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Michelle Carter's texts instructing her mentally ill online boyfriend to commit suicide offended the social moral code. But the law does not categorize all morally reprehensible behavior as criminal. Commonwealth v. Carter is unprecedented in manslaughter law because Carter was convicted on the theory that she was virtually present as opposed to physically present--at the crime scene. The court's reasoning is expansive, as the framework it employs is excessively vague and does not provide fair notice to the public of which actions constitute involuntary manslaughter. Disturbingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's logic. This Article concludes that a conviction based upon a virtual-presence theory is unconstitutional, as it is void-for-vagueness. Hypotheticals are provided to illustrate how the Carter framework is unworkable when applied to online relationships based on electronic communications. State legislatures, not courts, should regulate this area, providing clear rules on when electronic encouragement of suicide violates the law. States can consider a physical-presence requirement and prohibit prosecutions on this basis. Or, legislators can borrow from aiding and abetting principles to expand their special relationship statutes to include online relationships, creating a duty to report when encouraging another to commit suicide. In either case, the law will provide citizens with bright-line rules to forecast when electronic conduct is subject to criminal sanction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complexity and diversity of unlawful killings -- particularly those involving mentally impaired offenders -- does not fit neatly across the binary distinction of offence/defence that structures criminal law. This is demonstrated in the Australian State of Victoria, where cognitively impaired homicide offenders who fail to meet the strict remit of the mental impairment defence have no (partial) defence or offence available to them which adequately captures their levels of criminal responsibility, moral agency and culpability. This makes the sentencing of such offenders not only particularly complex but means that the only stage in which both moral and legal culpability can be considered is in mitigation. This article argues that a progressive framework is needed to permit a small minority of (mentally impaired) homicide offenders to be simultaneously inculpated and (partially) exculpated. Accordingly, we propose introducing a model of diminished culpability manslaughter in Victoria, drawing from Loughnan's seminal reconceptualisation of 'diminished responsibility manslaughter' as an offence-cum-defence, which renders the diminished accused differently liable. Informed by a study of all homicide cases (n=647) sentenced in Victoria between 1 January 2000 and 31 July 2017, we argue that this model would not revoke legal capacity and would instead enhance the legitimacy and coherence of criminal law procedures, allowing a wider range of more legitimate convictions and reflective sentencing dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diminished Responsibility is a statutory partial defence to the charge of murder in the Homicide Act 1957 which has been amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In R v Brennan, the Court of Appeal described the new criteria as relating 'entirely to psychiatric matters'. This article will explore to what extent such a conclusion is warranted. The statutory wording of the 2009 Act will be analysed and the role of expert psychiatric evidence will be considered. It will conclude that the new Diminished Responsibility is not a purely psychiatric matter. This is because of the moral dimensions inherent in the defence, the ambiguity in the statutory wording and the fundamental problems of psychiatry usurping the function of the jury in relation to the ultimate issue. This results in inconsistent application and role confusion in relation to the defence and asks psychiatric evidence questions it cannot answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on causation element in manslaughter proceedings and difficulties it raises in suicide-related cases in the U.S. It mentions about Commonwealth v. Carter court case addressing maliciously encouraging the suicide of another under a theory of manslaughter; causation element in suicide related cases; and technological component of encouraging suicide.

There has been much academic debate concerning criminal liability for omissions and the extent to which such liability should be extended. The focus here concerns a recent, unreported, conviction for gross negligence manslaughter which raises the question of how far the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service are willing to blur existing boundaries of omissions liability and the established principles of causation. By scrutinising the current legal duties to act required for such liability to arise in the context of R v Bowditch, it will be demonstrated that we are moving incrementally towards a Good Samaritan law but with an absence of fair warning to guide citizens. Further, it is apparent from this conviction that the restricted principles of causation that apply to actions are not as restrictive when applied to omissions. It is clearly timely for the Law Commission to act to determine appropriate boundaries so that omissions liability complies with the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Massachusetts Juvenile Court's ruling in the 2017 case Commonwealth v. Carter which deals with American criminal law, liability for physical harm, and the trial court's determination that defendant Michelle Carter was guilty of involuntary manslaughter for using text messages and telephone calls to encourage her long-distance boyfriend Conrad Roy to commit suicide. Carter's self-created duty and failure to act to prevent the suicide are examined.

