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This paper explores the transitory imaginaries in the semi-permanent constitutional polytransition in the Central and Eastern European region. It is centered on the novel concept of transitory imaginaries. This concept serves as a tool for combined socio-legal, comparative, and semiotic approach to constitutional transitions. The paper demonstrates the deep conceptual and pragmatic links between constitutional transitology, memory politics, and identity politics. It exposes the role of the forms of symbolic-imaginary constitutionalism for shaping and understanding of constitutional transitions and polytransitions. The paper shows the importance of constitutional imagination for collective symbolic-imaginary sublimation of constitutional transition and the bridging role of constitutional imaginaries that are stretched between the constitutional past, the constitutional present, and the constitutional future. In that regard, the paper explores the different ways for imagining the constitutional past and constitutional future and offers an outline of the main imaginaries in serving that purpose. More precisely, the paper analyses nationalist transitory imaginaries, universalist transitory imaginaries, and prospective transitional imaginaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On May 30th, Iraq’s Court of Cassation (CC) issued an unprecedented decision invalidating a previous ruling by the country’s highest court in the land, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC). The CC’s judicial coup and self-aggrandizement rests on a flawed doctrinal foundation and runs counter to the judicial hierarchy set out by Iraq’s constitution.

Who should judges be, and what is their role in society, especially in times of political instability? In this article, I answer these questions from the point of view of two visions: the era of legislators and the era of interpreters, presented by Zygmunt Bauman. Recommending a vision of judges as interpreters of the law, emphasising the importance of civic education, is the aim of the article. This task is accomplished on the basis of the two lines of argumentation. First, I show the dangers of the political entanglement of judges. Some of the forms of this entanglement can be linked to a legislative attitude that is rationalised by a culture of silence in public life. I then show that the era of interpreters makes it possible to present judicial freedom of expression as an act of communication between the sender of expression and its audience. Appreciating the position of the audience is linked to civic education. ¿Quiénes deben ser los jueces y cuál es su papel en la sociedad, especialmente en tiempos de inestabilidad política? En este artículo, respondo a estas preguntas desde el punto de vista de dos visiones: la era de los legisladores y la era de los intérpretes, presentada por Zygmunt Bauman. Recomendar una visión de los jueces como intérpretes de la ley, haciendo hincapié en la importancia de la educación cívica, es el objetivo del artículo. Esta tarea se lleva a cabo sobre la base de dos líneas de argumentación. En primer lugar, muestro los peligros del enredo político de los jueces. Algunas de las formas de este enredo pueden vincularse a una actitud legislativa racionalizada por una cultura del silencio en la vida pública. A continuación, muestro que la era de los intérpretes permite presentar la libertad de expresión judicial como un acto de comunicación entre el autor y su público. La apreciación de la posición del público está vinculada a la educación cívica.

Kuwait, a democratic outlier in a hopelessly authoritarian Gulf, is facing a constitutional crisis under its new Emir who is intolerant to his country’s never-ending political gridlocks. Over the next four years, expect a constitutional overhaul. Instead of emulating the Kais Saied model, which would scrap the entire democratic experiment, the new constitution should address the key flaws in a six-decade-old political system that has been plagued by persistent stalemates between the government and parliament.

