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What is post-normal science? What are the reasons for, and consequences of, encountering it in one's professional life? Here I share my own experience of readings, practices and discussions with the fathers, supporters and detractors of PNS. After a short description of PNS and of my own experience with it, I review some common criticism levelled to PNS from different authors and conclude reflecting on how PNS—difficult to explain and translate into formulae or checklists—provides its practitioners with useful keys to open relevant doors to understanding, and might be especially suited to face the present intersecting crises befalling the use of science for policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non‐living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life‐Sufficient Features (or LS‐Features). I also clarify what I mean by "strongly emergent powers". And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to my argument. I show why all of such reactions turn out to be troublesome or inadequate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I am persuaded that the anti‐reductionist stance of the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework is fundamentally sound and will prove heuristically fruitful. But the very success of this framework generates a challenge. Many biologically informed metaphysicians have drawn striking conclusions from the fact that biology cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry. One such conclusion is John Dupré's "disunity of the sciences" thesis which follows upon the alleged "disorder of things." These conclusions threaten to undermine assumptions underpinning the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework. In this paper I argue that metaphysicians need to find a middle path between an unattainable reductionism one the one hand and the unwelcome disunity thesis on the other. This is no easy task, as a survey of various proposals makes clear. I argue that adverting to the long‐discredited Aristotelian notion of Prime Matter is the most economical way of achieving unity without reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The overarching objective of this paper is to examine the cause–effect relationships among building and information modeling (BIM)-related risk factors and their impact on the implementation of BIM in construction projects. Design/methodology/approach: This paper draws on previous research to identify and categorize BIM-related risk factors. It then develops a system dynamics (SD) model to examine the cause–effect relationships among these factors leading to issues in BIM implementation. Findings: The proposed SD model illustrates how nine reinforcing feedback loops provide connections between four categories of risks, namely, technical, information, legal and organizational risks and, consequently, create vicious cycles that threaten the successful implementation of BIM. Originality/value: This paper is among a few studies that depart from reductionism by taking a holistic approach and demonstrating how the interactions between BIM-related risk factors lead to vicious cycles that threaten the successful implementation of BIM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite predictions that neuroscientific discoveries would revolutionize psychiatry, decades of research have not yet led to clinically significant advances in psychiatric care. For this reason, an increasing number of researchers are recognizing the limitations of a purely biomedical approach in psychiatric research. These researchers call for reevaluating the conceptualization of mental disorders and argue for a non‐reductionist approach to mental health. The aim of this paper is to discuss philosophical assumptions that underly neuroscientific research in psychiatry and offer practical tools to researchers for overcoming potential conceptual problems that are derived from those assumptions. Specifically, we will discuss: the analogy problem, questioning whether mental health problems are equivalent to brain disorders, the normativity problem, addressing the value‐laden nature of psychiatric categories and the priority problem, which describes the level of analysis (e.g., biological, psychological, social, etc.) that should be prioritized when studying psychiatric conditions. In addition, we will explore potential strategies to mitigate practical problems that might arise due to these implicit assumptions. Overall, the aim of this paper is to suggest philosophical tools of practical use for neuroscientists, demonstrating the benefits of a closer collaboration between neuroscience and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) samples dominating research has been ongoing for decades, and now the emerging trend is to turn to theoretical perspectives from the Majority World. Adopting Western-centric methods based on reductionism can overlook important details and differences between similar cultures, particularly in East Asian cultures, where the Confucian values of relational harmony take many forms. We discuss a novel theoretical perspective on moral constitutions in Confucian heritage cultures. Our central tenet is that divergent moral concepts and ideals are present in Confucian cultures because each culture emphasizes a specific pillar and the self is situated differently in the social relationships that define the scope of interpersonal moral obligations. We consider three Confucian countries: China, Japan, and South Korea as examples. Despite geographical proximity and conventional categorization in cultural psychology, each Confucian country manifests distinct patterns of the self, moral ideals, and behavior in socio-moral contexts. To understand how and why moral worldviews vary within a region, we need to examine how the self in socio-cultural contexts differs and guides interpersonal norms and behaviors across sociocultural contexts. We conclude this paper by offering methodological recommendations for including indigenous moral concepts outside the WEIRD context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demoralising ethical theory involves eschewing the deontic categories