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Copyright of Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Science plays a central role in propelling social progress and evolution as it serves as a source of knowledge that catalysts innovation and fosters critical thinking. In this essay, the author expounds some reflections that aim to elucidate the nature of scientific knowledge and the limits of what we can comprehend about the physical world. Historically, one of the key questions in the philosophy of science has been whether or not we can truly comprehend everything about the physical world. This enquiry delves into the very essence of scientific knowledge. While scientific discovery is typically the result of planned causal research, historical exceptions to this rule exist. In our pursuit of knowledge, it is essential to differentiate between ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. Ultimately, the historical perspective highlights the importance of ongoing critical reflection and debate within the philosophical theory of human knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Frank Ramsey's philosophy of science is considered abstruse due to the incompleteness and difficulty of his paper "Theories". This has not prevented various authors from arguing that Ramsey is committed to meaning holism for scientific theories, and that his philosophy of science is anti-realist but anti-reductionist. However, it is unclear exactly how meaning holism works for Ramsey, and how he can be both anti-realist and anti-reductionist. I argue that clarity can be gained on both issues by examining Ramsey's philosophy of science through a reconstruction of his decision theory compatible with his later philosophical beliefs. I develop an account of how credences can be formed over singular, theoretical propositions despite those propositions being fictions. Credences are ultimately measured by preferences over conditionals whose antecedents are the verification conditions of theoretical propositions and outcomes are elements of a privileged partition on an agent's possibility space induced by the language of the theory. Those verification conditions are the observational elements formed from the unions of this induced partition. Meaning holism is explained as the sensitivity of theoretical propositions to their verification conditions. And anti-realism and anti-reductionism can be maintained due to theoretical propositions forming a finer partition of possibility space than observational propositions, which prevents the former from being truth-functions of the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this text is to assert the thesis that scientific work, manifested in the production of analyses, theories, and concepts, irrespective of their disciplinary, multidisciplinary, or interdisciplinary origins, only unfolds when rooted in the primacy of the real. The complexity of scientific objects cannot be fully addressed exclusively within disciplinary confines. Discussions centered solely on theoretical, conceptual, or explanatory models, while assisting in transcending disciplinary limitations, do not propel the advancement of scientific knowledge. Contradictions in theoretical-conceptual and analytical production, explicit within disciplinary fields, arise not only from the limitations of disciplines but from how reality is conceptualized as concrete thought. Regardless of the discipline, theory and concept divorced from reality amount to mere speculation.

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Wilson (2012; 2018; 2019) has been conducting literature studies within the relevance theory program by exposing two conflicting conceptions. First is the notion held by relevance theory and its supporters that relevance can contribute to literary studies. The second conception is a counterpoint from literary theory by literary critic Keith Green (1996), that relevance has little to contribute to literary studies. We analyse both points of view, as asserted by Wilson and Green and we discuss the nature of linguistic communication theories and literary theories. We propose that, although they share the same observational object – literature – relevance theory and literary theory do not share the same theoretical object, so that the equivalence of both is a mistake. From such a mistake results a theoretical incommensurability problem and an imminent risk of pragmatics failing in its initiative to systematize literary phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages (modes): a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and a mature, rigorous phase of testing specific, explicit models. The first phase depends on Feyerabendian open possibility, the second on theoretical plausibility and internal coherence, and the third on testability (falsifiability, predictive efficacy). Multiple perspectives produce variety necessary for theory formation, whereas explicit agreement on evaluative criteria is essential for testing. Hertzian observer-mechanics of empirical-deductive scientific models are outlined that use semiotic operations of measurement/evaluation, computation, and physical action/construction. If models can be fully operationalized, then they can be intersubjectively verified (tested) irrespective of metaphysical, theoretical, value-, or culture-based disagreements. Verificationism can be expanded beyond simple predictive efficacy to incorporate testing for pragmatic, functional efficacy in engineering, medicine, and design contexts. Such a more open, pragmatist, operationalist, epistemically-constructivist perspective is suggested in which verification is contingent on the type of assertion (e.g., heuristic, analytic, empirical, pragmatic), its intended purpose, degree and reliability of model-based evidence, and existence of alternate, competing predictive models. Suggestions for epistemological hygiene amidst the world-wide pandemic of misinformation and propaganda are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of models of scientific theories should not be done without qualifications about the mathematics being used to build the models. This looks obvious, at least for logicians, but generally, it is not to the philosopher of science. Thus, some details about this point seem useful for both. Since any quick revision in the literature shows that in most cases, mainly after the raising of the semantic approach (to scientific theories), the models are taken to be set-theoretical structures, in discussing the issue we shall be concerned more with set theories, the locus where the play is usually developed (yet sometimes unconsciously).

