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Copyright of Journal of International Relations & Politics is the property of Journal of International Relations & Politics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After a long period of diplomatic tension between Russia and Ukraine, these two countries entered into a direct military conflict at the end of February 2022. This conflict has changed a wide field of international politics to a large extent. America is seeking to expand the borders of NATO towards the western borders of Russia in order to tighten the encirclement ring of this country, this issue has caused great tension in Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to investigate the influential variables in the adoption of policies of the Biden government towards the 2022 war between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, it seeks to find the answer to the question of what factors influenced the American foreign policy in response to Russia's attack on Ukraine and how can it be explained? The findings of the research show that the behavior of the American foreign policy is a mixture of which the teachings of neoclassical realism in the behavior of the American foreign policy are a mixture of the interaction of external factors (international system) and internal factors (internal structure and power and the type of perception of the decision-making elites of the American foreign policy) and it can be explained from the point of view of the neoclassical realism approach. The present research method is descriptive and analytical, using library resources and websites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been observed that the Paris Agreement has become an "analogy" of diplomatic success and institutional design because it allows emissions reduction commitments to be determined at the national level. While this is widely attributed to the United States' insistence on excluding any provisions that would have required US Senate ratification, the success of Paris stems more from the way the agreement partly circumvents the divergent interests of developed and developing countries by allowing states to pursue their own mitigation strategies based on domestic distributional and ideological politics rather than interstate cooperation and/or competition. It is this accommodation of both an institutionalist logic of absolute gains and a more realist logic of relative gains that ultimately underpins the diplomatic and institutional design success of Paris. However, the resonance of realism, at least in its neoclassical form, also stems from its greater capacity to accommodate the heightened socioecological complexity, interconnectedness, and unknowability occasioned by the Anthropocene than other branches of Anthropocentric international relations theory. This potential is outlined in this Forum article by sketching the epistemological and ontological connections between neoclassical realism and the concept of resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colombia has a long tradition of participating in regional integration initiatives, as a full or associate member. The Pacific Alliance (PA) is one of the most recent integration projects in which Colombia participates. This article explores, from the perspective of neoclassical realism (NCR), the role played by the perception of foreign policy decision-makers, both in the systemic and regional context, and how these perceptions were assumed as opportunities or threats that defined Colombia's entry into this integrationist initiative. It employs a qualitative methodology through documentary analysis of scientific and journalistic sources. It concludes that the perception of the external context played an important role in Colombia's decision to become a founding member of the Pacific Alliance, and that the intervening variable of the decision-makers perception becomes valuable in contexts where the formulation of foreign policy falls largely on the presidential figure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This research examines contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, and its central concern is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. We argue that China has had a double impact on Brazilian foreign policy: (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. A case study on Sino-Brazilian relations is conducted with typologies on foreign policy actions elaborated by Schweller (1994). Then, we propose that Brazilian foreign policy, through the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, sought to interpret a Jackal position within the international system. Our variables are defined based on Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering the structural stimulus of China’s rise as the independent variable, the permissiveness, and clarity of the international system as the intervening variable, and the behaviour of Brazilian foreign policy as a dependent variable.

The article examines neoclassical realism and Armenia’s international orientation as one of the directions in the transformation of the theory of international relations of small states. In this article, neoclassical realism is analyzed from the point of view of subjective aspects of policy formation and the influence of domestic political features of a small state on its foreign policy. Taking into account that neoclassical realism is a completely independent development of neorealism with a complementary elemental level of analysis of international politics. In terms of content, neoclassical realism of Armenia clarifies such concepts as resilience, national security, balance of power, balancing policy and others. The neoclassical model of Armenia’s foreign policy as a small state allows us to study the conditions under which great powers and small states deviate from the policy of balancing. From this point of view, the article proposes to analyze international politics through the prism of a global rollback to state-centric politics. The article takes into account that globalization presents new challenges for small countries such as Armenia, which risks being marginalized as a result of the restructuring of both global and regional economic relations.