of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility from our ethical thought. In this paper, I evaluate the case made in Alastair Norcross's recent book, Morality By Degrees (2020), for a consequentialist version of such demoralisation. Norcross defends scalar consequentialism, a radical variant of consequentialism which restricts fundamental normative verdicts to a scalar ranking of available actions, ordered according to the goodness of the consequences they produce. Following an introductory Sect. 1, I assess the positive case for scalar consequentialism in Sect. 2, concluding that no strong case has been made for the view. In Sect. 3, I assess the case against the view, concluding that while scalar consequentialism may be able to avoid the action-guidingness objection, it falls foul of the force objection. In Sect. 4, I expand on this critique, showing that Norcross gives an unstable account of how to assess attitudes, such as desires, beliefs and emotions. In Sect. 5, I argue that appeal to a contextualist reductionism does little to make the scalar view appealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the developmental trajectory of the debate concerning the nature of religious language, particularly the contrast between its literal and metaphorical dimensions, situating it within the broader context of linguistic, philosophical, and theological scholarship. Drawing on contemporary research, it offers a critical evaluation of three major approaches, with a detailed analysis of one in particular. The first two approaches, literalism and metaphoricism, are critiqued for their reductionist frameworks, which fundamentally erode the multifaceted nature of this discourse. The third approach, while avoiding these reductionist pitfalls, still calls for further clarification of the mechanisms underlying the interplay between these elements. Through conceptual analysis and grammatical examination, it demonstrates that this proposal, which posits a dynamic interaction—where neither dimension is subordinate to the other, but rather, they paradoxically coexist—yields a more accurate account. The findings suggest that this dialectical approach surpasses the conventional treatment of the literal–metaphorical nexus, proposing that religious language is not only communicative and comprehensible but also an evolving process in which grammatical perplexity fosters semantic depth and intellectual insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Translation is an intellectual endeavour that requires engagement with authors and conceptual frameworks from different times and worlds. It is not a neutral or simple task of converting linguistic codes but a situated, partial, and interested process that goes beyond mere intellectual activity. In translating Stuart Hall into Spanish for a Latin American audience, specific challenges and interests arise, as detailed in this article. Three main challenges are discussed: preserving the contextuality and complexity of Hall's writings, resisting the temptation to simplify or academicize his work, and ensuring that translations facilitate meaningful cross-cultural exchanges. The article underscores the importance of understanding Hall's work as an intellectual and political project, deeply rooted in specific historical and cultural contexts, and argues for an approach to translation that remains faithful to these dimensions while making his ideas accessible and relevant to contemporary Latin American readers. Finally, the paper reflects on the political significance of translation, highlighting how ideas can transcend boundaries and enrich local debates. Hall's concepts, such as articulation, context, and conjuncture, are presented as valuable tools for understanding and intervening in the social and political realities of Latin America today. The article concludes by emphasizing the ongoing relevance of Hall's intellectual and political contributions and the need for translations that honour his legacy while engaging with the specific challenges and opportunities of our present moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly all theoretical approaches and therapies to criminal thinking and behavior have been reductionist, meaning that they focus on a part or a subsystem of a system or a supra-system. While these reductionist theories and therapies have provided, and continue to provide, valuable information and rehabilitation, they offer a limited view of criminality and rehabilitation as a consequence of reductionism. Using general systems theory (GST), this article presents an integrated and interdisciplinary theoretical approach to criminal thinking and behavior. This article posits that criminality can be better understood, prevented, and treated using GST. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Conventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non‐linguistic. Modal neo‐conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo‐conventionalism, which I call 'worlds‐based neo‐conventionalism' and 'axiom‐based neo‐conventionalism'. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo‐conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo‐conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quantitative design of functionalities for functional materials is highly attractive for materials research, which must be based on a thorough understanding of the behavior of fundamental particles. Reductionism advocates for the understanding of complex materials through dissection into the constituent parts, providing a robust framework for investigating functional materials. In an ion battery system, this review utilizes reductionism to deconstruct cathode materials into phase, atom, and even electron, building the intrinsic connections between the macroscopic properties and fundamental particles across four degrees of freedom. This aims to enable the quantitative design of cathode materials. Specifically, the microscopic origins of the macroscopic properties, that is, capacity, potential, rate, and cycling reversibility, based on lattice, charge, orbital, and spin degrees of freedom are elucidated. Additionally, current strategies are summarized and proposed future development directions for improving