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework (e.g., Newtonian mechanics en bloc, as opposed, say, to Newton's theory of gravitation) either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. (In particular, Newtonian abduction is not inference to the best explanation, but rather is closer to Peirce's original idea of abduction.) I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell (Proc Camb Philos Soc II:292–294, 1876): "The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal theory was the main field of Leon Petrażycki’s investigations. However, his interests also included philosophy, methodology, psychology and sociology. His views in these fields were non-trivial, not only as far as the cognitive horizon of his time was concerned, but also with regard to the present epoche. Particularly significant is the idea of politics of law, i.e. the investigation and prediction of social effects of legal systems.

The leitmotif of Mario Bunge's work was that the philosophy of science should be informed by a comprehensive scientific philosophy, and vice versa; with both firmly rooted in realism and materialism. Now Bunge left such a big oeuvre, comprising more than 70 books and hundreds of articles, that it is impossible to review it in its entirety. In addition to biographical remarks, this obituary will therefore restrict itself to some select issues of his philosophy: his scientific metaphysics, his philosophy of physics, his concept of mechanismic explanation, his philosophy of social science and technology, and his approach to the demarcation problem. The final section will explore why Bunge, despite the extent and depth of his work, has not achieved a more prominent status in the philosophical community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages (modes): a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and a mature, rigorous phase of testing specific, explicit models. The first phase depends on Feyerabendian open possibility, the second on theoretical plausibility and internal coherence, and the third on testability (falsifiability, predictive efficacy). Multiple perspectives produce variety necessary for theory formation, whereas explicit agreement on evaluative criteria is essential for testing. Hertzian observer-mechanics of empirical-deductive scientific models are outlined that use semiotic operations of measurement/evaluation, computation, and physical action/construction. If models can be fully operationalized, then they can be intersubjectively verified (tested) irrespective of metaphysical, theoretical, value-, or culture-based disagreements. Verificationism can be expanded beyond simple predictive efficacy to incorporate testing for pragmatic, functional efficacy in engineering, medicine, and design contexts. Such a more open, pragmatist, operationalist, epistemically-constructivist perspective is suggested in which verification is contingent on the type of assertion (e.g., heuristic, analytic, empirical, pragmatic), its intended purpose, degree and reliability of model-based evidence, and existence of alternate, competing predictive models. Suggestions for epistemological hygiene amidst the world-wide pandemic of misinformation and propaganda are offered.

Copyright of Acta Comportamentalia is the property of Instituto de Psicologia y Educacion de la Universidad Veracruzana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For scientific projects to deal with something as diffuse as meaning-making there are multiple hurdles to solve, starting with the validity of meaning as a specific phenomenon to be represented scientifically. Modulating the concept of meaning into a comprehensible phenomenon across different scales of validity – as a top-to-bottom approach in the sense of applying meaning to areas where it is not commonplace – requires being able to both differentiate its expression in subjective systems (as, for instance, individuals with the faculty of language) and as a biological principle that takes place in other forms of life. In this paper we will examine whether the latter sense of meaning can be somewhat commensurable with the former, and propose a philosophical change of gears in regards to the way we express the issues of meaning as arbitrary vs the non-nomological relations witnessed in accounts of biological meaning, making the latter the more accurate way to invoke the secondary sense of meaning without marring it with issues of subjectivity as it happens in the first sense. We propose the concept of "surjectivity" to account for processes underlying behavior that cannot be explained away by appealing to physical law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on metaphor and models have been receiving wider attention and getting a deeper understanding of the role these resources play in scientific theories. From Mary Hesse and Max Black's seminal works in 1960's a wellspring of metaphor and models accounts has raised in the fields of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language, Pragmatics, Cognitive Sciences and Science Teaching. History of science has played an important role in showing the ubiquity of metaphorical process in science. This paper aims to clarify how metaphor play that major role in the context of discovery by being one of the most reliable thought tools for scientists in "knitting" the plausible and unobservable into the previous accepted world of the theory and by generating trustworthy access to theoretical entities and fertile explanatory hypotheses. We tent to show how this was possible through a philosophical demystification of its power and function and how to a certain extent, metaphors are synthetic models and models are systematic metaphors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the contradiction between theories of form in musicology (originating in the mechanistic and organicist definitions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), and new forms created by contemporary composers since circa 1970. The initial discussion introduces various "traditional" definitions of form in aesthetics, semiotics and musicology. Following this, a critique of the mechanistic approach, drawing on the work of André Souris, is presented. The third part discusses some recent scientific theories which composers have drawn from. The remainder of the article provides examples of the manifestation of new musical forms based on scientific theories such as the spiral, morphogenesis, fractal geometry, psychological-literary analysis, and L-systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every scientific attempt to explain nature includes a model that usually means a purposely simplified construct built with the aim to understand a certain particular phenomenon. In the presented paper, we focus on theoretical models that represent new mental constructions combining the approach of analogy with familiar and creative imagination in the area of inventing of new things. Therefore, the models are openended, extensible and suggestive of new hypotheses. Critical realism recognizes that models are selective; they only allow us to deal with a limited circle of aspects. Such models are neither pictures of reality nor useful fiction; they are partial and inadequate ways of imagining of what is not observable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the problem of inconsistency toleration in the context of scientific pluralism. I argue that, first of all, the notion of inconsistency toleration has to be qualified with respect to the evaluative attitude that one takes towards a given scientific theory or theories. Second, I show which types of inconsistency toleration are compatible with two major approaches to scientific pluralism, the so-called modest and the radical one. In view of this I suggest some points of demarcation between these two approaches.

