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Questions and analyses centered on race have become more prominent in philosophy. By employing a 'critical philosophy of race', thinkers become enabled to address how race and racism continue to operate in subtle and unintended ways, including within concepts, theories, principles, practices, and methodologies otherwise purported to be race-neutral. Yet, North American sports philosophy provides few examples of work that grapples with race, racism, or theories of race. In this essay, I ask why and conclude that the shortage of discussions that include explicit references to race or ethnicity in North American sport philosophy is due to the dominance and normalization of white epistemologies – white ways of experiencing, seeing, and knowing the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts at demarcating pseudoscience from science have in the last four decades been fueled by claims of a substantial extensional consensus. Most philosophers, as well as scientists, reportedly have a knack for recognizing pseudoscience, and they agree on what counts as cases of pseudoscience. It is also believed that this extensional consensus will facilitate an intensional consensus on the defining criteria of pseudoscience. The extensional consensus, however, is undocumented, as is the existence of an acute pseudoscience perceptiveness. In this paper, we survey PhD-holding philosophers to assess whether there is consensus on what are examples of paradigmatic pseudosciences. While we do record an initial agreement on examples that can be called “pseudoscientific”, we find no agreement that any of these are paradigmatic. Furthermore, philosophers with a PhD do not categorize pseudosciences markedly differently from respondents with lower or no degrees, suggesting that philosophers are no better at identifying pseudosciences than others. If these findings are correct, addressing the demarcation between science and nonscience via the pseudoscience – science divide will offer no clear advantage for solving the demarcation problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The once-popular thesis that non-Christians who are inculpably ignorant of the gospel can be saved through 'implicit faith' in Christ has fallen on hard times. In this paper, we consider objections raised against this position by a range of Catholic critics, including Thomas Crean, Augustine DiNoia, Gavin D'Costa, and Stephen Bullivant. In our judgement, criticisms of 'implicit faith' often suffer from a lack of clarity about the nature of such faith, although admittedly this ambiguity was present even in original Scholastic uses of the term. However, in the past few decades, analytic philosophers have explored many forms of belief, which one might call 'implicit'. Accordingly, we draw on both Scholastic and analytic epistemology to arrive at a more attractive characterisation of implicit faith. We argue that once implicit faith is understood in this way, recent objections to the claim that non-Christians can be saved soluble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a taxonomy of divisibilism, a philosophical perspective advocating for the infinite divisibility of continua. The taxonomy is founded on various conceptualizations of indivisibles, enabling the identification of two types of divisibilism: 'moderate' and 'strong'. The former denies indivisibles as constituent parts of magnitudes, whereas the latter rejects indivisibles as even intrinsic elements (such as limits or junctions) of magnitudes. The paper proceeds to demonstrate how Gregory of Rimini falls into the second category, utilizing geometry and non-entitism as primary tools to dismiss the very possibility of the existence of indivisibles. Within the framework of this 'strong divisibilism', the paper also examines Gregory's interpretation of mathematical items (e.g. points, lines, surfaces) against the backdrop of one of his main sources, that is, Augustine. Lastly, the paper delves into Gregory's interpretation of the fundamental Aristotelian divisibilist claim, namely, that a continuum is infinitely divisible. It highlights how Gregory's stance ultimately conflicts with Aristotelian premises, particularly concerning his assertion that the division of all continua is made into infinitely many actual parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores a specific problem within an important philosophical genre of the fourteenth century: the debates over the perfection of species. It investigates how the problem of defining limits for continuous magnitudes – a problem typical of Aristotelian physics – was integrated into these debates at the levels of genera, species, and individuals as these entities began to be conceptualized in quantitative terms. After explaining the emergence of this problem within fourteenth-century metaphysics, the paper examines the contributions of three philosophers – Hugolinus of Orvieto, John of Ripa, and Paul of Venice – who offered varying solutions to the challenge of defining limits between species. It demonstrates that two primary solutions arose, inspired by continuous and discrete mathematical objects. It is shown that whereas Hugolinus of Orvieto advocates for a continuist model, John of Ripa proposes a discrete one. The last part of the paper examines Paul of Venice's hybrid approach, which combines elements from both models, facilitating a more comprehensive treatment of species particularly difficult to analyse, namely geometric figures. The conclusions of this comparative study underscore how profoundly the metaphysical reflections of the Middle Ages contributed to the analysis of the structure of the continuum and the extension of the notion of quantity to various objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna's distinction between external existence and mental existence is seminal to logic and philosophy in the Islamic tradition. This article examines philosophers who depart from Avicenna's external-mental existence framework. They view the former as failing to support a general analysis of reality and truth, as mental existence is neither necessary nor sufficient for analyzing propositional truths, i.e., true propositions are true irrespective of "the very existence of minds" and "the perceptual acts of perceivers." They propose that Avicenna's semantics for categorical propositions needs revision, as there are true metathetic and hypothetical propositions, i.e., subject terms need not exist – in external reality or in a mind – for such propositions to be true. This counter-Avicennan