Neoclassical realism emerged as part of the neorealists’ response to the criticism of their core theoretical provisions, intended to adapt the latter to the challenges of post-bipolar international relations. However, with further elucidation and formalization of the key ideas and premises of neoclassical realism it started to assert itself as an independent research approach, and even more so, as a special, metasynthetic theory. In order to assess the validity of these claims and, in general, to better understand the place of neoclassical realism in the theory of international relations, this paper considers it within the context of the evolutionary logic of the realist paradigm and neorealism, in particular. The first section identifies the origins and main theoretical provisions of neoclassical realism. The second section covers modern theoretical debates on the essence of and prospects for further development of analytical and methodological aspects of this approach. In order to provide a better understanding of the epistemological potential of the neoclassical realism, the third section examines empirical researches carried out within its framework. The author concludes that at the moment neoclassical realism can hardly qualify for the status of an independent theoretical position, let alone a meta-theory. It is more appropriate to consider it as a peculiar form, specific research model within the framework of the (neo)realist paradigm. As such, it allows putting forward verifiable hypotheses based on the analysis of the relationships between the independent, dependent and interfering variables, and also opens up new opportunities for conducting empirical research on a wide range of subject matters. At the same time, there is still a lot of work to be done to overcome the eclecticism inherent to neoclassical realism and to better define its ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations.

Recent trends demonstrate that states with sufficient capabilities to be granted regional power status by its peers (primarily other states within their region) can nonetheless renounce regional leadership. This article analyzes the puzzling behavior of these detached or reluctant regional powers. We argue that resorting to an approach grounded in neoclassical realism is helpful to explain why regional powers might not exercise leadership. In this article regional leadership is conceptualized as an auxiliary goal within the grand strategy of a regional power. This goal will be pursued in the absence of certain structural and domestic constraints. Great power competition determines the incentives for regional leadership at the structural level. Capacity to extract and mobilize resources for foreign policy affects the decision to pursue leadership at the domestic level. We apply the analytical framework to analyze Brazil's detachment from South America after the Cardoso and Lula presidencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war.

Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bandwagoning by stealth refers to a situation when a government of a small state tries to accommodate a great power turned to aggressor amid a strong public opposition. We explain it with the example of Georgia's foreign policy towards Russia in the period of 2012–2022. It is argued that Georgia's attempt for rapprochement to Russia since 2012 can be explained by two unit-level variables: (1) a belief of the country's leadership in the need to accommodate Russia and (2) a societal and public opposition to the Russia-accommodating policy. A conflictual dynamic between the Russia-accommodating government and Russia-sceptic public resulted in bandwagoning by stealth – a defacto and partial bandwagoning with Russia without formally changing Georgia's declared pro-Western foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of the article is to examine the reasons of change and continuity in Russia-U.S. Relations during Putin's fourth term, 2018-2024. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these relations have been characterized by various fluctuations, including enthusiasm about promoting mutual understanding and collaboration during the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic discourse in the early 1990s, and the heightened tension during the realist discourse led by Putin. The U.S.-Russia relations have been deteriorating as a consequence of the uncertainties and insecurity which have increased due to the international order transition. The 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, as the greatest challenge in the relations between the United States and Russia in the post-Soviet period, is a clear manifestation of the gloomy situation. Russia considers this conflict to be a proxy war which is only part of the broader U.S. grand strategy to limit Russia’s geopolitical influence by lessening its strategic depth. The West’s support for Ukraine is viewed as a continuation of Washington’s previous attempts—including inciting the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, gradually infiltrating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), interfering in Russia's internal affairs, supporting the war in Yugoslavia, NATO's Eastward Expansion, and the establishment of an anti-missile shield — aimed at containing Russia without resorting to direct confrontation. On the other hand, American policymakers who seek to maintain U.S. supremacy in the international system, view Putin's Russia as a challenging and destructive actor that has improved its international position and has been trying to change the regional and global balance of power to the detriment of Washington by acting as a revisionist force, individually or collectively in collaboration with other members of the international revisionist front. In this context, the U.S. has adopted the strategy of ‘broad offensive deterrence’ (BOD) against Russia. Out of an abundance of caution, Moscow is pursuing the strategy of ‘active offensive defense’ (AOD) in the hope of reviving and strengthening its great power position. The adoption of these two competing strategies has intensified tension in the bilateral Russia-U.S. relations, and have had repercussions for other states. The author tries to answer the following research questions: 1. What are the causes of the persistence of conflict and tension in the U.S.