these properties. These insights contribute to achieving the goal of quantitative design of energy storage materials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the neural basis of natural intelligence necessitates a paradigm shift: from strict reductionism toward embracing complexity and diversity. New tools and theories enable us to tackle this challenge, providing unprecedented access to neural dynamics and behavior across time, contexts, and species. Principles for intelligent behavior and learning in the natural world are now, more than ever, within reach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we address two key questions in the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) to second language acquisition (SLA) that have not been resolved in recent debates about this issue. The first question relates to reductionism. Is an antireductionist position a necessary element of DST? We show that the radical antireductionist stance put forward by key movers of the application of DST to SLA neither follows from the mathematics of DST nor from the application of DST to science and that radical antireductionism results in an impasse for empirical research. In contrast, we argue that reductionism offers ways in which theory-derived hypotheses can be formed about subsystems that can be studied empirically using DST mathematics. The second question relates to intentionality. Are physical systems and mental systems similar enough to justify applying DST principles based in the physical sciences to processes in the human mind? Following Tschacher, we argue that current evidence suggests that there is a limited class of mental phenomena that can arise from physical phenomena. It is only this class of mental phenomena that can currently be modeled using DST mathematics. We offer a discussion of these perspectives to indicate how important it is to resolve these fundamental questions. In our view, these fundamental issues need resolution to put the application of DST to SLA on a solid conceptual and empirical footing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only the incurious and philosophically challenged doubt the significance of dignity as a central issue in human interactions. Human dignity is much debated in religion, law, moral philosophy, anthropology, psychiatry, bioethics, sociology, philosophical anthropology, psychology, communication studies, and elsewhere. It is subject to competing discourses of ontology, epistemology, axiology, and logic. It appears in intercultural and international discussions of rights, autonomy, race, ethnicity, economics, war, and peace. It is contrasted with guilt, shame, and humiliation, both ordinary and extreme. However, the dynamic roots of dignity are usually presupposed or ignored in favor of reductionist typologies and antinomies. Returning us to lived experience and with post-humanist animal studies and the medical model of psychiatry as exemplary cases of reductionism, I interpret H. Plessner's semiotic phenomenology as a communicative philosophy of the humane in dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have witnessed a rather controversial debate on what antioxidants are and how beneficial they may be in the context of human health. Despite a considerable increase in scientific evidence, the matter remains highly divisive as different pieces of new data seem to support both the pro- and the anti-antioxidant perspective. Here, we argue that the matter at the heart of this debate is not necessarily empirical but of semantics. Thus, the controversy cannot be resolved with the traditional tools of natural sciences and by the mere accumulation of new data. In fact, the term "antioxidants" has been part of the scientific language game for a few decades and is nowadays used differently in the context of different scientific disciplines active at different levels of scientific complexity. It, therefore, represents not a single expression but an entire family of words with distinctively different connotations and associations. The transcendent use of this expression from a basic to a more complex discipline, such as going from chemistry to physiology, is problematic as it assigns the term with connotations that are not corroborated empirically. This may lead to false claims and aspirations not warranted by empirical data. Initially, health claims may not even be indented, yet, on occasion, they are welcome for reasons other than scientific ones. To resolve this debate, one may need to refrain from using the term "antioxidants" in disciplines and contexts where its meaning is unclear, limit its use to disciplines where it is essential and beneficial, and, in any case, become more specific in such contexts where its use is warranted, for instance, in the case of "dietary antioxidants". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two distinct teleological perspectives emerge from the ancient Greek tradition. (1) Platonic teleology, which represents teleology as the result of intentional agency and is the origin of the idea of design; and (2) Aristotelian teleology, which introduces teleology as the result of natural and intrinsic causes. The preceding framework for understanding nature was superseded by the advent of the modern era and the establishment of the scientific method. Nevertheless, despite the prevailing skepticism regarding the possibility and utility of teleology in the modern era, it is asserted that several prominent scientists of the modern era are staunch defenders of teleology (design). However, with Darwin's proposal of the theory of evolution, the path to the destruction of teleology was initiated. This article examines the interconnection between Darwin's theory of evolution (then neo-Darwinism) and teleology, focusing on how this theory effectively undermines the teleological perspective. However, it seems that recent findings in the field of biology challenge this dominant view and open the way for the revival of teleology.

