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Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism., Preispitivanje i transformacija fenomena kritike i krize u društvenoj teoriji su poslednjih de cenija doveli do slabljenja pa i do delegitimacijskog osporavanja navedenog dubleta. U radu se razmatraju mogućnosti obnove diskursa o kritici/krizi s mogućim delatnim učincima, uz poseban osvrt na mogućnosti strukturalne kritike.Različiti autori recentnih analiza se uzima ju u obzir, te se razmatraju stanovišta koja vode do ponovnog razmatranja istorijskog i ana litičkog dinamizma kategorija strukture i konjunkture kao razrade aktuelnih strukturalnih procesa u terminima strukturalne analize i kritike. Rad se sastoji iz tri dela. U prvom delu razmatramo zbog čega su kritika i kriza koje su izvorno spojene podvrgnuti različitim proce sima derogiranja. U drugom delu pokazujemo efekte promene načina ispoljavanja krize u kapitalizmu, tačnije osvetljavamo njenu disperzivne i ne-punktualne modalitete. U trećem delu postavljamo pitanje o šansama ponovnog spajanja krize i kritike na osnovu navigacije strukturalne kritike, nadalje artikulišemo njene veze sa „imanentnom kritikom“. Strukturalna kritika se analizira kao spoj između imanentne kritike i transcendentnog usmerenja koji radi na reconnections between crisis and critique as the elements of relationship to capitalism.

Originating from the fields of philosophy and history, the term historicism is often used by architectural historians. Aiming to contribute to the theoretical framework for the analysis of architectural historicism, the paper first explores the meaning of the concept in its native field of philosophy of history. The paper is aligned with the recent scholarship which interprets historicism as a worldview and deduces three historicist principles – principles of holism, individuality, and development. This paper argues that an historicist outlook marked wider creative achievements of an epoch, and that architecture of the period approximately ranging from the 1750s to the 1950s did not evade its influence. Finally, the paper illustrates the three principles in the idea of building for the age which haunted architects of the Western civilisation for almost two centuries.

Originating from the fields of philosophy and history, the term historicism is often used by architectural historians. Aiming to contribute to the theoretical framework for the analysis of architectural historicism, the paper first explores the meaning of the concept in its native field of philosophy of history. The paper is aligned with the recent scholarship which interprets historicism as a worldview and deduces three historicist principles – principles of holism, individuality, and development. This paper argues that an historicist outlook marked wider creative achievements of an epoch, and that architecture of the period approximately ranging from the 1750s to the 1950s did not evade its influence. Finally, the paper illustrates the three principles in the idea of building for the age which haunted architects of the Western civilisation for almost two centuries.

Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism., Preispitivanje i transformacija fenomena kritike i krize u društvenoj teoriji su poslednjih de cenija doveli do slabljenja pa i do delegitimacijskog osporavanja navedenog dubleta. U radu se razmatraju mogućnosti obnove diskursa o kritici/krizi s mogućim delatnim učincima, uz poseban osvrt na mogućnosti strukturalne kritike.Različiti autori recentnih analiza se uzima ju u obzir, te se razmatraju stanovišta koja vode do ponovnog razmatranja istorijskog i ana litičkog dinamizma kategorija strukture i konjunkture kao razrade aktuelnih strukturalnih procesa u terminima strukturalne analize i kritike. Rad se sastoji iz tri dela. U prvom delu razmatramo zbog čega su kritika i kriza koje su izvorno spojene podvrgnuti različitim proce sima derogiranja. U drugom delu pokazujemo efekte promene načina ispoljavanja krize u kapitalizmu, tačnije osvetljavamo njenu disperzivne i ne-punktualne modalitete. U trećem delu postavljamo pitanje o šansama ponovnog spajanja krize i kritike na osnovu navigacije strukturalne kritike, nadalje artikulišemo njene veze sa „imanentnom kritikom“. Strukturalna kritika se analizira kao spoj između imanentne kritike i transcendentnog usmerenja koji radi na reconnections between crisis and critique as the elements of relationship to capitalism.