The current study asserts that the rejection of a culture of judicial silence is beneficial to the architecture of liberal democracy, as judicial expression outside a courtroom assists in maintaining a balance between its components. On the one hand, this can create defence mechanisms against the alienation of the law from society (which appropriately appreciates the democratic component), while on the other, it aids in the actualization of the constitutionally determined role of the judiciary within the political system (safeguarding the liberal element). The discussion, which is essentially based on an analysis of international soft law, commences by examining two areas pertaining to judicial expression outside a courtroom: public discussion on the law and generally understood social life involvement. Subsequently, the limits of judges' expression during such activities are analysed, and three proposals for their definition are put forward. As a next step, the paper highlights the diversity of judges as relevant to the problem at hand. The work concludes by outlining its findings, which also include the potential risks associated with the proposed project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's referendum vote to leave the EU in June 2016 generated deep divisions in British politics. It led to the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister David Cameron the following day, and an inability to deliver Brexit led to the resignation of his successor Theresa May in 2019. In addition, it has led to a number of legal challenges to the policies and processes of implementing these by both May's and Boris Johnson's governments. Those who support leaving the EU have characterised this period as one of 'crisis', in which politicians—unable to agree on a means of leaving—were pitted against the electorate or public will. Judicial challenges to the terms of exit and means of achieving Brexit were further incorporated into notions of crisis to the extent that failure to implement Brexit was portrayed as a crisis affecting the entire political system, or a constitutional crisis. In this article, we unpack this discourse, and by distinguishing between different forms of crises challenge the existing understanding of Brexit as a constitutional crisis. Rather, we suggest that these problems stemmed from constitutional weaknesses, specifically that the constitution is based on a reductionist understanding of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the result of the initiation of the 'judicial reform' in January 2023, and the huge wave of public protest, Israel is currently undergoing a political turmoil which may develop into a fully fledged constitutional crisis. In this article I provide an account of the roots and causes of the present crisis from a public law theory perspective. In particular, I discuss the relationship between constitutional and administrative law in Israeli law. I argue that the core of Israel's constitutional structure has always been the institutions of administrative law as created and developed during the 'administrative revolution' of the 1980s. In contrast, Israel's constitutional law has always been a peripheral in the core structure of judicial review over the political branches. Contrary to common wisdom, I argue that the 'constitutional revolution' of the mid-1990s has not changed this core structure, but rather provided an external belt of normative barricades for this core structure. Accordingly, and despite the pretentious constitutional discourse developed in the 1990s by the Court, Israel was and still is a monistic democracy with no true constitutional layer of norms that enjoys higher status vis-à-vis regular legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to further the understanding of the current constitutional crisis in Israel through the lens of political polarisation. Israel, like other countries around the world, is experiencing a substantial increase in political polarisation. Recent data shows that since 2009 affective polarisation (the extent to which individuals have negative feelings towards members of the opposing party or group and positive feelings towards their own party or group) has risen by 180 per cent. The article discusses the various phenomena associated with an increase in polarisation and the problems it raises, traces the reasons for the increase in polarisation in Israel, and argues that polarisation has played an important role in creating the conflict between the current government and the Supreme Court, and in making it so intense and intractable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the analysis of the judge's freedom of expression in a constitutional crisis, using the ECtHR case of Żurek v. Poland as an illustration. The argument begins with a discussion of the facts of the case and the judgment. At this point, I argue that the category of discriminatory legalism is relevant to the facts of the case. Further, two interrelated problems are addressed, which are considered to be particularly relevant for the expression of the judge in the course of the constitutional crisis. These are: 1) the relevance of Article 10 in relation to speaking in one's professional (here: judicial) capacity, and 2) an attempt to determine whether the judge's opposition to a constitutional crisis is an exercise of his or her freedom or a duty. On both issues, I also present the position of Judge Wojtyczek, who challenged the majority views in his separate opinion (partly dissenting, partly concurring). I believe that the disagreement between Wojtyczek and the majority goes to fundamental philosophical-legal issues and can be described as a friction between the analytical and post-analytical approaches to law.

Nearly two weeks after the 100th-anniversary celebrations of the Republic, Turkey's constitutional order faced one of the most significant judicial crises in its history when the Court of Cassation, the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, and the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) clashed over the fate of imprisoned opposition politician Can Atalay. How should we interpret this constitutional crisis? Is it the death of constitutionalism in Turkey? Is it an attempt to test the boundaries of legitimacy before establishing the rules of a new constitutional order?

On November 8th, the 3rd Criminal Chamber of Turkey's Court of Cassation, the nation's apex court for civil and criminal matters, defied the Constitutional Court (the TCC) and explicitly accused it of engaging in “judicial activism.” The judicial feud between the two high courts stemmed from the individual application of Can Atalay, an opposition MP from the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP), challenging his ongoing imprisonment despite obtaining parliamentary immunity in the May 2023 elections. Indeed, the 3rd Chamber's wholly ungrounded defiance is a failure of the constitutional order, illustrating how the Constitution no longer serves its core function of authoritatively channeling, restraining, and organizing state power. However, the Atalay controversy is neither unprecedented nor a true turning point in Turkey's ailing democracy—it is just another symptom of a deepening dysfunction.