current of thought articulates a third distinction in the analysis of reality, which focuses on the mind-independent nature of propositional content – particularly propositions with empty, hypothetical, or impossible subject terms – as a way to think generally about reality, in contrast to the Avicennan emphasis on the existential status of terms and essences. Notably, the analysis of mind-independent reality is supported by a novel semantics of "real" (ḥaqīqī) categorical propositions, which avoids external and mental existence conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a novel argument against an application of evidential scientism to religious belief. In particular, our target is those arguments at whose core lies the claim that it ought to be the case that, if one holds religious beliefs, then those beliefs are based on the best scientific evidence. Moreover, rather than focussing on the philosophical puzzles that usually fall within the purview of philosophers of religion, we are interested in the mundane beliefs of ordinary believers about their everyday interactions with God. Our argument combines recent work on epistemic partiality in close personal relationships with insights from analytic theology on the personal nature of believer's relationships with God. We argue that it's inappropriate for believers who take themselves to have a personal relationship with God to base their religious beliefs about God's nature on scientific evidence. In particular, it's precisely because these believers are in a personal relationship with God that it's sometimes inappropriate for them to form their beliefs about God's nature on the basis of scientific evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Georges Bataille was a regular attendee in Alexandre Kojève's seminars on Hegel between 1933 and 1939. Bataille developed a lifelong friendship with the Russian philosopher, with whom he corresponded, and whose numerous unpublished drafts came to his possession after Kojève's death. Initially, Bataille accepts the Kojèvian starting point of humanity and history, as desire and discourse, action and negativity, a vision which culminates in the apocalyptic end of history. However, progressively, Bataille comes to question the identification of negativity with human history or historical action. Bataille speaks of a 'negativity without use'; an excess of negativity and death which does not disappear after history has ended. Grappling with Kojève's suffocating vision of the end of history, Bataille emerges as a profound thinker who attempts to make sense of the post-historical and post-human horizon, and the return to animality, where there is neither desire, nor action and there is 'nothing else to do'. In this eclipse of sense and historical action, the only endeavours available to humanity seem to be art, death, eroticism and play. Thus, for Bataille, the end of history is an exclusively human condition, in which humanity is brought resolutely to confront its own negative excess. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs the forgotten friendship between Georges Bataille and the Russian émigré poet and philosopher Boris Poplavsky. Comparing their solar metaphysics, I focus on conceptions of friendship, sacrifice and depersonalisation. First, I retrace Bataille's relationship to early Surrealis and Russian circles in interwar Paris, with a focus on his friendship with Irina Odoevtseva. I then offer a novel reading of Poplavsky's poetry through the lens of Bataille's philosophy, analysing a recurring motif that I call 'dark solarity'. Uncovering a hidden intertextual dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I argue for Poplavsky's lasting impact on Bataille's anti-Icarian sun cult. Finally, my paper demonstrates how Poplavsky's writings on solar sacrifice, excess and friendship left marks on Bataille's vision of a solar community, embodied in the secret society Acéphale. The dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I finally suggest, is a missing piece in the entangled history of Russian and French philosophy, as well as an original contribution to discourses on friendship in twentieth-century continental thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Georges Bataille made no secret of the importance Friedrich Nietzsche's life and work held for him. But Bataille's encounter with Nietzsche remained paradoxical: he rejected or ignored most of Nietzsche's major concepts while nevertheless insisting on the value of Nietzsche's thought and experience as a necessary counterpoint to the political, religious, and social currents of modernity. This paper demonstrates the extent to which Bataille owes the content and to some degree also the form of his idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche to the influence and example of the Russian emigré philosopher Lev Shestov (1866–1938). In 1925, Georges Bataille published a translation of Shestov's The Idea of the Good in Tolstoy and Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching, co-signed with Shestov's daughter Tatiana Beresovski-Chestov. The translation was the product of a period during which Bataille also spent time with the older man and benefited from his tutelage. It was Shestov's interpretation of the meaning of the death of God in Nietzsche's life and thought that would have the most decisive influence on Bataille's own life and work and make him, in his turn, a philosopher of tragedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the scholarly analysis of impartiality in the early modern period. While previous studies have focused on impartiality in law, history, philosophy and aesthetics, this article analyzes impartial and cold or even cold-blooded self-examinations and self-observations, primarily in the work of the eighteenth-century German philosophers and writers Georg Friedrich Meier and Karl Philipp Moritz. The article is particularly concerned with the relation between the therapeutic and epistemic meanings and functions of these concepts. Without suggesting a linear development, it details how, over time, therapeutic connotations tended to be challenged and partly replaced by epistemic ones. It further argues that this development was intimately connected to the culture of sensibility and, in particular, to the growing interest in the unique, individual and often sensual experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue collects papers that explore the relationship between phenomenology and mindfulness with the goal of creating a fruitful dialogue between these two traditions, so