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This article explores the contribution of Wertkritik, a contemporary tendency in German critical Marxist thought, to the theorisation of capitalism, and in particular its relationship with geopolitical conflict and war. Against traditional Marxist and liberal determinism, Wertkritik emphasises how the rationally organised 'forces of production' do not motivate the historical development of capitalism, but rather the forces of destruction. This article suggests that Wertkritik illuminates contemporary capitalist development insofar as it lays bare how the apparent 'post-neoliberal' turn to state-driven industrial policy is motivated less by a drive to unleash the productive forces in pursuit of a more dynamic or green economy and more by the management of the unfolding destructive forces represented in the new forms of conflict and competition arising between warring military and economic powers. The explanation this offers of the cultural dynamics shaping a context of authoritarian convergence provides vital materials towards a critical theory of a capitalism conditioned by increasing geopolitical tensions. Offering the concept of a 'world civil war' as an alternative to the rationalisations inherent in prevailing notions of a 'new' or 'second' cold war, this theorisation also offers pointers for an emancipatory praxis attuned to the current context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary international relations are characterized by increasing interstate rivalry, which is especially pronounced at the level of regional subsystems. Latin Caribbean America (LCA) serves a vivid example, becoming the arena of competition (including in ideological terms) between the United States, which has traditionally considered the region its sphere of influence, and China, which is actively forging cooperation with the LCA countries in various fields. The purpose of this article is to identify and assess the role of the ideological component in the policy of the J. Biden administration towards the LCA countries against the background of the growing U.S.-Chinese rivalry in the region. The first section of the article defines the place of LCA in the foreign policy strategy of the current administration in the context of the Democrats’ rhetoric about the struggle over the ‘free world’ challenged by the authoritarian regimes, in particular by the PRC. The second section analyzes the main forms and directions of the PRC’s policy aimed at strengthening its presence in LCA. The author notes that the American authorities assess these PRC activities extremely negatively, as undermining the foundations of the U.S. leadership in the region. As a result, a new bipartisan consensus is emerging on the need to take urgent measures to counter the growing influence of China. The third section examines the key initiatives of the J. Biden administration aimed at strengthening the U.S. positions in the LCA countries. The author concludes that the steps taken by the 46th President of the United States in the Latin American direction have strong ideological overtones. They actually force the LCA countries to take sides in the U.S.-Chinese confrontation, which in turn leads to further polarization of the region in the spirit of a new Cold War.