The crime of unlawful act manslaughter (otherwise known as constructive manslaughter) exists in English and Australian common law. It is also an offence contrary to the Canadian Criminal Code. In all three jurisdictions the offence shares the same essential elements, including the requirements that the accused commit an act which is both unlawful and dangerous. This article will explore the case law on unlawful act manslaughter in Australia, Canada and England, focusing on the elements of an unlawful act and dangerousness, in order to identify similarities and differences in the application of the law in the three jurisdictions. Where differences are found, consideration will be given to the question whether English law should be reformulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I shall examine when an alternative offence and also a lesser-included offence is available for an accessory. Particular reference will be made to the offences of manslaughter and murder. It shall be argued that the decision in R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen is wrong as far as it holds that an accessory can be liable for manslaughter when the principal has been convicted of murder, because it is necessary to prove that the accessory intended the principal to perpetrate the actus reus of the relevant offence with the requisite mens rea for that offence. In such a scenario the accessory does not intentionally assist or encourage the more serious offence (murder), so she cannot be derivatively liable for it, and the principal does not perpetrate the less serious offence (manslaughter), so there is no offence of manslaughter for the accessory’s liability to derive from. The accessory only attempts to assist or encourage the principal to engage in conduct that has the potential to form the conduct element of constructive manslaughter. Such a conviction would rest on a presumption of participation in a result crime, when no result was in fact caused by the non-perpetrated crime (manslaughter), but instead the result was caused by an alternative more serious crime (murder), which was in fact perpetrated. If the principal had done the actus reus that the accessory intended (i.e. unlawfully inflict actual bodily harm), the victim most likely would not have been killed and it is pure speculation to suggest that the victim could have been killed by actual bodily harm as opposed to the act of grievous bodily harm or an act of intentional killing, which in fact killed the victim. It shall be argued that in such cases it is best to prosecute the putative assister or encourager under ss 44 or 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, for attempting to assist or encourage a potential aggravated assault. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the gross negligence manslaughter case R v Evans in London, England. The topics discussed include the interpersonal relations that Alun Williams and Richard Bowler had, the mummification practices they carried out on Williams after their sexual activity, and the manslaughter case of a 15-year-old boy.

The article discusses a court case wherein the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals of appellants and held that there was no misdirection on the established law adverse to them in England. The Court dealt with elements for unlawful act manslaughter which had to be carefully differentiated namely the requisite state of mind and the requirement of dangerousness in relation to the unlawful act. It cites options for changing the law such as modifying the objective test and maintaining the status quo.

The article discusses a case in the British Court of Appeal wherein the defendant pleaded guilty of manslaughter based on loss of control.

Diminished Responsibility--Mental Health Act 1983--Hospital Orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the merits of employing a restorative justice approach in cases of gross negligence manslaughter involving healthcare professionals, in line with the recent policy turn towards developing a just culture in addressing episodes of healthcare malpractice within the National Health Service in England. It is argued that redress for victims and rehabilitation of offenders should operate as key values, underpinning the adoption of a restorative justice approach in such cases. It would also be vital that a structured pathway was designed that established suitable protocols and safeguards for both victims and offenders taking account of problematic issues such as the informality of the process, power asymmetries between parties, and the context in which the offence took place. Taking all such matters into account, we propose that consideration be given to establishing a pilot involving the use of restorative justice in cases of gross negligence manslaughter involving healthcare professionals, which would be subject to judicial and stakeholder oversight to ensure transparency and accountability, which in turn could inform future policy options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2016, Michelle Carter was tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter in a Massachusetts juvenile court for the death of her eighteen-year-old boyfriend, Conrad Roy III. Carter’s involvement in the suicidal death constituted discussions with Roy on how to carry out the act, contemporaneous text messages encouraging Roy to carry out the suicide attempt, and the failure to contact his family or authorities. This Note focuses on the legal effects of Carter’s involuntary manslaughter conviction. It highlights the First Amendment free speech implications that result from Carter’s words being construed as an “overt act” for the purpose of an involuntary manslaughter prosecution. Additionally, it examines and analyzes how the current state of Massachusetts’s criminal law allows for a conviction of a defendant such as Carter. Finally, it recommends that the Massachusetts legislature take steps in legislating “assisted suicide.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the court case R. v Braithwaite (Ezekial), in which the British Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's appeal for his conviction of murder and unlawful act manslaughter.

The article presents a court case R. v. Winterton (Andrew), in which a Court of Appeal judge dismissed the appeal of the defendant, a construction site manager, who was charged with gross negligence manslaughter when a labourer died due to a collapsed trench at a housing development site.

The article presents a court case R. v Tas (Ali), in which a Court of Appeal judge dismissed the appeal of a defendant who was acquitted of murder but found guilty of manslaughter over the death of a person who was fatally stabbed by the defendant using a knife owned by his friend.

