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This text aims to counter the anxieties generated by the recent emergence of AI and the criticisms leveled at it, demanding its moralization. It does so by demonstrating that AI is neither new nor is it true intelligence but rather a tool, akin to many others that have long been serving human intelligence and its objectives. In what follows, I offer a broader reflection on technology that aims to contextualize the novelty and singularity attributed to AI within the history of technological developments. My ultimate goal is to relativize the novelty of AI, seeking to alleviate the moral anxieties it currently elicits and encouraging a more normal, optimistic view of it. The first step in understanding AI is indeed to realize that its novelty is only relative, and that AI has many ancestors that, upon closer examination, turn out to be closely related.

The concept of determinism contextualizes the problem of induction: how can we establish general truths from particular observations, or how can we predict future events from singular facts of the present? In the search for a principle of induction, Jules Lachelier goes through the foundations proposed by formal logic, by the empiricist and rationalist tendencies, by those coming from naturalism and intuitionist psychologism, and by those of metaphysics. This path is part of his methodology to testify that the foundation of spiritualist realism is more appropriate for the problem of induction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Metaphysics can be understood as a discipline whose object is the intelligible entities, but it is also an interpretation of nature, which is its real beginning as Plato ́s «second sailing». Nietzsche ́s inversion of Platonism has in the critique of finalism one of its main points. The opposition apparent/true world, from this perspective, can be explained in terms of the absence or presence of teleology in the interpretation of nature, but in Nietzsche ́s view finalism belongs to the apparent and not to the real world. Leaving aside his critique and the genealogy that he attributes to Platonism, his interpretation of Plato ́s philosophy in this point in accurate, because Plato tried to deliver with his theory of ideas a conception of the real causes of becoming, based on the categories of finality and unity, just what he called his «second sailing», as an alternative to the theory of nature proposed by Presocratic philosophy.

“We tried to run,” Louise Weasel Bear said, “but they shot us like we were a buffalo. I know there are some good white people, but the soldiers must be mean to shoot children and women. Indian soldiers would not do that to white children.”—Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded KneeSocial images of Indian/white relations, so typically born and nurtured in fiction, frequently seem impervious to fact, circumstance, perspective, or even argument. Despite a public that in record numbers consumed descriptions like the one that closes Dee Brown’s 1971 book, for instance, official accounts of the massacre at Wounded Knee—like nearly all official images of Indians— persistently reproduce a Manichean narrative that pits good against evil, White against Red, civilization against savagery. Why and how this is so continues to confound. The obvious, albeit simplistic, explanation is that “the winners write the histories.” A more complete understanding of how and why intercultural relations and images have sustained a moribund and at times even morbid bearing requires a more comprehensive explanation, however.In what follows we provide an explanation that merges Todorov’s concept of “finalism” with rudiments of social memory and an analysis of two days of hearings before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in February 1976. Our central thesis is that finalism serves as a mechanism that greatly aids the development and maintenance of social amnesia about Native identities and accomplishments, on the one hand, and the calcification of social memory, on the other. Together, these elements render Indian voices not simply irrelevant but also fundamentally anti-American.

One century and half after the publication of Darwin’s Origin, Owen’s notion of homology, which implies that two organs or features under comparison can be recognized as “the same” continues to dominate current approaches to the problem of homology. Eventually, the idea that characters can “remain themselves” throughout an indefinite although obviously finite number of possible alternative states that follow one another in the course of evolution is probably based on an idealistic interpretation of how organisms evolve. If the existence of body features that are “the same” is taken as given, then the existence of homologues can be explained according to one of the following lines: (i) in terms of universal laws of form, perhaps reformulated in the language of process structuralism, or (ii) as the product of common ancestry, or (iii) in terms of proximal causes responsible for the emergence of conserved developmental modules. However, reading the history of life through the lens of evolution, it appears very problematic to describe organisms in terms of characters that, since they first showed up as evolutionary novelties, eventually remain as essentially unchanging building blocks among which we can predicate or negate homology. All traits are better interpreted as complex and ever-changing intersections of an indeterminate number of features, and of the processes shaping them in ontogeny and in phylogeny. As a consequence, a factorial or combinatorial approach to homology is suggested.