-Russia relations? 2. How has the confrontation between the two strategies of ‘broad offensive deterrence’ (BOD) of the United States and ‘active offensive defense’ (AOD) of Russia led to the escalation of tension in their bilateral relations? Using the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, the analysis is focused on three inexorable variables (i.e., geopolitical power competition, security, and political culture) in order to find conclusive answers to the two questions. In the research hypothesis, it is argued that the persistence of tension in the U.S.-Russian relations is caused by three tension-generating variables of geopolitical power competition, security, and political culture. The method of qualitative textual analysis of the official documents and previous works on the subject revealed the impact of these variables on the nature of the relations between the two rival powers. The findings show that transformative variables (e.g., the circulation of the elites) had a positive effect on the bilateral relations between the United States and Russia in the short term, but the three above-mentioned factors have caused tension to prevail. However, Russia and the U.S. will probably continue their cooperation in three issue-areas: 1. Maintaining security and strategic stability in the international system as manifested in their support for the nuclear non-proliferation regime; 2. Confronting certain destabilizing regional challenges, particularly in the Middle East and the CIS; and 3. Dealing with asymmetric security threats such as international terrorism and cyber security. Nevertheless, the failure of the conciliatory approach and the perceived NATO-U.S. belligerent approach to Russia (including the "Reset" project), as well as the continual U.S. aggressive actions against Russian national interest have deepened their mutual mistrust. This perception of the U.S. intentions has been strengthened in Putin's third and fourth terms; and the Kremlin continue to believe inactions, restraint, and disengagement in response to the U.S. actions will not lead to a mutually-advantageous balanced relations. Russian leaders are concerned that a flexible and appeasing attitude towards the U.S. might result in increasing use of coercive and aggressive foreign policy instruments by Washington. This perception has forced Russia to adopt a posture of resistance and the strategy of ‘extensive aggressive defense’ against the U.S. It is expected to see the continuation of the tense bilateral relations and the situation of mutual mistrust between the two great powers in the medium term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, the United States has shown a sometimes conservative and sometimes radical pendulum in its position on several key subsidiary climate treaties. For example, in 1997, the United States Congress refused to approve the Kyoto Protocol signed by former US vice president Al Gore. In 2015, President Obama used executive power to bypass Congress to sign the Paris Agreement. In 2017, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. These seemingly confusing behaviors actually reflect the contradictions and conflicts in the formulation of climate policy of the United States. Using neoclassical realism theory as the analytical framework, the authors of this paper explore how such several key variables as leader image and perception, partisan politics, and civil society and lobbying groups shape the climate policy of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to build upon the existing neoclassical realist analysis of Russia's foreign policy in Ukraine during 2022. By introducing a comprehensive analytical framework grounded in neoclassical realism, it seeks to delve into the influence of specific developments and priorities within Russia on its foreign policy conduct towards Ukraine. Contrary to the commonly perceived image of a more assertive and aggressive Russia, recent trends in both foreign and domestic policy reveal an internally conflicted, introspective, and reactive Russia, demonstrating its lack of preparedness to embrace an evolving international role. Through this analysis, it becomes apparent that Putin's uncertainty in effectively addressing the multifaceted challenges and inevitable tensions, whether of domestic or international nature, emerges as a direct consequence of Russian mismanagement in handling foreign policy matters related to Ukraine. Unraveling the complexities and contradictions shaping Russia's actions in the region, this article provides deep insights into the dynamics governing the Ukrainian crisis and its wider implications for global geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bu çalışma Türkiye’nin 1956 Süveyş krizi konusunda yürüttüğü dış politikayı neoklasik realist teori çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, bir bağımlı değişken olarak “1956 Süveyş krizine yönelik Türk dış politikasını” analiz etmek için, çalışmanın metodolojisi gereği, “uluslararası sistemsel faktörler” bir bağımsız değişken ve “yerel faktörler” bir ara değişken olarak ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmada 1956 Süveyş krizine yönelik Türk dış politikası yapımı sürecinde belirleyici/sınırlandırıcı bir etkiye sahip olduğu öne sürülen uluslararası sistemin yapısı, Soğuk Savaş döneminde süper güçler arasındaki ideolojik karşıtlık ve nükleer rekabeti ifade eden iki kutupluluk ile ilişkilendirilerek açıklanmaktadır. “Caydırıcı askeri kapasite ihtiyacı”, “Türk dış politikası geleneğindeki Batıcılık eğilimi”, “ekonomik teşvik gereksinimi” ve “karar alıcıların bölgesel liderlik çabası” gibi çeşitli faktörler ise uluslararası sistemin belirleyici/sınırlandırıcı etkilerini yorumlayıcı nitelikteki yerel filtreler olarak ele alınmaktadır. İki farklı analiz düzeyinin kullanıldığı bu çalışmada hem 1956 Süveyş krizine yönelik Türk dış politikasının sistemsel etkilere dayanan “sürekliliği” hem de yerel dinamiklerden kaynaklanan “değişim eğilimi” ortaya konulmaktadır.