Originating from the fields of philosophy and history, the term historicism is often used by architectural historians. Aiming to contribute to the theoretical framework for the analysis of architectural historicism, the paper first explores the meaning of the concept in its native field of philosophy of history. The paper is aligned with the recent scholarship which interprets historicism as a worldview and deduces three historicist principles – principles of holism, individuality, and development. This paper argues that an historicist outlook marked wider creative achievements of an epoch, and that architecture of the period approximately ranging from the 1750s to the 1950s did not evade its influence. Finally, the paper illustrates the three principles in the idea of building for the age which haunted architects of the Western civilisation for almost two centuries.

Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism., Preispitivanje i transformacija fenomena kritike i krize u društvenoj teoriji su poslednjih de cenija doveli do slabljenja pa i do delegitimacijskog osporavanja navedenog dubleta. U radu se razmatraju mogućnosti obnove diskursa o kritici/krizi s mogućim delatnim učincima, uz poseban osvrt na mogućnosti strukturalne kritike.Različiti autori recentnih analiza se uzima ju u obzir, te se razmatraju stanovišta koja vode do ponovnog razmatranja istorijskog i ana litičkog dinamizma kategorija strukture i konjunkture kao razrade aktuelnih strukturalnih procesa u terminima strukturalne analize i kritike. Rad se sastoji iz tri dela. U prvom delu razmatramo zbog čega su kritika i kriza koje su izvorno spojene podvrgnuti različitim proce sima derogiranja. U drugom delu pokazujemo efekte promene načina ispoljavanja krize u kapitalizmu, tačnije osvetljavamo njenu disperzivne i ne-punktualne modalitete. U trećem delu postavljamo pitanje o šansama ponovnog spajanja krize i kritike na osnovu navigacije strukturalne kritike, nadalje artikulišemo njene veze sa „imanentnom kritikom“. Strukturalna kritika se analizira kao spoj između imanentne kritike i transcendentnog usmerenja koji radi na reconnections between crisis and critique as the elements of relationship to capitalism.

This paper offers an alternative theoretical consideration of ethnic identification in psychology. Mainstream social psychological theories are largely positivist and individualistic. New possibilities of theoretical understanding open up as the relational and symbolic nature of ethnicity enters psychological inquiry. This paper takes culture and self as two conceptual domains of social identification, following a meta-theoretical position of cultural psychology. The central focus is the cultural development of the person in social context of a given culture, specifically their ethnic identification, to which end, it looks at several processual aspects. First, ethnic culture is approached as a guiding principle and practice in everyday understanding and experience of one’s own ethnicity. Second, ethnic identification is considered a social and personal act of meaning making, which happens in a given social context, through practical activity and the discursive positioning of a person. Third, since rather than considered a conscious aspect of belonging, ethnicity is assumed and taken for granted, ruptures are considered as destabilizing events that create an opportunity for ethnic meaning reinterpretation and developmental transition. In the meaning making process, symbolic resources are conceived of as primary self-configuring tools, which are also culture[1]configuring. Ethnic meaning making is theorized as a central social[1]psychological process through which ethnic culture and a person as an ethnic subject emerge in historical perspective. Finally, the uniqueness of a singular person in the shared ethnic culture is conceptualized based on symbolic distancing from the immediate social context, through the model of knitting personal and socio-historical semiotic threads., Ovaj rad nudi alternativno teorijsko razmatranje etničke identifikacije u psihologiji. Glavne socijalno-psihološke teorije već su razmatrane kao pozitivističke i individualističke. Nove mogućnosti teorijskog razumevanja otvaraju se kada se u psihološko izučavanje uvedu relaciona i simbolička priroda etniciteta. Ovaj rad uzima kulturu i sopstvo kao dva konceptualna domena socijalne identifikacije, koji slede iz meta-teorijske pozicije kulturne psihologije. Glavni fokus rada je kulturni razvoj osobe u socijalnom kontekstu date kulture, specifično njene etničke identifikacije, u cilju čega posmatra nekoliko procesualnih aspekata. Prvo, etničkoj kulturi se pristupa kao vodećem principu i praksi u svakodnevnom razumevanju i iskustvu sopstvenog etniciteta. Drugo, etnička identifikacije se smatra socijalnim i ličnim aktom kreiranja značenja, koji se dešava u datom socijalnom kontekstu, kroz praktičnu aktivnost i diskurzivno pozicioniranje osobe. Treće, s obzirom da se etnicitet ne razmatra kao svesni aspekt pripadnosti, već se podrazumeva i uzima zdravo za gotovo, rupture se razmatraju kao destabilizujući događaji koji stvaraju prilike za reinterpretaciju etničkih značenja i razvojne promene. U procesu kreiranja značenja, simbolički resursi se smatraju primarnim samo-konstruišućim oruđima, koji su istovremeno konstruišući za kulturu. Kreiranje etničkih značenja se teoretizuje kao centralni socijalno-psihološki proces kroz koji etnička kultura i osoba kao etnički subjekat nastaju u istorijskoj perspektivi. Na kraju, jedinstvenost singularne osobe u zajedničkoj etničkoj kulturi konceptualizuje se na osnovu simboličkog distanciranja od neposrednog socijalnog konteksta kroz model pletenja ličnih i socio-istorijskih semiotičkih niti.