In this article the author makes a comparative analysis of two concepts of social finalism formulated with the difference of fifty years. Researchers consider.both authors to be esoteric thinkers. Daniel Andreev was fascinated with the doctrine of Elena Blavatskaya. That’s the main reason why the finalistic concepts of the above-mentioned authors are examined as interrelated ones. The definition of «social finalism» is given in the article. According to classical interpretation of the concept, finalism (from Lat. Finalis) means final, being the final goal. So, under this concept the author understands the achievement of a certain final level of social development, according to the goals. Each thinker offers his/her own goals and ways of achieving, the analysis of finalistic concepts helps to identify the most common and often allocated by philosophers, and hence universal goals, ways, means and conditions; which are, in our opinion, the ones reflecting the true preferences of mankind in the choice of the future for people themselves and their descendants. In this case, the esoteric concepts are analyzed. This fact in the author’s opinion is quite relevant, since the number of people who position themselves as adherents of esoteric teachings is steadily increasing. In the social finalistic concept of Blavatskaya the purpose – «brotherhood of all mankind», means of achieving – the Duty, Mercy, Self-sacrifice, and obstacles to the achievement of the final stage of society today are considered. The article shows that all necessary changes to achieve the ideal state of society, according to Andreev, should be carried out in all spheres of public life. This study will help to understand the aspirations and hopes for social transformations of people practicing esoteric approach to the perception of life.

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The paper tackles the mutual relation between the essence of a criminal offence (Tatbestand in German) and other elements comprising the structure of a criminal act, i.e. illegality and fault, a matter contentious in the study of criminal law. Special attention is devoted to discussing the character of the relation between the mens rea of an offence and fault. This is related to a postulate often put forward by Polish academic commentators that it is necessary to radically separate these two notions. This view is reflected in the provisions of the 1997 Polish Criminal Code. In line with such an argument are regulations whose subject is error as to the existence of a circumstance excluding illegality (Article 29) and error as to an element of an offence (Article 28 § 1 as amended on 20 February 2015). Underpinning these regulations is the assumption that the elements of mens rea (intention and non-intention) belong to the elements of an offence, however they have no constitutive significance both as regards establishment of illegality of an act as well as the offender’s fault. Intention and non-intention are sharply separated from fault (perceived “purely normatively”). According to this account the totality of elements of a prohibited act (the essence of an act) is of a descriptive character and remains free from any evaluation. The view has been endorsed by H. Welzel, the founder of “finalism” in the German literature, and A. Zoll in Poland. The paper attempts an analysis of the view of H. Welzel following his “ontological swerve” in the 1960s. Denormativization of, inert alia, the concept of intention as an element of an offence, separation thereof from any evaluative context, has led finalists to adopting the so-called strict theory of fault (die strenge Schuldtheorie). The situation is similar as regards the systematics of offences accepted by representatives of the Cracow school of thought (A. Zoll). Error as to the existence of a circumstance excluding unlawfulness does not exclude the illegality of an intentional act and this shall be resolved exclusively by reference to fault (Article 29 of the Polish Criminal Code). Also, the new wording of Article 28 § 1 is a manifestation of the view that mens rea elements of an offence shall be subject to denormativization. The author argues contrary in the paper, contending in favour of a societal-evaluative (normative) account of the essence of an act and intention (intent). This means that, when the object of intention (the offender’s consciousness) is ascertained, of significance are or may be not only “factual circumstances” forming the foundation of the elements of an offence, but also their societal (normative) context and meaning, awareness of social harmfulness), or even, potentially, the legal assessment of an act. To overlook this entire context (intention perceived “naturalistically”) leads to the so-called strict theory of fault. The author maintains that the concept mandating total exclusion of intentional illegality is correct: in cases of error as to the existence of a circumstance excluding unlawfulness the offender objectively wants something legal. At the same time, intention must (also) finds its place alongside fault (comprehensive, psychological-normative theory of fault). Actualization of the elements of an offence triggers a negative assessment both in the realm of illegality and that of fault. For in both realms it performs a “directional” function, therefore the typification of a criminal act shall already encompass elements of fault. The paper argues that direct intention shall be located both within illegality and fault. A comprehensive, hybrid character may also be proven as regards so-called dolus eventualis and non-intention. This is why the author furnishes a critique of the views in support of renouncing comprehensive theories of carelessness and negligence and of the aforementioned amendment to Article 28 § 1 of the Criminal Code. In his estimation, some form of presumption of intentional fault may result from the evaluative character of intention (its function within the realm of fault). Consistent denormativization of the notion of non-intention (previously known as “carelessness”, “negligence”) led Polish academic commentators to the conclusion that the mens rea of “non-intention” is simply “lack of intent”. The new wording of Article 28 § 1 of the Criminal Code, together with certain normative context and its construction (negative formulations of Articles 1 § 2 and 28 § 1, the objectivist interpretation of Article 9 § 2) gives rise to an account unacceptable in the criminal law within a democratic state governed by the rule of law: endorsement of a presumption of non-intentional fault based upon the actualization of the actus reus of a criminal offence. The need to positively establish the possibility of an offender’s foresight by reference to a concrete-individual (subjective) interpretation of the requirement Article 9 § 2 of the Criminal Code (“could have foreseen”) stems from unconscious non-intention’s lack of directional function, and an actualization of the elements of such offence does not induce a negative assessment of the offender’s decision.

