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This paper aims to reconstruct the life, networks, and experiences of the Caroline actor-turned-printer and journalist, John Harris, the pen behind Mercurius Militaris, the most radical newsbook of the civil war period. It provides the first extensive biography of Harris's life, shedding new light on the role of his 'Oxford Press' in New Model Army politics in the crucial summer of 1647. The analysis of Harris's experiences in this paper supports the growing body of scholarship which has sought to redefine the interpretation of 'radicals' and 'radicalism' during the British civil wars; it stresses the importance of fluidity, uncertainty, and compromise in terms of both ideas and allegiances. But it also argues that Harris did undergo a radicalizing process, one which was anchored to his broader experiences and his engagement with print in particular. The collaborative and creative processes of producing printed texts, the amalgamating, compromising, and finessing of different ideas, as well as refining positions in response to other printed texts, forced Harris to think creatively about his own intellectual and political outlook. Harris's experiences, at least, drove him to adopt more and more extreme solutions to the political crises which he perceived to be afflicting the body politic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several theologians have pointed to resonances between the Greek Patristic doctrine of deification or theosis and recent transhumanist narratives: both discourses indicate death as the final enemy of humankind and invest heavily in a hoped-for transcendence of life as we know it. These resonances will be investigated further by comparing the approach to human nature found in Maximus the Confessor and in the prominent transhumanists Nick Bostrom and John Harris. In addition to sharing with transhumanists a disavowal of death and a trajectory towards transcendence, Maximus also shares a view of human nature that is more dynamic and open-ended than is commonly attributed to his Late Antique context. On the other hand, Maximus also insists on the persistence of this dynamic nature in its integrity even into the eschaton. He does so for a number of reasons that should give Christians pause about any rhetoric that calls for an abandonment of human nature: (1) that theosis depends precisely on sharing a human nature with Christ; (2) that our vocation as mediators in creation depends on our physical bodies as the locus of shared existence with the material world; and (3) that corruption has a providential use in binding us together with our neighbors and in cultivating virtue as we strain for the incorruptible and supernatural gift of theosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses significant gap in the numeracy national benchmark test results between non-Aboriginal and Anboriginal students in Australia with suggested strategies on how to narrow the gap. Topics include the reference to misunderstandings of Australian Aboriginal number system as reported by John Harris., Aboriginal people's desire to literate their children to Western education while maintaining Aboriginal culture as well as the Torres Strait Island Perspective on mathematics.

The article offers the author's opinion on various moral and ethical issues related to the use of genetic engineering for human reproduction. The author explains in detail his views on using artificial gametes for in-vitro reproduction and discusses concerns associated with it such as parenthood without consent, financial and moral parental responsibility, and destruction of the embryos. The works of scientists including John Harris on the issue are also mentioned.

The article discusses the origins of "Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice" which is celebrating its 25th anniversary in 2014. Topics include the launch of journal in 1989 by Stanford University researcher John Harris, the first members of the journal's editorial board including Patricia Chilton and Byron Bland, and the journal's role as a form to present scholarship without the usual constraints in academia. Also mentioned are the essays published for the journal's 25th anniversary.

Some bioethicists have questioned the desirability of a line of biomedical research aimed at extending the length of our lives over what some think to be its natural limit. In particular, Leon Kass has argued that living longer is not such a great advantage, and that mortality is not a burden after all. In this essay, I evaluate his arguments in favour of such a counterintuitive view by elaborating upon some critical remarks advanced by John Harris. Ultimately, I argue that nothing substantial has been said by Kass to undermine the desirability of life-extending technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our starting point in this article is the debate between John Harris and Iain Brassington on whether or not there is a duty to take part in scientific research. We consider the arguments that have been put forward based on fairness and a duty to rescue, and suggest an alternative justification grounded in a hypothetical agreement: that is, because effective healthcare cannot be taken for granted, but requires continuous medical research, and nobody knows what kind of healthcare they will need, participating in research should be viewed from the perspective of a social contract, based on our mutual need for medical advances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu that moral enhancement ought to accompany cognitive enhancement, as well as briefly addressing critiques of this argument, notably by John Harris. I argue that Harris, who believes that cognitive enhancement is largely sufficient for making us behave more morally, might be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence: the gap between what we do and what we believe is morally right to do. In that regard, Persson and Savulescu's position has the potential to offer more. However, I question Persson and Savulescu's proposal of compulsory moral enhancement (a conception they used to promote), proposing the alternative of voluntary moral enhancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author comments on genetic human enhancement regarding sex selection and informs views of several philosopher related to this including John Harris, Julian Savulescu and Paula casal. He presents arguements of several philosophers, who inform that male children have higher expected-welfare than female children. He also examines that whether sexual dimorphism reduction is a desirable outcome in female in comparison to male elimination.