Neoclassical realism has carved a unique niche by offering a theoretically derived and empirically rich foreign policy analysis framework. Over the years, it has branched out as a theory of mistakes (Type I), a theory of foreign policy (Type II), and a theory of international politics (Type III). This article proposes another challenge to consolidate its offer of a progressive research agenda to position it as a theory for correcting mistakes. The theory of mistakes version differentiates ideal from actual foreign policy. The ideal corresponds to foreign policy that follows the pressures and incentives of the international system; structural realism, the basis for this optimal baseline, is here viewed as a normative theory. If there is a gap between the ideal baseline and the actual outcome, then foreign policy is sub-optimal and therefore costly. According to neoclassical realists, this is the result of the intervention of domestic political processes hijacking foreign policy. It follows that pointing out how to reduce the distorting impact of these domestic variables should help steer foreign policy toward optimality. By identifying the negative consequences that follow from a sub-optimal foreign policy, a theory for correcting mistakes also opens the door to developing prescriptions to manage the inevitable fallout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politica y Sociedad is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In its relations with China from 1972 to 2018, Pakistan has endeavored to extract and mobilize its domestic resources while conducting a foreign policy of balancing under systemic pressures and power disparities. Statist ideology and state-sponsored nationalism have been both useful and influential in this process. While there is abundant literature on ideology, nationalism, and Pakistan's foreign policy using theoretical foundations, a neoclassical realist approach has yet to be made. This paper seeks guidance from neoclassical realist theory as explored in the works of Taliaferro (2006) and Schweller (2004). We argue that Pakistan's ties with China have been facilitated domestically by an Islamic statist ideology and anti-Indian state-sponsored nationalism. These both have facilitated internal balancing through the extraction and mobilization of natural resources and emulation while externally they justified Pakistan's balancing efforts aimed at countering a perceived Indian threat. The nation's military and civil elites therefore agree on the necessity of closer ties with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This article examines aid as a foreign policy tool for power and influence. In doing so, it highlights the historical and contemporary Saudi–Yemeni relationship to analyse the different patterns of Saudi aid over the last three decades, including shifts in aid criteria and allocation. The article travels between 1994 and 2022, accounting for domestic, regional and international structures and dynamics that influenced the strategy, direction, scope and sum of Saudi aid. Saudi Arabia’s use of foreign aid as an instrument of political ordering and control is not only governed by the kingdom’s complex and multifaceted relation with Yemen, whose particularities and contingencies call for thorough consideration. Rather, regional and international realities also play a role. All these external influences are mediated by the priorities and perceptions of the Saudi leadership, whose decisions are also affected by elite ­struggles, domestic politics and institutional arrangements, and for whom Yemen invariably represents a source of concern– but also of opportunity. The work embraces a neoclassical realist framework to make sense of how domestic and external shifts redefined and redirected aid as concept and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines Azerbaijan's role as a potential mediator in Turkish-Israeli relations from a neoclassical realist perspective. The aftermath of the Second Karabakh War has raised the possibility of Azerbaijan mediating between Türkiye and Israel. This analysis suggests that Azerbaijani mediation is an auxiliary goal demonstrating the nation's evolving diplomatic ambitions, not a primary security imperative. I conclude that, while Azerbaijan's historical ties with Türkiye and Israel are valuable, unit-level factors in Türkiye's foreign policy, particularly its alignment with neo-Ottomanism, and systemic pressures such as disputes over Türkiye's Blue Homeland naval doctrine in the eastern Mediterranean Sea present challenges to successful mediation. Despite these challenges, this study considers Azerbaijan's potential transition from a small state to a middle power as it expands its global focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adapts underbalancing theory to explain regional powers' decisions when faced with the politics of great power intrusion. The paper finds two situations where regional powers defy expectations and details the causal models using India (1979-1980) and Russia (1996-1999) as illustrative cases. I find underbalancing theory wanting at the regional level. In each case, the regional power performs a variety of diplomatic maneuvers -- not limited to balancing and underbalancing -- to mitigate the fallout of great power decisions. This is explained by the power asymmetries dividing great and regional powers, both constraining the actions of regional powers while motivating more creative diplomatic practices. It is said that great powers are "Gullivers", tied down by their many responsibilities. This paper tells a different story, in which obstinate great powers make decisions without consideration for the locale where those decisions are carried out. It is the regional powers that are tied down by geostrategic position and regional security externalities. However weak or strong, these externalities create threats too salient to ignore. The findings suggest international political processes and outcomes can only be comprehensible