The Brazilian Consumer Protection and Defense Act has granted special protection to several categories. In doing so it has in fact recognized the stricto sensu, the bystander, and the collectively protected categories, further associating prospective protection to all those who may be reached by any number of commerce practices. It has also not waived rights of collective bargaining for consumer demands as fundamental rights. This article seeks to explore whether the current theoretical background that aims to categorize collectives as consumers is enough to deal with the issues within the field. Our hypothesis is that the current background is not sufficient given the need to overcome, through a complex hermeneutic approach, the answers proposed by the dogmatic perspective within consumer studies. Our approach seeks to critically analyze the juridical literature written on the topic in Brazil, mapping decisions written during the almost 30 years of effectivity of the Brazilian Consumer Protection and Defense Act, reviewing each of the current theories on the issue of consumer protection, and finally proposing an overarching theory of consumer protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze how Malebranche articulates his mechanicism and finalism in his theory of the preexistence of the germs. We intend to show how this articulation allows the Oratorian to give an answer to the Cartesian problem of the mechanical account of the generation of organized bodies. Thus, we take as our starting point (1) the attempt by Descartes to give a mechanical account of generation to, then, (2) analyze the notion of finality in Malebranche's occasionalism and, lastly, (3) the articulation between mechanicism and finality in Malebranche's theory of the preexistence of the germs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari attribute to Leibniz and Raymond Ruyer a vitalism of 'a force that is but does not act'. This is a judicious characterisation of Leibniz's vitalism, but not Ruyer's. In The Fold, Deleuze presents Ruyer as a disciple of Leibniz, but if Leibniz's monads have no doors or windows, Ruyer's are nothing but doors and windows, nothing but liaisons actively forming themselves. For Ruyer, there is only one force, a consciousness-force, matter-form in sustained, non-localisable self-formation. In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz's concept of the vinculum substantiale, Deleuze comes close to presenting a notion of force like that of Ruyer's, in that the vinculum inextricably interfolds monads and bodies, but ultimately the separation of the forces of monads from those of bodies prevails in a fashion incompatible with Ruyer's conception of force. Deleuze and Guattari make use of Ruyer's understanding of consciousness and the brain as the auto-overflight of an absolute surface in their concluding remarks on philosophy and the arts in What Is Philosophy?, but they depart from Ruyer in their characterisation of the relation of force to those two domains, ultimately because they reject Ruyer's advocacy of a universal, goal-directed finalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the creation of a contextual, historical, political and cultural framework that will give us elements to reflect on, and perhaps better understand, the gestation, execution and reception of the book La Evolución. The three editors and up to a third of its authors (approximately half of the contributions) belonged to, or collaborated with, a group of Catholic intellectuals of the Franco regime called Asociación Menéndez Pelayo. This association, founded in 1956, sought to bring together Catholic intellectuals from all fields in order to spread and promote a Catholic science in Spain. The group, heir to the cultural and political project of the traditional Catholic monarchists of the so-called Grupo Arbor (faction of the Franco's regime in internal struggle for power), achieved more than 200 partners among which there were rectors of at least 7 universities of the country, scientists, humanists and theologians of recognized prestige, as well as influential politicians and entrepreneurs. This association, which dominated crucial positions in the management of culture, had a special interest in creating a public discourse on science issues problematic for dogma - evolutionism among them - because the implementation of its cultural and political project depended on that. This article explores the links between La Evolución and this group of political-cultural pressure of the Franco's regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Darwin was wrong' was a headline that made news around the world in March 1956. Johannes Hürzeler, a Swiss palaeontologist, had just made public his theory that Oreopithecus bambolii , a fossil thus far classified as an extinct Old World monkey, was in fact a 12-million-year old hominid. That was 10 million years (!) older than the oldest hominids accepted at the time. Two years later he unearthed a complete skeleton of Oreopithecus in Italy. The echo of this discovery in the media was enormous yet the newspaper coverage in different western countries followed distinctive patterns. This paper will show these differences and point out possible explanations that go far beyond scientific disagreement. It will be argued that the press is a privileged source for comparing simultaneous reactions to the same scientific fact around the globe and for helping us discover national and supranational patterns of scientific discourse while linking them to their contexts. This paper also highlights the role of the news pieces as 'supports of knowledge.' Just like bones or scientific articles, news items circulate prompting in turn the circulation of other 'supports of knowledge' such as fossil remains or scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers arguments in the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre (circa 1215-1229) concerning the nature of reason in its directive function of human action and the presence of rationality in the universe as a whole. From acritical-exegetic perspective, this study examines the synergy of Hellenistic sources with Roman legal teachings and developments of the Augustinian tradition that William of Auxerre questions calls into question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Asclepio is the property of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Epistemologia is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses the role of 20th century Catalan scientist and paleontologist Miquel Crusafont in the development and advancement in paleontology and paleoanthropology. The author comments on the influence of Crusafont both nationally and internationally in these fields and describes his emphasis on the defense and management of paleontological collections. The ideologies and concepts known as finalism and neo-Darwinism that were espoused at the time of Crusafont's work are also explored.