As the philosophical basis for neuropsychoanalysis, dual-aspect monism is fundamental to the entire neuropsychoanalytic project. However, dual-aspect monism has been criticized not only from without but also from within neuropsychoanalysis. This paper considers criticisms of dual-aspect monism from within neuropsychoanalysis. These might be summed up as a concern that the difference at the level of epistemology (neuroscience, psychoanalysis) and phenomena (objectivity, subjectivity) must not be washed away by an appeal to a common ontology. In response, I propose to supplement dual-aspect monism with the philosophical framework of Transcendental Materialism. In this view, epistemological difference between the dual aspects is secondary to antagonism at the level of monistic ontology. Transcendental Materialism begins with the question: what sort of nature must nature be to give rise to two irreducible perspectives such as neuroscience and psychoanalysis? I argue for supplementing dual-aspect monism with Transcendental Materialism through a review of Mark Solms’s work on the hard problem of consciousness via Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle. Within the Solms-Friston framework, the informatic mechanisms that give rise to dual-aspect epistemologies rely upon ontological antagonism. Principles of a transcendental materialist dual-aspect monism for neuropsychoanalysis are put forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two distinct teleological perspectives emerge from the ancient Greek tradition. 1) Platonic teleology, which represents teleology as the result of intentional agency and is the origin of the idea of design; and 2) Aristotelian teleology, which introduces teleology as the result of natural and intrinsic causes. The preceding framework for understanding nature was superseded by the advent of the modern era and the establishment of the scientific method. Nevertheless, despite the prevailing skepticism regarding the possibility and utility of teleology in the modern era, it is asserted that several prominent scientists of the modern era are staunch defenders of teleology (design). However, with Darwin's proposal of the theory of evolution, the path to the destruction of teleology was initiated. This article examines the interconnection between Darwin's theory of evolution (then Neo-Darwinism) and teleology, focusing on how this theory effectively undermines the teleological perspective. However, it seems that recent findings in the field of biology challenge this dominant view and open the way for the revival of teleology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural sciences and that depends on an uncertain appeal to the possibility in principle of a future unified physics. I conclude that the uncertain character of these assumptions calls for a reassessment, not only of the implications of this type of argument for methodological naturalism but also of the role such arguments play in the study of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shafi'i Kadkani's perspective on defining mysticism and explaining its connection is based on aesthetics. According to him, mysticism is nothing more than an artistic understanding of religion from an aesthetic standpoint, presented through imagination, symbolism, and allegory. This article critically examines and evaluates this viewpoint's foundational and structural aspects by referring to fundamental discussions such as the nature of religion, religious experience, mystical experience, and the relationship between mind, language, and reality. From the critic's perspective, this theory is based on a purely formalist approach, focused on style and centred on language. Furthermore, it lacks a proper analysis of the relationship between cognition (mind) and language, the connection between mystical knowledge and reality, and the relationship between mystical knowledge and language. The theory also suffers from reductionism and includes errors such as the fallacy of confusing essence with its expression, ultimately stripping mysticism—a multifaceted phenomenon with various dimensions—of its most important aspect, which is its cognitive and epistemic dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bergson's integral empiricism is a philosophical approach that aims to harmonize the scientific study of nature with the experience of consciousness. Bergson drew heavily on the basic concepts of calculus in framing his philosophy of intuition. He did not merely use calculus metaphorically to describe processes and organizational patterns of consciousness. Instead, he studied the thought processes actually involved in calculus and showed that they are intimately connected to how we think about change more generally. I propose a distinction between derivative empiricism, i.e., reductionism, and integral empiricism that incorporates the study of the mind by the mind. The method involves the invention of a new kind of knowledge that is not based on generalization or abstraction but rather on the integration of experience. This is predicated on a study of the act of integration in consciousness that underpins our ability to think and do philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing interest in Evald Ilyenkov's work and its significance for contemporary debates. This interest spans several disciplines. One key thread in Ilyenkov's ideas concerns a perspective on the relation between biology and psychology. In rejecting crude reductionism and individualism, Ilyenkov put forward a view of mind and personhood as emerging from activity and social practice. In his rejection of brain-bound notions of the mind, Ilyenkov's ideas bear interesting resonances with current work in 4E cognition. One particularly interesting resonance that has occasionally been noticed are the connections with the enactive approach to life and mind. However, beyond some hints at interesting convergences, there is to date no detailed comparison between the two views. The present article attempts to address this gap, examining both complementarities and possible tensions between the two approaches. Rejecting cognitive views detached from environmental and social processes, the enactive approach, as exemplified by De Jaegher and Di Paolo's concept of participatory sense-making, emphasises the dynamic constitution of cognition through embodied and situated activities. The article draws parallels between Ilyenkov's emphasis