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Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to investigate autonoetic consciousness associated with episodic autobiographical memory in patients who had undergone unilateral medial temporal lobe resection for intractable epilepsy. Autonoetic consciousness, defined as the conscious feeling of mentally travelling back in time to relive a specific event, was assessed using the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm across different time periods as proposed in the autobiographical memory task developed by Piolino et al. (TEMPau task). Results revealed that the two patient groups (left and right temporal resection) gave reduced sense of reliving (R) responses and more familiarity (K) responses than healthy controls. This poor autonoetic consciousness was highlighted when patients were asked to justify their Remember responses by recalling sensory-perceptive, affective or spatiotemporal specific details across all life periods. These results support the bilateral MTL contribution to episodic autobiographical memory covering the entire lifespan, which is consistent with the multiple trace theory of MTL function [7,9]. This study also demonstrates the bilateral involvement of MTL structures in recalling specific details of personal events characterized by autonoetic consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This account examines how episodes are constructed and measured, and how Peirce's Index informs and even hastens the advancement of this process-from binding spatial features, to the awareness of participant roles and temporal sequencing. It provides semiotic rationale for how episodes develop from static single pictures (dependent on verbatim memory) to events whose frames reflect a deictic and sequential character-superseding the consciousness inherent in autonoesis. Empirical evidence will trace children's event memory-first iconic and static, and later characteristic of increasingly more complex interpretants which specify directional and logical relations, and memory sources. The signs which promote episodic thought are indexical in nature, given their largely relational character. They incorporate deictic projections of the self in diverse orientations, entering into different participant slots inherent to the event. Notice of the latter entails the influence of index to apprehend the spatial, participatory, and temporal directionality within and across event frames. This progression requires a rudimentary consciousness of aspectual features (telicity, dynamicity), as well as an appreciation for the events' purposes/goals. Anticipating how, where, and when events conclude is critical to realizing the event's purpose/goal, since, according to Bauer 2006: 384, it constitutes the basis upon which episodes are constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cognitivismo Clinico is the property of Giovanni Fioriti Editore and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There is ongoing theoretical debate regarding episodic memory and how it can be accurately measured, in particular if the focus should be content-based recall of episodic details or something more experiential involving the subjective capacity to mentally travel back in time and "re-live" aspects of the original event. The autonoetic subscale of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) is presented here as a new test instrument that attempts to redress theoretical and methodological shortcomings in autobiographical memory assessment. The EAMI merges a phenomenological detail-based approach with an assessment of autonoetic consciousness, departing considerably from traditional Remember/Know paradigms used within this field. We present findings from an initial pilot study investigating the potential markers of autonoetic consciousness that may accompany episodic retrieval. Key behavioural indices of autonoetic consciousness, notably those of viewer perspective, visual imagery, and emotional re-experiencing, emerged as being inextricably bound with the level of phenomenological detail recalled and the overall re-living judgment. The autonoetic subscale of the EAMI permits conceptually refined assessment of episodic personal memories and the accompanying subjective experience of mental re-living, characteristic of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although memory dysfunction is not a prominent feature of the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD), there is evidence of specific deficits of episodic memory in these patients. They also have problems monitoring their memory performance. The objective of the present study was to explore the ability to consciously retrieve own encoding of the context of events (autonoetic consciousness) and the ability to monitor memory performance using feeling-of-knowing (FOK) in bv-FTD. Analyses of the patients' cerebral metabolism (FDG-PET) allowed an examination of whether impaired episodic memory in bv-FTD is associated with the frontal dysfunction characteristic of the pathology or a dysfunction of memory-specific regions pertaining to Papez's circuit. Data were obtained from eight bv-FTD patients and 26 healthy controls. Autonoetic consciousness was evaluated by Remember responses during the recognition memory phase of the FOK experiment. As a group, bv-FTD patients demonstrated a decline in autonoetic consciousness and FOK accuracy at the chance level. While memory monitoring was impaired in most (seven) patients, four bv-FTD participants had individual impairment of autonoetic consciousness. They specifically showed reduced metabolism in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (near the superior frontal sulcus), parietal regions, and the posterior cingulate cortex. These findings were tentatively interpreted by considering the role of the metabolically impaired brain regions in self-referential processes, suggesting that the bv-FTD patients' problem consciously retrieving episodic memories may stem at least