by accounting for regional contexts and regional powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been widely argued that Turkish foreign policy has undergone a shift of axis under the ruling AKP, moving Turkey away from its Western alliance towards new alignments. The article employs neoclassical realism to explain the Turkish foreign policy behaviour, particularly Turkey's policies vis-à-vis the United States and Russia in recent years. It aims to provide an account of Turkey's military operations in Syria, the changing nature of Turkish-American relations, and Turkish-Russian strategic rapprochement, which has been raising concerns over Turkey's faithful ally role in the transatlantic alliance. The tensions between Turkey and the US have gradually escalated following the American refusal to hand over Fethullah Gülen, Turkey's military operations in Syria, Turkey's decision to purchase Russian S-400 antiaircraft systems, and its removal from the F-35 fighter jet programme. The article analyzes both the unit-level variables and the systemic variables to explain Turkey's evolving security and defence policies against the changing power structures and the implications of these policies on the country's deteriorating relations with the US, competitive cooperation with Russia, and the future of the transatlantic alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following scholarship on IR's 'historical turn' as well as on neorealism and neoclassical realism, this article finds fault particularly in neorealism's implicit reliance on the historically contingent but incompletely conceptualised transmission of systemic factors into state behaviour. Instead, it suggests that neoclassical realism (NCR) is well-suited to leveraging 'history' in systematic and general explanation. This article interrogates two routes towards a historically sensitive NCR (intervening variables and structural modifiers), and how they enable different operationalisations of 'history' as a sequence of events, cognitive tool or collective narrative. The first route suggests history underpins concepts and variables currently used by neoclassical realists. Here, history is more easily operationalised and allows a clearer view at learning and emulation processes. It is also more clearly scoped, and therefore less 'costly' in terms of paradigmatic distinctiveness. The second route, in which history modifies structural incentives and constraints, is more theoretically challenging especially in terms of differentiating NCR from constructivist approaches, but lends itself to theorising systemic change. Both routes provide fruitful avenues for realist theorising, can serve to emancipate NCR from neorealism in IR and foster cross-paradigmatic dialog. Examining how 'history' can be leveraged in realism allows interrogating how other 'mainstream', positivist approaches can and should leverage historical contingency, context and evidence to explain international processes and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korea's Japan policy has increasingly become inconsistent and even volatile across time. At the centre of the inconsistency is the Moon Jae-In government's GSOMIA policy. While starting his tenure by deciding to remain in the GSOMIA, the government made 180-degree turn and notified its intention not to renew the agreement when Japan announced export controls. But the decision was completely reversed within months when the government held off ending the agreement. What explains such inconsistency in Korea's Japan policy? To answer this question, the paper proposes a generic model of foreign policy inconsistency, which might be called "two-level constraint model" and applies it to the case of Korea's GSOMIA policy. The central argument of the model is that the inconsistency in the countries' foreign policy is the result of shifts in foreign policy leaders' incentives, which are affected by the changes in the level of external-and internal political constraints they face. A crucial case study of the Moon Jae-In government's GSOMIA policy finds strong evidence that lends a support for the argument. The paper concludes by offering both a short summary and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the period of Abdülhamid II, one of the most controversial periods of Turkish history. However, the entire period is not the subject of the study. The study is limited to the first years of Abdülhamid II's rule in terms of duration and British policy in terms of field. Although many sources have tried to explain the period in question with the policy of Islamic unity, the thesis of this study is that the explanatory concept for the foreign policy of the period in question is neoclassical realism, not Pan-Islamism. The fact that it is not a system theory but a foreign policy theory makes neoclassical realism a very appropriate theory for understanding the foreign policy of the period. By evaluating the four main points of contact between Britain, one of the great powers of the period, and the Ottoman Empire, which had lost its past glory and was now a regional power -the Balkans, Cyprus, Armenian issue, Egypt-, it was concluded that the foreign policy implemented was the result of the transformation of systemic effects with intermediate variables, especially the image of the leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Rivista di Politica is the property of Rubbettino Editore and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Summary: This article probes Japan's space diplomacy in a world returned to great power competition. Today, Japan's space diplomacy manifests in a wide variety of contexts at the global, regional and bilateral levels. The principal argument is that the Japanese state is responding to gathering external threats through diplomacy that communicates, persuades and bargains in the country's science, economic and military space interests. This proactive positioning allows Japan to situate its advanced technologies in the context of