The consensus on industry policy, state intervention and free trade that have been so central to the neoliberal international order of the past three decades has been fundamentally transformed over the past few years. The Biden administration has coined the term 'New Washington Consensus' to describe these transformations in the global political and economic order. The nub of our argument is that rather than being the start of 'deglobalisation', or a turn away from neoliberalism, it represents the emergence of a form of militarised neoliberalism that repurposes and reorganises security institutions and alliances to enable or facilitate global economic accumulation by states such as the United States and China, such that it leads to new forms of regulatory geographies. We contest the idea that this means a shift back towards more statist forms of development. State activism is an important dimension of the new conjuncture, but we see this as the emergence of a different and more militarised neoliberalism. It is not about disconnecting but reconnecting the global economy in a way that favours certain forms of social forces and interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Driven by the New Cold War between Russia and the West since 2014, this article draws on moral theory hinging on the conceptual framework of 'moral power' theoretically proceeding from 'civilian'/'norm ative'/'ethical' 'power Europe'. These are applied to the European Neighbourhood (Policy) (enp) as a prime test case composed of atomised case studies on a geographic terrain characterised by political, security, economic, etc. turmoil. Ontologically, the article bridges neorealism, constructivism, and critical theory to explain the latest developments in the EU's political neighbourhood. Epistemologically, it relies on the outside/in, bottom- up, inbound/outbound trajectories to grasp the local dynamics, regional interplay and the global context. Methodologically, it carries out qualitative discourse and quantitative content-analysis transcending from the 'pragmatic' and 'narrative' turns to interpretivism. This article a) demonstrates the theoretical convalescence from the 'normative power Europe' (npe) to 'moral power' deconstructing npe's core and minor norms and b) anatomises the enp through the seven 'parameters' of 'morality', namely, consequentialism, coherence, consistency, balance between values and interests, normative steadiness, inclusiveness and external legitimacy, and the relevant type of 'power', i.e. 'potential', 'actual', and 'actualised'. Thereby it 'constructs' a pyramid compartmentalising the EU's norms in line with purported objective morality, relative ethics and subjective normativity. Ultimately, beyond realpolitik, the article shows depletion of the npe, which induces (de-) valuation of the EU's 'moral power' through 'normative digressions' -- corrosion, derogation, deviation, perversion, erosion, conversion, subversion in tandem with 'moral distortions' -- morally utilitarian, unmoral, anti-moral, amoral, immoral, non-moral, and moralist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSmall- and medium-sized states acquire significant influence when regional and global orders are in flux, as in times of power transition. We have observed such dynamics especially since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when the competition between two superpowers of the United States (US) and China has intensified in such a way that it affects the soundness of the liberal international economic order (LIEO). These smaller states have become influential in the institutionalization of regional political and economic orders when conditions are right. We argue that the following three aspects of a small state’s attributes influence heavily in shaping their proactive approach to LIEO. The first is its economic structure that shapes its motivation. The second is its polity type that defines internal constraints. The third and final component is its international status that imposes external constraints. This study examines trade policies taken by Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea from the 2010s and onward and compares their respective approaches and their impacts on economic order-building in East Asia and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary international relations, the interaction between conventional and nuclear powers creates a complex dynamic that significantly influences states' threat perceptions and behaviors. The discovery in mid-2021 that China had constructed three new missile silo fields raised questions about whether a shift had occurred in China's traditional minimum nuclear deterrence strategy. This study posits that China is deviating from its long-standing nuclear strategy. Adverse changes in the conventional balance between the United States and China have incentivized China to enhance its nuclear capabilities and improve its nuclear force's deterrence capability by developing its conventional capabilities. A state that perceives its nuclear deterrence to be able to be weakened by the conventional capabilities of its adversary tends to respond by strengthening its nuclear deterrence. Similarly, such a state can enhance its conventional capabilities to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese experts view the United States' conventional precision strike capabilities as a significant threat to China's assured retaliation capability. Furthermore, these experts believe that China's nuclear arsenal faces a more diverse range of conventional threats compared to the past. This study aims to analyze the reasons behind China's expansion of its nuclear missile silos. The study also examines the role of nuclear weapons in China's military doctrine as well as recent modernization efforts within the Chinese military. The focal point of this study is to understand China's evolving nuclear capabilities based on its threat perceptions and their impact on global security dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the possible scenarios in Asia-Pacific is a bipolar order of two great powers, the United States and China. In this situation, alliance commitments will likely remain fixed rather than flexible. This scenario is also known as “a new kind of cold war” because both actors have many social and ideological differences that will often be emphasized in the competition for the geopolitical position. Three main questions are addressed in this study: 1) What are the roles the United States plays as the status quo in the Asia-Pacific?; 2) What approaches does China take to challenge the United States-centred security order?; 3) What are solutions for the United States and China to avoid the Lose-Lose Situation in the New Cold War?. This paper goes into view on the roles of states as either status quo or revisionist and introduces the happening of a New Cold War in the Asia-Pacific. China has made much progress in recent years, but the United States still has relatively significant advantages over a traditional power in economic size, technological capabilities, and military systems. The research will analyze whether the United States could strengthen the existing order by shifting from a strategy of engagement to a confrontation against China. However, the new Cold War, the “real” of new stability and stability derived from the bipolar order is still in significant doubt. Therefore, the United States and China should find solutions to avoid the “Lose-Lose” situation for all of them.