The article focuses on climate change and the science of fables. Several works are cited including the essay "Shall We Continue to Write Histories of Literature" by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, the book "The Value of Life" by John Harris, and the paper "Human Engineering and Climate Change" by Matthew Liao and colleagues. The invention of steam engine by James Watt is also discussed.

The article announces several awards and medals given to various people by the British Institute of Non-Destructive Testing including the Roy Sharpe Prize to professor Krishnan Balasubramanian of Chennai, India-based Indian Institute of Technology, the Nemet Award to engineer John Harris of Network Rail Ltd. and the John Grimwade Medal to Professor Peter Cawley of the Imperial College, London.

In this paper, I respond to criticisms by John Harris, contained in a commentary on my article "Harris, harmed states, and sexed bodies", which appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics, volume 37, number 5. I argue that Harris's response to my criticisms exposes the strong eugenic tendencies in his own thought, when he suggests that the reproductive obligations of parents should be determined with reference to a claim about what would enhance 'society' or 'the species'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to unveil the incompleteness of John Harris' view that parents have a moral obligation to genetically enhance their unborn children. Specifically, here two main conclusions are proposed: (1) at present there exist insufficient empirical data for determining whether prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) is a moral obligation on prospective parents. Although the purpose of PGE research would be to determine the extent to which PGE is safe and effective, the task of determining the veracity of Harris' premises is impossible to achieve without begging the question; we would be forced to assume the moral permissibility of PGE in order to generate the data that are required for determining its moral standing. So, given this empirical blindness, consequence-based normative frameworks like that of Harris cannot determine the moral standing of PGE, but merely push the question of the moral standing of PGE back a step, without offering any plausible and morally endorsable recourse for how to answer it; (2) even if PGE research were legal, which it is not, parents nevertheless have good reason not to consent to it for their children, especially as participants in the first wave(s) of such research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dr Catherine Rhodes is a research fellow at the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation specialising in the international regulations relevant to control of biotechnology. Professor John Harris is director of the Institute and has particular interest in biomedical ethics and medical jurisprudence. Sarah Chan is deputy director of the Institute. Professor Sir John Sulston was the founding director of the Wellcome Trust Sanger Centre in Cambridge from 1992 to 2000, where so much of the sequencing of the human genome was completed in a furious race to publish before American commercial interests patented. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises John Harris's attempts to defend an account of a 'harmed condition' that can standindependently of intuitions about what is 'normal'. I argue that because Homo sapiens is a sexually dimorphic species, determining whether a particular individual is in a harmed condition or not will sometimes require making reference to the normal capacities of their sex. Consequently, Harris's account is unable to play the role he intends for it in debates about the ethics of human enhancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on music writer and journalist John Harris. It mentions his comments regarding the substandard issues of contemporary rock music writing in terms of quality. The author denotes the epistemological nature of Harris' writings about the music. Furthermore, the author also tackles the styles and schemes of Harris in writing the journal.

In this article the authors examine the sharing of resources among Nigerian law libraries and its significance for legal research and the administration of justice in that country. It is noted that the production of law texts and the evolution of legal knowledge makes it very difficult for even well-funded law libraries to keep up. A number of topics are addressed including identification and analysis of the the problems involved in library collaboration, the actions of John Harris of the University of Ibadan, and the need for resource sharing.