on historically and culturally situated activity, notably labour, and the enactive understanding of human bodies as dynamically constituted in human activity. The article explores the Ilyenkovian and enactive perspectives on the dialectics of ideality, challenging traditional dualistic views and proposing that the ideal emerges as metastable patterns in the ongoing interactions between world, practices, norms, and bodies. The article concludes by suggesting future research directions for the enactive approach, particularly in areas emphasised by Ilyenkov, such as labour and the mediation of material/cultural artefacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we develop a non-reductive variant of the regularity theory of causation proposed in Andreas and Günther (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105: 2–32, 2024). The variant is motivated as a refinement of Lewis's (Journal of Philosophy 70:556–567, 1973) regularity theory. We do not pursue a reductive theory here because we found a challenge for Baumgartner's (Erkenntnis 78:85–109, 2013) regularity theory which applies to our previous theory as well. The challenge is sidestepped by a framework of law-like propositions resembling structural equations. We furthermore improve the deviancy condition of our previous theory. Finally, we show that the present theory can compete with the most advanced regularity and counterfactual accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notwithstanding the huge progress in molecular and cellular neuroscience, our ability to understand the brain and develop effective treatments promoting mental health is still limited. This can be partially ascribed to the reductionist, deterministic and mechanistic approaches in neuroscience that struggle with the complexity of the central nervous system. Here, I introduce the Context theory of constrained systems proposing a novel role of contextual factors and genetic, molecular and neural substrates in determining brain functioning and behavior. This theory entails key conceptual implications. First, context is the main driver of behavior and mental states. Second, substrates, from genes to brain areas, have no direct causal link to complex behavioral responses as they can be combined in multiple ways to produce the same response and different responses can impinge on the same substrates. Third, context and biological substrates play distinct roles in determining behavior: context drives behavior, substrates constrain the behavioral repertoire that can be implemented. Fourth, since behavior is the interface between the central nervous system and the environment, it is a privileged level of control and orchestration of brain functioning. Such implications are illustrated through the Kitchen metaphor of the brain. This theoretical framework calls for the revision of key concepts in neuroscience and psychiatry, including causality, specificity and individuality. Moreover, at the clinical level, it proposes treatments inducing behavioral changes through contextual interventions as having the highest impact to reorganize the complexity of the human mind and to achieve a long‐lasting improvement in mental health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Writings on epistemic injustice have assessed how people can be harmed in their capacity as knowers when they are a racial minority, a woman, disabled and so on. But what about when they belong to the working class? This paper is an initial attempt to understand why class has so far received limited attention within writings on epistemic injustice and to respond to these reasons. It focuses on how testimonial and hermeneutic injustices specifically harm workers in ways distinctive from the harm one might suffer due to other social identities. It does this by drawing attention to the special case of industrial strike action and the play of conceptual resources and credibility assessments that influence the action's success. Additionally, it provides a first-time exposition for social epistemologists on what I term the 'class compositional approach', derived from 1960-70s Italian labour struggles. This approach, I argue, succeeds in evading the criticism of class reductionism while developing recent philosophical work on class-based injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), biomedical sciences have moved away from a gene-centred view and towards a multi-factorial one in which environment, broadly speaking, plays a central role in the determination of human health and disease. Environmental exposures have been shown to be highly prevalent in disease causation. They are considered as complementary to genetic factors in the etiology of diseases, hence the introduction of the concept of the "exposome" as encompassing the totality of human environmental exposures, from conception onwards (Wild in Cancer Epidemiol Biomark Prev 14:1847–1850, 2005), and the launch of the Human Exposome Project (HEP) which aims to complement the HGP. At first sight, and seen as complementary to the genome, the exposome could thus appear as contributing to the rise of novel postgenomic deterministic narratives which place the environment at their core. Is this really the case? If so, what sort of determinism is at work in exposomics research? Is it a case of environmental determinism, and if so, in what sense? Or is it a new sort of deterministic view? In this paper, we first show that causal narratives in exposomics are still very similar to gene-centred deterministic narratives. They correspond to a form of Laplacian determinism and, above all, to what Claude Bernard called the "determinism of a phenomenon". Second, we introduce the notion of "reversed heuristic determinism" to characterize the specific deterministic narratives present in exposomics. Indeed, the accepted sorts of external environmental exposures conceived as being at the origins of diseases are determined, methodologically speaking, by their identifiable internal and biological markers. We conclude by highlighting the most relevant implications of the presence of this heuristic determinism in exposomics research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I suggest that the current situation