Turkey is plunged into yet another profound judicial crisis as the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) and the Turkish Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) lock horns over the fate of an imprisoned opposition politician. While two earlier posts published on Verfassungsblog have already meticulously dissected this unfolding judicial drama (here and here), we aim to invigorate the debate with a fresh vantage point. In this piece, we will narrow the focus to one key actor: the TCC. More particularly, we will delve into the implications this evolving judicial crisis holds for the future of the TCC's individual application mechanism.

This article considers the debates generated by referendum proposals during the constitutional crisis from 1909 to 1914. None of those proposals were adopted and they have received little attention from historians but they were not without significance. Some Conservatives saw the referendum as a way of democratically protecting the right of the house of lords to veto legislation passed by the house of commons, while others regarded the referendum process as a means by which single issues could be more effectively dealt with than at multi‐topic general elections. The debates also revealed many practical problems inherent in the various referendum schemes. They were ignored in the 21st century, when Conservative governments adopted referendums as a mechanism for overcoming internal party divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I reflect on how the anti-ecological class interest of capital finds a parallel in capital's role in both precipitating and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Focusing on the U.S. experience, I discuss how the political Right has taken advantage of the Left's failure to recognize the relevance of its own (anti-capitalist) ecological perspective to questioning a public health agenda largely driven by the interests of Big Pharma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Chilena de Derecho is the property of Revista Chilena de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Samoan election of 2021 provoked a constitutional crisis. It brought to an end sixty years of political stability that had been determined by the interweaving of democratic ideals with indigenous cultural values and Christian principles. The election had led to a tie on the night and led to various legal appeals, protests and the reluctance of the Prime Minister of more than twenty years refusing to stand down. With one exception – the Roman Catholic Archbishop – the churches were silent, 'lost for words'. The crisis happened at a time when the first wave of localized and contextual public theologies were beginning to appear in theological research. Their particular focus was on a range of other issues (mainly due to timing). Their emergence, nevertheless, invites a consideration of what such a public theology might look like in a society where there is no history of a prophetic voice and the cultural system of fa'aSamoa relies upon a principle of respect (which was violated during the crisis). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Samoa's 2021 constitutional crisis saw unprecedented attacks on the nation's judiciary and the rule of law. The Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) refused to concede defeat after a tightly contested general election on 9 April 2021. The transfer of power to the incoming Faʻatuatua i le Atua Samoa ua Tasi (FAST) government was stymied by determined efforts such as the attempted exploitation of the women's parliamentary quota, attempts to justify the calling of fresh elections and the locking of the parliamentary chamber to prevent parliament's first meeting. This article examines how the constitutionality and lawfulness of these actions was repeatedly challenged in Samoa's courts in a highly charged political atmosphere that persistently ignored court rulings. It outlines how Samoa's judiciary came under serious and repeated threat by constitutional actors, in particular the head of state, the outgoing government, and the attorney general. The article finds that despite these critical challenges, the rulings of the courts ultimately resolved the four-month impasse through decisions on an unprecedented number of complex and novel constitutional issues. The courts' role in the crisis demonstrates the importance of a sound and independent judiciary to uphold the rule of law, particularly in small island states when the foundations and functioning of a modern constitutional democracy are attacked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article is devoted to the study of the grounds and procedure for termination of a judge’s powers of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as a constituent of ensuring its independence. The article aims to establish the reasons for the insufficient level of ensuring the independence of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in terms of failure to comply with the current legislation on termination of powers of judges of the Constitutional Court and suggest recommendations to overcome defined problems. A set of methods was used for the study, such as: 1) a formal legal analysis of the texts of regulatory legal acts; 2) the historical and historical-legal analysis actualized and compared problems related to the independence of judges of the Constitutional Court during the events of 2008, 2010, 2014, and 2020-2021; 3) the comparative-legal method was used to compare the legal regulation of constitutional review bodies in several post-Soviet states with the transitional nature of legal and public administration systems; 4) the formal and dogmatic method allowed us to conclude the content of legal regulation for termination of powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court and changes in such regulation underwent during the existence of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine; 5) the systematic method defined the forms of interaction between legal institutions, in particular, the institution of removal from office in criminal proceedings and the institution of independence of judges of the Constitutional Court. As a research result, we described the key problems in the practice of termination of powers of judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and suggested recommendations to solve defined problems. The value of this article, first of all, is due to the study of events in the Constitutional Court during 2008, 2010, 2014, and 2020-2021.