fierce economic competition, cultivate an image as a pacifist and responsible actor in the turbulent international order, and set pragmatic expectations about building peaceful prospects in outer space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the lens of the strategic triangle to explore the connectivity interactions between the European Union (EU), Russia and China before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since 2004, the EU’s economic dynamics have moved to its Eastern peripheries. Since 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), moving westwards, has shortened the distance between Europe and China. Russia benefitted from its energy exports to both Eurasian powerhouses and began to build up the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, struggling with weak economic performance, Russia played the peripheral role of resource supplier in the EU’s and China’s increasing Eurasian connectedness. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a response to its self-inflicted weakness, challenges the Eurasian dimension of the BRI. The EU’s regulatory liberal capitalism, Russia’s territorial aspirations in the post-Soviet space, and China’s distributive state capitalism are incompatible with the EU’s connectivity approaches. The EU turned Eurasian connectivity sectors into sanction mechanisms in response to Russia’s war. Hence, the question: Quo vadis Eurasian connectivity? The paper’s methodological approach, more interpretative than data-driven, derives from the neoclassical realism perspective, tracing these strategic triangle dynamics. An emerging East-West Southern Route circumventing Russia and a Russia-instigated North-South Axis of Eurasian connectivity from the Arctic to South Asia might partly replace the trans-Russian East-West dynamics.

Japan, and its alliance with the USA, is central to the unfolding politics of the new space race. This essay draws attention to the ways the Japanese state has positioned its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests related to space in the context of the US–Japan alliance. It probes the material and ideational elements that are driving the Japanese state to closer alignment with its formal ally in the military, civilian, and commercial space domains. But while all these realities bode well for alliance collaboration, there are reasons to be cautious. While the Japanese state has proactively aligned its space policy and postures with the USA, it is not forever caught in the US orbit. Given the uncertain fate of US domestic politics that bears on great power competition, Japan is also prudently positioning for how the status of its ally may evolve. This is what complicates straightforward projections about alliance cooperation and balance of power politics in the unfolding international space order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Rwanda Defence Force recently staged military operations against insurgents in Mozambique and the Central African Republic. Both actions were performed outside regional or multinational efforts. This makes the contemporary actions of Rwanda outliers in the international relations of Sub-Saharan Africa and heralds shifts in conflict management on the continent. An explanation is found in the application of neoclassical realist theory to the case of Rwanda – a first – as the country's leaders have taken advantage of a permissive strategic environment, high clarity, leaders' beliefs and a strategic culture to produce the output of extra-regional military deployments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy on the 1956 Suez crisis within the framework of neoclassical realist theory. In this context, to examine Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 1956 Suez crisis as a dependent variable, international systemic factors are considered as an independent variable, and local factors as an intervening variable according to the methodology of the study. In the study, the structure of the international system, which is claimed to have a determining/limiting effect on the Turkish foreign policy-making process towards the 1956 Suez crisis, is explained by associating it with bipolarity, which implies ideological opposition and nuclear competition between the superpowers. Various factors such as the need for deterrent military capacity, Westernist tendency in the tradition of Turkish foreign policy, “need for economic assistance and decision makers’ effort for regional leadership are considered local filters that interpret the determining/limiting effects of the international system. In this study, two different levels of analysis are used, both the continuity of Turkish foreign policy towards the 1956 Suez crisis, which depends on systemic effects and the tendency to change arising from local dynamics are introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Bu çalışma, Türk Dış Politikası’nda dönüşüm bağlamında Türkiye-Venezuela ilişkilerinin gelişimini Neoklasik Realist kuram ile açıklamayı hedeflemiştir. Türkiye’nin Venezuela politikası, ABD’nin Venezuela’ya yaptırımlar uyguladığı bir dönemde gerçekleşmesi sebebiyle diğer dış politika adımlarından ayrışmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Soğuk Savaş sonrası sistem içindeki stratejik çevrenin izin verici karakteri ve Türkiye’nin artan göreli gücü, Türkiye'nin ABD’ye rağmen siyaset izlemesinin önünü açan temel sistemik faktörler olarak ele alınmıştır. İç faktörler bağlamında, 2002 yılından sonra Türkiye iç siyasetindeki değişimler, Türk toplumunda uzun yıllardır süregelen ABD karşıtlığı, ABD ve Türkiye’nin Suriye krizindeki çelişen politikaları ile ABD’nin 15 Temmuz 2016 darbe girişimi sonrası politikasının Türkiye’deki lider ve toplum algısına etkisi irdelenmiştir. Son olarak, Türkiye-Venezuela ilişkileri özelinde 2016 yılındaki sıçramayı açıklamak adına, iki ülkede de yaşanan darbe/yönetim değiştirme girişimlerinin getirdiği empati ile demokratik gerileme süreçlerinin yarattığı yakınlaşma üzerinde durulmuştur.