The aim of this paper is to project the future dynamics of US-China relations and assess the associated risks of bifurcation of the global economy between the two blocs. The United States and China face a strategic paradox in their long-term competition to research, develop, and acquire new and emerging technologies. In the commercial sphere, the two nations’ research and development (R&D) of emerging technologies is now deeply integrated, potentially providing mutual benefits to each country’s markets. However, despite their commercial interconnectedness, national security planners in each country continue to view each other as potential adversaries. By using the methods of explanatory research and an inductive approach for analysing the management of technological innovation and economic development, the authors argue that China’s economic transformation towards the upper end of global industrial value chains and the seizure of entire product ranges or supply chains have put at risk the US’s hegemonic status. By imposing export sanctions, the United States is trying to force technological decoupling and disable the functioning of global supply chains in the domains critical for Chinese high-tech in order to slow down or contain China’s technological and economic rise. Consequently, the conclusion drawn is that the United States will continue its efforts to maintain primacy over China in emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and nanotechnology, by mobilising investments in research and development as well as by using export bans and other kinds of sanctions. In this way, it is likely that a state of cohabitation between the two trading blocs will be developed, which would create the conditions for the evolution of the strained relations between the US and China.

This article reviews the analysis of the historian Stephen F. Cohen (1928-2020) on what he called the "New Cold War", i.e., the confrontation between the United States and Russia caused by the expansion, promoted by the United States, of NATO to Eastern Europe. The theoretical framework is the theory of imperialism, and the methodology consists in the analysis of primary sources, academic works and journalistic articles. The conclusion is that Cohen's analysis was vindicated by the outbreak of the current war in the Ukraine, but that his "Russo-centric" view is too narrow, and that his analysis must be placed in the larger global context within which the war in Ukraine takes place: US's two-pronged aggression against both Russia and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In face of the growing systemic conflict between the West and China and the sudden escalation of tensions with Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, the concept of the Cold War reappears in recent years as a reference category. Terefore, the purpose of this article is to present an exhaustive and up-to-date review of the historiographical state of the art in relation to the concept, interpretations, physical and mental spaces and defining systemic structures of the world order between 1947 and 1991. Classic references are included, as well as the most recent, innovative and ground-breaking contributions to the historiography of the Cold War, which since 1991 has undergone a profound makeover, due to the broadening of interpretative categories and the multiplication of historiographical sources. Only by identifying what the Cold War really was will it be possible to construct valid comparative analyses, highlight lines of continuity, describe new variables and, ultimately, draw interpretative frameworks that allow us to understand a potential new cold war in light of the systemic confrontation during the second half of the twentieth century.

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There is much pessimism as to the current state of Sino-American relations, especially since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020. Such pessimism has led to some scholars and commentators asserting that the Sino-American relationship is on the cusp of either a new Cold War or, even more alarmingly, something akin to the Peloponnesian War (via a Thucydides Trap) whereby the United States might take pre-emptive measures against China. This article rejects such analogizing and argues that, due to important technological advancements found at the intersection of the digital and fourth industrial revolutions, most of the real competition in the relationship is now occurring in cyberspace, especially with regards to the aim of asserting narratives of truth. Two key narrative battlegrounds that have raged since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic are examined: where was the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic? and who has had the most successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic?. This article shows that Sino-American competition in cyberspace over asserting their narratives of truth (related to the COVID-19 pandemic) is fierce and unhinged. Part of what is driving this competition is the challenging domestic settings politicians and officials find themselves in both China and the United States, thus, the competing narratives being asserted by both sides are predominately for domestic audiences. However, given that cyberspace connects states with foreign publics more intimately, the international aspect of this competition is also important and could result in further damage to the already fragile Sino-American relationship. Yet, whether this competition will bleed into the real world is far from certain and, because of this, doomsaying via historical analogies should be avoided.