The article is devoted to the problems of the functioning of constitutional justice in Poland and Ukraine. Applying the methodology of comparative law research and empirical analysis, the authors consider the problems of the violation of the principle of independence of constitutional justice in these countries, explore common and distinctive features of crisis situations, try to find the reasons that cause them, and deduce the relationship between the legitimacy of the decisions of the constitutional justice bodies and independence of these bodies. The authors substantiate and analyse two components of the legitimacy of the constitutional courts’ decisions: substantive (fairness and compliance of decisions with the principles of constitutionalism) and instrumental (proper validity and argumentation, which leave no doubt about the fairness and correctness of such a decision).

The future of constitutionalism revolves around two critical issues which we see against the backdrop of the crisis of liberal democracy. The first issue concerns the conflict between the “judicial” constitutionalism and “political” constitutionalism. The “judicial” constitutionalism assumes a strong role of courts in a democratic system. Only courts can decide on compatibility of law with the constitution. In turn, the “political” constitutionalism assumes that the parliament decides on constitutional law. The rivalry between these two constitutionalisms seems to be the matrix of contemporary political dilemmas. The result of this rivalry is important for the efforts to end Polish constitutional crisis, as we will have to decide on the constitutional benchmarks applicable after the crisis.The second issue concerns the limits of constitutionalism. The author argues that the current digital era created a new phenomenon of digital constitutionalism. It operates in the sphere of private law relationships, dominated by private entities (big corporations). The relevant provisions for the digital world are the private law provisions. Comparative law and comparativists are crucial for answering the questions on the future of constitutionalism. The conflict of the two visions of constitutionalism and the extension of its limits are a great “training ground” for the comparativists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Legal Studies / Studia Prawnicze is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Legal Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland, the government led by the Law and Justice party (PiS) has sought to win two interwoven battles: the restoration of 'a strong state' internally and 'regaining sovereignty' in the country's relationship with the EU. By examining the 2015 constitutional crisis in Poland, this article seeks to understand how and why a domestic dispute over the nomination of constitutional judges has transformed into a conflict of sovereignty in the EU polity. The paper shows that the claims to sovereignty of political, social, and legal actors reflect opposing conceptions of this principle as well as of democracy and the rule of law. PiS' understanding of State sovereignty is rooted in the past, echoes its Hobbesian conception, and is reminiscent of Carl Schmitt's notion of the political and of democracy. In 2015, this conception was pitted against the supremacy of the Constitution (legal sovereignty) and the ideal of shared sovereignty. Drawing on 20 parliamentary debates, this paper shows that the 2015 Polish constitutional crisis encapsulates a conflict of sovereignty over who holds the most legitimate representation of the people and who should have the last word in key political conflicts and constitutional settlements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the unexpected effects of the constitutional crisis in Poland that began at the turn of 2015 is the expansion of diffuse constitutional review of statutes. The Polish Constitution adopts a centralised model of constitutional review, but in the cases they hear common courts still independently disapply statutes that violate constitutional norms. Their stated grounds for doing so focus on the need to act in the place of the Constitutional Tribunal, which has lost its independence from the political power, as well as the necessity of continued effective preservation of the Constitution’s primacy and of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. This article takes a more detailed look at this new judicial practice, describes the rationale for its adoption and analyses its consequences from the legal perspective. The trend is capable of being described in theoretical terms, which is the reason for this article’s research hypothesis that the courts’ activities are changing the law-in-action of constitutional review in Poland, as a consequence of the formulation and activation of a defensive mechanism for constitutional democracy.