partly from deficient access to and maintenance/use of information about the self. Frontal and posterior cingulate metabolic impairment in the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia with impaired autonoetic consciousness Hum Brain Mapp, 2011. © 2011 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses some open questions about the self, development, consciousness and memory, especially episodic memory, and is meant to make an attempt to clarify on a descriptive manner these phenomena and especially the relationship between them. In particular, cognitive child development of memory and current theorizing on semantic and episodic memory and related developmental states of consciousness teaches us here to see how different levels of development of the self, identity and memory relate to the ontogenetic development of different stages of consciousness of being in the world. A gradual distinction becomes outlined: from a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or unknowing consciousness as a biological adaptive function with a first sort of “self-experience” already apparent at an anoetic level of consciousness relying on implicit experiential and procedural memory, towards “knowing consciousness”, including “noetic” and “autonoetic” consciousness based on semantic and episodic memory systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autobiographical memory (AM) specificity is impaired in depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Previous studies emphasised the role of cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories in this impairment. This study aimed to examine the association of cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories with specificity, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective. A total of 38 healthy participants were given the revised Impact of Event Scale (IES-R) and an AM task designed to assess positive and negative memories regarding specificity, autonoetic consciousness (remember/know procedure), and self-perspective (field/observer procedure). Taking into account age, verbal IQ, mood, harm avoidance, and executive resources, the IES-R avoidance subscale was negatively correlated with specificity and remember responses for positive memories, and with remember and field responses for negative memories. These findings suggest that cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories is associated with a decrease of the episodic components of AM retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. “Memory for the future”: An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1–12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A growing number of studies have highlighted impairments in the ability of individuals with autism spectrum disorders to recall specific, personally experienced material. These difficulties have been related to underlying problems with autonoetic consciousness, namely the subjective awareness of one's own existence in subjective time. The current paper describes the manifestation of these difficulties in three individuals diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. For the people described, lifelong collecting and hoarding behaviours appeared to serve the function of constituting and maintaining aspects of their sense of self, particularly the sense of continuity and agency over time. On the basis of this clinical information and previous research into self-related processes in people with autism spectrum disorders, an initial model of collecting and hoarding behaviours amongst individuals with Asperger syndrome was formulated. The implications of this formulation for both clinical practice and future research are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Key Practitioner Message People with Asperger syndrome can have problems in developing a functional sense of self., Collecting and hoarding behaviour by people with Asperger syndrome may reflect such underlying difficulties in their sense of self rather than being symptoms of comorbid mental illness., Interventions need to take account of the function of such behaviours rather than solely regarding them as discrete pathological signs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Psycho-Oncologie is the property of PiscoMed Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The capacity to adapt to resource distributions by modulating the frequency of exploratory and exploitative behaviors is common across metazoans and is arguably a principal selective force in the evolution of cognition. Here we (1) review recent work investigating behavioral and biological commonalities between external foraging in space and internal foraging over environments specified by cognitive representations, and (2) explore the implications of these commonalities for understanding the origins of the self. Behavioural commonalities include the capacity for what is known as area-restricted search in the ecological literature: this is search focussed around locations where resources have been found in the past, but moving away from locations where few resources are found, and capable of producing movement patterns mimicking Lévy flights. Area-restricted search shares a neural basis across metazoans, and these biological commonalities in vertebrates suggest an evolutionary homology between external and internal foraging. Internal foraging, and in particular a form we call embodied prospective foraging, makes available additional capacities for prediction based on search through a cognitive representation of the external environment, and allows predictions about outcomes of possible future actions. We demonstrate that cognitive systems that use embodied prospective foraging require a primitive sense of self, needed to distinguish actual from simulated action. This relationship has implications for understanding the evolution of autonoetic consciousness and self-awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autobiographical memories in our lives are critically dependent