in quantum field theory (QFT) provides some reason to question the universal validity of ontological reductionism. I argue that the renormalization group flow is reversible except at fixed points, which makes the relation between large and small distance scales quite symmetric in QFT, opening up at least the technical possibility of a non-reductionist approach to QFT. I suggest that some conceptual problems encountered within QFT may potentially be mitigated by moving to an alternative picture in which it is no longer the case that the large supervenes on the small. Finally, I explore some specific models in which a form of non-reductionism might be implemented, and consider the prospects for future development of these models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the concept of personal identity in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, a Hindu tradition. It examines the relationship between consciousness, the self, and the body, emphasizing that consciousness is a crucial aspect of the self and is reliant on the body. The text also explores the notions of liberation and fall-down, suggesting that attachment to a specific type of body is necessary for one's eternal personal identity. The author presents a series of statements and axioms to elucidate these concepts and their implications. Additionally, the article discusses the concepts of grace and the conditions for liberation or fall-down in Gauḍīya theology, presenting various scenarios and statements to explore the connection between inhabiting a spiritual body and a material body. The text concludes that P1 and F2 are the only relevant statements for comprehending personal identity in relation to liberation and fall-down, as they represent necessary implications of inhabiting a spiritual or material body within Gauḍīya theology. [Extracted from the article]

The Campbellian validity typology has been used as a foundation for outcome evaluation and for developing evidence-based interventions for decades. As such, randomized control trials were preferred for outcome evaluation. However, some evaluators disagree with the validity typology's argument that randomized controlled trials as the best design for outcome evaluation, and with its strategy to maximize internal validity at the expense of external validity. The debates over these issues have been ongoing and intensive. This paper proposes a fresh idea for approaches to address this controversy, by bringing problem-solving philosophies into discussions. Three problem-solving philosophies have been used to develop intervention programs: reductionism, systems thinking, and pragmatic synthesis. This paper argues the validity typology is appropriate for evaluating reductionism-based programs only, but not systems thinking- or pragmatic synthesis-based programs. Mismatched applications of research designs in evaluation are sources of confusion and controversies. This insight indicates a pressing need for developing evaluation theories and approaches for systems thinking and pragmatic synthesis. Because the majority of community programs are pragmatic synthesis-based programs, this paper devotes to developing such solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effectively a double-height or larger void internal to a building, the atrium is a familiar architectural feature the world over. The global popularity of the space in contemporary urban buildings – including hotels, shopping malls, casinos, hospitals, museums, galleries, libraries, schools, office blocks, and universities – is a somewhat puzzling development, and one ripe for sociological analysis. Cultural political economy (CPE) helps to explain this affinity. Using this perspective guards against reductionisms of various stripes, while rigorously situating the atrium vis-a-vis the production and circulation of material and symbolic surplus value. By facilitating inquiry into how this architectural form stabilises and furthers capitalist arrangements, CPE allows for interrogation of the atrium's distinctive role in adding momentum and cultural meaning to contemporary urban accumulative strategies. In particular, the article draws out the atrium space's paradoxical relationships to (i) the intensification of rentiership in very tall buildings, and (ii) with respect to the demarcation of insider–outsider boundaries underpinning elite consumption. Positioning the atrium as being reflective of attempts to both intensify and embed capitalism in the built environment, key arguments concern the meaningful, experiential and out-of-the ordinary nature of the space, As such, the article contributes to and draws from sociologies of architecture, reconciling the atrium's materiality and meaning in a way that does not reduce either to the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article shows that Christopher Franklin's No Opportunity Argument fails and argues that it puts requirements on the ability to do otherwise that have nothing to do with determinism. Topics discussed include the Possibility Principle, the idea of the No Possibility Argument, Humean reductionism, problems of non-fundamentality and crowding out, indeterminism and free will tailored for the No Opportunity Argument, and timing of actions and abilities as loopholes of the No Opportunity Argument.