This article critiques the definitive guideline on sentencing loss of control manslaughter in England and Wales. The guideline fails to address adequately the circumstances of victims of abuse who kill (primary victims). The article suggests that the primary' victim is disadvantaged by the guideline in three ways. First, the guideline includes a policy against considering, at sentencing, factors that have been assessed at trial in establishing whether the partial defence applies (policy against double counting). Secondly, the guideline does not address the impact of power imbalances on the primary victim's decision to carry a weapon for the purposes of assessing culpability. Thirdly, there is a lack of guidance relating to the relevance of domestic abuse as aggravating/mitigating factors in the case of primary victims. Recommendations for developing the guideline are advanced throughout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Popoe's appeal to the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal in case of 'R v Popoe' in which the judge found that evidence were sufficient to convict Popoe of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.

The article discusses three British Court of Appeal cases dealing with murder, voluntary manslaughter, loss of control, and sufficient evidence. It examines the evidences of loss of control in the cases which are reportedly insufficient that led the courts to dismiss the appeals. Also explored are the rights of defendants to seek to be excused from being held guilty for murder.

The article discusses the gross negligence manslaughter case against Dr Hadiza Bawa-Garba and two nurses in the death of a six year old boy, Jack Adcock, focusing on the tension between the fitness to practise and related appeal processes. Topics discussed include the then Secretary of State for health, Jeremy Hunt having commissioned a rapid policy review in cases of gross negligence manslaughter related to health professionals.

Murder-manslaughter-historic offences-non-recent offences-Jogee-culpability-knife [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper (1) defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, (2) offers an account of the nature of omissions of the kind that need be included in that for which criminal liability is imposed in the absence of a voluntary act, and (3) argues that possession is a status that is constituted in part by an omission of this sort. The result is that to hold people criminally liable for possession is to hold them criminally liable both for a status and for an omission, an omission that is part of what it is to have that status. The paper also distinguishes possession from vagrancy, which is not a proper object of criminal liability, precisely because of constraints placed by the Voluntary Act Requirement. And the paper argues that possession incident to dispossession is not a proper object of criminal liability because it does not involve an omission of the kind that other forms of possession involve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case in Great Britain related to manslaughter, presence of cocaine ingested by the defendant, admissibility, lies told by defendant, relevance to guilt and credibility and propensity to aggression.

The article reports the decision of the Great Britain Court of Appeal Criminal Division in case R. v. Brennan (Michael James), in which defendant Michael James Brennan was convicted of murder. Topics discussed include conviction of Brennan for manslaughter under Great Britain Homicide Act 1957, diminished responsibility issues and uncontradicted expert evidence.

The article focuses on the decision of Great Britain's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case R. v Williams (Clayton Ronald) regarding the sentence of 20 years' imprisonment for offences of manslaughter, burglary and aggravated vehicle taking.

The article discusses the lawsuit HKSAR v. Lai Shui Yin related to gross negligence manslaughter (GNM) in Hong Kong, China. Topics discussed include importance of mens rea in issues related to GNM, imposition of mandatory lengthy sentences in the cases of GNM, and issues of recklessness associated with GNM in comparison to gross negligence.

The article discusses the judicial opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court on the case State v. Montoya and its application in the rule of lenity. Topics discussed include violating the double jeopardy in the action of voluntary manslaughter, role of rule of lenity in resolving the claims related to dwelling and homicide for violating double jeopardy and the judicial review of the judicial error related to the case of manslaughter.

This study investigates the expressive side of the sentencing hearing in three trials dealing respectively with a charge of battery, of indecent assault and of manslaughter. The communication phases of the sentence have been associated with underlying functions of the judge's speech and with moments of moralization. The specificity of the case appears in the distancing from the defendant and in the moralizing style of the judges. We discuss the implication of this procedure for the administration of justice and for the defendant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from news agency Associated Press as of early July 2016, stating that surgeon and stem cell advocate Paolo Macchiarini is facing preliminary charges of involuntary manslaughter and causing bodily injury.

The article discusses the Ontario Court of Appeal case R. vs. Kokopenace which deals with manslaughter. The appeal asserting that the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated, was allowed, holding that the 2008 jury roll in the District of Kenora was improperly constituted. The conviction was also set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The article tackles the prosecution of surgeons for manslaughter. Topics discussed are the three thresholds that must be crossed if a person is to be sentenced for manslaughter, the 1995 case Regina v. Adomako that illustrated a crime of gross negligence manslaughter, guidelines prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council of Great Britain, mitigating factors indicating lower culpability, and the court judge's reasoning behind the custody sentence on surgeon David Sellu.