Copyright of Formación Universitaria is the property of Centro de Informacion Tecnologica (CIT) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Pensamiento Americano is the property of Corporacion Universitaria Americana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise, models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge - e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations - and assertional knowledge - e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature and their organization and takes track of the way they are experimentally acquired or intentionally elaborated. A model mainly represents the theoretical knowledge or hypotheses on a domain, while the theory of observations mainly represents the empirical knowledge and the given experimental practices. We propose a precise identity criterion for observations and we explore different links between models and observations by assuming a degree of independence between them. By exploiting some techniques developed in the field of social choice theory and judgment aggregation, we sketch some strategies to solve inconsistencies between a given set of observations and the assumed theoretical hypotheses. The solutions of these inconsistencies can impact both the observations - e.g., the theoretical knowledge and the analysis of the way observations are collected or produced may highlight some unreliable sources - and the models - e.g., empirical evidences may invalidate some theoretical laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Historiae Scientiarum is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Bertrand Russell once pointed out that modern science doesn't deal with causal laws and that assuming otherwise is not only wrong but such thinking is erroneously thought to do no harm. However, looking into the scientific practice of simulation or experimentation reveals a general causal comprehension of physical processes. In this paper I trace causal experiences to the existence of innate causal capacity by which we organize sensory information. This capacity, I argue, is something we have got in virtue of natural selection as can be seen from experiments with intelligent animals like crows and chimpanzees. So understanding the empirical world is impossible without the use of causal categories. The reason why Russell believed that modern science does not refer to causal laws is, I think, because he argued that the laws of mathematical physics give us a non-causal description of reality. In contrast to such a claim I hold that theoretical laws are prescriptive rules of description rather than descriptions themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Apuntes Universitarios: Revista de Investigación is the property of Universidad Peruana Union Filiar Tarapoto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Se realizó una revisión bibliográfica del objeto de estudio, a la vez que se aportaron datos de investigaciones del autor, que le dan sustento a novedosas teorías científicas, con vistas a fundamentar los estudios fisiológicos e investigativos de la hipnosis con una concepción científica y materialista del mundo y un enfoque didáctico metodológico, entre otros importantes aspectos. Se expone una teoría científica de la génesis, naturaleza y mantenimiento del proceso hipnótico, así como del modo de funcionamiento subconsciente del cerebro en estado hipnótico, lo cual permite proponer la definición y el concepto de hipnosis desde esta perspectiva.A literature review of the object of study was carried out, and at the same time data of the author's investigations were added, which provide the support to novel scientific theories aimed at establishing the bases of physiological and investigative studies of hypnosis with a scientific and materialist conception of the world and a methodological didactic approach, among other important aspects. A scientific theory on the genesis, nature and maintenance of the hypnotic process, as well as on the way of unconscious functioning of brain in hypnotic state is exposed, allowing to propose the definition and concept of hypnosis from this perspective.