This paper presents three interconnected examinations of Asger Sørensen’s arguments in Capitalism, Alienation and Critique, which thematize Sørensen’s overarching understanding of the relationship between theory and practice: his general methodological perspective on critical theory, its distinctive epistemology and its anchoring in the empirical world. The paper authors each try to push Sørensen on these crucial points by considering how Sørensen’s variant of critical theory actually operates, scrutinizing in more detail the particular relationship between the ‘experience of injustice’, which for Sørensen constitutes the empirical foothold for critical theory, and the theoretical diagnosis of social reality which the critical theorist should formulate against the backdrop of this experience., Ovaj rad predstavlja tri povezana ispitivanja argumentacije Asgera Serensena u Kapitalizmu, otuđenju i kritici, koja tematizuju Serensenovo generalno razumevanje odnosa teorije i prak se, drugim rečima njegovu metodološku perspektivu u pogledu kritičke teorije, njene speci fične epistemologije i njene ukorenjenosti u empirijskom svetu. Marjan Ivković, Srđan Pro danović i Milan Urošević nastoje da problematizuju Serensenovo stanovište razmatrajući način na koji Serensenova kritička teorija zapravo funkcioniše, analizirajući detaljnije odnos između ,iskustva nepravdeʻ, koje za Serensena predstavlja empirijsko uporište kritičke teo rije, i teorijske dijagnoze društvene stvarnosti koju kritički teoretičar formuliše na temelju tog iskustva