on temporal lobe structures. However, the contribution of CAl neurons in the human hippocampus to the retrieval of episodic autobiographical memory remains elusive. In patients with a rare acute transient global amnesia, highly focal lesions confined to the CAl field of the hippocampus can be detected on MRI. We studied the effect of these lesions on autobiographical memory using a detailed autobiographical interview including the remember/know procedure. In 14 of 16 patients, focal lesions in the CAl sector of the hippocampal cornu ammonis were detected. Autobiographical memory was significantly affected over all time periods, including memory for remote periods. Impairment of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness exhibited a strong temporal gradient extending 30 to 40 y into the past. These results highlight the distinct and critical role of human hippocampal CAl neurons in autobiographical memory retrieval and for re-experiencing detailed episodic memories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the observable phenomena of memory. Considered in idealized isolation from other systems, episodic memory was taken to underlay the ability of individuals to remember events from their personal past. Yet, in reality, memory systems regularly interact, standing in many-to-many relations to actual memory tasks and experiences. Upon this backdrop, I explore a puzzle about the increasing prominence of the notion of autonoetic consciousness in Tulving's theory of episodic memory. I argue that, contrary to widespread belief, the prominence is not best explained by the purported essential link between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory. Rather, it is explained by the fact that autonoetic consciousness, hypothesized to uniquely accompany episodic retrieval, was considered a source of crucial data, predictable only from theories positing a functionally distinct episodic memory system. However, with the emergence of a new generation of theories, positing wider memory systems for remembering and imagination, the question of the relation between episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness has been reopened. This creates a pressing need for de-idealization, triggering a new search for crucial data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Tulving argues, concepts shape psychologists' thinking and determine how the end products of research are recorded. Currently in prominent use is not only Tulving's concept of episodic memory but also his allied concept of autonoetic consciousness. And because, too, of the growing attention by psychologists to aspects of their subjects' consciousness streams, I explore Tulving's concept of autonoetic consciousness: to help improve the exercise of consciousness concepts in psychology generally. Two special topics among others are discussed: (a) the "flavor" Tulving claims characterizes recollective experience and corresponds to the warmth and intimacy James proposes consciousness states possess, and (b) whether the autonoetic-consciousness concept applies to a brain-damaged man said to lack, probably, any capability for autonoetic awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. This article is categorized under:Philosophy > Psychological CapacitiesPhilosophy > ConsciousnessPsychology > Memory [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reviewed studies that have specifically explored the memory deficit hypothesis of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) checking, highlighting the methodological differences between these studies that may explain inconsistencies regarding memory deficits in OCD checkers. Based on Conway's proposition that one function of episodic memories is to keep an adaptive record of recent goal processing in order to check that actions have actually been accomplished, we suggest that impaired autonoetic consciousness –one of the main features of episodic memory- may be at the heart of the issue of checking compulsion. Autonoetic consciousness, that can be experimentally assessed by the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm,could be impaired in OCD checkers leading them to be unable to mentally relive their actions in order to be assured that they have been accomplished (e.g., having locked the door). We make methodological suggestions to improve the assessment of autonoetic consciousness deficit in OCD checkers and understand its role in the etiology and maintenance of compulsive checking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do our bodies influence who we are? Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has examined consciousness associated with the self and related multisensory processing of bodily signals, the so-called bodily self-consciousness. A parallel line of research has highlighted the concept of the autobiographical self and the associated autonoetic consciousness, which enables us to mentally travel in time. The subjective re-experiencing of past episodes is described as re-living them from within or outside one's body. In this brief perspective, I aim to explore the underlying characteristics of self-consciousness and its relation to bodily signals and episodic memory. I will outline some recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence indicating that bodily cues play a fundamental role in autobiographical memory. Finally, I will discuss these emerging concepts regarding the current understanding of bodily-self, autobiographical-self, their links to self-consciousness, and suggest directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic memory (EM) allows us to remember and relive past events and experiences and has been linked to cortical-hippocampal reinstatement of encoding activity. While EM is fundamental to establish a sense of self across time, this claim and its link to the sense of agency (SoA), based on bodily signals, has not been tested experimentally. Using real-time sensorimotor stimulation, immersive virtual reality, and fMRI we