea relations from September-December 2011 is offered.

The article presents a report on the international relations between South Korea and North Korea in late 2011. The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il from a heart attack on December 17, 2011 is highlighted. Expectations on the leadership of Kim Jong Un, the successor of Kim Jong Il, are outlined. A chronology of events about the South Korea-North Korea relations from September-December 2011 is offered.

The article discusses how North Korea uses its geopolical position as a tool for regime survival under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. It also focuses on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and how the country uses it as a survival strategy. Military provocation made by North Korea to South Korea in 2010, such as torpedoing South Korean naval ship Cheonan and the shelling made by North Korean artillery to South Korean island Yeonpyeong, are also discussed.

The article reports on developments concerning South Korea-North Korea relations. It reports on the 10th anniversary of the inter-Korean summit in June 2010 when South Korean President Kim Dae-jung went to Pyongyang to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. The year 2010 marks several anniversaries on the Korean Peninsula, including the centenary of Japan's occupation of Korea in 1910 and the ouster of South Korea's authoritarian first leader Syngman Rhee.

This section offers news briefs on North Korea. The South Korean National Intelligence Agency (NIS) intercepted messages from North Korea that states Kim Jong-un as successor of his father Kim Jong-il. Two detained American journalists has been put on trial by the Central Court of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United Nations Security Council imposed UN Resolution 1874 on North Korea banning all trade of weapons to the country as a response to the latter's nuclear test on May 25, 2009.

The article discusses the relations of China and Korea as of 2009. It states that Kim Jong-Il's talks with former U.S. President Bill Clinton and Hyundai Chairperson Hyun Jung-Eun in August 2009, State Councilor Dai Bingguo in September 2009 and Premier Wen Jiabao in October indicated North Korea's shift toward diplomacy. Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Hu Jintao held a summit meeting after Lee's proposal for dealing with North Korea.

The article discusses the promises kept by the U.S. and North Korea regarding their international relations. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting and signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) representing the U.S. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il ignored all United Nations Security Council resolutions, shot more missiles, and never returned to the Six-Party Talks. U.S. President Barack Obama took steps toward global disarmament.

The article explores the probable causal association between the belief systems of top leaders and policy priorities by looking at the attitude of administrations of former U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush toward the Korean Peninsula. It discusses the reasons behind the emergence of nuclear impasse at the end of the Clinton administration. It provides an overview of how the Bush administration chose to dismiss the Kim Jong II regime in North Korea as a legitimate counterpart.

The article presents an overview of issues related to East Asian bilateral relations. It relates the selection of Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China for the first official trip overseas of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It discusses the impact of the announcement made by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to conduct a satellite launch in early April 2009 and describes the drama surrounding the ballistic missile launch. It discusses the status of the Six-Party Talks.

This essay makes a comparative examination of the North Korean Juche-Stalinist literary ideas in Kim Il Sung's Duties of Literature and Arts in Our Revolution and Kim Jong Il's On the Art of the Cinema. Outlined are the backgrounds of the Kims, their definitions of literature, their conceptions of the writer, and their character typologies of heroes and villains. The essay concludes with a critical summary, discusses the problems of the meta-author and intentional fallacy, and proposes reading strategies for interpreting North Korean literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The only significant part of North Korean propaganda that is uncritically accepted in the foreign research community is the regime's claim to be guided in its policy-making by Kim I1 Sung's Juche Thought. Oddly enough the Western consensus regarding Juche's crucial importance to Pyongyang has never been accompanied by much research into the doctrine. Usually it is described in a sentence or two as a cult-like ideology of self-reliance. The following article sets out to show that the conventional wisdom is mistaken: Juche Thought exists to be praised and not read, let alone implemented. The little paraphrasable sense that can be extracted from the official sources is not only distinct from, but in many respects incompatible with, the paranoid, race-based nationalism that has always constituted North Korea's true dominant ideology. In addition, the article seeks to explain how it was that the outside world accepted the Juche myth no less readily than did the North Korean people themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political system in North Korea has been characterized as a "Suryong Dominant Party-State System." Since the mid- 1980s, however, its political system has displayed two interesting aspects. Formally, the broad "Suryong System" has been maintained; in practice, however, the Workers' Party of Korea, the Korean People's Army, and the government have come to acquire respectively different and considerably strengthened roles. Under this new regime, Kim Jong II (Suryong) directly rules over the party, the government, and the military. Mean-while, the political-ideological base, the military base, and the economic base are administered respectively by the party, the army, and the government. Interestingly, while the power of the party still overwhelms that of the military and the government, the party's means of influence has changed from giving direct orders to providing provisions or encouraging policy outlines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The very frequent downs of North Korean domestic socio-economic and political development determine the political and security situation, not only in the region of Northeast Asia, but also globally. Despite the effort of the international community, most of the issues regarding North Korea have not been solved and some have not even been addressed, largely due to the uncooperative and 'stubborn' attitude of DPRK leadership. This article argues that as long as the current leader, Kim Jong Il, is in power in North Korea promoting the ideology and realizing the policy that his late father imposed, the internal affairs and foreign policy of this isolated country will not mark any positive progress in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section offers news briefs concerning North Korea. As part of a six-party agreement, North Korea stop the operation of its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in July 2007. From October 2 to 4, 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il met at the second inter-Korean summit. Nine provinces in North Korea were flooded because of heavy rainfall.

The article presents a discussion on the future of North Korea's economy and politics. It is noted that the country will suffer the same fate as the Soviet Union, en economic implosion will take place resulting to the collapse of the government. It is asserted that reforms to economic policies will not prevent the fall of the economy and the regime of Kim Jong Il.

The article discusses the developments in the relations between South Korea and North Korea. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il which produced a series of follow-up meetings. These meetings highlighted the revival of the intercourse between North and South Korea in their 62-year history of separation. South Koreans voted Lee Myung-bak as South Korean president. Le Myung-bak has demanded nuclear arms compliance from North Korea in line with South Korea's assistance/aid to the country.

The article explores several charges filed against Kim Jong II, dictator of North Korea. It is stated that Jong maybe criminally liable for accusations against him such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes during his efforts to denuclearize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.). It is concluded that facts provide a reasonable basis to believe that Kim Jong II and his cadres are individually liable for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. It is recommended that the United Nations Security Council intervene judicially in the D.P.R.K. by referring the situation to the International Communications Center.

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