This essay critically engages the work of John Harris and Jürgen Habermas on the issue of genetic engineering. It does so from the standpoint of women's embodied experience of pregnancy and parenting, challenging the choice-chance binary at work in these accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the contention of John Harris on the permissibility of creating and destroying embryos for research purposes in the U.S. It states that creating and destroying of embryos for research is permissible when implantation of an embryo is not an option. It emphasizes that to promote health, well-being and longevity and when reproductive needs have been met, letting embryos die is permissible.

John Harris has previously proposed that there is a moral duty to participate in scientific research. This concept has recently been challenged by Iain Brassington, who asserts that the principles cited by Harris in support of the duty to research fail to establish its existence. In this paper we address these criticisms and provide new arguments for the existence of a moral obligation to research participation. This obligation, we argue, arises from two separate but related principles. The principle of fairness obliges us to support the social institutions which sustain us, of which research is one; while the principle of beneficence, or the duty of rescue, imposes upon us a duty to prevent harm to others, including by supporting potentially beneficial, even life-saving research. We argue that both these lines of argument support the duty to research, and explore further aspects of this duty, such as to whom it is owed and how it might be discharged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information about several topics discussed at a meeting of the Tennessee Academy of Science (TAS) held in Nashville, Tennessee in 2007 is presented. The topics included the guidelines for stipend and postal charges. The event has featured several speakers including Cindi Smith-Walters, former President John Harris and secretary Teresa Fulcher.

Advances in reproductive technologies continue to present ethical problems concerning their implementation and use. These advances have preoccupied bioethicists in their bid to gauge our moral responsibilities and obligations when making reproductive decisions. The aim of this discussion is to highlight the importance of a sensibility to differences in moral perspective as part of our ethical inquiry in these matters. Its focal point is the work of John Harris, who has consistently addressed the ethical issues raised by advancing reproductive technologies. The discussion is aimed at a central tenet of Harris's position on reproductive decision-making--namely, that in some instances, giving birth to a worthwhile life may cause harm and will therefore be morally wrong. It attempts to spell out some of the implications of Harris's position that the author takes to involve a misplaced generality. To support this claim, some examples are explored that demonstrate the variety of ways in which concepts (such as harm) may manifest themselves as moral considerations within the context of reproductive decision-making. The purpose is to demonstrate that Harris's general conception of the moral limits of reproductive autonomy obscures the issues raised by particular cases, which in themselves may reveal important directions for our ethical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1975 John Harris envisaged a survival lottery to redistribute organs from one to a greater number in order to reduce number of deaths as a consequence of organ failure. In this paper I reach a conclusion about when running a survival lottery is permissible by looking at the reason prospective participants have for allowing the procedure from a contractual perspective. I identify three versions of the survival lottery. In a National Lottery, everyone within a jurisdiction is a candidate for being a donor for everyone else, disregarding all differences between individuals' eventual possibility of needing an organ. In a Group Specific Lottery, it is a question of running a lottery among members of a specific group who share the same probability of getting organ failure. In a Local Lottery one randomises among individuals who are already in need of a new organ but who happen to be compatible and in need of different organs. While the first is vulnerable to considerations of fairness, it is difficult to perceive a feasible way to implement the second option that does not come with a host of unwelcome consequences. I argue, however, that it is permissible to run Local Lotteries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A list of participants to an event of interest to physics and physicists is presented. The list includes Dieter Ackermann, Steffen Bass, Wolfgang Cassing, Jean Pierre Coffin, Dennis Dean Dietrich, Christian Fischer, Avraham Gal, Walter Greiner, Thomas Haberer, Joseph Hamilton, John Harris, Matthias Hempel, Roy Lacey, Gunnar Martens, and Larry McLerran.

Presents a letter in response to bioethics professor, John Harris on extended human life span. Opinion on the use of medical resources to extend the life of a person; Reaction of Harris on optimal balance; Argument on successive selves.