manipulated the SoA and report stronger hippocampal reinstatement for scenes encoded under preserved SoA, reflecting recall performance in a recognition task. We link SoA to EM showing that hippocampal reinstatement is coupled with reinstatement in premotor cortex, a key SoA region. We extend these findings in a severe amnesic patient whose memory lacked the normal dependency on the SoA. Premotor-hippocampal coupling in EM describes how a key aspect of the bodily self at encoding is neurally reinstated during the retrieval of past episodes, enabling a sense of self across time. This study describes a premotor-hippocampal coupling in episodic memory, revealing how the bodily sensory context and in particular the sense of agency of the observer at encoding is neurally reinstated during the retrieval of past episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memory and language are the two higher-order cognitive abilities intertwined for communication and other cognitive skills. Memory is the storage capacity of all the information we perceive. Where the sensory memory perceives the stimuli, the working memory actively stores the information and passes it to the long-term memory. However, there is a question that how is the continuous perception of stimuli transformed into meaningful information and organized for proper execution and retrieval from the memory? This paper focuses on the episodic memory that perceives information that is spatial and temporal based on our everyday experiences. Though the spatiotemporal information we receive is continuous; the episodic memory arranges the information as to episodes in the working memory before the information is stored for a longer period. The episodic buffer is one of the components of the working memory model which holds the episodic memory that is organized concerning time. To this point, the paper tries to understand the working of the episodic buffer in maintaining the episodic memory and also about the process of episodic events into meaningful units. Further, the paper also concentrates on the hippocampus which is considered to be the location of the episodic buffer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu have important shared characteristics, in this commentary, we focus on potential differences that may question the argument that two phenomena lie on a continuum. We propose that differences in their frequency and autonoetic consciousness could be explained by different types of cues and memory representations involved in experiencing IAMs and déjà vu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aimed to explore autobiographical memories (longlasting memories about the self) and episodic memories (memories about discrete episodes or events) within dream content. We adapted earlier episodic memory study paradigms and reinvestigated the incorporation of episodic memory sources into dreams, operationalizing episodic memory as featuring autonoetic consciousness, which is the feeling of truly re-experiencing or reliving a past event. Participants (n = 32) recorded daily diaries and dream diaries, and reported on wake-dream relations for 2 weeks. Using a new scale, dreams were rated for their episodic richness, which categorized memory sources of dreams as being truly episodic (featuring autonoetic consciousness), autobiographical (containing segregated features of experiences that pertained to waking life) or otherwise. Only one dream (0.5%) was found to contain an episodic memory. However, the majority of dreams (>80%) were found to contain low to moderate incorporations of autobiographical memory features. These findings demonstrate the inactivity of intact episodic memories, and emphasize the activity of autobiographical memory and processing within dreams. Taken together, this suggests that memories for personal experiences are experienced fragmentarily and selectively during dreaming, perhaps in order to assimilate these memories into the autobiographical memory schema. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autobiographical memory is vital for our well‐being and therefore used in therapeutic interventions. However, not much is known about the (neural) processes by which reliving memories can have beneficial effects. This study investigates what brain activation patterns and memory characteristics facilitate the effectiveness of reliving positive autobiographical memories for mood and sense of self. Particularly, the role of vividness and autonoetic consciousness is studied. Participants (N = 47) with a wide range of trait self‐esteem relived neutral and positive memories while their bold responses, experienced vividness of the memory, mood, and state self‐esteem were recorded. More vivid memories related to better mood and activation in amygdala, hippocampus and insula, indicative of increased awareness of oneself (i.e., prereflective aspect of autonoetic consciousness). Lower vividness was associated with increased activation in the occipital lobe, PCC, and precuneus, indicative of a more distant mode of reliving. While individuals with lower trait self‐esteem increased in state self‐esteem, they showed less deactivation of the lateral occipital cortex during positive memories. In sum, the vividness of the memory seemingly distinguished a more immersed and more distant manner of memory reliving. In particular, when reliving positive memories higher vividness facilitated increased prereflective autonoetic consciousness, which likely is instrumental in boosting mood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The qualities of remembered experiences are often used to inform "reality monitoring" judgments, our ability to distinguish real and imagined events. Previous experiments have tended to investigate only whether reality monitoring decisions are accurate or not, providing little insight into the extent to which reality monitoring may be affected by qualities of the underlying mnemonic representations. We used a continuous-response memory precision task to measure the