The rationale behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine: all-or-nothing?

Why did the Russian leader take this course of action despite the risk of a severe armed conflict, which could potentially escalate to nuclear warfare and the prospect of an extreme sanction regime? This article discusses the question through Neoclassical realist lens, utilizing a case-centric, explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing analysis. The objective of the study is to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome in question. Within this framework, I identify three intervening variables: the foreign policy executive's (FPE) perception of the relative distribution of power; the political culture; and the FPE's extractive capacity. Findings indicate that three factors have played a crucial role in the process leading up to the war: first, the perception of the NATO enlargement as not only a threat to Russia's security, but also as a challenge to its great power status; second, the incompatibility of modern nation-building practices and narratives in Ukraine, coupled with a contrasting interpretation of the concept of sovereignty; third, a diminishing 'window of opportunity', viewed as a strategy within the context of preventive war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]