Until a decade ago, a comprehensive contestation of the so-called “transitional” paradigm was largely missing in the post-socialist era. This reality changed in the last ten years, especially in the region of former Yugoslavia. Some social movements in this region have started questioning the very essence of the economic and social misconceptions of the post[1]socialist condition. This paper first provides an elaboration of the very conceptual edifice of the ruling paradigm (hence the object of the critique of the three social movements in question), as well as a theoretical and methodological framework. It goes on to map out the epistemic discursive content of the respective social movements in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, thereby assessing the conceptual content of their critique of the post-socialist transitional paradigm. Finally, given the similarities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the paper seeks to explain variations in the critique by how the structural and contextual features impact the perspective from which it is constructed., Do pre desetak godina, sveobuhvatna kritika takozvane ‘tranzitološke paradigme’ je u dobroj meri izostajala u eri post-socijalizma. Ovakva realnost promenjena je u poslednjoj deceniji, a posebno u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Pojedini društveni pokreti su u ovoj regiji počeli da propituju suštinu ekonomskih i društvenih protivrečnosti post-socijalističkog stanja. Ovaj članak po-činjem elaboracijom konceptualne konstrukcije vladajuće paradigme kao objekta kritike tri društvena pokreta kojima se bavim – a onda i elaboracijom teorijskog i metodološkog okvira. Potom nastavljam sa mapiranjem epistemološkog diskursa tri pokreta u Beogradu, Zagrebu i Sarajevu – i time ispitujem konceptualni sadržaj njihove kritike post-socijalističke paradi-gme. Konačno, uzevši u obzir sličnosti između Srbije, Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, ovaj članak teži da objasni varijacije u prirodi kritike – imajući u vidu način na koji su strukturne i kontekstualne karakteristike ove tri zemlje uticale na perspektivu iz koje su kritike bile konstruisane.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons’s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons’s main criticism., Ovaj rad proširuje konceptualnu distinkciju Alana Džona Simonsa između lokovske koncep cije legitimiteta (koja se zasniva na pristanku) i kantovske koncepcije legitimiteta (koja se za sniva na opravdanju) koju je primenio na pitanje legitimnosti država, odnosno na pitanje le gitimnosti javnih odluka. U radu kritikujem koncepciju legitimiteta zasnovanog na pristanku koju Simons zastupa, te branim rolsovsku verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnovane na oprav danju od prigovora. Ovaj rad je karakterističan po tome što se ove dve koncepcije legitimi teta procenjuju kroz istraživanje, primenom metode refleksivne ravnoteže, njihovih odgova rajućih propisa koji se tiču lečenja antisocijalnog poremećaja ličnosti (ASPD) i epidemioloških mera. Tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže ne podržava koncepciju legitimnosti zasnovane na pristanku. Izumajući u obzir problem lečenja ASPD-a i problem epidemioloških mera, tvr dim da koncepcija zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena za procenu normi koje se ne tiču striktno govoreći nas samih. Ovo prouzrokuje nedovoljan odgovor za relevantne društvene probleme. Dalje, razmatrajući slučaj odgovora na epidemije, pokazujem da ova koncepcija legitimnosti može da izbegne štetne posledice samo pozivanjem na dodatne i nezavisne premise. Iako neuzrokuje nekoherentnost, ovo umanjuje koherentnost normativ nog sistema. Konačno, koncepcija legitimnosti zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena da podrži društvenu saradnju na optimalan način, što se pokazalo neophodnim u kritičnim uslovima poput pandemije. S druge strane, tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže podržava Rolsovu verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnove na opravdanju zbog svojih prednosti u rešavanju navedenih problema. Pored toga, pokazujem dal koncepcijaegitimiteta zsnovana na opravdanju poštuje slobodu i jednakost delatnika kao moralnih samozakonodavaca, te da nije podložna Simonsovim glavnim kritikama.

Until a decade ago, a comprehensive contestation of the so-called “transitional” paradigm was largely missing in the post-socialist era. This reality changed in the last ten years, especially in the region of former Yugoslavia. Some social movements in this region have started questioning the very essence of the economic and social misconceptions of the post[1]socialist condition. This paper first provides an elaboration of the very conceptual edifice of the ruling paradigm (hence the object of the critique of the three social movements in question), as well as a theoretical and methodological framework. It goes on to map out the epistemic discursive content of the respective social movements in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, thereby assessing the conceptual content of their critique of the post-socialist transitional paradigm. Finally, given the similarities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the paper seeks to explain variations in the critique by how the structural and contextual features impact the perspective from which it is constructed., Do pre desetak godina, sveobuhvatna kritika takozvane ‘tranzitološke paradigme’ je u dobroj meri izostajala u eri post-socijalizma. Ovakva realnost promenjena je u poslednjoj deceniji, a posebno u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Pojedini društveni pokreti su u ovoj regiji počeli da propituju suštinu ekonomskih i društvenih protivrečnosti post-socijalističkog stanja. Ovaj članak po-činjem elaboracijom konceptualne konstrukcije vladajuće paradigme kao objekta kritike tri društvena pokreta kojima se bavim – a onda i elaboracijom teorijskog i metodološkog okvira. Potom nastavljam sa mapiranjem epistemološkog diskursa tri pokreta u Beogradu, Zagrebu i Sarajevu – i time ispitujem konceptualni sadržaj njihove kritike post-socijalističke paradi-gme. Konačno, uzevši u obzir sličnosti između Srbije, Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, ovaj članak teži da objasni varijacije u prirodi kritike – imajući u vidu način na koji su strukturne i kontekstualne karakteristike ove tri zemlje uticale na perspektivu iz koje su kritike bile konstruisane.