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas is the property of Revista Brasileira de Politicas Publicas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What types of institutional dynamics and conditions allow constitutional resilience in the face of attempts at undermining gains in a constitutional democracy? Using Sri Lanka as a case-study, I claim that the legal complex acting in synergy with independent public institutions (the Speaker of the Parliament) and civil society can produce constitutional resilience. Synergy between the legal complex and these institutions can transform constitutional vulnerability into constitutional resilience. I argue therefore that the legal complex theory must be extended to consider the ways in which it can work in synergy with other public institutions in being resilient against attempts at rolling back gains for constitutional democracy. I argue further that synergy between the legal complex and formal and informal institutions over the short term can only result in "simple" constitutional resilience. The development of "reflexive" constitutional resilience requires long-term synergy between the legal complex and other public institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(2), 851-869 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Theoretical framework: why national judges participate in judicial dialogue with the CJEU. - III. Judiciary reforms in Poland 2017-2018: a brief overview. - IV. Preliminary questions as reaction of Polish courts to the judiciary reforms. - V. Defending the rule of law or reality based self-defense? - VI. Conclusions. | (Abstract) In the course of the last two years, the Polish courts frequently resorted to the procedure of preliminary ruling requesting the Court of Justice to qualify the Polish judiciary reforms introduced by the PIS-regime in the light of the principle of judicial independence, the rule of law and effective judicial protection. Against this backdrop, one could suggest that the issue regarding the use of the preliminary ruling mechanism by national courts and the reasons that incentivise the judges to engage in dialogue with the Court of Justice have gained a novel dimension. It is the aim of this Article to discuss the relevant preliminary questions referred by the Polish courts and place them in the context of various theoretical streams that aim at explaining the reasons and motivation behind national courts' participation in judicial dialogue with the Luxembourg Court.

One of the unexpected effects of the constitutional crisis in Poland that began at the turn of 2015 is the expansion of diffuse constitutional review of statutes. The Polish Constitution adopts a centralised model of constitutional review, but in the cases they hear common courts still independently disapply statutes that violate constitutional norms. Their stated grounds for doing so focus on the need to act in the place of the Constitutional Tribunal, which has lost its independence from the political power, as well as the necessity of continued effective preservation of the Constitution’s primacy and of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. This article takes a more detailed look at this new judicial practice, describes the rationale for its adoption and analyses its consequences from the legal perspective. The trend is capable of being described in theoretical terms, which is the reason for this article’s research hypothesis that the courts’ activities are changing the law-in-action of constitutional review in Poland, as a consequence of the formulation and activation of a defensive mechanism for constitutional democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors have conducted the political and legal analysis of such phenomena in modern civilization as constitutionalism and populism, their value and institutional foundations, and the negative impact of populist parties on the constitution transformations under democratic transition. The article proves that populists treat any legal procedures and institutions negatively, particularly those that cannot satisfy their goals. A means of political struggle populist parties resort to is the diminution of judiciary independence and the role of constitutional jurisdiction bodies. The experience of Central and Eastern European countries shows that it is almost impossible to combine populist legislation with the independence of constitutional jurisdiction bodies. The article emphasizes that populist parties, which enjoy a high credit of public trust, are trying to expand their powers by adopting populist constitutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The striking sync between the constitutional functionaries establishes the template of the relationship envisaged in the Indian Constitution between the Judiciary and the Executive. The relationship between the two organs is akin to constitutional wedlock that demands mutual faith, fidelity, and longstanding passionate commitment. If failure exists on any counts, the relationship develops intermittent fissures and timeless frictions. It is imperative to further the spirit of collegiality to ensure this successful constitutional collaboration. The insatiable appetite demonstrated by the political establishments in draping the Judiciary with political colors and making relentless attempts to bring judicial functioning to a standstill prepares an unfailing recipe for the constitutional crisis. The shortage of consensus in drawing up an acceptable Memorandum of Procedure has led to an embarrassing deadlock between the Judiciary and the Executive on the issue of judicial appointments. The spirit of constitutionalism, thereby, is caught in the crossfire. The manner wherein the Executive has selectively delayed clearance of names for judgeships makes a riveting case for a dedicated constitutional thought. Purposeful delays in judicial appointments have precipitated a demonstrable never-seen-before crisis that exemplifies the operation of direct political intervention in the judicial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law is the property of Revus - European Constitutionality Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The current decade brought a neo-authoritarian wave to the countries in CEE. This process, which in certain respects runs parallel to the populist upsurge in Western countries, has its own specificity. Firstly, by focusing on the clash between “elites” and “the people”, it rekindles – in a displaced, right-wing form – the class conflict which before 1989 was an ideological staple in CEE countries. Secondly, insofar as neo-authoritarianism in CEE has often a distinctly neo-liberal agenda shadowed by declarative anti-globalism and national chauvinism, it warps the field of political struggle. Thirdly, in the neo-authoritarian turn law becomes the crucial field of ideological fight, principally in those countries where populists came to power. In this respect, new governments in CEE resort to a blend of old Fascist tools (such as dismantling of constitutional control and denying the primacy of international law) and new inventions (such as the effective state of exception in some areas of law in Poland introduced in 2015–18). The role of critical jurisprudence in CEE is therefore particularly significant and difficult. The paper argues that liberal jurisprudence, although actively engaged in analysing neo-authoritarianism, does not possess adequate conceptual tools for full success. Therefore critical jurisprudence should urgently take part in explaining neoauthoritarianism in the legal field.