as to bring into relief the overlaps and incongruities, exploring historical as well as systematic connections. Both phenomenology and mindfulness are inclusively construed: the former (phenomenology) is understood as an umbrella term that includes philosophers and approaches that follow directly from Brentano's and Husserl's phenomenological discoveries. For this reason, the issue will focus on phenomenology as a method as well as a philosophical approach with a major emphasis on Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Merleau-Ponty's approach. The latter (mindfulness) includes a wide range of conceptions of mindfulness, from Buddhist-inspired strands of meditation practices and theories to Stoic-inspired. The journal issue takes into consideration the potential benefits that such a theme would have to clinical psychology by exploring the existing connection between mindfulness, well-being, and self-exploration. In particular, in this special issue we will point out how the phenomenological approach to mindfulness can help to further the understanding of such notions as "attention," "authenticity," "time," "dignity," and more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "From Death to Life: Key Themes in Plato's Phaedo" by Franco Trabattoni discusses key themes in Plato's Phaedo, focusing on the idea that individual souls must obey reason to live virtuously. Trabattoni's book is a collection of essays originally published in Italian, offering insights into the Phaedo and engaging with main issues in the bibliography. The author analyzes Socrates' assertion on knowledge acquisition posthumously and discusses the contrast between ascetic and political virtue in the Phaedo and the Republic. Trabattoni also explores the hypothesis that Antisthenes is Plato's target in passages alluding to false philosophers in the Phaedo. [Extracted from the article]

The article "Fractured Goodness: Aristotle's Response to Plato's Form of the Good" by Christopher Shields explores Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's Form of the Good in the context of ancient philosophy. Shields delves into the arguments presented by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, challenging the plausibility and utility of Plato's Form of the Good. The article discusses the implications of Aristotle's criticisms for normative ethics and axiology, highlighting the need for a primary referent for 'good' in Aristotle's framework. Shields suggests a Platonic response to Aristotle's critiques, emphasizing the importance of foundational axiological principles for moral realism. [Extracted from the article]

Fan Zhen's 范縝 "Shen Mie Lun 神滅論" can be read as a debate between a physicalist and a dualist in the philosophy of mind. This debate, known as the "mind-body problem" in the Western tradition, has a long history beginning with the ancient Greeks, and is still rife to this very day. Many of the arguments found in the "Shen Mie Lun" correspond to arguments found in the history of Western thought, including those of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Frege, and Ryle. My aims in this essay are threefold: (1) offer a philosophical translation and explication of the key arguments in the "Shen Mie Lun," (2) compare them with the corresponding arguments of some relevant Western philosophers, and (3) clarify Fan Zhen's position on the mind-body problem through comparing the conceptual distinctions employed by him with those employed by his Western counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs a series of encounters between architectural history and philosophical aesthetics in the postwar decades by comparing the discourse of two journals: the Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Shared hermeneutic concepts including "space," "style," and "symbol" gained new meaning as historians of architectural modernism drew on, and contributed to, developments within Anglophone analytic thought. For philosophers as well as historians of art and architecture, including early advocates of social history, Panofskian iconology introduced a tension between idealist and materialist approaches that reappeared in the work of figures bridging these discourses, such as James Ackerman, Nelson Goodman, Susanne K. Langer, and Paul Zucker. This tension was temporarily resolved, on the one hand, by a critique of architectural ideology inspired by the New Left, and on the other, by a politically conservative aesthetics of cultural training, most notably advanced by the philosopher Roger Scruton. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What metaphoric images does the metaphoric concept of liquidity deliver? Scholars have unanimously argued that it is a hydraulic metaphor invented by the rational motive of economists who want to define an economic phenomenon objectively. Opposing this conventional view, this article argues that liquidity is a chemical or alchemical metaphor invented by the irrational alchemic motive of financiers with the intention to create money. It further argues that property rights or personae are the philosopher's stones by which modern banking—including commercial banking, money market funds, repurchase agreements, and quantitative easing—transmutes credit into money. This argument contributes to the formation of a new critique of liquidity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Design theory is increasingly acknowledging the ethical nature of Design. At the same time, philosophers are becoming increasingly aware of the aesthetic potential of Design, and of its distinctive claim to beauty. Yet Design theorists and philosophers alike have failed to note the connection between the ethical nature of Design and its beauty. In this article, I argue that beautiful design is fundamentally ethical in nature. To this end, I develop what I call an axiological conception of functional beauty, whereby beauty is linked to other values, I broaden the notion of functions relevant to design to accommodate the many possible affordances of Design objects, and I argue that beautiful design is design that manifests deep, ethical, concern: beautiful design is carefull design. I suggest that this can take a number of forms, and seek to distill some of these through detailed discussion of several examples of beautiful design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