This article challenges the view of disability presented by Harris in his article, "Is gene therapy a form of eugenics?"(n1) It is argued that his definition of disability rests on an individual model of disability, where disability is regarded as a product of biological determinism or "personal tragedy" in the individual. Within disability theory this view is often called "the medical model" and it has been criticised for not being able to deal with the term "disability"; but only with impairment. The individual model of disability presupposes a necessary causal link between a certain condition in the individual and disablement. The shortcomings of such a view of disability are stated and it is argued that in order to have an adequate ethical discourse on gene therapy perspectives from disability research need to be taken into consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the work of science fiction writer John Beynon Harris, also known as John Wyndham. Availability of the John Wyndham Archive; Unpublished novels; `Vivisection' as Harris' first publication.

Comments on the paper written by John Harris about the ethical issues in connection with in vitro fertilization. Recognition of Harris' exploration of the subject in the area of morality; Efforts to extend the analysis instead of offering a solution to the insights of Harris; Suggestion on the avoidance of dictating theories by chairmen to their committees; Absence of any discussion on the factual outline of the practice of in vitro fertilization in 1983; Agreement on the moral dilemma stemming from the fertilization techniques and the use of tissues from embryos.

This article seeks to explore utilitarian conceptions of personhood which for a long time have been employed as part of a rational moral justification for the termination of pregnancy. Michael Tooley's desires-based rights approach to personhood presented in his work Abortion and Infanticide is considered and, it is argued, is found wanting when one considers unconscious adults and their ability to desire life. This article will offer that unconscious sleeping individuals only have the potential to regain the capacity to value their own life and, as such, under Tooley's formula for personhood, temporarily lose their status as a person. Following this, John Harris's utilitarian views on the status of the sleeping adult will be considered and deconstructed to show that, like Tooley, his ascription for personhood falls down at the sleeping adult. This article illustrates that utilitarian conceptions of personhood leave the sleeping adult human devoid of the rights of a person and hence render the value of this consquentialist theory, with regard to the idea of personhood, in severe doubt. The paper argues that utilitarian conceptions of personhood do little more than obstruct the worthy debate over the morality of abortion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the article "Sex Selection and Regulated Hatred," by John Harris. Complaints of Harris on recommendations of the report "Sex Selection: Options for Regulation" released by the Great Britain Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA); Views of Harris on pre-implantation sex selection; Criticisms of Harris against the HFEA.

Comments on the reaction of Tom Baldwin, Deputy Chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in Great Britain, on sex selection. Complaints of Baldwin against the comments of author John Harris on HFEA inquiry; Effects of sex selection on children; Reasons for using sex selection in the discussion of genetic determination.

Presents abstracts of several articles on the politics in India. "Constitutional Centring: Nation Formation and Consociational Federalism in India and Pakistan," by Katharine Adeney; "Redrawing the Body Politic: Federalism, Regionalism and the Creation of New States in India," by Emma Mawdsley; "The Continuing Struggle for India's Jharkhand: Democracy, Decentralization and the Politics of Names and Numbers," by Stuart Corbridge; "Liberal, Secular Democracy and Explanations of Hindu Nationalism," by Rajeev Bhargava; "Whatever Happened to Cultural Nationalism in Tamil Nadu? A Reading of Current Events and the Recent Literature on Tamil Politics," by John Harris.

This paper examines one particular justification for the screening and termination of embryos/fetuses which possess genetic features known to cause disability. The particular case is that put forward in several places by John Harris. He argues that the obligation to prevent needless suffering justifies the prevention of the births of disabled neonates. The paper begins by rehearsing Harris's case. Then, drawing upon claims advanced in a recent paper in the Journal of Medical Ethics, it is subjected to critical scrutiny, focusing on Harris's "suffering claim" (the claim that a life with disability inevitably involves suffering on a significant scale).(n1) It is argued that the suffering claim must be false if understood as an empirical claim. And, even if understood as a conceptual truth, it mistakenly assimilates the concepts of harm and suffering. Finally, again focusing on Harris's recent work in this area, his characterisation of disability as a "harmed condition" is shown not to apply in the case of at least some moderate forms of intellectual disability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]