The widespread public rejection for a 5th mandate of the now former President of the Republic Bouteflika gradually leaded to a constant expression of dissent against the Algerian regime as a whole. Much more than a simple political crisis and beyond the future of certain high-ranking officials, legitimacy and legality of the key Algerian State authorities or institutions are challenged, i.e. the Presidency of the Republic, the Government, the Parliament, the Constitutional Council and the ANP Military Staff. Protesters claim a "second Republic" that must be a "civil State, not a military". In front of an increased popular mobilisation and an upgrading level of political grievances, the regime in place took steps that are clearly against the 1996 Constitution or that can be regarded as a constitutional transgression, although it claims to respect the content of the Constitution and protect the institutions. Now, this situation leads Algeria towards a new constitutional deadlock: the de facto prolongation of an interim power at the head of the State for an unlimited duration. The crucial issue in the background is about the role of the army. From now on, in practice and openly, the army holds a monopoly on political decisions, while defending itself not to interfere in politics. The high command refuses the idea of transitional institutions as well as a next election of a constituant assembly in the name of the constitutional order from whom it alleges, wrongly by law, that the army is the guardian. In lieu, the high command tries to impose Presidential elections while increasing repression. But popular mobilisation stands up against any election as long as key figures of the regime will stay in power and until all guarantees for free elections are not fulfilled.

The article provides an analysis of the powers of the President of the Republic of Poland, which may have an impact on counteracting and moderating constitutional crises and constitutional rot. It aims to describe the potential actions that the head of state may take in a constitutional crisis to restore the stabilization of the state and the constitutional order with its values. The study also includes a reflection on the influence of the style of the presidency on the effectiveness of arbitration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Permanent private secretaries to the monarch are not elected, nor are they chosen on civil service criteria. They also have no formal legal training, despite the fact that their advice can be vital during constitutional crises. We test Ivor Jennings's claim that private secretaries serve as 'irresponsible advisers' to the Crown, who may have influence in political disputes, and whether that influence may serve political interests. Four case studies include the Home Rule crisis, 1910–14; Edward VIII's abdication; the election of 1950; and the dismissal of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1975. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referring to the honourable one-hundred-year history of Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, and the more than seventy-year tradition of Państwo i Prawo, the two most prestigious legal journals in Poland, the authors discuss the mission of legal journals in a democratic society. They focus on the times of constitutional revolutions and transformations, where the well-established interpretations of constitutional provisions became questioned or even violated. The 2015-2020 constitutional developments in Poland serve as an illustrative background and point of reference for the authors in answering the following question: how and what should legal journals publish when the constitution is being 'vanished' (to use the compelling metaphor of Mirosław Wyrzykowski). This predominantly descriptive and interpretative article consists of the following four parts: the mission of journals, constitutional revolution, constitutional crisis, and constitutional anomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suspension of the president is a subject that recurs on the public agenda. The purpose of this article is to make an incursion in the constitutional process of suspending from office the President of Romania, by highlighting the consultative character of the advisory opinion issued by the Constitutional Court, its weight in the process, as well as the political and institutional contexts generating conflict understood as motive for suspension. This cannot be better explained than by comparing the political and institutional contexts in Romania in 2007 and 2012, which led to the double suspension of the President, analyzed through the jurisprudence of the Romanian Constitutional Court. The article aims also to provide certain elements supporting the hypothesis that the Court’s opinion is assumed or ignored by the decision-maker according to its own political agenda.

The text is an analysis of changes and actions made in Poland within the judiciary. These changes concerned the most sensitive areas from the point of view of the separation of powers and the rule of law. Within two years, several dozen changes were introduced, covering many aspects of the functioning of the judiciary, which led to its destabilization, threatened the constitutional status of judges and, as a result, the rights and freedoms of the individual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Constitutional History / Giornale di Storia Costituzionale is the property of Giornale di Storia Costituzionale (Journal of Constitutional History) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)