This article explores analytically different senses and usages of the concept of wonder, in order to analyze which of them are more fruitful for fostering care for nature, especially when it tends to avoid scientific reductionism or fundamentalist understandings of religions. Wonder that is understood as openess to mystery and uncertainty is particularly positive precisely beacause it moves us away from the aforementioned dangers. In this sense, wonder as awe seems to be the most positive sense of wonder. Inasmuch wonder questions our way of doing things and/or our preconceptions it may be a useful resource to embrace for environmentally friendly habits. The article compares this sense of wonder that Rachel Carson developed in order to question our dominion of nature and tendency to control it, with Pope Francis' claim that paying attention to reality rather than to our deformed visions of nature is necessary to foster care for the environment rather than destroying it. In conclusion the article argues that wonder is a powerful resource, for believers and non-believers alike, to build a better relationship with the environment in order to preserve it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This paper examines cognitive and body-based therapies through the lens of embodiment, framing treatments as constructed experiences shaped by individuals' subjective and intersubjective lived experiences. Embodiment is considered to have restorative qualities that have the potential to improve psychotherapy's success. We address some of the limitations associated with traditional brain-based reductionist approaches and treatments in clinical psychotherapy. An argument is made for the integration of an embodied approach, empowering clinicians and researchers to evaluate and integrate embodied therapeutic processes leading to successful treatment outcomes. Methods: This integrative review provides evidence-based practice initiatives and findings from a range of embodied research as it applies to body-based techniques in psychotherapy. It gathers and synthesizes both empirical and theoretical evidence relevant to impact the overall success of psychotherapeutic interventions. Data collection involved keyword searches of electronic databases, including PsycINFO, NCBI, PubMED, Frontiers, MEDLINE, EBM Reviews, and Google Scholar. Results: We present an array of cognitive and body-based methodologies that can be employed to enhance embodied and enactive therapeutic practices, offering a fresh and promising perspective on psychotherapy. Analyses provide insights into current body-based therapeutic applications, highlighting how a deeper understanding of recent advances in neuroscience can enrich both therapists' and clients' meta-awareness of mind–body-environment connections on mental health. Conclusions: We conclude that psychotherapy can benefit from the transformative process that occurs when individuals gain insights, skills, and self-awareness through embodied therapeutic experiences. In the context of embodied psychotherapy, learning to self-heal extends beyond the acquisition of information; it involves a deeper understanding of the connection between one's body, thoughts, emotions, behaviors, and the interconnectedness of these elements within the environment/context. Through this process, along with the therapist, clients acquire valuable insights into the root causes of challenges, develop coping strategies, and enhance emotional regulation. The learning extends to practical skills for managing stress, improving communication, and fostering healthier relationships. Embodiment in psychotherapy encourages a form of experiential learning, where individuals actively engage with and reflect upon their internal and external world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philip Sherrard and Theodosius Dobzhansky, both Eastern Orthodox intellectuals, would have agreed on little. While Sherrard rejected modern science, especially evolution, Dobzhansky was one of evolution's leading figures. But Sherrard saw climate change coming and warned of it, whereas Dobzhansky was perhaps too easy in his liberal progressivism. Despite their major differences, however, Dobzhansky and Sherrard both shared a hostility towards reductionism and a mechanistic view of the universe. In studying their ideas and incorporating ecology into the conversation, we can consider different ways to view evolution and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans need to experience meaning in their lives yet often find it difficult to do so. We argue that, for nonreligious individuals in many Western cultures, the materialist and reductionist ideology that surrounds scientific practice and data may be an impediment to attaining a robust sense of meaning in life. Furthermore, scientific materialism and reductionism may be especially problematic for existential mattering —the form of meaning entailing a belief that one's life matters in the context of the universe as a whole. We review new research supporting this account, along with implications for those immersed in the materialist worldview. We conclude by suggesting possible means of finding meaning, including a sense of existential mattering, without abandoning science, and highlight research directions to further examine these possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently there has been a rise in the application of concepts and methods from biological evolutionary theory to human cultures and societies where the aim is to explain these by describing them as population-level phenomena reducible to individual-level processes. I argue against this type of view by using Mesoudi's Cultural Evolution as a case study. I claim that Mesoudi's ontological assumptions about cultures and societies are dubious and his methodological assumptions inadequate when it comes to addressing cultural and social phenomena. A consequence is that this approach to studying culture is, at the very least, incomplete and of limited application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the approach of the text in three ways: in its socio‐historical context, its philosophical context, and its personal context in the life of the philosopher. Such a strategy offers new ways of comparing very different texts and assessing them in terms of the aims of the philosopher writing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to give a historical and reasoned overview of the phenomenon of emergence according to the various authors involved, with particular emphasis on its openness to the dimension of the mystery of the real, which can lead the scientist to humility in scientific research. The evidence, the curiosity and then the study of this concept, which is so pervasive in the complexity of cosmic dynamics, in fact requires an investigation that must be extended not only to different disciplines, but through them. In fact, the cross-disciplinary method enriches the quality of this research, giving reason to both the unity and the complexity of reality. The phenomenon of emergence is particularly concerned with this cross-disciplinary