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How should an excessively large parliament be effectively reduced in size without violating constitutional principles? This is a question that the German Bundestag has discussed since the introduction of the 2013 electoral reform measure. Facing a Bundestag consisting of 709 members and some public dissatisfaction, a reform measure to decrease the parliament's size was adopted in 2020. However, the 20 Bundestag, elected in September 2021, again increased in size to 735 members. The newly adopted electoral law still uses plurality voting to select the directly elected lawmakers. It is widely known that selection using the plurality rule is flawed because it violates the principle of majority decision. Aside from this aspect, this paper demonstrates that the plurality rule itself contributes to the excessive size of the parliament. By removing the flaws caused by the plurality rule and replacing this voting scheme with a Condorcet method (simple-majority rule), the targeted reduction of the size of the Bundestag can be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, the emergence of planning law and the juridification of planning in Germany did not follow any planning theory, but a logic inherent to the constitutional state. Only in small number of cases did the legislature or the judiciary adopt elements of planning theories, most of which were developed much later. Law defines itself by its strict claim to be obeyed. Therefore, the requirements of planning law may conflict with the recommendations of normative planning theories and then claim precedence over these. Nevertheless, with regard to the viability of some proposals of agonistic planning theories, legal borderlines arise. This paper deals with these borderlines. However, the goal of agonistic theories of planning coincides with the basic function of planning law to pacify conflicting interests and to reach acceptable solutions. Opponents of state planning projects thus are entitled to participate in planning procedures and to file farreaching lawsuits. However, the legal order also sets limits to legitimate resistance to democratic planning and cannot refrain from distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of rejection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In mixed-member proportional systems with closed party lists, such as the German Bundestag election, candidates’ electoral fate is widely determined by their placement on party lists. Despite its importance for the final composition of parliaments, candidates’ list placement in such systems is still under-researched. The literature on political careers has revealed a number of prevalent recruitment factors, but how these factors actually affect candidates’ placement on party lists has rarely been tested. This paper puts forward the question of what recruitment factors affected candidates’ chances to be allocated viable list positions in the 2013 German Bundestag election. The findings suggest that in particular candidates’ incumbency status, their number of prior candidacies and district nominations play key roles in shaping candidates’ electoral viability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new electoral law in the state of Hamburg, which was first used in the 2011 elections for the state parliament, abolished the optional overall list vote in the electoral districts and thus forced voters to cast preference votes for individual candidates. Supporters of the new electoral law assume that voters will inform themselves better about the candidates. This assumption contrasts with the voters' tendency to choose their favourite option based on the little information which is provided on the ballot paper. We show that the new electoral law has missed its target and that voters rely heavily on the ballot paper cues, resulting in the replication of the behaviour pattern they were used to under the optional list vote and earlier under the closed list. Most importantly the ballot position has the largest effect on being elected to the parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As compensation for their disempowerment in the process of European integration, national parliaments have been provided with various new rights and powers since the 1990s, culminating in the current provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. This paper argues, however, that rather than simply re-enhancing traditional powers of national parliaments, these reforms imply ideas of a new type of parliamentary democracy in Europe. It identifies three different roles for national parliaments in the EU: preventing rather than shaping legislation (gatekeeping role), cooperating with other parliaments and supranational institutions (networking role), and adopting a uniform mode control of government across all party groups (unitary scrutiniser role). All these roles require a significant deviation from the standard role legislatures usually play in European parliamentary democracies. The paper briefly explores how national parliaments in two ‘old’ (France, Germany) and one ‘new’ (Poland) member state fulfil these three new roles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The activities of Sorbian deputies in the People's Chamber, the highest legislative body in the German Democratic Republic, is a subject that has yet to be fully studied. This paper outlines the main findings of our research, undertaken in Germany in the years 2014-2016. For our study of Sorbian deputies, we have divided the existence of the People's Chamber into three basic periods: the Era of Kurt Krjeńc (1950-1964/1967), the Era of Jurij Grós (1967-1990), and the Era of Democratic Changes (1990). Each period is associated with important figures from Sorbian Lusatia. We counted a total of 28 deputies in the People's Chamber who were in some way associated with life in this region. However, there was no chance of promoting the interests of the Sorbs in the People's Chamber, since despite being the GDR's highest legislative body, its role was purely formal and symbolic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a growing convergence in the attitudes and behaviours of voters in the unified Germany, research shows that eastern and western German voters continue to differ over general ideological issues. How well does the