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Here, we review the literature on autonoetic consciousness in episodic memory, our memory for personally experienced events, in order to understand its relationship to visual perspective. Autonoeti...

The capacity to adapt to resource distributions by modulating the frequency of exploratory and exploitative behaviors is common across metazoans and is arguably a principal selective force in the evolution of cognition. Here we (1) review recent work investigating behavioral and biological commonalities between external foraging in space and internal foraging over envi- ronments specified by cognitive representations, and (2) explore the implications of these commonalities for understanding the origins of the self. Behavioural commonalities include the capacity for what is known as area-restricted search in the ecological literature: this is search focussed around locations where resources have been found in the past, but moving away from locations where few resources are found, and capable of producing movement patterns mimicking Levy flights. Area-restricted search shares a neural basis across metazoans, and these biological commonalities in vertebrates suggest an evolutionary homology be- tween external and internal foraging. Internal foraging, and in particular a form we call embodied prospective foraging, makes available additional capacities for prediction based on search through a cognitive representation of the external environment, and allows predictions about outcomes of possible future actions. We demonstrate that cognitive systems that use embodied prospec- tive foraging require a primitive sense of self, needed to distinguish actual from simulated action. This relationship has implica- tions for understanding the evolution of autonoetic consciousness and self-awareness (Current Zoology 61 (2): 368-381, 2015). Keywords Self-projection, Mental time travel, Episodic future thinking, Foraging, Consciousness

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. “Memory for the future”: An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1–12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.

Autobiographical memories in our lives are critically dependent on temporal lobe structures. However, the contribution of CA1 neurons in the human hippocampus to the retrieval of episodic autobiographical memory remains elusive. In patients with a rare acute transient global amnesia, highly focal lesions confined to the CA1 field of the hippocampus can be detected on MRI. We studied the effect of these lesions on autobiographical memory using a detailed autobiographical interview including the remember/know procedure. In 14 of 16 patients, focal lesions in the CA1 sector of the hippocampal cornu ammonis were detected. Autobiographical memory was significantly affected over all time periods, including memory for remote periods. Impairment of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness exhibited a strong temporal gradient extending 30 to 40 y into the past. These results highlight the distinct and critical role of human hippocampal CA1 neurons in autobiographical memory retrieval and for re-experiencing detailed episodic memories.

This article addresses some open questions about the self, development, consciousness and memory, especially episodic memory, and is meant to make an attempt to clarify on a descriptive manner these phenomena and especially the relationship between them. In particular, cognitive child development of memory and current theorizing on semantic and episodic memory and related developmental states of consciousness teaches us here to see how different levels of development of the self, identity and memory relate to the ontogenetic development of different stages of consciousness of being in the world. A gradual distinction becomes outlined: from a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or unknowing consciousness as a biological adaptive function with a first sort of “self-experience” already apparent at an anoetic level of consciousness relying on implicit experiential and procedural memory, towards “knowing consciousness”, including “noetic” and “autonoetic” consciousness based on semantic and episodic memor...

Few studies have investigated autobiographical amnesia in neurodegenerative diseases and yet these pathologies are particularly relevant when addressing the issue of theories of long-term memory consolidation. According to the standard model, the medial temporal lobe (MTL) is involved in the storage and retrieval of episodic and semantic memories during a limited period of years. An alternative model, the multiple trace theory (MTT), suggests that the capacity of the MTL to recollect episodic memories is of a more permanent nature. In order to test these models, we studied three groups of patients with a neurodegenerative disease predominantly affecting different cerebral structures namely the MTL (13 patients in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease) and the neocortex involving either the anterior temporal lobe (10 patients with semantic dementia) or the frontal lobe (15 patients with the frontal variant of frontotemporal dementia, fv-FTD). We compared these groups of patients with control subjects using an original and reliable autobiographical memory task designed specially to assess strictly episodic memory over the entire lifespan. This task, developed on the basis of the most up-to-date definition of episodic memory, takes into account the ability to mentally travel back in time and re-experience the source of acquisition (remembering, i.e. autonoetic consciousness) via the remember/know paradigm. All three groups of patients produced strongly contrasting profiles of autobiographical amnesia (regardless of the nature of the memories), which also differed markedly from that of the control group: temporally graded memory loss in Alzheimer's disease, showing that remote memories are better preserved than recent ones; memory loss with a reversed gradient in semantic dementia; and memory loss without any clear gradient in fv-FTD. Most strictly episodic memories (i.e. unique, specific in time and space, and detailed) were impaired, whatever the time interval considered in the three groups, though the memory loss was ungraded in Alzheimer's disease and fv-FTD, and temporally graded in semantic dementia, sparing the most recent period. A deficit of autonoetic consciousness emerged in Alzheimer's disease and fv-FTD, but not in semantic dementia, though beyond the most recent 12-month period, the latter group could not justify their subjective sense of remembering to the same extent as the controls, in terms of the actual contextual information retrieved-phenomenological, spatial or temporal details. Our results demonstrate that autobiographical amnesia varies according to the nature of the memories under consideration and the locus of cerebral dysfunction. They are discussed in the light of the two competing models of long-term memory consolidation and recent conceptions of autobiographical recollection: new insights based on current concepts of episodic memories challenge the standard model and tend to support the MTT instead.