scientific approach, which transcends any reductionism in favour of a network of meanings specifically nourished by the possibility of conjunctive explanations involving empirical science, philosophy, metaphysics and theology. Faced with this perspective offered by emergence, science discovers the mystery of the cosmos in a new light, thereby opening the door to an ever deeper understanding and new avenues of research. An essential characteristic of this revised scientific method, inspired by cross-disciplinarity, is thus humility, which allows, on the one hand, a deeper relationship between disciplines and persons and, on the other hand, a heightened awareness of the depth of reality, as a complex and intelligible gift of a Trinitarian God, revealed as Logos in Jesus Christ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between social and individual phenomena, advocating for a form of analytical individualism that incorporates both ontological and explanatory holism. The first part of the paper addresses foundational ontological questions, arguing for the reduction of social facts to individual behaviors without equating them in identity. In the second part, the discussion focuses on collective intentionality, particularly through a critical examination of John Searle's account. I argue that while collective intentionality offers useful insights into the nature of social institutions, it faces principled limitations when applied to broader social phenomena. The paper ultimately supports a non-identifying reductive individualism, which recognizes the social as grounded in individual actions while avoiding simplistic reductions. This approach, I contend, provides a more coherent framework for understanding the complex interaction between individual and social processes, as well as the ontological status of social facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is a discussion of the concept of power in three different social theories that are often applied to educational research: the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault. In everyday life, the concept of power is used as if it only had a single connotation: power as possessed by someone (“the powerful”) while exercised over someone else (“the powerless”). In this case, power is considered as a (potentially) repressive force and ascribed to a person, a culture, a state, or a society. Though, power can be comprehended otherwise: as non-possessed and productive. In the paper, the three conceptions of power are presented and discussed in relation to each other and to specific philosophical themes like dualism, reductionism, determinism and autonomy, truth, normativity, and relativism. Finally, the paper shows that the applied powerconcept has significant consequences for the way the educational researcher analyzes conflicts, and therefore also for our understanding of the world in which we live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Positivism, especially Mach's, was highly influential in the development of psychology as a science and often criticized by Marxist theorists, particularly Vygotsky in many of his writings. Behaviorism and reflexology, its Russian analog, fail to acknowledge the social character of man due to their reductionism, limiting themselves to studying only the simplest elements of human behavior. At the same time, their obsession with purifying science from supposed "metaphysical" assumptions leads to the elimination of consciousness and higher psychological functions from the field of research. The Vygotskian critique highlights that the positivist spirit of behaviorism and reflexology leads to methodological dualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This publication presents the Ukrainian translation of chapters 8-10 of the second part and chapter 1 of the third part of the work Zen-no Kenkyu (The Study of the Good) by Nishida Kitaro, a prominent Japanese philosopher of the 20th century, the founder of modern Japanese philosophy. In these chapters, Nishida completes his analysis of the concept of reality, starting from the concept of pure experience, which was introduced and explained in detail in the first part of the work. Chapter 8 examines the concept of nature. In it, Nishida criticizes the idea of nature as a purely material objective reality - it is, in his opinion, nothing more than an abstract concept. He rejects the mechanistic reductionism characteristic of contemporary natural science. Nature, the philosopher believes, should be considered as a concrete reality given in direct experience. Nature, like its individual phenomena, has a kind of self, which can be intuitively understood by artists. Chapter 9 is devoted to the spirit. According to Nishida, "subjective spirit separated from objective nature" is likewise an abstraction. The spirit is the "unifying activity of reality", it exists in everything, but in inanimate natural phenomena and even in plants it has not yet manifested itself. According to Nishida, evolution consists in ever greater actualizations of the spirit. Further developing the dialectic of objective and subjective, the Japanese philosopher claims that at the highest stage of development, the spirit becomes objective: in order to know the truth, one must get rid of one's subjective self. Very much in the spirit of Zen Buddhism, though without mentioning it, Nishida says that the greatest individuals are those who have gotten rid of the self. Chapter 10 concludes the second part of the book, in which Nishida examines the concept of God. Such a concept was new for Japanese thought of the Meiji era. Nishida considers the concept of God to be universal for all eras and cultures. He examines the three known proofs of God's existence - cosmological, teleological, and moral - but criticizes them all. According to Nishida, the real proof of the existence of God should be sought in the depths of our soul, in our direct experience. The apophatic theology of Nicholas of Cusa and the Christian mysticism of Jacob Böhme are close to Nishida. The third part begins with a chapter dedicated to the notion of conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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