Studies of films of the 1980s have noted a tendency towards "ideological conglomeration"—the presence of multiple contradictory ideological registers. This article argues that 80s films' "ideological conglomeration" is made legible and coherent through Michael Rothberg's (2009, Multidirectional memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the age of decolonization. Stanford University Press) concept of multidirectional memory. It thus proceeds to apply a theoretical framework of multidirectional memory to the analysis of two "New Cold War" films—Sylvester Stallone's Rocky IV (1985) and Taylor Hackford's White Nights (1985). Reading Rocky IV through a lens of multidirectional memory allows us to perceive links between the "New Cold War," U.S. racializing logics, and the racializing schemas of the Nazi regime. In White Nights an analytic of multidirectional memory foregrounds the connections between Little Rock, Arkansas, the 1968 Democratic National Convention, and the displacement of the associated discourses of state brutality, racism, and accountability onto the Soviet Union. The article concludes that multidirectional memory offers a generative theoretical framework for the study of the cinema of the "New Cold War" that illuminates how films link U.S. Cold War and racial logics to secure the hegemony of white masculinity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relaciones Internacionales (1699-3950) is the property of Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, International Relations Studies Group (GERI) Law Faculty and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Varia História is the property of Varia Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Putin's invasion of Ukraine comes amidst indications that Moscow and Beijing are pursuing a condominium of geostrategic power to dominate Eurasia, with North Korea as a regional partner. Although there is muted mistrust between all three countries, this is outweighed by their common interests in seeking to displace the U.S. role in the post-1945 rules-based order. It is also likely that Beijing and Moscow view North Korea as a useful regional partner that can be used to occupy U.S. attention. Moreover, Xi Jinping's ambitions to absorb Taiwan into China comes when U.S. ability to maintain its "Two War" capability is under question due to Washington's efforts to contain Russian expansionism. Such developments pose a challenge for the ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol. Although the ROK has historically focused on the land warfare threat posed by North Korea, the possibility of the United States coming to blows with China in an air-naval standoff over Taiwan could leave the ROK in an awkward position insofar as its alliance obligations to the United States are concerned. Such trends underscore the need for the ROK to increase joint planning with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in planning for airnaval contingencies outside the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives the identification of political-military determinants of the full-scale phase of the war in Ukraine which has been going on since 2014. The said goal shall be achieved by analyzing the boundary conditions of the Russian security policy against the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the geostrategic conditioning of the Republic of Belarus. Methods the following techniques have been implemented in the article: qualitative analysis and critical analysis of the source literature, synthesis – cause and effect associations. The statistical method has also been used. The empirical methods include abstract modelling for the construction of simplified models of the description of reality with reference to the object of analysis. Results the three goals mentioned beforehand have been achieved in the article through (1) showing the main strategic and operational assumptions of the Russian Federation with regard to its national security policy, (2) the role of incorporated Belarus in the military operation being carried out, (3) the estimation of the main assumptions of the military campaign. Conclusions the neo-imperial policy carried out by the Russian Federation towards the neighboring countries is the main determinant of the warfare in Ukraine. Russian willingness to reestablish the regional order in Central and Eastern Europe determines the next phase of the military campaign. Over the past years, Belarus has been gradually integrated as a Union Member State. It may be assumed that Belarus will become a subjugated country of Russia – which increases the possibility of Belarus being involved in military conflicts carried by the Russian Federation.

The situation generated by the pandemic has meant the acceleration of the ongoing hegemonic clash between the United States and China, as well as the intensification of the anti-China narrative and a deplorable wave of Sinophobia throughout the world. In this context, Taiwan has become a strategic hot spot for the development of the rhetoric of the enemy. This study analyses some of the direct consequences of the ensuing friend/foe discourses in the Taiwanese milieu. In the context of a new Cold War, certain groups of power and their media apparatuses have embarked into a race to discursively distance the country as quickly as possible from the despised global enemy, not to be dragged down by the proximity and commonalities shared with China. Moreover, social polarization within Taiwan and contempt for the internal “enemies” pose an added challenge both for the maintenance of liberal democracy and the preservation of peace and self-government on the island. These outcomes are facilitated by underlying populist and nationalist processes of identity construction and hegemonic struggle: distinct discourses re-articulating the Taiwanese identity as an underdog people and a victimized nation.