Family issues rest on two important pillars: the first is establishing whether there is an issue in the family, or whether the issue is being raised by the researcher. Secondly, assuming that there is a family issue, its type needs to be determined. In order to determine the existence of an issue, it is necessary to know the academic and cultural environment of the family and therefore the dominant paradigm, in order to understand the researcher’s school of thought and his scientific approach. Moreover, in order to diagnose the issue it is also necessary to address the practical aspects of such as knowledge and behavioral patterns. In addition the relevant legal rules and freedoms, functional analyses, effects and consequences, policy-making, principles, legal rules and regulations also need to be determined.

This study examined relations between 124 British children’s and their parents’ endorsements about the origins of three living things (human, non-human animal, and plant) as reported on questionnaires. In addition to completing questionnaires, half of the sample discussed the origins of entities ( n = 64) in parent–child dyads before completing the questionnaires. The 7-year-old age group endorsed creationism more than evolution, and the 10-year-old age group endorsed both concepts equally for all three living things. Children’s endorsements were correlated with their parents’ endorsements for all three living things. Children’s endorsement of evolutionary theory was more closely related to parent–child conversational mentions of evolution than to parents’ endorsement of evolutionary theory in questionnaires. A similar pattern was found for children’s endorsement of creationism. Parent–child conversations did not consistently invoke evolution or creationism even when parents endorsed a particular theory. Findings are interpreted in relation to the pivotal role of joint collaborative conversation in children’s appropriation of scientific content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until now, the problem of demarcation between science and philosophy has been one of the most fruitful issues regarding epistemology. At the same time, it has been also sterile, insofar as no reliable and widely accepted criterion has been established in this regard. Thus, we do not have clear boundaries which circumscribe scientific rationality and differentiate it from all others forms of reason. The discussion concerning the "limits of science" has one of the most influential views in this realm in the Popperian approach. There is here an evaluation of Popper's frontier between scientific theories and metaphysical research programmes. This opens the door to the final remarks on the uncertainty of the frontier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Written in honour of the late Academician Georg Brutian, the paper draws attention on one of the most special means of the transformative logic, the corrective argumentation, called here reasoning, that better emphasises the specific of arguments as such: that to inform semantically about the intention to arrive to certain conclusions. The corrective reasoning is that which reviews not only the validity of inferences, but also of the different types of premises lying at the basis of the theories people erect about every moment and aspect of life and reality. The corrective reasoning is the form of the capacity to critique the former judgements and has three tiers: the first – concluding that the former/existing theory was proven to be wrong; the second – gathering the arguments of alternative theories, and the third – focusing on the best/or even only in present the more economical alternative theory. Every tier has more strata of reasoning whose result is the correction: the conclusion that 1) the old results (and focus on examples/situations), so the old theories require/directly send to their refutation, and 2) the conclusion suggests just some arguments of alternative theories. The corrective argumentation is not reduced to propositions, neither to syllogisms, but is constituted of the many relationships between statements. From all the domains the corrective argumentation does manifest within and about, the scientific one was chose just because here the corrective approach is compulsory and its pattern – the most obvious. An epistemological analysis was deployed and it was demonstrated that the goal of the corrective reasoning is truth (in a certain concrete temporal interval) and the way to it involves the better understanding of the semantic level of language and its dependence on the real world. Because the corrective reasoning is a question of daring and imagining new theories, the mechanism of this process was sketched by showing that consciousness has not only a passive face (that of representations) but always an active one too (the intention toward the external world), and by focusing on the logical forms as structures of thinking and their relationships with the external world “through the medium of” their internal consistence and coherence. In its turn, argumentation has in view both the formal model and substantial model of situations. The specific of the corrective reasoning in science shows the difficulty of this endeavour and some deviations from this specific. The conclusion is that, indeed, the corrective reasoning is revolutionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this study was to explore the nature and structure of implicit theories of Spanish-speaking in-service teachers on learning to read. The study sample consisted of 591 in-service teachers from various Ibero-American countries (Spain, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador). The study analyzed attributional structure or teacher beliefs on learning to read based on principal component analysis. Findings revealed that many of the implicit theories on learning to read held by the teachers correspond to the historiography analysis and representational structure identified in previous studies. Based on main component analysis with varimax rotation, a factorial structure was found to be formed by the seven main factors related to the constructivist, nativist, maturationist, social, repetition, corrective, and psycho-linguistic learning theories. Also, significant differences were found in the learning theories of the teachers depending on geographical and cultural context. Spanish teachers were more likely to be associated with the psycho-linguistic and nativist theories. Mexican teachers were more closely associated with the constructivist theory, and both Guatemalan and Colombian teachers tended to be linked to the repetition-based theory. Finally, Ecuadorian teachers tended to rely on the nativist theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]