party system in the unified Germany represent this ideological diversity? To answer this question, this paper analyses the extent to which (1) parties-in-electorates, (2) parties-in-parliament and (3) parties-in-government agree ideologically with voters from both regions between 1980 and 2013. Hypothetically, a lop-sided representation pattern, where the ideological location of parties converges primarily with those of western voters, suggests that existing ideological differences become institutionalised. Contrary to this scenario, we find that the German party system effectively articulates the ideological preferences of western and eastern voters. The same applies to parliaments and governments where the election outcome rather than any institutional bias affects the distance of parties to voters in the East and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Oral questions are usually seen as a procedure designed for political conflict. Yet question time may serve other purposes depending on the institutional setting, the political context and the policy field. By comparing the use of oral questions on the defence issue in the national parliaments of four Western democracies, the paper identifies a specific characteristic of questioning in each lower house: political conflict in Germany, internal dissent in the United Kingdom, reward of policy expertise in Spain and local issues in France. Such diverse uses of questioning procedures impact differently on the quality of the accountability process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the articles in this volume and places them in the broader discussion about German politics and comparative legislative behaviour. I describe their collective understanding of German law-making and highlight the strong empirical foundation of the research. Some challenges of the research agenda appear after comparing and contrasting the individual articles. Specifically, I start with a simple veto game and then amend and scrutinise this model using theoretical and empirical insights from this volume and the larger literature on legislative politics. The article closes by suggesting two future areas of research: institutional transformation and policy dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a fresh look at the midterm loss in German elections and argues that government type is a crucial determinant of midterm loss. Using panel regressions on a newly compiled data set covering all state elections during the period 1949–2004, we find that systematic midterm losses occur only when both chambers of the federal legislature (Bundestag and Bundesrat) are controlled by one party or a party coalition. Prior research has failed to discover this important regularity. These findings lend strong support to electoral balancing models while calling into doubt more traditional explanations of midterm loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliamentary systems can be characterised by particular patterns of interaction between the executive, the majority parties and the opposition parties in parliament. The basic argument outlined in this paper is that in order to understand the impact of European integration on national parliamentary democracies we have to find out how these patterns are adjusted. The article starts by identifying the basic social mechanisms that drive the interaction of the mentioned groups of actors and by describing how they are modified in European multi-level governance. In this context, members of national parliaments are faced with a dilemma: Successful scrutiny can undermine the effectiveness of European governance whereas a permissive parliament causes a legitimacy deficit. Through case studies on the Europeanisation of the parliamentary systems in the UK, in Denmark and in Germany, the authors show how members of parliaments cope with this challenge and which strategies they apply to avoid the dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the power of opposition parliamentary party groups when scrutinising their governments' decision-making concerning European Union issues, an important component in assuring democracy within the emerging multi-level system of governance in the EU. It first sets out the advantages that this provides to the political system, including improving government performance, improved democratic legitimacy, the channelling of disagreement and conflict into parliament, and preparing the opposition to govern. The article then proposes a set of criteria for measuring such power, which focus on the legal framework, institutional structures, and strategic behaviours, which give power to opposition parties when conducting scrutiny. Finally, the article considers these variables in four EU member states to evaluate empirically the power of opposition parties to scrutinise their government's EU decision-making. Because the power of scrutiny over EU matters must be seen in the context of the overall relationship of executive–legislative relations in a country, the four countries have been chosen to represent a country with a majority government (UK), two coalition governments (Germany and the Netherlands), and a minority government (Denmark). This analysis shows that opposition parties in parliaments with minority governments have the greatest power to scrutinise their government, followed by parliaments with coalition governments. Opposition parties in parliaments with majority governments have the least power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses whether and how party politics transform German bicameralism. Based on the policy positions of bicameral legislators, the study computes the win sets, the yolks of each chamber and a Nash solution in order to analyse empirically the effects of party politics on German bicameralism. In comparison to the basic bicameral model, hypotheses on bicameral conflict and policy stability are tested in the case of similar and different party majorities in the two-dimensional policy space of German labour politics. The results show that party politics transform German bicameralism in two ways. Similar majorities collapse bicameral checks-and-balances, while different party majorities come close to the basic bicameral model with high policy stability and conflict between both chambers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]