This analysis contributes to a fast-growing body of literature on Sino-Western relations and the tension between economic and security interests. It takes Britain's China policy as a case study considering the Integrated Review 2021. It argues that London's stance towards Beijing has shifted – officially – from the so-called "golden era" to a complex phase of diplomatic–military tensions and scrutinised economic relations, principally because of US pressure. However, this shift de facto has not had a structural impact on the economic side of the relationship between London and Beijing. The article reaches this conclusion by framing its narrative through the lens of the economy-security conundrum at the heart of the Liberal International Order and through the lens of the New Cold War between the US and China. These two factors are crucial for understanding the change between Britain's China policy pre- and post-2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the portrayal of German Democratic Republic (GDR) socialism in the TV series Deutschland, the first foreign-language show to premiere on a U.S. network. Paving the way for the globalization of Germany's TV industry, the series exemplifies the rise of the nostalgic spy thriller. It employs the aesthetic and ideological codes of a genre rooted in the 1960s to evoke the time period and ideological certainties of the Cold War from a contemporary perspective. Deutschland focuses on the Stasi's division of counterintelligence to portray the GDR as a totalitarian regime, run by corrupt elites, which subjugated its population and supported terrorism and illegal arms trading. The series employs the conventions of "historical event TV" and re-created historical settings to claim veracity and authenticity for plotlines that invoke sensationalized coverage of Cold War conflicts and distorted allegations against the GDR. Deutschland dismisses GDR efforts to create and globalize an alternative system, based on principles of anti-imperialist solidarity with the global South, and caricatures postsocialist nostalgia as an elite sentiment for the re-creation of totalitarianism. The series contributes to neo-Cold War imageries that evoke a past of Western superiority over European state socialism, which has little to offer to a future post-neoliberal world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction to this special issue outlines comparative approaches to cultural representations of post/socialism in order to move beyond the term's association with the Soviet Union, the unevenly aligned or nonaligned nations in Central/Eastern Europe (CEE), and the period between 1917 and 1990. The histories and afterlives of state socialisms, and socialist globalization in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, are at the center of ongoing geopolitical realignments toward a multipolar world. The introduction explores the framing of these shifts as a "new Cold War" between the West and the nations of China and Russia, whose autocratic regimes are associated with remnants of totalitarian state socialism. Like the official rhetoric of many postsocialist nations, these discourses dismiss the far more diverse and progressive legacies of socialism. The introduction inserts cultural representations of Left Internationalism, the Non-Aligned Movement, socialist reformism, and committed art into the fields of comparative literature and media studies to contribute to theories of ongoing transformations and to provide alternative imaginaries for more equitable futures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ukraine-Russia war is a symbolic reminder of the crisis facing the rules-based liberal international order that has been in place since World War II. However, it remains to be seen whether changes in the global strategic environment, including the war in Ukraine, signify fundamental changes in the international order. Has the liberal international order lost its momentum? As a key international apparatus of the current Western-centered international order, has the United Nations failed to impose effective sanctions on Russia and no longer reflected reality? Will the world order after the war in Ukraine return to a multipolar system led by superpowers? This study views that while it is necessary to discuss a potential transition of global governance in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the emergence of a new international order that supersedes the existing order is still a remote prospect. However, such changes in the global strategic environment will serve as an opportunity to reform the existing order and establish an effective international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, the Russo-Pak relationship had a foreign policy context and a legacy that went through the historic eras of pre-partition Great Game between the British Indian and Czarist Empires, and the post-partition Cold War between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA).Pakistan on its creation sided with the American led West through Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or Baghdad Pact, plus, the partnerships against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and in the War on Terror. The US military and financial aid and the support by the International and Asian financial institutions for Pakistan is decades old--albeit now with a friction over Afghanistan, Russia and China. Still, the transactional-cooperation remains over Afghanistan through the air-corridor that is useful for Americans in many ways. American influence, assets and the air-corridor is a deadly mix in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban know that the drones, jets and aircrafts using the corridor take-off from and land at Qatar without ever landing in Afghanistan. Moreover, intelligence sharing is part of Pak-US operational cooperation with a possibility of a military base too. The context of Pak-US cooperation is the centuries old British era Frontier Policy. It remained until the American strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan. The relationship since then has deteriorated and the perception of each other is not harmonious despite the tactical cooperation in Afghanistan. The reason is the strategic choices made by Pakistan and America lacking congruence over China, Russia, Afghanistan and India. The interactive-arm-twisting of Pakistan is an indicator. The rest is the detail of Pakistan's New Frontier Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the possible ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic as they relate to changing American strategic posture and geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia. Since the spread of the pandemic, the overall security situation in Northeast Asia appears to be worsening, contrary to public expectations. Disputes over the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic between Beijing and Washington have aggravated the Sino-American relationship, already shifting from the existing “cold peace” between the two into a Cold War. The authors explore the new and rapidly evolving Cold War discourse in the United States and traces its geopolitical implications across Northeast Asia. The first section examines emerging patterns of new Cold War discourse and practice in the United States. The second discusses four major geopolitical flashpoints in the region: the dynamics of military modernization and strategic arms races between China and the United States, Taiwan Strait relations, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the paper makes suggestions to mitigate rising geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia.