You and I are conscious. But You-and-I, a pair of subjects, cannot be conscious. Why? Because subjects of consciousness cannot have parts but are mereologically simple. Although most contemporary philosophers do not take the thesis that we are simple seriously, David Barnett has proffered an argument in its defense that has faced numerous objections but is yet to be defeated, or so I will argue. In responding to these objections, I expand and develop important ontological and mereological theses that strengthen Barnett’s argument and others of its kind. I also argue that a significant body of empirical work supports Barnett’s argument against a recent objection. Lastly, I show how, although not made explicit by Barnett, his argument is plausibly a defense of the immaterial self or a bodily soul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of background knowledge in human intelligence, knowledge, and consciousness has been a topic of discussion among several philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Searle, Martin Heidegger, and Hubert Dreyfus. Hubert Dreyfus criticizes what he calls the mediational approach and offers the contact theory to clarify the concept within his theoretical framework. In alignment with Heidegger's existential phenomenological perspective, he posits that our contact and our embodied coping with the world constitute a background by which we become acquainted with preunderstanding that encompasses both prelinguistic and pre-propositional understandings. In this article, Dreyfus's analysis of background knowledge is criticized by focusing on his latest writings. It is argued that, although Dreyfus claims to be defending horizontal foundationalism rather than vertical foundationalism, he primarily emphasizes the foundational nonlinguistic role of motor intentionality in absorbed coping. Furthermore, it is asserted that nonlinguistic embodied coping alone cannot provide the basis for linguistic communication and a humanly way of understanding. Rather than serving as a foundation, embodied coping is more appropriately situated within a linguistic context, because we perform deeds with words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Merleau-Ponty's specific theory of negation has received surprisingly little attention within the literature. Given his engagement with Sartre, not to mention Hegel and Marx, one would think that this concept and its surrounding issues and problems would occupy a more central place within various readings and interpretations. This essay attempts to give some indications of how to think about a Merleau-Pontian theory of negativity specifically. By re-reading the "Temporality" chapter from Phenomenology of Perception in dialogue with later writings and lectures, I propose a theory of "integration" and "disintegration" of temporal passage in place of a dialectic of pure being and nothingness. This theory organizes various themes in Merleau-Ponty's work, including sense-genesis and his references to the "scream of light". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discourse concerning musical expression hinges on a fundamental analogy between music and language. While the extant literature commonly compares music to language, this essay takes the reverse direction, following Wittgenstein's approach. The discussion contrasts the theoretical underpinnings of the "music as language" simile with those of the "language as music" simile. The emphasis on characterization, performance, mutual tuning-in relationships, the interaction between language and music, and the open-ended effort to reorient ourselves as we draw in significance challenges the "informing paradigm" that has been paramount across contemporary philosophical theories of musical expression. One of the most promising philosophical avenues that emerges as we move beyond the "informing paradigm" is recognizing the inseparable relationship between musical expression and our power to shape our own language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ernest Sosa has long been a leading advocate of a virtue-theoretic approach to the traditional problems of epistemology. However, in a recent book his thoughts take a striking new turn. Appealing to our epistemic competencies, he argues, will not suffice to meet the skeptical challenge to our claim to have knowledge of the world around us. We must recognize that our epistemic competencies are exercised against a background of "proper default assumptions": commitments concerning the world and our place in it that we cannot justify but can rely on without incurring epistemic fault. Sosa finds anticipations of this idea in Wittgenstein's appeal to propositions "hinge" propositions which, though not known, "stand fast". However, mere fast-standing beliefs, "unhinged from any broader virtue epistemology", cannot explain how we come to have knowledge of a world whose character is independent of what we happen to think about it. I argue that the claim that our everyday knowledge of the world rests on a body of assumptions is a serious concession to skepticism, which Wittgenstein shows we need not make. Hinge propositions are not mere "standfast" beliefs: they are known with certainty. Wittgenstein offers a way of thinking about knowledge that Sosa does not consider. He also poses a challenge to commonly held views about how epistemology, to the extent that there is such a subject, should be pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After criticizing the three traditional proofs of divine existence in the first Critique, Kant fills this void with an apologetic argument based on his practical philosophy. However, this moral–religious project has long been charged with various inconsistencies, particularly regarding the tension between the demand for moral perfection and human limitation. There is even some indication that he becomes aware of these issues, as he later moves away from the vision of endless moral progress that holds his original project together. However, this revision does not resolve all the tensions, as the question of how imperfect humans can be well-pleasing to God remains. I argue that this predicament is a difficult-to-avoid feature of his project given how it interacts with his religious context of Lutheran Christianity. This is because he incorporates some of its elements (particularly its uncompromising moral standard) virtually intact while radically altering others (such as vicarious atonement and imputation of alien righteousness). However, this procedure undermines the coherence of the tradition he inherits because the elements he fully incorporates are meant to lead to the traditional doctrines he leaves behind. I conclude by reflecting on how theists who are sympathetic to Kant should lead his moral–religious project