The security of South Asia often remains in turmoil because of the rivalry between the neighboring countries. South Asian countries, particularly developing states, adhere to the principles of strategic hedging for security and economic development. Bangladesh, as an ambitious and developing state, is no exception. Aiming for economic prosperity, Bangladesh tries to maintain a balanced relationship with its bordering states. The evolving regional economic and political dynamics are becoming more competitive and challenging than ever before. This competitive environment can enable Bangladesh to pursue economic and political advantages, reflecting neoclassical realism. Considering the South Asian political developments, the India-China relationship serves as the foundation of regional balance. This research utilizes a qualitative methodology based on neo-classical realism to assess previous data and forecast potential intervening variables that drive Bangladesh to achieve strategic balance in its bilateral relationship with India and China. In this context, the study uses the neoclassical realist model to explain the structural and national interests of Bangladesh and the influence of the strategic environment of the region on its foreign policies.

Since 1972, Tokyo has maintained official diplomatic relations with Beijing, while stressing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Based on governmental documents and decision-makers’ political declarations, this article examines Japan’s approach towards cross-strait relations since the 1990s. It applies the perspective of neoclassical realism by analyzing both the international determinants (independent variables) and the domestic factors (intervening variables) behind Tokyo’s approach to ‘One China’ policy. The article tries to answer the question why different Japanese governments reacted in various ways to cross-strait frictions and rapprochement. It is argued that the level of Tokyo’s involvement in the Taiwan problem was dependent both on international and domestic factors. Growing concerns about China’s military buildup, coupled with a gradual demise of pro-Beijing faction in the Liberal Democratic Party, pushed Japan towards containing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while ameliorating relations with Taipei. As Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated, Tokyo became less inclined to lecture Taiwan against provoking Beijing and more willing to support Taipei’s international initiatives. At the same time, Japan started perceiving cross-strait rapprochement not only as a factor stabilizing the regional security system, but also as a potential threat to national security.

Amidst multiple foreign policy flip-flops of the Turkish government, the Middle East is where observers agree most about the explanatory priority of ideational factors over realpolitik calculations. The assertive foreign policy activism to extend the country's role in the region has largely been linked to the Islamist leanings of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). This study revisits Turkey's Middle East policy with a particular focus on the AKP's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimin), which marked Turkish foreign policy formulation and implementation in multiple theatres from Yemen to Egypt to Libya. Using a neoclassical realist approach, it argues that the AKP's ideological ties to the Ikhwan are significant for the availability of new resources but Turkish foreign policy behavior in the Middle East, including relations with the Ikhwan, reflects a grand strategy to respond to systemic and sub-systemic stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes contemporary Turkey-European Union (EU) relations through the lenses of international relations (IR) theory. After providing a brief overview of the history of Turkey-EU relations, it focuses on the underlying dynamics of Turkey-EU relations in the post-2016 period. It makes a case that realism is better suited to explain the latest episodes in Turkey-EU relations. It specifically argues that balancing and neoclassical realism provide a more nuanced explanatory value as to why Turkey and the EU are going through a particularly tense period in their relationship. It also outlines global/regional factors as well as intervening national/domestic factors behind the rising tensions in Turkey's relations with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia's construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia's so-called 'red lines.' It also identifies an agency problem in realism: realists not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The usefulness of 'realism' in explaining Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer's offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Medunarodni Problemi is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)