quality of remembered experiences that underlie two different types of reality monitoring decisions: self/experimenter decisions that distinguish actions performed by participants and the experimenter and imagined/perceived decisions that distinguish imagined and perceived experiences. The data revealed memory precision to be associated with higher accuracy in both self/experimenter and imagined/perceived reality monitoring decisions, with lower precision linked with a tendency to misattribute self-generated experiences to external sources. We then sought to investigate the possible neurocognitive basis of these observed associations by applying brain stimulation to a region that has been implicated in precise recollection of personal events, the left angular gyrus. Stimulation of angular gyrus selectively reduced the association between memory precision and self-referential reality monitoring decisions, relative to control site stimulation. The angular gyrus may, therefore, be important for the mnemonic processes involved in representing remembered experiences that give rise to a sense of self-agency, a key component of "autonoetic consciousness" that characterizes episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic future thinking (EFT) has been suggested to underlie anticipatory pleasure (AP), itself known to play a crucial role in social functioning (SF). Both AP and SF are impaired in various clinical populations, including autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and 22q11.2 deletion syndrome (22q11DS). Therefore, the relationship between EFT, AP and SF was investigated, as well as the potential role of projecting oneself in a social vs. non-social context. Seventy-seven participants [24 with 22q11DS, 20 with ASD, 33 typically developing controls (TDs)] (aged 12–25) were included. They were assessed with a future thinking task in which they were asked to recall a memory and produce a likely event. Narratives were rated based of specificity, richness and imaginability. Participants completed questionnaires assessing AP and SF. Narratives from ASD and 22q11DS participants were rated as less vivid compared to TDs. However, the characteristics of the narratives differed between ASD and 22q11DS participants in terms of specificity and level of details, as well as in reaction to social condition. Moreover, correlations were found between AP and EFT in both ASD and 22q11DS participants, and between SF and EFT in ASD participants. These results point towards impairments in EFT in both ASD and 22q11DS participants but with a specific profile in each condition. The observed associations between EFT and AP suggest that decreased autonoetic consciousness might underlie AP impairments. In ASD individuals, the association between SF and EFT highlights the need to better characterize EFT since EFT could be another mechanism contributing to social difficulties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background:Autobiographical memory (ABM), personal semantic memory (PSM), and autonoetic consciousness are affected in individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) but their relationship with Alzheimer's disease (AD) biomarkers are unclear.Methods:Forty-five participants (healthy controls (HC) = 31, MCI = 14) completed the Episodic ABM Interview and a battery of memory tests. Thirty-one (HC = 22, MCI = 9) underwent β-amyloid positron emission tomography (PET) and magnetic resonance (MR) imaging. Fourteen participants (HC = 9, MCI = 5) underwent one imaging modality.Results:Unlike PSM, ABM differentiated between diagnostic categories but did not relate to AD biomarkers. Personal semantic memory was related to neocortical β-amyloid burden after adjusting for age and apolipoprotein E (APOE) ɛ4. Autonoetic consciousness was not associated with AD biomarkers, and was not impaired in MCI.Conclusions:Autobiographical memory was impaired in MCI participants but was not related to neocortical amyloid burden, suggesting that personal memory systems are impacted by differing disease mechanisms, rather than being uniformly underpinned by β-amyloid. Episodic and semantic ABM impairment represent an important AD prodrome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time is usually conceived of in terms of space: many natural languages refer to time according to a back-to-front axis. Indeed, whereas the past is usually conceived to be "behind us", the future is considered to be "in front of us." Despite temporal coding is pivotal for the development of autonoetic consciousness, little is known about the organization of autobiographical memories along this axis. Here we developed a spatial compatibility task (SCT) to test the organization of autobiographical memories along the sagittal plane, using spatiotemporal interference. Twenty-one participants were asked to recall both episodic and semantic autobiographical memories (EAM and SAM, respectively) to be used in the SCT. Then, during the SCT, they were asked to decide whether each event occurred before or after the event presented right before, using a response code that could be compatible with the back-to-front axis (future in front) or not (future at back). We found that performance was significantly worse during the non-compatible condition, especially for EAM. The results are discussed in light of the evidence for spatiotemporal encoding of episodic autobiographical memories, taking into account possible mechanisms explaining compatibility effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report aims to introduce, test and discuss a new method of measuring episodic memory in participants with highly restricted verbal abilities. Although an elicited/deferred imitation paradigm has already proposed a successful method of measuring this capacity in infants as young as 6 months old [Bauer, Patricia J. 2006. “Constructing a Past in Infancy: A Neuro-Developmental Account.”Trends in Cognitive Sciences10 (4): 175–181], it failed to include a measure of capacities crucial for episodic recall, that is: a sense of self, a sense of subjective time and autonoetic consciousness [Tulving, Endel. 