out of its current precarious predicament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In pre-Song Chinese thought, the afterlife, or the subterranean realm was a sacred space distinctly separate from the world of the living, an extension of the political–religious–cultural order of the Chinese empire. Even after the introduction of Buddhism to China, although the Buddhist concept of hell applied karmic retribution to the present life in an attempt to provide ethical norms for real life, the sacredness of the afterlife remained intact. Song Dynasty Chinese thought underwent a profound "modernization" transformation. Su Shi, with the concept of qing 情 [disposition] at its core, disenchanted the sacred afterlife, shaping a new, self-conscious individuality in the interplay between the living and the dead, the finite and the infinite, the mortal and the immortal. This new individuality, with its spiritual spontaneity and freedom, integrated the afterlife with the present world, internalizing infinity and immortality into a utopian spiritual homeland. This free individuality, entirely different from Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, marking a hidden potential in the development of Chinese intellectual history that has yet to be fully revealed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to philosophical discussions on religious diversity by applying a Wittgensteinian lens, specifically drawing on insights from On Certainty. It examines interreligious disagreement as a form of "deep disagreement" and posits that Wittgenstein contends that argumentation has limitations in resolving such conflicts. Instead, the article suggests that persuasion—a distinct process of making differences visible—facilitates a gradual reassessment of one's world-picture. A key contribution of Wittgenstein's thought to discussions on religious diversity lies in his emphasis on recognizing differences and understanding their transformative impact on our world-pictures. The article begins by differentiating between various types of disagreement, proposing that On Certainty addresses conflicts between world-pictures which can be characterized as deep disagreements. It then delves into Wittgenstein's insights into the functioning of world-pictures and the crucial importance of grasping their dynamics for a better understanding of such disagreements. Building on this foundation, this article argues that persuasion, as a non-argumentative mode of engagement, is uniquely positioned to effectively make these differences visible in cases of deep disagreement. Finally, this article demonstrates how these ideas can help to address and resolve key misunderstandings within the philosophy of religious diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terrors of the twentieth century left those who still believed in man's capacity for the Good seeking new approaches. Martin Heidegger's anti-metaphysical critique had called into question the systems of the past. In Poland, where these crises were felt acutely by a profoundly Catholic society, two thinkers can serve as a case study that helps give insight into the rebuilding of an ethical society and system of thought from within, namely, Jozef Tischner and Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II). Regarding the crucial question of human dignity, Tischner follows Emmanuel Levinas, who seems to have accepted Martin Heidegger's anti-metaphysical critique, to a conception of goodness "beyond being" by which being becomes the enemy of goodness. This position is contrasted with that of John Paul II and others—such as Hans Urs von Balthasar, Robert Spaemann, and D. C. Schindler—who adhere to the comprehension of being and goodness as coextensive and bring it into the twenty-first century. While numerous points of contact exist, the contrast between Tischner and John Paul II is one of alternate priorities—phenomenology or metaphysics, respectively—which results in two different trajectories for comprehending ethics, encounter, solidarity, and the Good. While Tischner's openness to dialogue with his contemporary world is laudable and necessary, John Paul II's insistence on the ontological grounding of the Good is indispensable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Cottingham argues that traditional university modules in the philosophy of religion take us into a 'very abstract domain that is often far removed from religion as it actually operates in the life of the believer'. This paper makes four moves based on Cottingham. First, it argues that the application of Ludwig Wittgenstein's methods supports and facilitates a shift to the anthropological in the philosophy of religion (as evidenced in the work of Mikel Burley). Second, literature is examined as a tool for doing the philosophy of religion, following Danielle Moyal-Sharrock's notion of the literary text as surveyable representation. Three works are investigated, namely Silence by Shūshaku Endō, The Brothers Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky, and the Gospel of John. It is argued that, far from being merely illustrative of religion, story is (in its widest sense) constitutive of belief. Third, it is shown how Wittgenstein's remarks on mysticism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be read as a transmutation of literary writing that creates a non-abstract mysticism of the world. Wittgenstein's remarks are placed in dialogue with Angelus Silesius's poetry and Leo Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief. Fourth, the relevance of Wittgenstein to the current debate on cultural Christianity is brought out. Philosophers of religion must take leave of the abstract, if only to return to it and to view it differently. Wittgenstein's thought is too important to ignore in this venture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Duncan Pritchard argues for a position he calls quasi-fideism. Quasi-Fideism is the view that hinge commitments such as "God exists" are exempt from rational scrutiny within the language game of religion. However, other religious beliefs, which are not part of the framework of hinge commitments, can be rationally assessed and evaluated. This view is to be contrasted with pure fideism, in which all aspects of religion are exempt from rational scrutiny. The success of quasi-fideism depends on demonstrating that "God exists" is, indeed, a hinge commitment. In this paper, I will review and criticize some of Pritchard's reasons for arguing that God's existence should be considered a hinge commitment. Additionally, I will offer reasons why "God exists" cannot be a hinge commitment. Considering the rational problem of evil, single and multiple divine attributes, and the emotional problem of evil, I will show that the non-circular rational criticism of God's existence is possible. Following the distinction between subjective and objective certainty in Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I will suggest that a more fruitful line of inquiry for Wittgensteinians is to examine God as a subjective certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that Newman's emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman's epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman's conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman's reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reception of the so-called New Atheism in the 2000s in the intellectual community was harsh. Its main figures were accused of elaborating on a subject of which they were mostly ignorant. Criticism focused on the narrow way they described religion as a set of factual beliefs that compete with—and pale in the face of—modern science, instead of a life experience, an ethical orientation, an existential commitment, or a set of communal practices. In the spirit of S.J. Gould's non-overlapping magisteria thesis, these critics contended that religion has little to do with factual assertions. This paper challenges this strict separation, arguing that many theistic traditions, such as Christianity, inherently make factual claims about the universe and history, intertwining their beliefs with cosmic realities. Following Ronald Dworkin's posthumous distinction between the "science part" and the "value part" of religion, the paper underscores the philosophical legitimacy of religious factual claims, thus acknowledging the potential overlap between science and religion. In this sense, it argues that the New Atheists may have got wrong the meaning of religion in many people's lives, but they got the "science part" right enough. In the same vein, it concludes that while creationists are most likely wrong in their account of the origin of life and biodiversity, their contestation in the factual domain cannot be discarded as a disfigurement of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome that a miracle can lead a person to God, but a miracle cannot be evidence of God. This also faces two challenges. First, if miracles can only be seen from a religious point of view, then suggesting that a miracle can influence a person towards religion implies that a person can see a miracle before having a religious point of view. Second, if religious belief is not based on evidence, then those who report believing because of evidence are confused about their beliefs in a way we would not expect. I argue that these are not challenges to Wittgenstein's account but symptoms of our misunderstanding of grammar and his distinction between relative and absolute miracles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adopting a transdisciplinary approach, with specific emphasis on the post-Jungian transpersonal psychological theories on the 'Spectrum of Human Consciousness', this paper introduces a transpersonal psychological thread of understanding of 'Mystical Consciousness' through an interreligious field of comparative religious approaches to action, contemplation and non-action. This paper draws on Merton's interreligious contemplative thinking in relation to three major world religious mystical traditions of Buddhism, Hinduism and mystical Islam/Sufism and elucidates comparative insights with the Christian mystical–contemplative tradition, akin to the 'mystical contemplation' of Evelyn Underhill. This paper introduces and applies the transpersonal perspective to the scholarly field of mysticism. The reader is invited to consider how Merton may have responded or written about interreligious contemplative depth mysticism in terms of his own writings on 'pure consciousness', had he had the benefit of the language of the transpersonal models of consciousness. Finally, the reader is left with a contemplative question at the 'heart' of mysticism—does the ancient sculpture of the Sleeping Hermaphrodite helpfully represent an art–theological symbolic analogy for the inner repose of an illumined soul, one with God's Unity, in whose awakened consciousness through depth mystical contemplation, action occurs as an extended manifestation, a total gestalt of contemplative solitudinous action? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One recurrent criticism of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) is its equation with a potential axiological nihilism that undermines, inter alia, the telos of Buddhist practice. Here, I speculate that Madhyamaka non-foundationalism could be compatible with the naturalized teleology of C.S. Peirce. In brief, Peirce argues on pragmatic grounds that the 'final cause' of events does not refer to a predetermined finis ultimis or summum bonum with any 'intrinsic nature' ('svabhāva'). Rather, a final cause is a general continuum of lawfulness ('Third'/future) that mediates between indeterminate possibility ('First'/present) and determinate actuality ('Second'/past). Therefore, while a continuum of 'purposiveness' is a rational precondition for all temporal events, its futural significance means it can only ever be asymptotically realized; indeed, the constitutively general form of each 'final' cause is, practically speaking, fundamentally vague and open-ended to some degree. Finally, I show that the so-called strange attractors of dynamical systems theory provide an imperfect model for this naturalized 'groundless teleology'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

St. Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of God as ipsum esse subsistens is not easy to understand. Even some of his more informed interpreters appear to struggle with it. In this paper, I attempt to explain the doctrine in a way that I hope is intelligible to a fairly broad philosophical audience. I also respond to Norman Kretzmann's interpretation of it, which I think is mistaken. The main problem with Kretzmann's interpretation seems to be a failure to grasp what Thomas means by esse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to show how and in what stages G. W. Leibniz came to develop his proof of God's existence from eternal truths. It begins by tracing the main stages in the history of this proof, initially forged by Augustine of Hippo, and discusses the reasons for its renewal in the last quarter of the 17th century in the post-Cartesian context. The article then shows why, despite skepticism towards this proof in his youth, Leibniz finally produced a version of it that he presents in the Monadology even before the ontological proof. My hypothesis is that the development of the proof from eternal truths is directly linked to Leibniz's reflection on the nature of the possible, a reflection that is itself to be placed in the context of the polemic between Nicolas Malebranche and Simon Foucher after the publication of the Search after Truth. The Leibnizian proof is original in that it rests on the consideration of the reality of possibles, insofar as God is the reason for them, and on the claimed subordination of logic to ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers endorse "exclusionism", the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How reliable are causal inferences in complex empirical scenarios? For example, a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, and then the patient undergoes various changes to their symptoms. They then increase their confidence that it is the drug that causes such changes. Are such inferences reliable guides to the causal relation in question, particularly when the physician can gain a large volume of such clinical experience by treating many patients? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, while some physicians and philosophers support such appeals to first-person experience. We develop a formal model and simulate causal inference based on clinical experience. We conclude that in very particular clinical scenarios such inferences can be reliable, while in many other routine clinical scenarios such inferences are not reliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we show the strong analogies between Hegel and Rosmini on the relationship between the soul-body. In his works written between 1807 and 1830, Hegel goes beyond dualistic logic and explains the subject's identity, despite all his modifications. He valorizes corporeality, recognizing the instinct as finality, albeit within a finite horizon. Moreover, according to the German philosopher, soul and body cannot exist without a self and are simultaneously overcome in a third, that of the spirit, in which the subject becomes aware of itself as autonomous freedom. In the texts of his maturity, Rosmini takes up these same themes and, while criticizing the German philosopher, posits an analogous dialectic between body, soul, and the human spirit. Secondly, we clarify that the Rosminian ontological approach is nevertheless antithetical to the Hegelian one. While in Hegel the individual is resolved into being a moment of the Spirit, in Rosmini the presence of the initial being allows one to grasp the subject's dignity as a finite and complete being, so that man, recognizing the initial being, returns to himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosopher and businessman Max More describes transhumanism as "eupraxsophy", i.e. as a philosophy that emphasises practical wisdom and categorically denies the existence of a transcendent order. More connects transhumanism with enlightened humanism that prioritises reason, science and progress over supernatural faith. While transhumanism is not a homogeneous movement, More's non-theistic conception has been widely accepted. The article aims to show that the declaredly secular character of transhumanism is an extreme version of modern gnosis. For this purpose, the work of the German philosopher Eric Voegelin will be taken as a frame of reference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of a biological notion of "population" over the first century of the theory of evolution has been commented upon by a number of historians and philosophers of biology. Somewhat less commonly discussed, however, is the parallel development of the statistical concept of a population over precisely the same period, in some cases driven by the same historical actors (such as Francis Galton and R. A. Fisher). We explore here these parallel developments, first from the perspective of a reconstruction of the historical development of each concept, then with the aid of a digital analysis of a corpus of literature drawn from the journals Biometrika and Journal of Genetics , between 1900 and 1960. These twin analyses show both points of interesting overlap between these two historical trends as well as points of important divergence. The biological and statistical notions of "population" seem to be relatively clearly distinguishable over these six decades, in spite of the fact that a number of authors contributed clearly to both traditions. The complex interplay of continuity and discontinuity across these two notions of "population" makes them a particularly interesting case study of scientific conceptual change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers throughout history have long been drawn to big, important ideas that bubble up to the surface in interesting ways in myriads of disparate contexts. Following this tradition, authors in this issue engage with big ideas that percolate into clinical ethics, such as hope in healthcare, empathy in genetic counseling, the ramifications of Western cultural assumptions in clinical ethics, the proper aims of palliative hospice and palliative medicine, and the proper role of the public in pharmacovigilance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It may be true that we are epistemically in the dark about various things. Does this fact ground the truth of fallibilism? No. Still, even the most zealous skeptic will probably grant that it is not clear that one can be incognizant of their own occurrent phenomenal conscious mental goings-on. Even so, this does not entail infallibilism. Philosophers who argue that occurrent conscious experiences play an important epistemic role in the justification of introspective knowledge assume that there are occurrent beliefs. But this assumption is false. This paper argues that there are no occurrent beliefs. And it considers the epistemic consequences this result has for views that attempt to show that at least some phenomenal beliefs are infallible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense appears meaningful. The second constraint requires that nonsense does not express thoughts. An account which fails to meet this constraint undercuts the critical force of the concept of nonsense. I offer an account which meets both constraints. The central idea is that to be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The method of cases (MOC), as standardly construed, involves an