In my view, making the case for a specific interpretation of Critical Theory is problematic. Although the term has a prestigious origin stemming from Horkheimer’s 1937 paper, Traditional and Critical Theory, given during his term as Director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University and generating the enthusiasm of its members, the term and the movement associated would be defined and radically redefined not only by subsequent generations but by its very author. One of the merits of the book under discussion is that even before the first chapter an ‘Interlude’ is presented entitled Arguing for Classical Critical Theory signifying to the reader that Horkheimer got it right when he defined the subject and that it is possible to return to that particular definition after 83 years. This paper challenges Professor Sørensen’s claims for the restoration of classical Critical Theory on three levels: the scientific, the historical and the political level., Prema mom shvatanju, zastupanje jedne specifične interpretacije kritičke teorije je proble matično. Iako ime kritička teorija ima prestižno poreklo vezano za Horkhajmerov rad iz 1937 Tradicionalna i kritička teorija, ime koje je dato tokom njegovog mandata kao direktora Insti tuta za društvena istraživanja Univerziteta u Frankfurtu, i koje je bilo entuzijastično privha ćeno od strane članova Instituta, samo ime i pokret vezan za njega će biti radikalno redefi nisani, ne samo od strane narednih generacija već i samog autora. Jedna od prednosti knjige o kojoj se ovde diskutuje je da čak i pre prvog poglavlja postoji ,interludijumʻ sa naslovom Argumentovanje u prilog klasičnoj kritičkoj teoriji koje čitaocu sugeriše da je Horkhajmer na ispravan način definisao kritičku teoriju i da je moguće vratiti se toj definiciji posle 83 godi ne. U ovom tekstu preispitujem Serensenove pokušaje restauracije klasične kritičke teorije an tri nivoa: nivou nauke, istorije i politike.

This paper offers an alternative theoretical consideration of ethnic identification in psychology. Mainstream social psychological theories are largely positivist and individualistic. New possibilities of theoretical understanding open up as the relational and symbolic nature of ethnicity enters psychological inquiry. This paper takes culture and self as two conceptual domains of social identification, following a meta-theoretical position of cultural psychology. The central focus is the cultural development of the person in social context of a given culture, specifically their ethnic identification, to which end, it looks at several processual aspects. First, ethnic culture is approached as a guiding principle and practice in everyday understanding and experience of one’s own ethnicity. Second, ethnic identification is considered a social and personal act of meaning making, which happens in a given social context, through practical activity and the discursive positioning of a person. Third, since rather than considered a conscious aspect of belonging, ethnicity is assumed and taken for granted, ruptures are considered as destabilizing events that create an opportunity for ethnic meaning reinterpretation and developmental transition. In the meaning making process, symbolic resources are conceived of as primary self-configuring tools, which are also culture[1]configuring. Ethnic meaning making is theorized as a central social[1]psychological process through which ethnic culture and a person as an ethnic subject emerge in historical perspective. Finally, the uniqueness of a singular person in the shared ethnic culture is conceptualized based on symbolic distancing from the immediate social context, through the model of knitting personal and socio-historical semiotic threads., Ovaj rad nudi alternativno teorijsko razmatranje etničke identifikacije u psihologiji. Glavne socijalno-psihološke teorije već su razmatrane kao pozitivističke i individualističke. Nove mogućnosti teorijskog razumevanja otvaraju se kada se u psihološko izučavanje uvedu relaciona i simbolička priroda etniciteta. Ovaj rad uzima kulturu i sopstvo kao dva konceptualna domena socijalne identifikacije, koji slede iz meta-teorijske pozicije kulturne psihologije. Glavni fokus rada je kulturni razvoj osobe u socijalnom kontekstu date kulture, specifično njene etničke identifikacije, u cilju čega posmatra nekoliko procesualnih aspekata. Prvo, etničkoj kulturi se pristupa kao vodećem principu i praksi u svakodnevnom razumevanju i iskustvu sopstvenog etniciteta. Drugo, etnička identifikacije se smatra socijalnim i ličnim aktom kreiranja značenja, koji se dešava u datom socijalnom kontekstu, kroz praktičnu aktivnost i diskurzivno pozicioniranje osobe. Treće, s obzirom da se etnicitet ne razmatra kao svesni aspekt pripadnosti, već se podrazumeva i uzima zdravo za gotovo, rupture se razmatraju kao destabilizujući događaji koji stvaraju prilike za reinterpretaciju etničkih značenja i razvojne promene. U procesu kreiranja značenja, simbolički resursi se smatraju primarnim samo-konstruišućim oruđima, koji su istovremeno konstruišući za kulturu. Kreiranje etničkih značenja se teoretizuje kao centralni socijalno-psihološki proces kroz koji etnička kultura i osoba kao etnički subjekat nastaju u istorijskoj perspektivi. Na kraju, jedinstvenost singularne osobe u zajedničkoj etničkoj kulturi konceptualizuje se na osnovu simboličkog distanciranja od neposrednog socijalnog konteksta kroz model pletenja ličnih i socio-istorijskih semiotičkih niti.