The life of bees, one of Maeterlinck’s works, is together a scientific and literary book, not because of it scientific exactness and its literary style, but for the reason it suggests the unity of both these domains. Literay’s aspects of this work (writing’s beauty, use of images, analogy, etc.) are not secondary but necessary to elaborate an authentic knowledge about bees, that means a knowledge which admit the unknown part and the mistery that subsist despite all the physical and mechanical explanations we can give moreover about the observed phenomenons. Be a scientist, in this sense, that is give something to know, therefore means be literary. Finally, this conception of science consist in a philosophiacl conception of Universe as a whole where everything links together, and is united by analogical relations, that base and justify the use of a symbolist style.

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In his struggle to constitute sociology as a natural science, Durkheim fought against finalism, Gabriel Tarde's general project, efforts at theoretical synthesis unconnected to specific empirical problems, and ideological analysis. The article dwells on these four "epistemological battles," especially on Durkheim's (unfortunately failed) effort toward purging the social sciences from ideological analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years, there has been an exaggeratedly widespread and frequently confused use of the concepts of ‘stakeholder’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’. However, some interesting insights of both these notions can be found in traditional European business administration studies. In this article, the Italian view will be examined. In particular, this paper investigates the teachings of some of the historical masters of the Italian Economia Aziendale (EA), with particular attention to the concept of the azienda, its finalism and its essential characteristics, in order to verify some consistencies with the more recent Stakeholder Management Theory (SMT). Principles and considerations seem to emerge from EA scholars’ seminal works that unequivocally connect ethics with business decisions. EA fits in with SMT in many ways, and the former (EA) seems, moreover, to suggest a specific normative point of view from which the role of ethics in business activities can be approached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the second half of the fifties, when the post-war censorship had been partially overcome, the new Darwinism of evolutionary synthesis, acknowledged by numerous researches from Madrid and Barcelona in the centenary of The Origin of Species, was incorporated into textbooks in Spanish universities. During the fifties and sixties this new Darwinism coexisted with the finalist and theist evolutionism propelled by both the Encyclical Humani generis (1950) and the spreading of Teilhard de Chardin's ideas. in the last quarter of the 20th century, after the finalist/Neodarwinist debate was closed, a slow process of normalization was initiated in the field of evolution in relation to academics and investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theoretical divergences that have been provoked between the different schemes from the crime have been conditional by different epistemologic paradigms; consequently, it is posible to preach a deep and abysmal difference between schemes of ontologicist base and the present functional scheme founded on the normativism. However, before the formulation of the new paradigm already existed a tendency towards the normativization. Certainly, it is not possible to advocate by a dogmatic of criminal law that disregard absolutely of the factual reality, since, from the point of view of the theory of the objective imputation, the causality, relation to which normative criteria of the criminal law and the society are applied to him, it is a fundamental requirement for the determination of the tipicity in the result crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the transition from finalism to contextualism, the history of science seems to be caught up in a basic dilemma. Many historians fear that with the new contextualist standards of rigorous historiography, historical research can no longer be relevant to working scientists themselves. The present article argues that this `dilemma of rigor vs relevance' is particularly urgent to `community' historians affiliated with the very scientific communities whose history they study. The solutions of Kurt Danziger and J. F. Hans van Rappard, both community historians of psychology, are discussed, and the author adds her own community historian's views for debate. These include, that there are no cogent reasons for completely rejecting finalism, but that, at present, rigorous symmetrical contextualism actually is the best way to produce relevant results. It is also argued that the common tale of scientists only tolerating congenial histories might be largely based on misinterpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]