Episodic memory deficits are predominately the first cognitive impairment in Alzheimer disease (AD). Previous studies have demonstrated that these deficits are specifically linked to autonoetic consciousness impairment, whereas noetic consciousness remains preserved in AD. This study focused on the self-reference effect and examined emotional valence, as it has been shown that emotional content can enhance memory in AD. A task involving recognition of emotional versus neutral adjective traits after self-reference versus semantic encoding, and using the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm was administered to 22 AD patients and 18 normal controls. Results for AD patients show that self-reference increased autonoetic consciousness only for emotional and particularly negative trait adjectives. This interesting result indicates that neutral valence does not allow properties of the self to emerge in AD patients because of the progressive loss of the sense of self-linked to the disease, whereas emotional valence does.

There is ongoing theoretical debate regarding episodic memory and how it can be accurately measured, in particular if the focus should be content-based recall of episodic details or something more experiential involving the subjective capacity to mentally travel back in time and “re-live” aspects of the original event. The autonoetic subscale of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) is presented here as a new test instrument that attempts to redress theoretical and methodological shortcomings in autobiographical memory assessment. The EAMI merges a phenomenological detail-based approach with an assessment of autonoetic consciousness, departing considerably from traditional Remember/Know paradigms used within this field. We present findings from an initial pilot study investigating the potential markers of autonoetic consciousness that may accompany episodic retrieval. Key behavioural indices of autonoetic consciousness, notably those of viewer perspective, visual imagery, and emotional re-experiencing, emerged as being inextricably bound with the level of phenomenological detail recalled and the overall re-living judgment. The autonoetic subscale of the EAMI permits conceptually refined assessment of episodic personal memories and the accompanying subjective experience of mental re-living, characteristic of episodic memory.

Although memory dysfunction is not a prominent feature of the behavioral variant of fronto- temporal dementia (bv-FTD), there is evidence of specific deficits of episodic memory in these patients. They also have problems monitoring their memory performance. The objective of the present study was to explore the ability to consciously retrieve own encoding of the context of events (autonoetic consciousness) and the ability to monitor memory performance using feeling-of-knowing (FOK) in bv- FTD. Analyses of the patients' cerebral metabolism (FDG-PET) allowed an examination of whether impaired episodic memory in bv-FTD is associated with the frontal dysfunction characteristic of the pathology or a dysfunction of memory-specific regions pertaining to Papez's circuit. Data were obtained from eight bv-FTD patients and 26 healthy controls. Autonoetic consciousness was evaluated by Remember responses during the recognition memory phase of the FOK experiment. As a group, bv-FTD patients demonstrated a decline in autonoetic consciousness and FOK accuracy at the chance level. While memory monitoring was impaired in most (seven) patients, four bv-FTD participants had individual impairment of autonoetic consciousness. They specifically showed reduced metabolism in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (near the superior frontal sulcus), parietal regions, and the posterior cingulate cortex. These findings were tentatively interpreted by considering the role of the metabolically impaired brain regions in self-referential processes, sug- gesting that the bv-FTD patients' problem consciously retrieving episodic memories may stem at least partly from deficient access to and maintenance/use of information about the self. Frontal and poste- rior cingulate metabolic impairment in the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia with impaired autonoetic consciousness Hum Brain Mapp 00:000-000, 2011. V C 2011 Wiley-Liss, Inc.