This paper presents three interconnected examinations of Asger Sørensen’s arguments in Capitalism, Alienation and Critique, which thematize Sørensen’s overarching understanding of the relationship between theory and practice: his general methodological perspective on critical theory, its distinctive epistemology and its anchoring in the empirical world. The paper authors each try to push Sørensen on these crucial points by considering how Sørensen’s variant of critical theory actually operates, scrutinizing in more detail the particular relationship between the ‘experience of injustice’, which for Sørensen constitutes the empirical foothold for critical theory, and the theoretical diagnosis of social reality which the critical theorist should formulate against the backdrop of this experience., Ovaj rad predstavlja tri povezana ispitivanja argumentacije Asgera Serensena u Kapitalizmu, otuđenju i kritici, koja tematizuju Serensenovo generalno razumevanje odnosa teorije i prak se, drugim rečima njegovu metodološku perspektivu u pogledu kritičke teorije, njene speci fične epistemologije i njene ukorenjenosti u empirijskom svetu. Marjan Ivković, Srđan Pro danović i Milan Urošević nastoje da problematizuju Serensenovo stanovište razmatrajući način na koji Serensenova kritička teorija zapravo funkcioniše, analizirajući detaljnije odnos između ,iskustva nepravdeʻ, koje za Serensena predstavlja empirijsko uporište kritičke teo rije, i teorijske dijagnoze društvene stvarnosti koju kritički teoretičar formuliše na temelju tog iskustva

This paper looks at Thomas Szanto’s theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto’s theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred., Članak se fokusira na teoriju mržnje kod Tomasa Santa koja sugeriuše da mržnja nema jasan afektivni fokus, te da njen intentizet proističe iz zalaganja za sam intencionalni stav mržnje. Za razliku od Santove teze, članak trvrdi da omražena svojstva nisu nužno nejasna. Naprotiv, u mnogim slučajevim se precizno može rekonstruisati kvazi-racionalna geneza mržnje, oslanjajući se na duboke strukture iza društvene dinamike (kao što pokazuje primer antisemitizma). Nadalje, članak konstatuje da iako je istina da je u izvesnim slučjavima mržnja bez sadržaja, ovi slučajevi su marginalni u odnosu na druge, značajnije forme mržnje

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics., Tema ovog rada je problem moralnog statusa ne-ljudskih životinja, tj. pitanje da li osećajne životinje imaju moralni značaj. Razmatraju se argumenti u prilog i protiv moralne relevantno-sti životinja, pre svega argument marginalnih slučajeva. Zastupa se tvrdnja da osećajne živo-tinje imaju moralni status na osnovu toga što imaju interese u pogledu svoje iskustvene do-brobiti, ali da postoje različiti stepeni moralnog statusa. Predstavljaju se i razmatraju dva pristupa zasnovana na interesima: Degrasijino gledište da osećajne životinje imaju interes da nastave da žive i da treba pripisati moralni značaj njihovim interesima. i Mekmanova TRIA teorija koja slično tome postulira da životinje imaju interese i da bi u datoj situaciji trebalo uporediti interese ljudi i životinja u pitanju. Najzad, zaključak je da bi trebalo odustati od an-tropocentričnog pristupa zarad biocentrične etike.

Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum 41 contains some rather atypical observations concerning the distinction of sexes in the human person. There is a certain ambiguity as to whether the distinction of the sexes was intended by God and is ‘by nature’ (as found in Genesis and asserted by most Church Fathers) or a product of the Fall. Namely, Christ is described three times as “shaking out of nature the distinctive characteristics of male and female”, “driving out of nature the difference and division of male and female” and “removing the difference between male and female”. Different readings of those passages engender important implications that can be drawn out from the Confessor’s thought, both eschatological implications and otherwise. The subject has been picked up by Cameron Partridge, Doru Costache and Karolina Kochanczyk–Boninska, among others, but is by no means settled, as they draw quite different conclusions. The noteworthy and far-reaching implications of Maximus’ theological stance and problems are not the object of this paper. In a 2017 paper I attempted to demonstrate what Maximus exactly says in these peculiar and oft-commented passages through a close reading, in order to avoid a two-edged Maximian misunderstanding: to either draw overly radical implications from those passages, projecting decidedly non-Maximian visions on the historical Maximus, or none at all, as if those passages represented standard Patristic positions. Here, I am revisiting this argument, given that the interest in what the Confessor has to say on the subject seems to be increasing., Neodoumica (Ambiguum) 41 Maksima Ispovednika sadrži neka prilično netipična zapažanja u vezi sa razlikom među polovima u ljudskoj ličnosti: postoji određena dvosmislenost u po-gledu toga da li je razlika među polovima Božija namera, to jest da li je ona „po prirodi“ (kao što je to starozavetna knjiga Postanja i većina crkvenih otaca tvrdi) ili je ona proizvod pada, pošto je Hristos tri puta opisan kako „izbacuju iz prirode osobenosti muškog i ženskog pola“, „istiskuje iz prirode razliku i podelu na muško i žensko“ i „uklanja razlike između muškog i ženskog“. Različita čitanja tih odlomaka rađaju važne implikacije koje se mogu izvući iz Ispo-vednikove misli, kako eshatološke tako i druge. Bavljenje ovom temom su, između ostalih, odabrali Kameron Partridž, Doru Kostake i Karolina Kočanžik – Boninska, ali ni na koji način ona nije rešena, jer su formulisani sasvim drugačiji zaključci. Značajne i dalekosežne implika-cije Maksimovog teološkog stava, kao i njegovi problemi, nisu predmet ovog rada. U radu iz 2017. godine pokušao sam detaljno da demonstriram šta Maksim tačno kaže u ovim neo-bičnim i često komentarisanim odlomcima, kako bi se izbegao dvosmerni maksimovski nes-porazum – koji bi iz tih odlomaka povukao previše radikalne implikacije, projektujući defini-tivno ne-maksimovske vizije na istorijskog Maksima ili pak projektući gotovo nikakve vizije, uzimajući te odlomke kao standardna patristička stanovišta. Ovde, ponovo preispitujem ovaj argument, s obzirom na to da se čini da interes za ono što Ispovednik kaže na tu temu ne splašnjava, već raste.