evidential appeal to intuitions. Philosophers, however, often argue for their case verdicts, they offer reasons for accepting their truth. According to Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen – whose ground-breaking case studies first drew attention to this underappreciated phenomenon – their reason-giving would constitute compelling evidence that, contrary to the received view, philosophers relying on MOC regard arguments, not intuitions, as their main justificatory source. This explanatory hypothesis has met with substantial resistance among metaphilosophers. The main goal of this paper is to broaden the theoretical playing field by considering a yet unexplored alternative hypothesis. I argue that said phenomenon in fact admits of an alternative, intuition-friendly explanation in light of a fundamental distinction in justification theory which has been entirely overlooked by the current debate – i.e. the one between justifying a belief and being justified in holding it. This distinction, I suggest, allows one to naturally construe philosophers' justifying activity as a dialectically motivated kind of proactive reasoning geared toward the goal of maximizing consensus over their verdicts. Once thus construed, it remains compatible with philosophers thinking of intuitions as the main source of their justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bhikhu Parekh is a leading philosopher and political theorist of multiculturalism and has combined this with a dedication to public and community service in Britain and India. Here Gurpreet Mahajan, Geoffrey Brahm Levey, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Charles Taylor, Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood, in a symposium edited by the last two, come together to celebrate Bhikhu Parekh's 90th birthday. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most African philosophers would accept the observation that the 'African philosophy question'—Is there an African philosophy, and if there is, what is it?—and the different responses to it have not only generated much debate in African philosophy but have also had a significant impact on its development. Since its inception about half a century ago, African philosophy has gained recognition as a member of the world philosophies and established itself as an academic discipline. African philosophy owes these significant inroads, at least in part, to the challenge presented by the African philosophy question and the African predicament. In view of this, it remains crucial that African philosophers continue to clarify the nature of African philosophy as a field of study. Oruka captures the different scholarly responses to the African philosophy question in his famous four varieties or trends of African philosophy: (1) ethnophilosophy, (2) nationalist–ideological philosophy, (3) philosophical sagacity, and (4) professional philosophy. This article offers a general critique of these varieties of African philosophy, reflects on the nature of African philosophy and philosophizing, and argues for a relevant African philosophy of education. The article argues an African philosophy of education that considers features of the African thought that enable and enthuse African people to problem-solve and participate fully in and contribute to world affairs. As such, the article advocates Africanization, criticality, dialogue, and African humanism as the sine qua non features of African philosophy of education. The article also responds to some notable objections to the proposed African philosophy of education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2020 Yale Law Journal article, "Commonsense Consent," Roseanna Sommers argues that deception is compatible with the layperson's intuitive sense of consent. That is, unlike the canonical understanding of consent defended by legal scholars and philosophers, the notion of consent defended by the folk is not invalidated by deception. In this study, I find that while respondents do appear to attribute consent to victims of deception, they do so in a limited number of contexts – i.e., they attribute de re consent to victims of de dicto deception and attribute de dicto consent to victims of de re deception. When the two varieties of consent and deception are properly disambiguated and matched type for type however, we see the reverse phenomenon – i.e., participants refrain from attributing de dicto consent to de dicto deception and refrain from attributing de re consent to de re deception. If this is right, rather than saying, as Sommers does, that deception generally fails to invalidate commonsense consent, we should refine our understanding of commonsense consent to include two varieties of consent, each of which is in fact invalidated by its own variety of deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-traumatic growth (PTG) has been a key topic of research by psychologists over the last 25 years. But the idea that a person can benefit from adversity has been around for much longer, and is a stable in many mainstream cultures, and in theological and recent philosophical thinking. However, there has been, to date, little overlap between psychological research into PTG, and philosophical thinking about similar ideas. This is unfortunate, both because philosophers are not taking up potential sources of empirical support, and because psychological research into PTG is subject to a range of criticisms and concerns. In this paper, we aim to show how philosophical thinking can address some of these, and as a result put psychological research into PTG on a firmer theoretical footing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions about the role of universities have long been framed in terms of questions of what is good for the public, as well as how and whether higher education serves that good. Today, the language of 'societal impact' has become an accepted way for policymakers to frame the matter, but just who is included in the underlying definition of society that this formulation presupposes? In this paper, we consider how 'society' has been constructed in discussions of the societal impact of humanities research in Denmark, through an engagement with legislation, national political commentary, and institutional policy. We draw on the work of Martin Heidegger and Simone Weil to analyse, through an ontology of policy approach, the vision of society these policies construct. We conclude with proposals for alternative societies and forms of policy that these philosophers make possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]