Does autonoetic consciousness in episodic memory rely on recall from a first-person perspective?

ABSTRACTHere, we review the literature on autonoetic consciousness in episodic memory, our memory for personally experienced events, in order to understand its relationship to visual perspective. Autonoetic consciousness is the sense of self we experience when recalling a memory from our life (Tulving (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 26(1), 1–12). It is our ability to mentally travel through time, to re-experience and be subjectively aware of this as our memory (e.g. Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory: The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 331–354). We examine whether reliving an event we have experienced is supported by our ability to recall from a first-person perspective. Considering that experiences start from the perspective of our own eyes, it seems reasonable to suggest that recall from a first-person viewpoint is associated with a greater subjective experience of travelling back in time to re-experience the event. Here, we review current measures of autonoetic consciousness. We then present an overview of work on visual imagery and memory. Evidence relating to the visual perspective of imagery and autonoetic consciousness will then be discussed. Finally, the review will encompass neural evidence for the role of the parietal cortex, angular gyrus in particular, in these processes as demonstrated by experimental manipulations of perspective in episodic memory.