The author finds the possibility of overcoming the current liberal-capitalist system in a different conception of time, which requires a different attitude towards both the past and the future. The paper begins with an analysis of the Benjamin’s critique of Marx, followed by analysis of Derrida’s critique of Benjamin and finally Derrida’s critique of Marx. Benjamin points out the problem of teleological understanding of time, the understanding that the meaning of events comes only from the future, which is present in Marx, and which prevents us from escaping the “circle” of violence. Although he relies on Benjamin’s conception of time, the author seeks to transcend the understanding of law as something separate from justice, and law as violence. Therefore, the paper turns to Derrida and his understanding of the law, eventually providing new possibilities for understanding and constituting the left, social theory, but also critical thinking today., Mogućnost prevazilaženja liberalno kapitalističkog Sistema današnjice autor nalazi u druga čijem promišljanju vremena, koje zahteva drugačiji odnos kako spram istorije, tako i buduć nosti. Rad počinje analizom Benjaminove kritike Marksa, koju zatim slede analize Deridine kritike Benjamina i na kraju Deridine kritike Marksa. Benjamin će ukazati na problem teleo loškog razumevanja vremena, shvatanje da smisao događaja dolazi tek iz budućnosti, koje je prisutno kod Marksa, a koje ne dopušta da se izađe iz „začaranog kruga“ nasilja. Premda se oslanja na Benjaminovo poimanje vremena, autor nastoji da prevaziđe razumevanje zakona kao nečega što je odvojeno od pravde, zakona kao nasilja. Stoga se rad okreće Deridi i nje govom shvatanju zakona, pružajući nam na kraju nove mogućnosti mišljenja i konstituisanja levice, socijalne teorije, ali i kritičkog mišljenja danas.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons’s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons’s main criticism., Ovaj rad proširuje konceptualnu distinkciju Alana Džona Simonsa između lokovske koncep cije legitimiteta (koja se zasniva na pristanku) i kantovske koncepcije legitimiteta (koja se za sniva na opravdanju) koju je primenio na pitanje legitimnosti država, odnosno na pitanje le gitimnosti javnih odluka. U radu kritikujem koncepciju legitimiteta zasnovanog na pristanku koju Simons zastupa, te branim rolsovsku verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnovane na oprav danju od prigovora. Ovaj rad je karakterističan po tome što se ove dve koncepcije legitimi teta procenjuju kroz istraživanje, primenom metode refleksivne ravnoteže, njihovih odgova rajućih propisa koji se tiču lečenja antisocijalnog poremećaja ličnosti (ASPD) i epidemioloških mera. Tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže ne podržava koncepciju legitimnosti zasnovane na pristanku. Izumajući u obzir problem lečenja ASPD-a i problem epidemioloških mera, tvr dim da koncepcija zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena za procenu normi koje se ne tiču striktno govoreći nas samih. Ovo prouzrokuje nedovoljan odgovor za relevantne društvene probleme. Dalje, razmatrajući slučaj odgovora na epidemije, pokazujem da ova koncepcija legitimnosti može da izbegne štetne posledice samo pozivanjem na dodatne i nezavisne premise. Iako neuzrokuje nekoherentnost, ovo umanjuje koherentnost normativ nog sistema. Konačno, koncepcija legitimnosti zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena da podrži društvenu saradnju na optimalan način, što se pokazalo neophodnim u kritičnim uslovima poput pandemije. S druge strane, tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže podržava Rolsovu verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnove na opravdanju zbog svojih prednosti u rešavanju navedenih problema. Pored toga, pokazujem dal koncepcijaegitimiteta zsnovana na opravdanju poštuje slobodu i jednakost delatnika kao moralnih samozakonodavaca, te da nije podložna Simonsovim glavnim kritikama.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons’s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons’s main criticism., Ovaj rad proširuje konceptualnu distinkciju Alana Džona Simonsa između lokovske koncep cije legitimiteta (koja se zasniva na pristanku) i kantovske koncepcije legitimiteta (koja se za sniva na opravdanju) koju je primenio na pitanje legitimnosti država, odnosno na pitanje le gitimnosti javnih odluka. U radu kritikujem koncepciju legitimiteta zasnovanog na pristanku koju Simons zastupa, te branim rolsovsku verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnovane na oprav danju od prigovora. Ovaj rad je karakterističan po tome što se ove dve koncepcije legitimi teta procenjuju kroz istraživanje, primenom metode refleksivne ravnoteže, njihovih odgova rajućih propisa koji se tiču lečenja antisocijalnog poremećaja ličnosti (ASPD) i epidemioloških mera. Tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže ne podržava koncepciju legitimnosti zasnovane na pristanku. Izumajući u obzir problem lečenja ASPD-a i problem epidemioloških mera, tvr dim da koncepcija zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena za procenu normi koje se ne tiču striktno govoreći nas samih. Ovo prouzrokuje nedovoljan odgovor za relevantne društvene probleme. Dalje, razmatrajući slučaj odgovora na epidemije, pokazujem da ova koncepcija legitimnosti može da izbegne štetne posledice samo pozivanjem na dodatne i nezavisne premise. Iako neuzrokuje nekoherentnost, ovo umanjuje koherentnost normativ nog sistema. Konačno, koncepcija legitimnosti zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena da podrži društvenu saradnju na optimalan način, što se pokazalo neophodnim u kritičnim uslovima poput pandemije. S druge strane, tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže podržava Rolsovu verziju koncepcije legitimiteta zasnove na opravdanju zbog svojih prednosti u rešavanju navedenih problema. Pored toga, pokazujem dal koncepcijaegitimiteta zsnovana na opravdanju poštuje slobodu i jednakost delatnika kao moralnih samozakonodavaca, te da nije podložna Simonsovim glavnim kritikama.