The new US administration has four difficult years ahead. However, none of the White House's predecessors had an easy task: there are always several drawbacks. Now the problems to be faced are no longer opportunistic but systemic. In this context, the legacy of former President Trump in this area remains ominous and it is worrying that not only did bilateral relations end in the deepest crisis in recent decades, but under Trump almost all negotiating mechanisms which previously allowed solving problems or preventing their uncontrolled development were destroyed. Therefore, in this regard, this article seeks to analyze the situation from Biden's first foreign policy speech, through the evaluation of a possible cold war and the isolationist tendency of the United States, to finally offer proposals for Russia, with the aim of preserving "good" relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initially Western scholars generally assumed that Russia would become a 'normal' democratic state, taking its place in the existing world order. They attributed this to Yeltsin's democratic credentials, but they could do so only by ignoring the clear flaws in Russian democracy as it developed under his presidency. This means that when Russia moved in a more authoritarian direction under Yeltsin's successor Vladimir Putin, the explanation that most gave for this was the agency of Putin. He was seen as reinstating many of the elements of the Soviet legacy, including the role of the security apparatus. Putin's rise was also seen as decisive in the shift of Russia's international position from one seeking accommodation within the existing international architecture to one seeking to revise that architecture in ways objectionable to the West. The result is said to be a new cold war. But there is disagreement about how this should be understood: is Russia acting as a traditional great power, and therefore understandable through the established principles of international relations, or is she still claiming Soviet-style exceptionalism? What is clear, and many do not appreciate, is that even when Putin has gone, Russia's core interests will likely not change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contains the analytical commentary on Russian translation of the separate chapter from the book «Long Telegram 2: Neo-Kennanite Approach to Russia» by American anthropologist, historian and political scientist Peter Eltsov. It analyzes critically the reasons, according to Peter Eltsov, why in the historical perspective the collapse of Russia is possible

China is challenging the hegemony of the United States through its economic power, creating the so-called New Cold War. The consequent conflict between the US and China can cause selective coercion in South Korea. South Korea is highly dependent on the United States militarily and on China economically. In a conflict, if Korea is asked for selective support, there will be a dilemma in policymaking. Accordingly, I studied the geopolitical dilemma in South Korea resulting from the US–China competition and six security issues . I was able to identify six conflict factors related to Korean security: the North Korean nuclear problem, the role of US forces in South Korea, friction due to protectionism, the battle for the semiconductor market, the formation of the Pacific Coast Council, and the discharge of contaminated water from nuclear power plants in Japan. I examined the flexible survival strategies that Korea could choose for each security issue. I expected policy utility by dividing it into military, economic, and diplomatic fields.