2002. “Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain.”Annual Reviews Psychology53: 1–25]. We combined developmental and comparative approaches in the altered video task to allow for simultaneous measuring of episodic recall and autonoetic consciousness. Episodic recall was measured via presentation of non-modified and modified recordings of a personal past event after a 24-h delay. The 15-month-old infants were expected to watch the modified video significantly longer than the non-modified video, and so evince the differentiation between them. Alongside, the infants participated in a mirror-mark task (a standard measure of self-recognition) and in a real-time video task (a possible alternative for the mirror-mark task). Results for ‘what’ and ‘who’ were consistent with our expectations. All results, their implications and possible future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person "self-experience," a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of "awareness" or "knowing consciousness" that permits "timetravel" in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one's life and its possibilities within the "mind's eye." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering— autonoetic consciousness , as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness , as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Chronic alcoholism is known to impair episodic memory function, but the specific nature of this impairment is still unclear. Moreover, it has never been established whether episodic memory deficit in alcoholism is an intrinsic memory deficit or whether it has an executive origin. Thus, the objectives are to specify which episodic memory processes are impaired early in abstinence from alcohol and to determine whether they should be regarded as genuine memory deficits or rather as the indirect consequences of executive impairments. Methods: Forty recently detoxified alcoholic inpatients at alcohol entry treatment and 55 group-matched controls underwent a neuropsychological assessment of episodic memory and executive functions. The episodic memory evaluation consisted of 3 tasks complementing each other designed to measure the different episodic memory components (learning, storage, encoding and retrieval, contextual memory, and autonoetic consciousness) and 5 executive tasks testing capacities of organization, inhibition, flexibility, updating, and integration. Results: Compared with control subjects, alcoholic patients presented impaired learning abilities, encoding processes, retrieval processes, contextual memory and autonoetic consciousness. However, there was no difference between the 2 groups regarding the storage capacities assessed by the rate of forgetting. Concerning executive functions, alcoholic subjects displayed deficits in each executive task used. Nevertheless, stepwise regression analyses showed that only performances on fluency tasks were significantly predictive of some of the episodic memory disorders (learning abilities for 40%, encoding processes for 20%, temporal memory for 21%, and state of consciousness associated with memories for 26%) in the alcoholic group. Discussion: At alcohol treatment entry, alcoholic patients present genuine episodic memory deficits that cannot be regarded solely as the consequences of executive dysfunctions. These results are in accordance with neuroimaging findings showing hippocampal atrophy. Moreover, given the involvement of episodic memory and executive functions in alcohol treatment, these data could have clinical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essence of who we are depends on our brains. They enable us to think, to feel joy and sorrow, communicate through speech, reflect on the moments of our lives, and to anticipate, plan for, and worry about our imagined futures. Although some of our abilities are comparatively new, key features of our behavior have deep roots that can be traced to the beginning of life. By following the story of behavior, step-by-step, over its roughly four-billion-year trajectory, we come to understand both how similar we are to all organisms that have ever lived, and how different we are from even our closest animal relatives. We care about our differences because they are ours. But differences do not make us superior; they simply make us different. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Cognitive networks impairments are common in neuropsychiatric disorders like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), bipolar disorder (BD), and schizophrenia (SZ). While previous research has focused on specific brain regions, the role of the procedural memory as a type of long-term memory to examine cognitive networks impairments in these disorders remains unclear. This study investigates alterations in resting-state functional connectivity (rs-FC) within the procedural memory network to explore brain function associated with cognitive networks in patients with these disorders. Methods: This study analyzed resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) data from 40 individuals with ADHD, 49 with BD, 50 with SZ, and 50 healthy controls (HCs). A procedural memory network was defined based on the selection of 34 regions of interest (ROIs) associated with the network in the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas (default atlas). Multivariate region of interest to region of interest connectivity (mRRC) was used to analyze the rs-FC between the defined network regions. Significant differences in rs-FC between patients and HCs were identified (P < 0.001). Results: ADHD patients showed increased Cereb45 l - Cereb3 r rs-FC (p = 0.000067) and decreased Cereb1 l - Cereb6 l rs-FC (p = 0.00092). BD patients exhibited increased rs-FC between multiple regions, including Claustrum r - Caudate r (p = 0.00058), subthalamic nucleus r - Pallidum l (p = 0.00060), substantia nigra l - Cereb2 l (p = 