The Obama administration has stated its intention to avoid a new Cold War, but it has also demonstrated little interest in addressing the core issue in the dispute, namely the regional order in post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia. This "middle way" policy has failed. In order to head off a new Cold War, the United States should lead the West in a new approach that eases competition over countries like Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Official discourses of Development are being redefined. If the key geopolitical contexts shaping the post‐war Development project were decolonisation and the Cold War, the defining world‐historical transformations shaping the emerging vision of Development are the expansion of state capitalism and the rise of China. The IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the G20, other multilaterals, and bilateral partners are increasingly taking stock of the rise of state capitalism, and acting as ideational vectors of this emerging regime. However, this new "state capitalist normal" is also portrayed as carrying risks. There is anxiety regarding the direction the political form of global capital accumulation is heading: with the unchecked proliferation of state capitalism possibly blunting competition, politicising economic relations, and intensifying geoeconomic tensions. This anxiety underwrites the current re‐articulation of Development, one which embraces the state as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital; even as it critiques China's use of similar instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the term 'new Cold War' has become popular among the media and in academia as a description of contemporary world politics, in general, and major-power relations. Despite the connotations of its name, the Cold War period, sometimes referred to as the long peace, was associated with stability and the avoidance of an all-out world war. This study offers a preliminary examination of the extent to which 21st-century world politics reflects the features of the old Cold War. The findings show that the polarity and polarisation inherent in the current international system are similar to conditions of the early Cold War period (1947--1962), which can be classified as both power bipolar and cluster bipolar. Theoretically, this systemic condition is neither most nor least prone to war. However, similar to the pre-1962 Cold War period, when the implicit rules of the major-power game had yet reached maturity, little consensus on the proper conduct of American--Chinese relations has been reached at present, making current major-power politics highly uncertain and prone to conflict that may lead to war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, international relations and the global order are in turmoil and disorder. The bases of the international order and the means by which it was regulated are in the process of being dismantled, such as the central considerations of the Treaty of Westphalia that guided international politics and diplomacy for centuries. As the world becomes increasingly polarised into different opposing and competing geopolitical camps, the question needs to be asked, why is this happening? The answer seems to lie, at least in part, in a rapidly evolving and changing system of global political hegemony, where liberal democracy is on the wane. This is also further influenced by the declining economic and military power of the West, where the US is still the unipolar hegemony, but is declining in its hard power and ability to manage/control international affairs as it was able to do in the 1990s (such as the First Gulf War in 1990–91 and Kosovo in 1999). This paper analyses the rise and decline of the West, and the international consequences and results. A conclusion of this paper, although the West is significantly weakened in terms of its political, military and economic power, it is trying to stave off its decline. Therefore, the ‘New Cold War’ is an important element in this strategy as a means to try and unite a divided and wary domestic audience by attempting to invoke the spectre of a foreign ‘threat’ and to do this through the concept of a crisis. A crisis represents an extraordinary situation, which if accepted, becomes the basis for applying extraordinary measures to ‘rescue’ the public from the hazard. It is a means to try and bargain the public’s freedom for their sense of security.

Currently, the confrontation between two global giants, the United States and China, in trade and technology advancement and hegemony in international politics is escalating. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. economic “war,” or the so-called “new Cold War,” not only indicates the escalation of this confrontation but also symptomizes the international order’s transformation as a result of the change in power balance and rise of a challenger against the existing United States–led international liberal order. Most IR specialists focus on the prospects of this confrontation and its uncertain worldwide circumstances and are concerned about its impact on East Asian/Asia Pacific regional circumstances. Among them, prospects regarding regionalism and regional institutions in Asia seem pessimistic. However, Asian regionalism was activated following the decline in United States’ power and rise of China as a global power, and the international liberal order’s retreat became visible toward the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, even under the uncertain situations created by the Sino-U.S. confrontation, regional powers, including China, Japan, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are promoting their multilateral approach by proposing and advancing various regional frameworks. This indicates that each regional power is adopting the “institutional hedging” strategy to ensure that their individual interests are satisfied and the regional order is comfortable for themselves. This paper verifies that regionalism and regional institutions have become important as measures of regional power for countries’ institutional hedging strategies to overcome the challenges posed by the beginning of regional uncertainties and that Asian regionalism is more active today than ever before.

Increased and diversified tensions in Russian-Western relations and first Russian-American relations are not only а result of propaganda pressure. They also reflex a number of conflicting realities of the contemporary system of international political and economic relations that involve Russia as an important player. The role of Russia is especially noticeable now that the process of development of the architecture of a new global system is underway. Hostile or confrontational position of Russia could be a major risk as well as a factor that can change the strategic context of the global competition. The emerging system looks much different from the one that formed the basis on which the world developed during the last 30 years. In that environment a potential hostile position of Russia is regarded as a major risk. But the active involvement of Russia into most important recent global economic and political developments prevents the situation of surpassing the limits of the «non-zero sum game».

With the changes of international order and the deterioration of China–US relations, it has been argued that a new Cold War is approaching. However, this view does not comprehensively consider the differences between the current world and the world during the Cold War era. In fact, the political and economic basis of a new Cold War is far from mature, and China and America have gained abundant experiences of risk management. In addition, China is also very different from the Soviet Union. All of these elements determined that China and US will not necessarily have a new Cold War. However, some potential risks that may push China and US crash with each other should be carefully considered.