0.00082), Cereb10 r - SMA r (p = 0.00086), and Cereb9 r - SMA l (p = 0.00093) as well as decreased rs-FC in subthalamic nucleus r - Cereb6 l (p = 0.00013) and Cereb9 r - Cereb9 l (p = 0.00033). SZ patients indicated increased Caudate r– putamen l rs-FC (p = 0.00057) and decreased rs-FC in subthalamic nucleus r – Cereb6 l (p = 0.000063), and Cereb1 r – subthalamic nucleus r (p = 0.00063). Conclusions: This study found significant alterations in rs-FC within the procedural memory network in patients with ADHD, BD, and SZ compared to HCs. These findings suggest that disrupted rs-FC within this network may related to cognitive networks impairments observed in these disorders. Clinical trial number: Not applicable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hippocampus plays a critical role in the formation of declarative memories, and hippocampal damage leads to significant impairments in new memory formation. Drawing can serve as a form of multi-modal encoding that improves declarative memory performance relative to other multimodal encoding strategies such as writing. We examined whether, and to what extent, patients with hippocampal damage could benefit from the mnemonic strategy of drawing. Three patients with focal hippocampal damage, and one patient with both hippocampal and cortical lesions, in addition to 22 age-, sex-, and education-matched controls, were shown a list of words one at a time during encoding and instructed to either draw a picture or repeatedly write each word for 40 s. Following a brief filled delay, free recall and recognition memory for words from both encoding trial types were assessed. Controls showed enhanced recall and recognition memory for words drawn versus those that were written, an effect that was even more pronounced in patients with focal hippocampal damage. By contrast, the patient with both hippocampal and cortical lesions showed no drawing-mediated boost in either recall or recognition memory. These findings demonstrate that drawing is an effective encoding strategy, likely accruing from the engagement of extra-hippocampal processes including the integration of cortical-based motor, visual, and semantic processing, enabling more elaborative encoding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Age-related hippocampal atrophy is associated with memory loss in older adults, and certain hippocampal subfields are more vulnerable to age-related atrophy than others. Cardiorespiratory fitness (CRF) may be an important protective factor for preserving hippocampal volume, but little is known about how CRF relates to the volume of specific hippocampal subfields, and whether associations between CRF and hippocampal subfield volumes are related to episodic memory performance. To address these gaps, the current study evaluates the associations among baseline CRF, hippocampal subfield volumes, and episodic memory performance in cognitively unimpaired older adults from the Investigating Gains in Neurocognition Trial of Exercise (IGNITE) (NCT02875301). Methods: Participants (N = 601, ages 65–80, 72% female) completed assessments including a graded exercise test measuring peak oxygen comsumption (VO2peak) to assess CRF, cognitive testing, and high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging of the hippocampus processed with Automated Segmentation of Hippocampal Subfields (ASHS). Separate linear regression models examined whether CRF was associated with hippocampal subfield volumes and whether those assocations were moderated by age or sex. Mediation models examined whether hippocampal volumes statistically mediated the relationship between CRF and episodic memory performance. Covariates included age, sex, years of education, body mass index, estimated intracranial volume, and study site. Results: Higher CRF was significantly associated with greater total left (B = 5.82, p = 0.039) and total right (B = 7.64, p = 0.006) hippocampal volume, as well as greater left CA2 (B = 0.14, p = 0.022) and dentate gyrus (DG; B = 2.34, p = 0.031) volume, and greater right CA1 (B = 3.99, p = 0.011), CA2 (B = 0.15, p = 0.002), and subiculum (B = 1.56, p = 0.004) volume. Sex significantly moderated left DG volume (B = −4.26, p = 0.017), such that the association was positive and significant only for males. Total left hippocampal volume [indirect effect = 0.002, 95% CI (0.0002, 0.00), p = 0.027] and right subiculum volume [indirect effect = 0.002, 95% CI (0.0007, 0.01), p = 0.006] statistically mediated the relationship between CRF and episodic memory performance. Discussion: While higher CRF was significantly associated with greater total hippocampal volume, CRF was not associated with all underlying subfield volumes. Our results further demonstrate the relevance of the associations between CRF and hippocampal volume for episodic memory performance. Finally, our results suggest that the regionally-specific effects of aging and Alzheimer's disease on hippocampal subfields could be mitigated by maintaining higher CRF in older adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human imagination has garnered growing interest in many fields. However, it remains unclear how to characterize different forms of imaginative thinking and how imagination differs between young and older adults. Here, we introduce a novel scoring protocol based on recent theoretical developments in the cognitive neuroscience of imagination to provide a broad tool with which to characterize imaginative thinking. The scoring protocol distinguishes between concrete/perceptual forms of imagination termed the "mind's eye" and abstract/reflective forms of imagination termed the "mind's mind." The protocol also captures whether thoughts pertain to the self, others, or both. We applied this scoring protocol with high inter-rater reliability across two studies involving distinct participants and narrative-based imagination tasks. When compared to young adults, older adults showed a bias toward general content, which is a feature of the mind's mind form of thinking while describing aloud their memories of specific, past events (Study 1). Further, older adults made fewer references to the self. In a separate study of only older adults (Study 2), increasing age was not associated with a bias toward the mind's mind while describing specific past or future events. These results reveal that imaginative thinking can be characterized within the Mind's Eye Mind's Mind framework, with implications for understanding cognitively normal older age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD) are reported to have disrupted autobiographical memory (AM). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we investigated behavioral and neural processing of the recall of emotional (sad and happy) memories in 30 MDD, 18 BPD, and 34 healthy control (HC) unmedicated women. The behavioral results showed that the MDD group experienced more sadness than the HC after the sad recall, while BPD participants experienced less happiness than HC after the happy recall. The fMRI results for sad AMs, compared to happy AMs, elicited greater activation in multiple brain regions (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, insula) linked to self-related information, emotional processing, and semantic recollection across all groups. Functional connectivity analysis revealed a significant main effect of group between the occipital cortex and precuneus and between occipital cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. The effect was driven by stronger connectivity between the occipital cortex and precuneus in the clinical groups taken together than in the HC. Our results suggest a need for stronger coordination between visual imagery and contextual recall for vivid memory retrieval in these clinical groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NMDA receptor (NMDAR)-mediated calcium influx triggers the induction and initial expression of long-term potentiation (LTP). Here we report that in male rodents, ion flux-independent (metabotropic) NMDAR signaling is critical for a third step in the production of enduring LTP, i.e., cytoskeletal changes that stabilize the activity-induced synaptic modifications. Surprisingly, females rely upon estrogen receptor alpha (ERa) for the metabotropic NMDAR operations used by males. Blocking NMDAR channels with MK-801 eliminated LTP expression in hippocampal field CA1 of both sexes but left intact theta burst stimulation (TBS)-induced actin polymerization within dendritic spines. A selective antagonist (Ro25-6981) of the NMDAR GluN2B subunit had minimal effects on synaptic responses but blocked actin polymerization and LTP consolidation in males only. Conversely, an ERa antagonist thoroughly disrupted TBS-induced actin polymerization and LTP in females while having no evident effect in males. In an episodic memory paradigm, Ro25-6981 prevented acquisition of spatial locations by males but not females, whereas an ERa antagonist blocked acquisition in females but not males. Sex differences in LTP consolidation were accompanied by pronounced differences in episodic memory in tasks involving minimal (for learning) cue sampling. Males did better on acquisition of spatial information whereas females had much higher scores than males on tests for acquisition of the identity of cues (episodic "what") and the order in which the cues were sampled (episodic "when"). We propose that sex differences in synaptic processes used to stabilize LTP result in differential encoding of the basic elements of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basolateral amygdala (BLA) is crucial for the encoding and expression of fear memory, yet it remains unexplored how neural activity in this region is dynamically influenced by distributed circuits across the brain to facilitate expression of fear memory of different ages. Using longitudinal multisite electrophysiological recordings in male mice, we find that the recall of older contextual fear memory is accompanied by weaker, yet more rhythmic, BLA gamma activity which is distally entrained by theta oscillations in both the hippocampal CA1 and the anterior cingulate cortex. Computational modeling with Light Gradient Boosting Machine using extracted oscillatory features from these three regions, as well as with Transformer using raw local field potentials, accurately classified remote from recent memory recall primarily based on BLA gamma and CA1 theta. These results demonstrate in a non-biased manner that multi-regional control of BLA activity serves as reliable neural signatures for memory age-dependent recall mechanisms. Differential neural dynamics in the amygdala that define recall of different ages of fear memory remain not fully understood. Here, the authors show by both experiments and modeling that multiregional control of amygdalar gamma activity encodes memory age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a multifaceted psychiatric disorder triggered by traumatic events, leading to prolonged psychological distress and varied symptoms. Rat models have been extensively used to explore the biological, behavioral, and neurochemical underpinnings of PTSD. This review critically examines the strengths and limitations of commonly used rat models, such as single prolonged stress (SPS), stress–re-stress (S-R), and predator-based paradigms, in replicating human PTSD pathology. While these models provide valuable insights into neuroendocrine responses, genetic predispositions, and potential therapeutic targets, they face challenges in capturing the full complexity of PTSD, particularly in terms of ethological relevance and translational validity. We assess the degree to which these models mimic the neurobiological and behavioral aspects of human PTSD, highlighting areas where they succeed and where they fall short. This review also discusses future directions in refining these models to improve their utility for translational research, aiming to bridge the gap between preclinical findings and clinical applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]